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ABSTRACT 
 
FORMATIONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF LANGUAGE REGIMES: 
TURKEY, A CASE STUDY 
 
 
Mehmet Berk Balçık 
 
Ph.D., Political Science, 2008 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. ġerif Mardin 
 
 
Keywords: language regimes, ideology, Turkey, globalization 
 
 
There are two main aims of this dissertation: to present a legal and ideological 
history of the formation of the language regime in Turkey in the Republican period; and 
to analyze its transformation in the post-1980 era.  
A language regime is defined in this dissertation as a de jure or de facto regulation 
of the linguistic behavior, in its content or in its status, within a space of communicative 
action, such as that of a nation-state or a speech group. In other words, a language 
regime is a system of the governance of the linguistic domain within a defined political 
territory by planning and employment of particular policies. Language ideologies, on 
the other hand, are inseparable aspects of the formulation and operation of the language 
regimes. Such a conception of language enables an analysis of language as a domain of 
social and political power. 
In the first part of the dissertation, the history of the language politics in the 
Republican Turkey is analyzed through the concept of language regime, and the 
ideological repercussions pertaining to the designation and practicing of these regimes 
are assessed.  
The second part concentrates on the changes in post-1980s, within a globalizing 
environment,  in the broadcasting policies and the ways in which language regimes have 
been transformed. Controversies over two basic processes have been analyzed in this 
part: the commercialization of the audio-visual domain, and the developments 
concerning broadcasting in minority languages. 
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ÖZET 
 
DĠL REJĠMLERĠNĠN OLUġUMU VE DÖNÜġÜMÜ: TÜRKĠYE ÖRNEĞĠ 
 
 
Mehmet Berk Balçık 
 
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi, 2008 
 
DanıĢman: Prof. Dr. ġerif Mardin 
 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: dil rejimleri, ideoloji, Türkiye, küreselleĢme 
  
 
Bu tez, iki ana amaç doğrultusunda tasarlanmıĢtır: Türkiye‘de Cumhuriyet dönemi 
dil rejiminin kuruluĢunun hukuki ve ideolojik bir tarihini sunmak ve bu rejimin 1980 
sonrası dönemdeki dönüĢümlerini incelemek.  
Dil rejimi bu tezin kapsamında, belli bir iletiĢimsel alan içinde, ki bu alan bir ulus-
devletin hüküm sürdüğü dil evreni ya da bir dil topluluğu olabilir, dilsel davranıĢların 
yasal ya da fiili olarak düzenlenmesi Ģeklinde tanımlanmıĢtır. Bir baĢka deyiĢle, dil 
rejimleri belirli bir siyasal alan içinde dil evreninin yönetilme biçimlerini tanımlar. Dil 
ideolojileri bu rejimlerin biçimlendirilmesinde, organizasyonunda ve uygulanmasında 
ayrılmaz unsurlar olarak ortaya çıkar. Dilin bu Ģekilde kavramsallaĢtırılması, dilin bir 
toplumsal ve siyasal iktidar alanı olarak incelenmesine olanak sağlar. 
Tezin ilk bölümünde Cumhuriyet döneminin dil politikaları, dil rejimleri kavramı 
çerçevesinde değerlendirilmiĢtir. Türkçeyi tek geçerli dil kılan dil rejiminin ideolojik 
arka planı ile birlikte, bu rejimin kuruluĢu ve iĢletilmesi sırasında türeyen söylemler de 
analizin kapsamı içine alınmıĢtır. 
Tezin ikinci kısmı bu dil rejiminin 1980 sonrası dönemde ne tür itirazlarla ve 
meydan okumalarla karĢılaĢtığını incelemektedir. Temel olarak odaklanılan konu yayın 
politikalarındaki dönüĢümdür. Bu dönüĢümün iki temel ayağı vardır. Birincisi, 
1990‘larda geliĢen, özel radyo ve televizyon kanallarının ortaya çıkıĢı, diğer ise, azınlık 
dillerinde yapılacak yayınlarla ilgili olarak beliren tartıĢmalardır.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Kroskrity marks that various debates on language ―serve to keep us aware of the 
status of language as a primary site of political process and of the discursive mediation 
of those very activities and events we recognize as political‖ (2000a, p. 1). A Turkish 
version of constant push towards such an awareness is exactly what guided this 
dissertation. 
In the last decades, public sphere in Turkey has become an arena where language 
fighters are chanting and hunting. Language has always been a hot issue to talk and 
write on, even before the Republican period. For more than a century, the cultured 
circles experienced confrontations about language. Major disputes have emerged 
between supporters of Arabic vs. Latin orthography, elite vs. simple language, moderate 
or living vs. pure Turkish, ―progressive-nationalist‖ vs. ―conservative-nationalist‖ 
styles, etc.  
However, contemporary debates have developed to become significantly different.  
For the majority of the participants of the debates, the main concern today is the 
alleged decline of Turkish. The fear, to be exact, of losing the language that has long 
been accepted as the ―flag‖ of the national culture has been provoked with increasing 
use of English in various domains, from education to public communication and 
consumer culture. The phenomenon of the ―corruption‖ of Turkish by ―unconscious‖ 
and ―careless‖ users has been equally effective. However, for a smaller number of 
citizens, mostly Kurds, the issue has been rather about being able to speak, use or learn 
their mother language. The fire was not fed only by those who were simply debating in 
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public, but many legal regulations and laws concerning various aspects of language use 
have been made, ranging from the banning of shop names in non-Turkish languages to 
the granting limited rights for learning or broadcasting in Kurdish. 
In summary, there are concerns about both the status and the corpus of the 
claimed languages. Status problems, for Turkish, have been interpreted as the language 
is losing ground to English and Kurdish in many aspects of cultural and social life, 
which were supposed to be conducted in Turkish. For the Kurdish side, the issue of 
status is rather a political motive and the agenda is quite different.  
Problems of corpus for Turkish is also with the intrusion of English words and 
idioms into the language itself, but also with the increasing visibility of non-standard 
varieties of Turkish with respect to the popularization of the mass media. As for 
Kurdish, its diverse varieties and the question of standardization, again, exhibit distinct 
characteristics.  
Each of the discursive elements of these public debates has been derived from a 
complicated political background, of which construction was primarily performed by 
the Republican state. As Kroskrity proposes, recent debates on language in Turkey are 
considered in this study as great opportunities for the exposition of the political that is 
intrinsic to language.  
For an authentic perspective to analyze language politics in Turkey, one concept, 
language regime is employed as the core theoretical base of this dissertation. A second 
one, language ideology, a widely debated, well-known notion, has also been utilized in 
order to complement the conceptual framework. This framework and its further 
implications are explained in the next chapter. In this introductory chapter, I will try to 
present the contributions that this dissertation might offer in order to understand the 
historical and ideological aspects of language politics in Turkey. I will also give the 
outline of the work.  
 
To be specific, this thesis aims at discovering the dynamics of the relationship 
between language regimes and language ideologies through an analysis of the formation 
of the Turkish official language regime. This discovery will be enhanced with the 
examinations of the practical consequences of the language regime with respect to 
speakers of languages other than Turkish, and of its discursive consequences within the 
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public sphere with respect to the perception and conception of Kurdish, as a minority 
language.  
Many studies have been published recently on the construction of the national 
identity in Turkey, and the way in which language was incorporated in this 
construction.
1
 However, these studies are exclusively dedicated to the first decades of 
the Republic, as they are parts of a recently growing scholarly enterprise to enlighten 
the political and cultural transformations related to the new era.  
In some of the studies on the establishment of the modern language politics in 
Turkey, the common approach has been to concentrate on instrumental aspects. 
Questions of how language has been used, changed, modified or reformed in order to 
supplement the nationalizationist/ modernizationist practices have been in the center of 
some researches (cf. Çolak, 2004; and Aydıngün & Aydıngün, 2004). In other 
researches, the nationalist nature of the Language Reform was scrutinized. ġavkay, for 
example, aims to present the political dimensions of the Turkish Language Reform, 
especially those that went beyond the mere establishment of a national language for a 
new nation-state. He questions the ways in which the Reform had been associated with 
the Kemalists‘ understanding of nationality (ġavkay, 2002, pp. 16-17).  
There is only one study, which could be considered as a social scientific endeavor, 
on the language politics of the later Republican decades (Doğançay-Aktuna, 2004). 
Doğançay-Aktuna examines the politics of language since the Tanzimat era (the 
Ottoman reform period of 1839 to 1876), but her analyses are rather formed by 
conventional perspectives and ideas. In her work, she reproduces the classical themes of 
the Republican discourse on the issue of language reform and ―its success‖. Most 
strikingly, her story of the language policy in Turkey does not reflect on any image of 
the minority languages.  
She states that her article has a two-fold purpose: ―to familiarize the reader with 
the most important language planning effort in Turkey, the Turkish Language Reform 
… and to discuss current language problems and recent Turkish language planning 
attempts on Turkish.‖ (p. 5). Whereas the article is titled Language Planning in Turkey: 
                                                 
1
 See ġavkay (2002), Sadoğlu (2003), Çolak (2004), Aytürk (2004), and 
Aydıngün and Aydıngün (2004). 
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Yesterday and Today, her theoretical and ideological framework apparently has no 
space for questioning the re-configuration of the non-Turkish linguistic situation in 
Turkey by the Republican state‘s language planning. Her approach, in fact shared by 
many, takes Turkish as the only legitimate and proper language in Turkey to be 
discussed in such a presentation. In this dissertation, I aim, inter alia, at explaining how 
this conception of language hierarchy has become so dominant that it also informs 
academic studies.  
As it will be unfolded in the next chapters, Turkish language politics were not 
only about reshaping the content and the functions of Turkish language, but they were 
also about the governance of non-Turkish languages. So, to put it another way, the 
exploration here focuses not only on the constitution of a particular variety of Turkish 
as the standard and official language of the nation, but also emphasize how other 
languages and linguistic varieties are excluded, both practically and discursively, 
outside the legitimate domain of linguistic action in the public sphere. 
What conditioned this dissertation has been the examination of the larger system 
of language politics, with an analysis of recent developments. Nevertheless, a historical 
background is also considered as a necessity. 
The new Republican state acquired a more substantial legitimacy and power that 
were absent in the last century of the Ottoman Empire. The Republic was ruled by 
educated elites who had uncompromising faith in positivism for achieving development 
and social change. Therefore, they conceived language quite differently from the rulers 
of the Ottoman Empire. This is not say that linguistic matters was completely irrelevant 
to the culture of the Imperial Palace, but the Republican state introduced practices and 
narratives of language politics that were far more radical. The language had been 
constructed as a new category; it was nationalized along with other cultural aspects of 
the society. People, who were just speaking the language, were confronted with ―the 
national language‖, which became a sign of loyalty, obedience, unity, and integrity. On 
the other side, other people who were just speaking ―other languages‖, too, were 
confronted with the national language, which indexed their own tongue as a symbol of 
diversity, subversion, treason and betrayal.  
In that sense, the language politics of the Republican period is beyond an 
instrumentalization of language for political ends. It is not simply repressive, either, as 
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it banned the use of a language while prioritizing another. There are also productive 
aspects of the language regime and practices in Turkey. The Republican language 
regime not only denied some languages, but also constructed their status as a non-
language (as in the case of Kurdish). It did not only exclude the provincial dialects of 
the national language, but created a new ―high‖ Turkish (in the process of the Language 
Reform) while the claim was to create a language that would be of Turkish essence. 
Last, but not the least, the Turkish language regime constructed and framed the codes of 
legitimate talk on language. Creation of a moral code of language and spread of it to all 
citizens resulted in the emergence of a civil society, which would consider Turkish 
language as one its essential elements. A counter consequence, however, was the 
emergence of a significant number of discontent citizens, who claimed their own, 
separate identity through their own language, while facilitating the very ideological 
principles that the regime produced. 
Although the main proposition of the thesis will be that the official language 
regime of Turkish state has always been to single out Turkish as the one and only 
legitimate language, this is not to deny that there have been fluctuations in time in the 
consistency of the regime. These fluctuations has ranged from forwarding a radical 
version of pure Turkish in the 1930s, constructed within the framework of the Dil 
Devrimi (variously translated as Language Reform or Revolution), to shifting the focus 
more on the uses of traditional and elite Ottoman Turkish in the 1950s when the 
Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party, DP henceforth) was in power, and to the approval of 
the implementation of English in many universities as the language of instruction after 
1980s. Therefore, the Republican language regime has gone through considerable 
changes, although the principality of Turkish has never lost power, at least for the 
majority of the citizens. 
The Turkish official language regime has faced serious challenges by the social 
and cultural transformations particularly in the 1990s. There have been three concurrent 
and interrelated developments with respect to the sources of these challenges. First, the 
social structure has been transfigured through urbanization and commercialization of the 
cultural spheres. Second, distinctive processes inherent in globalization, such as the 
expansion of economical, political and cultural patterns, considerably threatened the 
assumed monopoly of the state in determining the cultural dynamics of the population. 
6 
 
And third, the rise of politics of identity brought about the empowerment of identity 
claims that endangered the presumed integrity of the nation and its cultural and 
linguistic representations of homogeneity. So, accompanying the recent debates on 
languages, there have occurred major social and cultural transformations. 
To explore both the establishment of the domain of language politics and its 
ideological implications, as noted above, a core concept, language regime, and a 
complementary one, language ideology, will be utilized. 
The literature of linguistic anthropology has recently concentrated on how 
particular language ideologies produce particular discourses on language and its use, 
and particular practices of them (Schieffelin, Woolard, & Kroskrity, 1998). This 
dissertation aims to explain how certain language policies and practices of linguistic 
manipulation guide and inform particular language ideologies. That is, it tries to 
examine the opposite direction of the ideology-regime link. Studies of language 
ideologies generally excavate ideological underpinnings of certain metalinguistic 
discourses and practices. Here, the object of analysis is rather the ways in which nation-
state politics of language frame linguistic ideologies and how the hegemony of the 
official discourses of language are established over the perceptions and conceptions of 
languages in Turkey in general, and of Kurdish as a minority language, in particular. It 
is intended to present that such a domination or colonization of minds with respect to 
languages not only operates through a rigorous indoctrination via national and 
compulsory education and the control over mass communication institutions, but also 
through the very policies, practices and formations of legitimate and illegitimate 
domains of language use.  
Therefore, the thesis is comprised of three different levels of analysis. The first 
level focuses on how the domain of language is incorporated as into a project of total 
political and social transformation an essential dimension. This examination 
investigates the Turkish modernizationist project of westernization, of which two main 
pillars has been nationalization and secularization, and its articulation of language as 
both its medium and instrument. The end result of this articulation has been the 
construction of a language regime that encompassed the officialization of a particular 
variety of Turkish in all public domains, and the discouragement and/or the legal 
exclusion of other varieties of Turkish and non-Turkish languages. As a part of this 
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analysis, a short examination of the census results will be given in order to assess to 
what extent the regime was successful in leveling the linguistic differences in Turkey. 
The second level of analysis is based on the explanation of the changes and 
variations within this language regime with respect to social and cultural changes. At 
this stage, the transformation of the social structures and emerging of new channels of 
information flows are brought under inquiry, such as globalization, urbanization, and 
commercialization of the information networks that were once under the monopolistic 
control of the state.  
The third level of analysis concentrates on the development of particular 
discourses about Kurdish. The survey at this level assesses the discursive frameworks in 
the public arena about the Kurdish language(s). Since Kurdish has not been controlled 
and cultivated under a state authority, as Turkish has been in the 20
th
 century, the former 
lacks a unified, standard form. This lack of homogeneity has been frequently 
overemphasized by the Turkish nationalists, to the point of arguing that there is no 
language as Kurdish. However, for those who have been in favor of linguistic and 
cultural freedoms of non-Turkish speakers, the problem is about democratization and 
human rights, rather than about the justifications for realities of linguistics. Thus, there 
have developed particular frameworks of discourses on Kurdish that are distinct and 
competing in the public sphere.  
Having presented the conceptual flow of the dissertation, the outline of the 
chapters and section follows below.  
The next, second theoretical chapter will explore the conceptual repercussions 
pertaining to the concepts of language regime and language ideology. First, a brief 
review of the traditional research on language policy and planning is presented. 
Following, enriched by the theoretical contributions of Foucault and Bourdieu, the post-
modern critique to the classical language policy research and the evolution of the 
concept of language regime are reviewed. Last, the theoretical implications (together 
with language ideology) and the possibilities of explanation promised by the concept 
are discussed. 
From the third chapter on, the empirical research is presented. The chapter starts 
with a short history of the pre-Ottoman and Ottoman legacies of language politics. 
Especially the last century of the Empire is considered as important, and is detailed 
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accordingly, since most of the basic ideological principles of the Republican practices 
were formed in that period. The formation and the practices of modernity in the 
Ottoman Empire are deemed critically significant for explaining the Republican politics.  
In the fourth chapter, the Republican official policies and legal regulations will be 
analyzed. Regulations, with actual practices, and ideological implications and outcomes, 
amount to the subsistence of a language regime. The formation and the development of 
the Republican language regime are analyzed. The main axis is formed by the 
chronological history of regulations that affected languages of the country, in one way 
or another. However, the discourses and ―realities‖ generated are also evaluated. 
Through the notion of language regime, the relationship between the political and the 
linguistic spheres in the Turkish case will be assessed.  
The fifth chapter is devoted to a survey of the changes in the linguistic 
populations in Turkey. Considered as a sign of the effectiveness of the language regime 
of the top-down modernization in Turkey, the levels of linguistic assimilation are 
assessed based on the data from the censuses and other relevant researches. 
Chapter 6 continues the history of the language regime in Turkey, now with a 
specific focus on the regulations of and public debate about broadcasting. Mass media 
in general, and television and radio broadcasting in particular have become the field of 
language battles, especially since 1990s. On the one hand, private radio and TV 
channels have flourished. They rapidly and substantially commercialized a domain that 
belonged to the state before. The profound changes emerged with commercialization of 
audio-visual domains inevitably changed the way language has been conceived with 
respect to broadcasting.
2
 Moreover, the intrusion of English was unleashed under the 
conditions of less-control by the state and of profit maximization.  
Broadcasting in a language other than Turkish was considered a political taboo for 
more than half a century. This taboo has been recently challenged not only by the 
technological developments that enabled transnational broadcastings that render the 
official language policies on broadcasting mostly invalid. More importantly the Turkish 
governments have experienced a two-way pressure from both inside with the demands 
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 Öncü (2000) discusses various aspects of commercialization in the sphere of 
television. Öncü‘s article has been a major inspiration in the formulation of this 
dissertation‘s case study. 
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of cultural and linguistic rights, claimed especially by Kurds, and from outside, 
particularly from the EU that mandates the implementation of a certain level of 
multiculturalist policies to become a member. Finally, some of the languages other than 
Turkish were broadcasted on Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (Türkiye Radyo 
Televizyon Kurumu, TRT henceforth) after being defined as ―the traditional languages 
and dialects that are used by the Turkish citizens in their daily lives‖ instead of being 
titled as ―the minority language‖.  
Since 2000, the media coverage on the issue of broadcasting in non-Turkish 
language has been vast. In a context of abundance of speech on language, some 
regularities with respect to the representations of particular language ideologies have 
appeared. In the last eight years, there have been reformulations and explicit 
manifestations of how Turkish and non-Turkish language has been conceived. 
Therefore, 2000s has been a valuable period for the excavation of language ideologies 
that have considerable effect in the public arena. Chapter 6, then, will be the part where 
these language ideologies are presented and analyzed. 
The controversy on language in Turkey in the last two decades has been best 
demonstrated in the field of broadcasting. Spitulnik remarks  ―[t]he place of powerful 
institutions such as mass media … in the construction and the maintenance of such 
linguistic hegemonies has been the subject of growing attention over the past decade‖ 
(Spitulnik, 1998, pp. 164-165). In this sense, this chapter might be considered as a study 
on the Turkish case of how mass media has become a primary field of conflicts on 
language politics. 
The conclusion chapter will be an evaluation of the findings of the empirical 
research above. First, the following questions will be answered. To what extent has the 
theoretical framework that is constructed with the critical notions of language regime 
and language ideology helped us to understand the political nature of language in 
Turkey? What are its advantages, and what has it enabled us to uncover? Secondly, 
based on the categorizations of regimes by Pool and Laitin (see below) and the review 
of the history of the Turkish language regime, its comparative position with respect to 
other regimes will be explained. And finally, more theoretical questions will be 
discussed, such as how language regime and ideology could be related to each other and 
10 
 
how the case study of Turkey helped us to advance the conceptual understanding of 
politics of language. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: LANGUAGE REGIME 
The following chapter introduces the theoretical framework of this study. 
Language regime is presented here as the core concept and it is explained how the 
concept could be utilized to analyze the formation of and the transformation of the 
language politics in Turkey.  
In the next section, the theoretical and empirical developments that transformed 
the studies of language politics are presented. After that, the notion of ―language 
regime‖ is introduced and further conceptual implications that the notion offers are 
assessed.  
2.1 Theoretical Challenges to Traditional Language Planning 
It is widely accepted that language, as a social phenomenon, is political. Its 
political nature derives from that it is a social and historical construct, which marks 
cultural borders among genders, statuses and communities, and that it is a means to 
control or maintain the access to knowledge, hence to power. Language is also always 
politically contextualized because it has always been incorporated into the power play 
of politics.  
Modernity, by substantially transforming the ways in which the political sphere is 
organized and operated, has changed the political nature of language (Neustupny, 2006). 
12 
 
Modernity, especially with its urge for scientific understanding and control, turned 
languages into means of direct cultural and political change and discipline. Language 
has become one of the essential dimensions of modern forms of power (Wright, 2004 
and 2007). ―The standardization and the spread of Western European vernaculars‖ 
(Wright, 2007, p. 165) were guided and accompanied by a serious of parallel and 
consequential processes: the spread of printing and print capitalism (Anderson, 1991), 
the formation of the modern state institutions (Wright, 2004), the undertaking of 
language as an object of science and a resource for intellectual and political discourses 
(Crowley, 1996; Neis, 2006; and Patten, 2006). The highest level of authority and 
power in the modern era, the nation-state has taken the ―problem of language‖ seriously 
from the very beginning and manipulated languages and language uses in the way to 
national identity construction (Barbour & Carmichael, 2000; and Joseph J. E., 2006). 
The western European nation-states transferred their experiences in language and 
culture administration to the colonies, as well, and created a colonial political culture in 
their imperial domains. As nationalism and modern-state formations are reproduced in 
non-European geographies, so were the corresponding politics of language. 
In 1960s and 1970s, the political interest in language policy and planning (LPP) 
was becoming globalized. In the center of the interest were the emerging nation-states, 
mostly established during the rapid decolonization process in Africa and Asia. There 
were two main sides of these planning attempts. On the one side were the political elites 
of these countries who inherited the European ideological legacies of state control of the 
linguistic domains. The other front of language planning process was formed by the 
language planners from the academic circles, who were, infused with the enthusiasm of 
modernization theories, believed that these new political settings promised a fertile 
domain in which linguistic and sociolinguistic theories would be assessed and put into 
practice.
3
  
Some issues were especially attractive. The choice of the official language was 
one of the main problems. Most decolonized polities were sociolinguistically 
complicated: there were the languages of the colonialists; the multilingual context of the 
                                                 
3
 For an in-depth review of the history of language planning studies, see 
Blommaert (1996) and Wright (2004). 
13 
 
society and a set of linguistic power relations pertaining to ethnic and class distinctions. 
Standardization and modernization of local languages were other hotspots, since a 
―modern‖ language was expected to satisfy the needs of a ―modern‖ nation-state and 
country. The urge for language modernization was exhibited best in setting up 
educational language policies for the now-liberated members of these nations, in order 
to close the ―gap‖ in the race for modernization.4 
However, theories emerging in the last quarter of the 20
th
 century attacked fiercely 
on these types of Westernizationist/modernizationist missionary attempts. The critique 
of the modernization theories in general were derived from dual sources of 
deconstructivism in the western political theory and the theories of post-colonialism. 
The tides of this critique also influenced classical LPP theory and practice. Sue Wright, 
in her review of language planning studies, similarly emphasizes that the concern for the 
relationship between language and power relations was derived from the Critical Theory 
and postmodernism (2004, pp. 165-172).  
The strong belief in the evolutionary progress of human societies that would bind 
them all, in the end, in the condition of modernity was among the pillars LPP research 
with modernizationist aspirations. Modernity was defined by the economical, political 
and cultural standards of the Western societies, of which national citizenship and 
modern bureaucratic formation of the state apparatus were held to be essential. Glyn 
Williams similarly argues that "… language planning emerged side by side with the 
theory of modernization which not only was closely integrated with a specific 
theoretical perspective - structural functionalism - but also involved a specific 
conception of the world. This world view involved dividing states into the modern and 
the traditional." (Williams, 1992, p. 124; cited in Blommaert J. , 1996).
5
 
Criticism of conceptual categorization of ―the modern‖ and ―the traditional‖ has 
also been coupled by the critique of modernity itself. Many scholars followed the 
Frankfurt School‘s disillusionment with modernity and the Enlightenment, especially 
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 See Spolsky and Hult (2008) for a collection of empirical and theoretical essays 
on how educational language and language cultivation has been major issues for nation-
states. 
5
 For a further analysis of the theoretical foundations of the classical LPP studies, 
see Richard J. Watts (2001), especially pages 297-298. 
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that of Adorno and Horkheimer. Postmodern theories interrogated the institutions and 
technologies of modernity, and questioned to what extent modernity, as a discourse and 
practice, fulfilled its promise for the well-being and the development of humanity; and 
what it can further contribute (Wright, 2004).  
Within the re-assessment of modernity, via its method and its content, none of the 
modern social and political formations were left out, including nationalism and 
language.  
With respect to nationalism, a theoretical deconstruction of the modernist 
nationalist utopia was launched by those who successfully interpreted nationalism as an 
invention of modernity, rather than a transcendental historical ideal (Gellner E. , 1983; 
Hobsbawm E. J., 1993; Anderson, 1991; Kroskrity P. V., 2000b). 
However, for the issue of language, the deconstructivist attacks proved more 
subversive. The strongest criticism to the understanding of language as an object be 
studied, categorized and planned, appeared within anthropology, especially studies of 
linguistic anthropology. The nature of anthropological research and theory challenges 
established conceptions of social dynamics. Kroskrity identifies that there has been an 
increasing awareness in anthropological perspective to complement the microanalysis of 
language with ―an understanding of how such patterns might be related to political-
economic macroprocesses‖ (2000a, p. 2). He describes how the 20th century linguistics 
mostly dealt with an ―amputated‖ language, that is language removed from its social 
and political context and he marks the theoretical re-assessments to restore ―the 
relevance of contextual factors‖ (p. 5). Kroskrity refers, for example, to Irvine where 
she launches a socio-cultural emphasis as she concentrates on ―the cultural system of 
ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and 
political interests‖ (Irvine, 1989, p. 255; cited in p. 5). 
A series of reconsideration has also emerged about how language has become an 
instrument of politics and science. Among other philosophers, Foucault 
―acknowledge[d] the significance for modernity of the construction of language as a 
separate realm in the 17th century‖ (Foucault M. , 2002; cited in Makoni & Pennycook, 
2005, p. 145). Bauman and Briggs similarly questioned the modern establishment of 
language as a discrete domain, and asked ―how language came into being‖ (2003, p. 7). 
Mühlhäusler joined this track with his claim that ―the notion of a ‗language‘ is a recent 
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culture-specific notion associated with the rise of European nation-states and the 
Enlightenment. The notion of ‗a language‘ makes little sense in most traditional 
societies.‖ (Mühlhäusler, 2000, p. 358).  
Similarly, Blommaert notes, language is a key ingredient of modernity and thus a 
rather recent construct (Blommaert, 2006, p. 512). He adds, ―… but it has become the 
most widespread view of language both in popular and in scientific circles. Linguistics 
has contributed in no small degree to the cultural construction of language in general as 
a stable, contextless individual mental object, and language and educational policies as 
well as larger nation-building programs have been deeply influenced by this ideology‖ 
(ibid.). 
On the front historians and sociologists, on the other hand, approaches to the 
linguistic dimensions of modernity, nationalism and the political. Anderson (1991) 
focused on this issue in relation with the emergence of nationalism and modern politics 
of language. He unearthed the association between nation building and language 
construction. Likewise, Blommaert confirmed that standardization of languages has 
been tied to the rise of nation-states and the concurrent project of modernity (1996). 
Glyn Williams (1992, p. 128) described how, as a part of that project, language has been 
situated within an evolutionary view of progress, which is itself a central idea of the 
modernist thought.  
Among all, Bourdieu stands significantly distinctive in ―understanding and 
exposing the role of language in power relations‖ (Wright, 2004, p. 11).  
Like Foucault, Bourdieu was also interested in how modern power relations are 
established, and through which dynamics they are maintained or subverted. In his 
analysis, the notion of ―symbolic power‖ is located at the center, defined as the power in 
constructing reality (1991, p. 166). He further elaborates on ―reality‖, where he echoes 
Foucault‘s truth regimes6: reality normalizes the social taxonomy of the social 
inequality (a process of legitimization of domination), naturalizes new configurations of 
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 For Foucault, what is called ―truth‖ is not independent of power: ―… there are 
truths that correlate with modes of government. The production of truth is 'not the 
production of true utterances but the establishment of domains, or ‗regimes of truth‘, in 
which the practice of true and false can be made at once ordered and pertinent' 
(Foucault M. , 1981, p. 9; quoted in Simmons, 1995, p. 44).  
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power relations, and it subjugates the dominated. In this sense, symbolic power imposes 
systems of classifications, or hierarchies. His approach has challenged those of linguists 
with an understanding of language as a transcendental grammatical reality. Bourdieu 
criticized, for example, Chomsky‘s theory of universal language for ignoring the 
economic and social conditions of language and ―social laws of construction‖, and 
hence, for masking the ―social genesis of language‖ (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 44). A 
categorization of language, which had become of historical importance in the science of 
linguistics, Saussure‘s langue vs. parole, could not escape Bourdieu‘s critique, either.7 
Bourdieu emphasized the political unification of ―a‖ language in the formation of 
modern official languages and during the incorporation of the vernaculars into the 
language of the political authority. Saussure‘s langue as a category actually corresponds 
to official languages, according to Bourdieu.  
Subsequently, Bourdieu reversed one of the classical and popular assumptions 
about official languages and languages of the people. According to him, it is the politics 
of official language that has constructed the ―linguistic community‖ as a ―group of 
people who use the same system of linguistic signs‖; and that such a construction has 
been a precondition ―for economic production and even for symbolic domination‖ 
(Bourdieu, 1991, p. 45).
8
  
Bourdieu‘s critical approach has inspired many scholars who reviewed, not only 
the actual relationships of politics and language, but also theoretical orientations that 
have had framed studies of those relationships. 
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 On langue and parole, Sanders reminds that ―the former refers to the potential 
linguistic system which resides in the mind of all members of a speech community, and 
waits to be activated in parole, in individual utterances, or acts of speech‖ (2004, pp. 4-
5). 
8
 Bourdieu‘s relating language and economics sounds is similar to Gellner‘s idea 
of establishment of horizontal social relationships via institutions of education and 
relations of capitalist production (Gellner E. , 1983). 
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2.2 New Approaches to LPP Research 
The new theoretical influence on ―traditional language policy and language 
planning‖ (Wright, 2007, p. 164) has been more than a mere criticism. Hornberger 
marks that critical and postmodern theories have made their way into LPP research, 
―infusing new perspectives and emphases‖ (2006, p. 24). LPP research and practice 
itself has become an object theoretical attention. Hornberger points out that Cooper 
(1989) and Tollefson (1991) were first to critically revise LPP. Cooper has proposed a 
descriptive function for the field of LPP, while Tollefson has sought to ―contribute to a 
theory of language planning that locates the field within social theory‖ (1991, p. 8; cited 
in Hornberger, 2006, p. 24).  
These new perspectives led the way to the new conceptual tools, as well. New 
concepts prioritized some of the issues like locality, diversity, subjectification and 
objectification, power as a dispersed network rather than an application of domination 
from above, reproduction and subversion of/through power relations, etc. In these new 
orientations, focus shifted to explain how ―language is employed to produce, maintain 
and change the social relations of power and to permit the domination of some people 
over others‖ (Wright, 2004, p. 167). 
One of the flourishing new concepts has been ―language regime‖. This concept, 
with its underpinnings and promises for the analysis of politics of language will be 
discussed in the sections below. Before that, there is a need to describe the new world 
order within which these new conceptualizations thrived.  
The new theoretical approaches were coupled with the revival and reformation of 
the field of LPP within the discipline of sociolinguistics. For Hornberger, this 
resurgence was due to two factors: ―the imperious spread of English and other global 
languages, and reciprocally the alarming loss and endangerment of indigenous and 
small language communities world-wide‖ (2006, p. 24). There have been various forces 
of globalization, both from above and from below, which challenged established 
systems of politics of language.  
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2.3 Revival of LPP Research in Connection with Globalization 
After 1980s, conceptualized under the notion of globalization
9
, the new world 
(dis)order generated many repercussions, which subverted particular aspects of the 
modern political order. Not as a primary cause but as a process in effect, globalization 
also entailed the creation of new areas of interest for LPP scholars. Equipped by the new 
theoretical orientations, scholars focused on a new set of linguistic problems, which 
were quite different from those they dealt with within the mind-set of post-colonial 
nation-state building (cf. Maurais & Morris, 2004). These new studies focus on four 
main sites of language political challenges. 
First, the dissolution of Soviet Union resulted in the rapid formation of new 
republics, in which now language, as a political battleground, was to be reconfigured. 
Second, the European Union (EU), as one of the most ambitious and controversial 
political projects in history, has given rise to equally controversial linguistic problems. 
Within this project, multiculturalism and multilingualism have been presented as 
political ideals, but on the other hand, they posed more questions than they aimed to 
answer. Third, the problematic of linguistic matters, fueled by both ethnic nationalisms 
and immigrant communities, have forced the long established language regimes of 
national politics to be reformulated. Fourth, the global storming effect of English has 
become the top ranking linguistic issue in almost every country. Having implications for 
all the previous three areas of research, the domination of English has also been critical 
for the futures of national or sub-national languages. In the following sections, these 
four new spheres of study of language politics will be explored briefly. 
2.3.1 The Aftermath of the Break of the Soviet Union 
The fall of the Soviet Union was not only about the collapse of the communist 
system and a disappointment with the socialist utopia. It meant a radical change in the 
overall world power system, as well. To the interest of the scholars of LPP, the end of 
                                                 
9
 For theories of globalization, see Robertson (1990) and Robinson (2007).  
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the Soviet era entailed re-establishment of the local politico-linguistic spheres due to the 
formation of new nation-states together with their attempts to form capitalist economies 
and liberal democratic parliamentary systems. In all these post-Soviet republics, 
nationalist ideologies eventually triumphed and language politics were nationalized in 
contrast with the ―imperialistic‖ politics of language in the Soviet Union (Hogan-Brun, 
2005b, p. 369), which was based on the precedence of Russian.
10
 
In his work on the changes in language regimes in globalizing environments, 
Coulmas refers to the developments in post-Soviet republics and shows how  
―… language policies were adopted to expand the communicative space 
of the national languages at the expense of Russian, the language of the 
erstwhile power holders. Language laws passed from 1989 to 1995 were 
explicitly anti-Russian, restricting the use of Russian in spheres of regulated 
communication. By means of laws of citizenship and linguistic qualifying 
requirements, Russian was turned from the language of power that 
dominated all domains of higher communication into a stigmatized ethnic 
language.‖ (2005a, p. 8).  
The geography directly affected by the fall of the Soviet Union was vast. Baltic 
and Black Sea coasts, Caucasia, and Central Asia have hosted new republics. The new 
sociolinguistic situations were multi-layered and complicated with officialized 
languages of the majorities; minority languages; lingering hegemony of Russian, 
linguistically, and of Russia, politically; and the lowered instrumental value of all these 
varieties in the international arenas of communication and competition with respect to 
English.  
In the three states on the Baltic shores, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, national 
languages have been very strong symbols for cultural authenticity and ―central to the 
political life‖ (Hogan-Brun, 2005b, p. 368).11 In all three Republics, the status and the 
prestige of the national languages are secured at the constitutional level. 
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 For a historical account of the Soviet language politics, and how language 
became a crucial symbol in the dissolution of the USSR, see Marshall (1996). Pavlenko 
(2006), too, presents the situation of Russian in the territory of the former Soviet Union. 
11
 For a comparative sociolinguistic analysis of the Baltic states, see Hogan-Brun 
(2005a). 
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In Lithuania, for example, ―the Lithuanian language is one of the key elements of 
ethnic and cultural originality of the Lithuanian state, an inseparable part of the nation‘s 
spiritual culture, the guarantee of national identity and survival, the language of state 
and individual, the language of the state and all spheres of public life.‖ (Smetoniene, 
2003, p. 147; cited in Grumadiene, 2005).  
As noted above, the Baltic states issued further laws that required the use (or the 
demonstration of competence to use) of the national languages in public contact. 
"[O]ther requirements covered the increase of teaching of the national language in all 
school systems, signage, and measures promoting the national languages in 
broadcasting, publication and public life." (Ozolins, 2003, p. 218). Nevertheless, there 
have been important problems with respect to the linguistic rights of the Russian 
minorities. Lithuania differs from the other two Republics in that the proportion of its 
main ethnic population was preserved during the post-WWII migrations from the other 
Soviet republics that were mainly initiated by the Soviet regime. Major demographic 
changes have taken place since then ―reducing the titular nationals to 61.3% of the 
population in Estonia by 1989 (down from a pre-war 88%) and to 52% in Latvia (down 
from 77%). Lithuanians‘ proportion remained largely unchanged, at 79.6% (down from 
80.6%)" (ibid.). Ozolins reports that in Estonia and Latvia, those (of whatever 
nationality) who were citizens in 1940 at the time of Soviet occupation and their 
descendants were granted citizenship, leaving over 30% of the population in Latvia and 
25% in Estonia without citizenship (ibid.). While Moscow, concerned with the 
conditions for Russian speaking minorities, was quite agitated by the Baltic initiatives 
and delayed the withdrawal of its armies, the institutions of the European Union, of 
which the Baltic states decidedly endeavored to become members, were closely 
monitoring the standards of human rights, as the minority and language rights are one of 
the main accession criteria. In short, these countries had to find out ways out of rather 
challenging language political situations and work on a balanced standpoint that would 
simultaneously satisfy the members of the EU for accepting them to the Union, ease the 
worries of Russian government and soothe its possible aggression, and respond to the 
nationals that were demanding their cultural security and independence.  
On the other hand, membership to the EU has been perceived as both an 
opportunity and a potential threat concerning the Baltic languages. Hogan-Brun notes 
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the anticipation in external strengthening Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian as official 
languages of the Union, accompanied with a ―growing awareness of an ensuing local 
impact of more widely spoken languages such as English, French and German‖ (2005b, 
p. 368). 
Ukraine, another independent republic of the post-Soviet period, similarly turned 
its attention on the empowerment of the national language and worked on the 
establishment of the superiority of Ukrainian over Russian.
12
 While Ukrainian was 
made the official language of the Republic, Russian was downgraded to the status of a 
minority language (Janmaat, 1999, p. 475). However, this has posed major problems, 
since the Russian speaking community forms the almost half of the Ukrainian citizens 
(Taranenko, 2007, p. 119 and 123). The new Constitution of the Ukraine adopted in 
1996 further confirmed the status of Ukrainian as the state language, as well as a 
number of other laws (on education, mass media, television and broadcasting, the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces, citizenship, etc.) and state programs which also provided for 
the expansion of the functions of the Ukrainian language in society‖ (p . 127-128). The 
educational language policies expanded the use of Ukrainian against Russian; however, 
the political demand to register Russian as the second official language of the state 
remains powerful (ibid.).  
Belarus followed a somewhat different pattern. Although, since the 1980s, ―the 
Belarusian language became the symbol of Belarusian independence‖ (Goujon, 1999, p. 
661), the political leadership, even after independence, has been mostly in favor of 
maintaining a close relationship with Moscow and aimed at the continuation of the pro-
Russian language politics. Goujon describes how Belarusian became the battleground 
for power between the two main factions running for the government since the 
independence (1999). The 1994 Constitution re-affirmed the article of the previous 
                                                 
12
 For a sociolinguistic study on the Ukrainian language politics, see Bilaniuk 
(2005). 
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constitution, which stated that Belarusian is the official language of the state, but in 
1996, a referendum approved an equal official status to Russian (p. 665).
13
  
Kazakhstan, too, experienced a process of Russification with the establishment of 
Soviet Union. ―The issue of the Kazakh language was among the main grievances 
articulated by Kazakh intellectuals in the wake of the national revival during 
Perestroika.‖ (Bissenova, 2004, p. 5). The current constitution, adopted in 1995, grants 
Kazakh the status of state language, but it also recognizes ―Russian as the language of 
‗interethnic communication‘ and guarantees its ‗equal use‘ in the government and 
media‖ (ibid.). In 1997, a Law on Languages was issued to support Kazakh in its use in 
bureaucracy and mass communications. Bissenova underlines that the politics of 
language has already coincided with political and social tensions among various 
sections of the society, especially between Kazakhs and Russians. Similar to the case in 
Belarus, there is a strong political opposition in Kazakhstan and an international 
pressure from the Russian diplomatic channels, to raise the status of Russian to the level 
of the second state language. 
Azerbaijan became independent in 1991 and in its constitution, Article 21 notes 
that ‗‗the Azerbaijan language shall be the state language‖ (quoted in Bishop, 2006, p. 
634). Speakers of minority languages constitute comparatively a smaller part of the 
society, with 3% Russian and 2% Armenian, hence, the language ideological debates 
are more focused on the issues of Azerbaijanian, itself, such as its script and purification 
(ibid.). 
Uzbekistan, the most populated country of its region, exhibits alike numbers of 
linguistic minorities with 14% Russian and 4% of Tajiki speakers. Uzbekistan adopted a 
change in script to a Latin-based orthography in 1993. As in other Central Asian 
Republics, language and language policies have become important dimensions of the 
political sphere after independence, and moving away from a Slavic script to a Latin 
one is in concert with the creation of an authentic linguistic and cultural identity apart 
from Russia and Russian:  
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 For a study that analyzes the uses of both languages in public spaces in Belarus, 
see N. Anthony Brown (2007). For another study by Brown on another dimension of 
Belarusian language issues, with a more sociolinguistic emphasis on the role of 
language in shaping individual and collective identity, see (2005). For a study on 
language ideologies in Belarus, see Woolhiser (2001). 
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―And perhaps most significantly, Latinized Uzbek emphasized the 
geopolitical borders of Uzbekistan, distinguishing it from Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan, which use Cyrillic script; Afghanistan, which uses Arabic 
script; and Tajikistan, which uses both Cyrillic and Arabic letters. 
(Turkmenistan also adopted a Latin alphabet but remains politically isolated 
because of the policies of its government.) (Montgomery, 2006, p. 291).  
In the Republic of Tatarstan, de-Russification of the language, as well, has been 
an integral part of the Tatar nationalist ideology and identity. The Republic is similar to 
Ukraine in that the Tatar and Russian populations are both around 45%, as Tatars are 
slightly higher in number (Davis, Hammond, & Nizamova, 2000, p. 204). Since the 
declaration of Tatarstan‘s autonomy in 1990, Wertheim reports, ―government has been 
legislating ‗promotive‘ language policies in an attempt to put Tatar on more equal 
footing with Russian, such that Tatar is now one of the Republic‘s two official 
languages and Tatar language study is compulsory in primary and secondary school‖ 
(2003, p. 348). Tatarstan, despite the nationalist discourse and practices to support 
Tatar, experiences the hegemonic domination of Russian, as a legacy of the Soviet 
period. Davis, Hammond and Nizamova report that the 1989 census revealed that while 
more than 77% of Tatars knew Russian, only 1.1% of Russians understood Tatar (2000, 
p. 205). In parallel, where the state authority is less decisive, such in many aspects of 
public and cultural life, there is an imbalance in favor of Russian (p. 204).  
The destruction of the Soviet system was also effective on what was once called 
―Eastern Block‖ countries with communist regimes. Released from the subjugation by 
the Soviet regime, these eastern European countries turned their faces towards 
capitalist/liberal westernization. Pertaining to politics of language, these new regimes 
found themselves facing unaccustomed problems in the face of speedy transformation.
14
 
Studies that focus on the post-Soviet language political issues bring forward novel 
insights into a variety of theoretical subjects. They refer to matters such as minority 
and/or linguistic rights, cross-cultural analysis of language politics, discourses on 
diversity and integrity especially those derived from Western experiences.  
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 For a historical analysis of the language politics in Hungary, with a special 
emphasis on the developments after the fall of communism in 1989, see Medgyes 
Katalin Miklósy (2000). For the post-Yugoslavian case, see Greenberg (2001) 
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Ozolins, for example, by examining ―the specific sociolinguistic situation in the 
Baltic including the often unrecognised attitudes of the Russian-speaking minorities‖, 
introduces a ―critique of the minority-rights based approach of European institutions‖ 
(2003, p. 217). Hogan-Brun, similarly, ―explores issues pertaining to the transferability 
of standards developed for established democracies in the West to the situation of 
democratizing countries in Central and Eastern Europe, where the demographic legacy 
of the Soviet past has left its imprint on the structure and outlook of society‖ and 
―considers a range of factors which need to be taken into account in Western discourses 
on diversity and integration, or sameness and difference, when applied to post-
communist or post-imperialist contexts‖ (2005b, p. 367). Exemplified by both authors, 
the post-Soviet terrain not only raised new policy-based issues but also generated a new 
critical perspective that also reflects upon the Western experience and conceptions of 
language.  
In addition to the critical analyses of the post-Soviet language politics, there has 
appeared another fertile ground for re-thinking the relationships among language, state, 
citizenship and nationality; the European Union. 
2.3.2 The European Union 
Established at first as the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, the 
European Union, by 2008, includes 27 states with two more, Croatia and Turkey, in the 
process of negotiations for full membership. The transnational project of the EU has 
been stimulating in many respects. For one, although the origins of the Union were 
based on post-WWII solidarity aimed at economical recovery, it promised the 
realization of the idea of a union of Europe. It was a dream to be emphasized from time 
to time since the Enlightenment to become the Europe, a singular entity, a unity could at 
last end the centuries old national and religious conflicts. Brought together, the peoples 
of Europe would enjoy the richness of cultural diversity and political unity 
simultaneously.  
Mamadouh summarizes what makes the issue of language rather a complicated 
problematic for the EU, as follows: 
25 
 
―The linguistic configuration of the European Union consists of the 
official and national languages of the Member States, of which are also the 
official and working languages of the European Union, many regional 
languages with an official status in regional constituencies (such as Basque 
in the Basque Country in Spain), regional languages with no such status 
(such as Corsican), non-territorial languages (such as Romani) and non-
territorial languages of (recent) immigrant communities (such as Turkish). 
(1999, p. 134).
15
  
There are many languages in effective use within the borders of the EU. Urrutia 
and Lasagabaster report that the Union encompasses more than 60 autochthonous 
languages in its member states (2007, p. 479). By 2008, there are 23 official languages 
of the Union.
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The Union itself was also a fresh field of experiment for the language planners. 
Since every citizen of the member states has been supposed to participate in decision 
making processes, the language problem to realize this aim was a painstaking one. On 
the one hand, there is the political ideal of equality of differences, in this context, 
linguistically. On the other hand, there exists the difficult question of maintaining an 
efficient way of working of the bureaucratic units within this plethora of languages. 
van Someren, in her study of language policies of the EU, states that in 2003 all 
translation and interpretation work of EU institutions cost about a billion Euros. She 
also adds that this ―figure does not include the costs for language courses, office space 
and booths and the finances that are actually needed for more employees to cope with 
the current backlogs in the EU translation and interpretation divisions‖ (Van Someren, 
2004). It is important to note that these figures belong to the year 2003, that is before 
ten new states joined in 2004, and two more (Bulgarian and Romania) in 2007 to add 
eleven more languages to already existing spectrum of official languages of the EU. The 
time consumed in translations is immense and the hindrance to an efficient working 
schedule is easily anticipated.  
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 See Urrutia and Lasagabaster (2007) for the chronology of expansion of the 
EU‘s official language list. 
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 The official languages of the Union are, in the alphabetical order; Bulgarian, 
Czech, Danish, Dutch, English Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, 
Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, 
Slovene, Spanish, Swedish. (Languages of Europe, 2008).  
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―The principles underpinning policies in both the Council of Europe and 
the EU, then, are broadly complementary and clearly support 
multilingualism. Nonetheless, the implementation of these policies is largely 
left to the governments at nation-state level. It is, therefore, no surprise that 
European language policy is developing at different speeds and even in 
different directions, the inevitable gainer in such a situation being 
international English.‖ (Mar-Molinero & Stevenson, Language Policy in a 
Changing Europe - Introduction, 2006b, p. 240) 
For these reasons, there has been a challenging race among the language planners 
to work out solution to the linguistic problems of the Union. 
Mar-Molinero and Stevenson reports how, since 1991, key language questions 
confronting the Union are raised by a number of scholarly works (2006b, p. 241). 
Starting with the publication of A Language Policy for the European Community, edited 
by Florian Coulmas (1991), a debate about the language policy and practices across 
Europe has been opened.
17
   
One major work on the theoretical debates inflicted by the complexities of the 
language politics in the EU is written by Jonathan Pool (1996). Pool discusses whether 
an optimal language regime that is both politically and economically correct (p. 161) is 
a possibility for the Union, and he concludes affirmatively.
18
 He elaborates on various 
possible policies of languages regimes and analyzes them with respect to political 
ideals, such as equality for all languages, and to economical reasonable. Although Pool 
himself does not offer a single model for the Union, he proposes a consideration of 
different official language systems ―potentially optimal‖ for the institutions of the EU 
(p. 177). 
Pia Vanting Christiansen, too, elaborates on the possible futures of the language 
policies of the EU (2006). The author analyzes ―ten future language policy scenarios, 
selected as representative of the spectrum of language policies available to the European 
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 For a wide-range of discussions on the issue, see Mamadouh (1999), Extra & 
Gorter (2001), Lenaerts (2001), O‘Reilly (2001) , Grin (2003), Hogan-Brun & Wolff 
(2003), Phillipson (2003), Baldauf & Kaplan (2005; and 2006), Ginsburgh & Weber 
(2005), Horspool (2006), Mar-Molinero & Stevenson (2006a), and Trenz (2007)  
18
 In a previous study, Pool already argued that the dilemma of political fairness 
versus economical efficiency in determining official language policies in multilingual 
societies could be overcome (1991). 
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Parliament‖ (p. 23). Christiansen differentiates various levels of language use within the 
EU, such as daily communication, contact languages with the governing bodies the 
Union, translation and interpretation facilities. She debates how different domains of 
language use could be organized and managed, including the corresponding educational 
and organizational plans. The scenarios include the present situation from which 
English is benefitted, and other possible alternatives, some of which are more 
democratic and ecological, while other are more hierarchical and hegemonic. Among 
various possibilities, Christiansen argues in favor of the employment of a planned 
language (such as Esperanto) in the long term, as the lingua franca of the Union; and 
―thereby contributing to establishing a democratic public sphere in the EU‖ (p. 38).
 With its repercussions to nationalism, rights (individual or communal), civil 
society, public sphere and reconfiguration of the political, the linguistic issues in the EU 
have been and, as it seems, will continue to be attracting much interest.  
2.3.3 Minority Groups vs. the Nation-state 
In traditional LPP practice, multilingual social settings, which were to be found in 
every nation-state, were found disruptive. They were the outward signs of multi-ethnic 
populations, therefore, in conflict with the project of modernization. Laitin summarizes 
the extent of the debate within the classical approach to LPP: 
―Ethnic heterogeneity is often portrayed as a powerful source of 
democratic instability, regional assertiveness, and civil war. In his classic 
essay on primordial conflict, Geertz (1973) sees it as a source of chronic 
tension in the postcolonial states after World War II. Dahl (1971) sees it as a 
serious constraint to the success of democracy. Rabushka and Shepsle 
(1972) model ethnic heterogeneity such that it leads in equilibrium to the 
breakdown of democratic regimes. Connor (1994) equates ethnic 
heterogeneity with higher probability for civil war. But not all studies link 
heterogeneity with unhappy outcomes. Lijphart (1977) for one showed the 
possibility for democracy (of the nonmajoritarian sort) under conditions of 
cultural pluralism‖ (2000, p. 142).  
The rise of the notion of minority rights has been another field that challenged the 
LPP researchers. While the focus in the traditional LPP studies was on the formation 
and the maintenance of the nation-state and its language policies, post-1980s were the 
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times when the axes of the debates shifted. The emphases, since then, have been on the 
linguistic policies that would be produced to ensure the survival and the rights of the 
languages of minorities. Various new terminologies were developed, such as linguistic 
rights, linguistic human rights, linguistic discrimination, and linguicide or linguistic 
genocide. Many scholars wrote extensively on how language politics of nation-states 
and colonial powers ended up with the destruction of languages of minorities, either in 
power or in number (see Atkins, 1978; Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas, 1994; Hamel, 
1997; Skutnabb-Kangas, 2000; and Masenko, 2005). A parallel issue that concerns the 
backlash of locally dominant national languages against the hegemony of English in the 
globalization process is also a crucial debate, as will be discussed below. 
Contrary to the expectations towards the dissolution of nationalism in the 
post/late-modern world
19
, there is an apparent process of re-nationalization in the 
already established nation-states and a rise of ethnic nationalism by the sub-national 
minorities who seek autonomy or independence. Pleading for language rights or 
linguistic survival has been one of the pillars of these ethnic/national struggles. 
Besides the demands from existing minorities, new minorities are incessantly 
formed across world-geography due to the increased flow of individuals. The 
dislocation and relocation of masses due to civil wars, military occupations or 
oppression, poverty or streams of labor force doubles the linguistic challenges that 
countries and LPP researches face. As Heinrich concurs, ―[c]hanging language regimes 
exert pressure on national languages. Their ideological assessment is affected because a 
growing number of new (foreign) speakers and their ‗deviant‘ language behavior serve 
as evidence as well as a source of change‖ (2005, p. 228). 
A remarkable point concerning the issues of minority language is that the very 
logic of the politics of language that nation-states have been employing now turned 
back onto themselves. That is, nation-states have built their own systems of language 
policies on the premise that every nation, as the political expression of a unique culture, 
represents itself exclusively with its unique language, its vital marker for identity. 
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 Hobsbawm, for example, argues that, historically speaking, nationalisms 
becoming more and more insignificant (1993, p. 225). It should be reminded that his 
argument was originally written down 1989 and published in 1990, as Hobsbawm 
reminds in his preface to the Turkish translation. 
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Hence, the nation-states have been assumed to uphold the right to pursue the 
development and practice of the language of the proclaimed nation (Barbour & 
Carmichael, 2000). However, the rising waves of nationalisms of ethnicities turned 
linguistic minorities of the nation-states into new nations, or they reclaimed their 
―abused‖ right to become one). The political actors of these nationalisms raised a 
similar demand, like that of the nation-state: the political independence or autonomy of 
the distinct linguistic/cultural community.  
Coupled with the rise of equality and freedom of choice as basic values, at least in 
theory, the road to the recognition of the languages of autochthonous and immigrant 
minorities was drawn. Coulmas concludes that  
―[t]hus, ironically, in combination with progressing democratization, 
monolingual language regimes have become instrumental in their own 
undoing. All Western countries … are faced with increasing linguistic 
pluralism in urban centres and, calls for deregulation notwithstanding, feel 
compelled to introduce more language regulations targeted especially at 
immigrant communities‖ (2005a, p. 12).  
2.3.4 English as the global lingua franca 
Besides the pressure from below by the minorities, nation-state language policies 
are also under threat from above by the overwhelming effects of English, which has 
developed to be the worldwide lingua franca, not only in the capitalist consumer 
universe, but also in academics, international communication and organizations. English 
seems disempowering national languages, even in homeland domains such as the 
language of the university education. On the other hand, intrusion of English hinders the 
instrumental functions of both national and minority languages. They are rendered to be 
less effective in increasingly interconnected universe of institutions and processes. 
Coulmas comments: 
―[M]arketization, democratization and deregulation favor languages of 
scale and undermine the instrumental utility of local languages. Push 
factors, such as government sanctioned foreign language education, and pull 
factors, such as tourism, cross-border communication, Internet trade and 
international migration advance the expansion of English. More generally, 
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bigger languages expand at the expense of smaller ones. Diminishing 
linguistic diversity worldwide is the result‖ (2005a, p. 12). 
Many researches and arguments are produced concerning the global diffusion of 
English (see Pennycook A. , 1994; Siedlhofer, 2001; Brutt-Griffler, 2002; Crystal, 
2003; and House, 2003). A concept used to explain the hegemonic power of English has 
been ―linguistic imperialism‖ (Phillipson R. , 1992). Chimombo summarizes the debate: 
―This imperialism is most clearly confirmed in the fact that 80 percent of 
the information stored in the world's electronic retrieval systems is in 
English, with the vast majority of people communicating in English through 
the Internet (Crystal 1997:360). Far from being a "neutral" international 
language, culturally and politically, English is asserting and maintaining its 
dominance by ‗…the establishment and continuous reconstitution of 
structural and cultural inequalities between English and other languages‘ 
(Phillipson 1992:47; cf. Pennycook 1994:12). The dominance of English is 
thus leading, if not to linguistic genocide, at least to ‗linguistic curtailment‘ 
(Pennycook 1994:14)‖ (1999, pp. 222-223). 
Surely, the constitution of structural and cultural inequality with respect to 
globalization is not confined to linguistic sphere; there is also political inequality at 
stake where the non-Western subjecthood has to express itself in the conceptual 
framework of the West. According to Griffiths, technological imperialism that works 
through transnational communication and media networks implicate two further 
problems:  
―First, … the flow of information is still largely one-way and [is] 
determined by the economic control of the large Western international 
publishing houses and media distributors; and secondly, ... when the 
postcolonial world wants to employ the resources and technology of the 
metropolitan world to speak, it had better learn to do so in voices and 
accents (for these read formats and structures) which people in the West 
want to hear‖ (1997, p. 131; cited in Chimombo, 1999, p. 223). 
Again ironically, opposition to globalization at the international level is also 
organized in English. The Internet and English are not merely the medium of global 
domination; they are also the connection that enables a global resistance (Coulmas, 
2005a, p. 13). 
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Resentment of local nationalisms operates in language politics, as well, in 
addition to the reactions against the dynamics of economic and political globalization. 
The idea of protection of national languages serves two advantages for nationalism: it 
both enables the fabrication of defensive language policies against the perceived attack 
of English, such as limiting the use of the latter in certain sites such as shop and 
company names; and it re-confirms the rigidity of the national language policies against 
minority demands.  
 
In summary, latest studies on language politics have focused on recently 
generated areas of research and are equipped with new theoretical directions. New 
concepts have been crafted to unearth the disguised relationships of language and 
politics as they are revealed by emerging problematics. One of these new concepts, 
―language regime‖ is considered most effective for the framework of this dissertation.20 
Below are the theoretical introduction of the concept, its implications for the association 
between language politics and power relations and a final debate on how it can help to 
illuminate our understanding of the dynamics of language politics in Turkey.  
2.4 A History of the Concept of “Language Regime” 
In fact, the notion has already been used for some decades, however with a 
restricted scope. The political tensions concerning what language should be used in the 
services of schools, municipalities or governments of some states with multilingual 
populations were already on the rise in late 1960s and 1970s. Scholars, who were 
interested in language status problems in administration and education systems of 
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 Other relevant new concepts are linguistic culture (see Schiffman, 1998 and 
2006), linguistic landscape (see Landry & Bourhis, 1997; Hicks, 2002; Ben-Rafael, 
Shohamy, Amara, & Trumper-Hecht, 2004; Shohamy, 2006; Gorter, 2006; Backhaus, 
2007; and Shohamy & Durk Gorter, 2009), language/linguistic ecology (see 
Mühlhäusler, 1996 and 2000; Maffi, 2000 and 2001; and Pennycook, 2004) and 
language ideology (see Silverstein, 1979; Joseph & Taylor, 1990; Woolard, 1992; 
Woolard & Schieffelin, 1994; Schieffelin, Woolard, & Kroskrity, 1998; Blommaert J., 
1999 and 2006; and Kroskrity, 2000a).  
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multilingual social settings, used the notion of language regime to describe policies of 
official language. Main debates were about the ways to implement monolingual or 
bilingual language regimes in bureaucratic services and/or schools. Such studies 
focused on two major geographical areas where language regime debates were similarly 
assessed: Canada with her francophone state, Quebec (see Pharand, 1968; Rowat, 1968; 
Smiley, 1978; and Esman, 1982) and Belgium with her problems of regionalism 
between Flanders and Wallonia (see Stephenson, 1972; Dunn, 1974; Geiger, 1980; and 
Halls, 1983). 
 These earliest uses of the notion of ―language regime‖ should be evaluated within 
the theoretical framework of traditional LPP research and action. The concern in those 
studies was rather about maintaining the national unity than it was about cultural 
diversity. Both in Quebec and in the regions of conflict in Belgium, there were localities 
with populations in majority and who spoke languages other than the official language 
of the federal state. In the ideological climate of the world-wide decolonization process 
where political legitimacy of local majorities were celebrated, the main thrust of 
policies regarding language regimes was to preserve the status quo of the overarching 
political structure. In order to maintain the integrity of the polities, some of the 
linguistic minorities have been granted with rights to a certain extent. However, on the 
other hand, the policy makers were cautious about that any compromise in favor of 
linguistic rights would not trigger struggles of independence by the local majorities. 
In the literature up to the 1990s, a clear definition of what a language regime is 
had not been offered. It was rather used in line with the concept of political regimes, in 
the ideological atmosphere of Cold War, where macro nation-state politics were 
classified as regimes: liberal/capitalist/democratic or totalitarian/socialist/communist. A 
regime was, then, taken to be the totality of basic premises according to which a 
government administered the political unit.  
In 1991, Jonathan Pool offers the first clear definition for a ―language regime‖. 
Pool‘s aim is to work out a proposal for a model to overcome the efficiency-fairness 
dilemma that arises in governance of multilingual societies. The peak point of that 
dilemma is about determining the official language(s) of a polity and Pool exclusively 
focuses on that problem. Pool, therefore, first defines what he called as the ―official 
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language problem‖: ―a set of language policy choices that have particular consequences 
and that are subject to particular normative criteria‖ (1991, p. 497).  
In addition to fairness and efficiency, there are a large number of norms inhabited 
by various solutions to the official language problem. Pool gives an account of these 
norms: 
… authenticity (favoring indigenous languages), uniformity (favoring 
only one language), diversity (favoring multiple languages), distinctiveness 
(favoring languages unique to the community), universality (favoring 
languages known by outsiders), stability (favoring existing language rights 
and statuses), radicality (using language policy to liberate oppressed 
groups), definitiveness (avoiding linguistic options), liberty (noncoercion), 
modernization (favoring languages with developed lexicons and literatures), 
populism (favoring mass over elite languages), prestige (recognizing 
already-high-status languages), antibossism (discouraging powerful 
linguistic intermediaries), and tolerability (avoiding policies that would 
induce emigration or secession)… (my emphases, 1991, p. 497). 
Based on these normative premises, states and institutions determine their 
language regimes. Pool identifies a language regime as ―a rule [that is] producing a 
language policy‖ (1991, p. 499). He emphasizes the functions (in mathematical terms, 
as well) of a regime; of which inputs would be linguistic facts, such as the numbers and 
the size of language groups, and output to be a language policy that would ensure both 
justice and efficiency (ibid.). He proposes ten possible models and compares them with 
respect to their power in efficiency and political fairness. 
Pool later develops his definition, in another article in 1996. The writer, here too, 
is primarily interested in the politics of official languages, this time for the European 
Union. He identifies two possibilities of linguistic regimes for the Union: 
―The prevailing conditions in the EU create a clear choice between two 
families of language regimes. One family satisfies the professed norm of 
equal language treatment by making either none or all of the groups' 
languages official. The other family, by making only the largest languages 
official, systematizes the common EU practice of sacrificing language 
equality for cost reduction.‖ (Pool, 1996, p. 159) 
Similar to his work in 1991, Pool compares alternative regimes. Here, he extends 
his discussion of language regimes and defines two dimensions of them: (a) ―a set of 
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official languages‖ and (b) ―a set of rules governing their use‖ (1996, p. 164). With such 
a description, he aims at to disable any reductionism regarding a language regime. He 
warns that: 
―[T]he official languages of an institution do not completely define its 
language regime. Two institutions with different official languages must 
have different language regimes, but two institutions with the same official 
languages need not have the same language regime. Nor do the rules 
governing the use of official languages completely define a language 
regime. For example, two institutions that both require all official 
communication to take place in a single official language still have different 
language regimes if their official languages differ. Likewise, if either the 
official languages or the rules change, the language regime changes. (Pool, 
1996, p. 164). 
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Pool develops the span of a language regime, on the one hand, with the 
composition of official languages and their respective consequences on the linguistic 
communities, and, on the other hand, with the variety of rules with which the chosen 
languages are managed. The management is, basically, about the way the institutions 
the official languages employed are run, such as those of education, bureaucracy, or 
other offices of the state.  
Pool‘s approach is institution-centered and clearly functionalist. He is more 
interested in the ways in which language regimes are utilized and how they (should) 
function. A language regime, accordingly, is presented as a possible project of a 
government, or of a governing body such the European Union, shaped by its political 
motives and morality. In this sense, Pool understands a language regime as a 
governmental practice, a matter of choice and political vision. Pool‘s early attempt of 
defining what language regime is, therefore, limited in its power of explanation with 
respect to the power relations that generate those language regimes and that the latter 
transform. 
Pool emphasizes that it is a characteristic feature of the macro social and political 
establishments to develop some sort of a language regime. He notes that for a polity, 
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 It should be noted that Pool‘s argument was basically on the discussion of the 
language regimes in the EU, so he was writing specifically about multilingual official 
language environments. It is for this reason that he accentuated on ―a set of official 
languages‖ rather than one official language. 
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indifference to religious or racial diversities, for example, is a possibility. However, it 
has to choose and use language(s) (1991, p. 496), and the choice is inevitably political 
in its nature, regarding the institution‘s authority over related social networks of power. 
Florian Coulmas, a scholar who has utilized the concept of language regime with wider 
implications, joins Pool at this point: ―Some states limit their attention to instrumental 
aspects, while others also take an interest in esthetic and symbolic functions of 
language. However, all states have a language regime, which finds expression in the 
allocation of various statuses to the languages used within their territories‖ (1998, p. 
66). Coulmas‘s position will be analyzed in detail below, but before that another 
functional definition, by David D. Laitin, will be examined, as it stands closer to that of 
Pool in terms of its empirical methodology and its focus on officialdom. 
In his article dated 2000 where he utilizes the notion of ―language regime‖, Laitin 
discusses the ways in which language communities could be indexed. His distinction is 
based on the number of languages in a political territory, which are either officialized or 
crucial for social or economical mobility. In line with his aim, he distinguishes two 
forms of language regimes: (a) rationalized language regimes and (b) multilingual 
regimes (2000, p. 151).  
For the first type of language regimes, Laitin derives the notion of rationalization 
from Max Weber‘s Economy and Society (1968) and redefines it for his purpose.  
―Rationalization, the authoritative imposition of a single language for 
educational and administrative communications, is a concept borrowed from 
Max Weber (1968), who used the term to refer to modern state practices of 
standardization and bureaucratization. A common currency, a common legal 
system, and a unified tax code are all examples of rationalization, as would 
be a common administrative language.‖ (my emphasis; Laitin, 2000, p. 
151).  
The second type of language regimes, multilingualism, is identified with respect 
to the states that are not able to pursue a single-language policy, for one reason or 
another (ibid.).  
Laitin further categorizes each type of language regimes with reference to how 
they were achieved. He identifies three ways for realizing rationalized language 
regimes.  
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Firstly, rationalization through the recognition of a lingua franca occurs ―when 
there is a language spoken widely and understood practically universally within the 
boundaries of a state, but this language is not associated as the mother tongue of a 
significant language-group living within that state‖ (ibid.). His examples are Swahili in 
Tanzania, Bahasa in Indonesia, and English in the U.S. 
Secondly, rationalization through the recognition of the language of a majority 
group takes place when ―a dominant language group [has and practices] the power to 
impose its standard on a wider society‖ as happened in France for French, in China for 
Han Chinese and in Japan for Kyotsugo Japanese (ibid). 
And thirdly, rationalization through the recognition of the language of a minority 
group is the last type of outcome as in ―the rationalization of Spanish by Mestizos in 
South America, Halle Selassie's policy to impose Amharic on Ethiopia, and Afrikaner 
attempts to make Afrikaans the rationalized language of South Africa‖ (ibid).  
Concerning multilingual regimes, Laitin defines two distinguished sets. 
Firstly, ―multilingual regimes with individual multilingual repertoires‖ involve the 
development of different language repertoires that are required by distinct functional 
domains. These different domains might include ―official regional affairs … economic 
exchange in large businesses … for official business with the central state … for local 
services such as hospitals and primary schools‖ (ibid.). Laitin‘s frequently referred and 
quoted model of multilingual regime is derived from Indian case:  
―In India there is a well-established (but not formally recognized) 3 ± 1 
language regime. Here, Indians with aspirations for a wide range of mobility 
opportunities must know Hindi (the language of much popular culture and 
some state documents), English (the language of the higher civil service and 
big business), and the state language (used for most state services and 
education). This is a three-language formula. For those who live in a state 
where Hindi or English is the state language, only two (3-1) languages are 
necessary for one's repertoire. For those who are minorities within states 
where Hindi and English are not state languages, and seek minority rights, 
their people need to know four (3+1) languages – English, Hindi, the state 
language, and their minority language‖ (Laitin, 2000, pp. 151-152). 
His second type of multilingualism is achieved through pillarization. In this 
regime, there is no necessity for individuals, even if they pursue social or mobility, to be 
multilingual. However, the political organization itself is multilingual: ―Each region 
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under pillarization has equal rights to write laws, to impart education, and to administer 
society in its own language. There is no necessity for a citizen living in one pillar to 
learn the language spoken in regions of the other pillars, but there is a minimal level of 
bilingualism for those who develop a specialty in all-pillar governance‖ (2000, p. 153). 
Laitin‘s examples for this category are Switzerland and Belgium.  
Laitin‘s work is policy oriented and, as described above, it aims to create a model 
with empirical indices and well-defined categories. He is not interested in the political 
dimension, if not in consequences, of the establishment of rationalized or multilingual 
language regimes. Hence political processes involved in making a lingua franca or 
minority language the only official one, for example, or of what reconfiguration of 
power relations such rationalization or multilingualism results in have not been taken 
into consideration in his work.
22
  
Like Jonathan Pool, Laitin gives clear definitions of language regimes and 
explains their various implementations. The works of both authors are confined mostly 
to polities and the way states organize the use of language(s) at the official level. Their 
common approach is institution-centered and they hardly attempt to discover relations 
of symbolic power that any language regime generates. Their theoretical preferences 
stems from their interest to build up practical solutions for linguistic conflicts at the 
official level.  
The study of politics of language closely depends on how ―political‖ is defined. In 
the classical sense, politics is relevant to sphere of action of governments, states and 
other actors associated with governance. This particular definition of ―politics‖ narrows 
the conceptual universe of the notion with a bias towards institutional configurations. 
Within this conceptual framework, a study of language politics and language regimes 
would be focused, fundamentally, on the actions, practices or programs of the 
governmental bodies.  
However, there is another approach in political philosophy, which associates 
politics with broader relations of power. Accordingly, in this approach, politics as a 
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 In relation to that, Safran refers to Laitin as ―a proponent of the ‗rational-
choice‘ thesis‖ (Safran, 2004, p. 2) 
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noun turns into an adjective as ―the political‖, marking a state of affairs. Mouffe 
elaborates:  
―The political designates the potential antagonisms inherent in human 
relations and can manifest itself in many different social relations. Politics, 
for its part, indicates the ensemble of discourses, institutions and practices 
which aim at establishing an order; at organising human coexistence, in a 
context that is always conflictual because of the presence of the political.‖ 
(1993, p. 8; quoted in McAuley, 2003, p. 4).  
Here, politics is considered intrinsic to human social relations, which involve 
intersecting arrays of discourses and practices of power. Such an expanded 
understanding of ―the political‖ takes the concept beyond organized competition for 
access to institutions of power, as in party politics, or beyond the practices of 
domination exerted by macro bodies of governance.  
Such an opening of the concept of the political also transforms the way language 
politics is understood. To consider the issue of language in society as an issue of 
dynamic power regimes rather than a problematic of institutional politics also empowers 
the attempt to understand and explain language in society.  
The next sub-section reviews Florian Coulmas‘s works, in which his perspective 
on language regimes is closer to the notion of ―the political‖ than ―politics‖.  
2.5 Language Regime as Symbolic Domination 
Coulmas, who, in his works, deals with the transformation of language regimes 
and the widespread effects of due language policies, reminds us first, that his 
understanding of the language regime is centered on administered language (2005a, p. 
3).  
Unadministered language, Coulmas identifies, is oral and acquired spontaneously. 
Administered language, on the other hand, is literal and formed consciously through 
various institutional domains such as, he exemplifies, ―schooling, literacy education, 
terminology creation, and other measures of corpus planning‖ (Coulmas, 2005a, p. 3). 
Spoken, unadministered language has a higher capability for adaptation to changes in 
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communication requirements. Coulmas, borrowing the notion of an invisible hand 
guiding the fashion of this adaptation from Keller (1994), contrasts language 
administration as the visible hand, which takes various forms of manipulating language 
use (ibid.). 
What seems to be missing in this categorization by Coulmas is the fact that orality 
is not completely free of social conventions or linguistic morality in a given community. 
His emphasis on the administration of written languages seems like he suggests that 
unwritten languages are not subject to social or political control. Florian Coulmas 
kindly replied my questions on the issue and further deliberated on the issue:  
―Regarding language regimes, you should distinguish two things, (1) the 
administration of languages and (2) language as an object of 
administration/regulation. A language regime that regulates language use in 
a community can refer to both spoken and written language. For instance, 
only certain languages are admissible in national parliaments or other 
official bodies in speech and in writing. Limitations are placed on the 
display of a written language in public places, or on its use in speech. This 
refers to the fact that a given language can or cannot be used in a certain 
context. (personal communication with Florian Coulmas, April 2008). 
Here Coulmas distinguishes between language regime and administered language:  
―On the other hand, the notion of administered language refers to the way 
it is used, that is, the traditional domains of corpus planning: spelling, 
grammar, phonetic standardization, lexicon, terminology. These activities 
are typically bound to a language that has a written form. The use of 
unwritten languages can be proscribed or permitted, but it is very difficult if 
not impossible to administer them in the sense of standardization, systematic 
lexical development, phonetic normization, etc. Thus ―language 
administration‖ can be concerned with written and unwritten languages, as 
the case may be, but ―administered languages‖ are typically languages that 
do have a written form.‖ (ibid.). 
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In this sense, Coulmas differentiates between the general regulations on various 
uses of language and the particular administration of the language itself, which 
concentrates on the language itself, in other words, on its corpus planning.
23
  
Indeed, verbal hygiene, as a concept made popular by Cameron (1995), is but one 
illustration of that how speakers of a language ―routinely make value judgments‖ and 
―active[ly] attempt to improve or ‗clean up‘ language‖ (Cameron, 2006, p. 407). Apart 
from individually conscious manipulations, spoken language is also bounded by social 
regulations such as registers, politeness, age related speech, sub-cultural domains of 
alternative language uses, etc. There are strictly administered speech acts, too. In some 
cases oral language, or unadministered language, is interfered by the political 
administration from above. Typical examples would be banning of the speaking of 
mother tongues of minorities, as was the case with Kurdish in the first decades and the 
post-1980s of Turkey.
24
 Therefore, the administration of a language, the planning of its 
written and spoken forms, vocabulary or other inherent characteristics is only one of the 
elements of language regime practices. Language regimes encompass a wider space of 
intervention and regulation. 
For Coulmas it is critical to underline that we can talk about language regimes 
since languages are artifacts, rather than natural structures. His approach to language, in 
this regard, is similar to that of Bourdieu‘s, whose ideas on the subject have been 
presented in the previous section. However, the constructedness of language, Coulmas 
concludes, is by no means clear in the public mind:  
―[r]ather, the notion of a language regime tends to evoke suspicion if not 
resistance because language is so often talked about as a natural system, 
where ‗natural‘ is understood by some, notably the adherents of Noam 
Chomsky‘s conception of biolinguistics, in the strict sense of the natural 
                                                 
23
 The classification for language planning as corpus and status planning was first 
introduced by Kloss (1969). ―This dichotomy has set the trend in language planning 
studies for the past 25 years‖ (Daoust, 1998). Recently, language planning has been 
widely accepted to comprise another dimension as well, acquisition planning (Cooper, 
1989). On language planning, also see Haugen (1966; and 1983). 
24
 Another example would be the banning of certain words to be used in 
broadcasting by the Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) in 1984. Further details will be 
given in the following chapter. 
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sciences, while others just mean objects that have come into existence 
without deliberate planning‖ (2005a, p. 4).  
For highlighting how such a naturalist approach is widely accepted, Coulmas 
presents, as an example, the common opposition against the language reforms (ibid.) 
which has important implications for the Turkish case, as well. One of the favorite 
counter arguments against reforms of language is that the latter disturbs the natural 
development of a language. This perspective is very typical of conservative stance 
against modernist/rational social intervention. Coulmas, however, notifies that since 
every linguistic system is an artifact ―the notion ‗natural development‘ must be called 
into question‖ (2005a, p. 4).   
Having preliminaries laid down, Coulmas defines a language regime ―as a set of 
constraints on individual language choices [consisting of] habits, legal provisions, and 
ideologies‖ (2005a, p. 7). Coulmas, elsewhere, discusses the various complicated ways 
in which these three dimensions of language, habit, legal provisions and ideology 
interact. Below, the repercussions of these three elements of language regimes are 
discussed.  
Ideally, legal provisions reflect habits and they are supported by ideologies, but 
this is not always the case. Sometimes, inconsistencies appear, generating pressure for 
adjustment. For instance, habitual functional domain allocations of languages may 
change in ways that diverge from current legal provisions, ideologies or market forces. 
Language of the education in many developing and post-colonial countries is a popular 
site of language debate, and a good example of such a divergence. Is higher education a 
domain that is exclusive to the national language, or is there a place for English as well?  
Another example concerns the status of minority languages. Although individual 
speakers may be able to and may want to use language X in a courtroom, they may not 
be permitted to do so because the rules of procedure determine that language Y must be 
used. In this connection, clear criteria for distinguishing X from Y are particularly 
important (Coulmas, 1998, p. 7).  
The use of language or linguistic choices does not naturally just occur nor are they 
under complete control of human intentions. People and communities have linguistic 
habits as more or less regulated practices of linguistic behavior. Some uses fit more in a 
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situation rather than others. They seem to be tailored for some circumstances, and in 
most cases, speakers or writers find themselves employing a particular variety of 
language without even noticing it. Not strictly bound by rules, habits mostly determine 
the way language is exercised. Coulmas offers the notion of inertia for the habitual 
implications of language regimes (2005b, p. 187). Establishment of a linguistic regime 
creates a potential for inertia that, in advance, ensures the regime‘s prevalence. A 
regime produces or transforms peculiar linguistic subjects, who would act within its 
boundaries. The expansion of the effect of the regime within the linguistic domain, in 
time and in space, enforces and generates habitual dynamics. Coulmas notes that 
language regimes are ―supported by habit and inertia‖ in many cases (ibid.).  
The concept of ―ideology of language‖ is recently proved a valuable source for the 
construction of another theoretical framework. The notion is variably used as language 
ideology, linguistic ideology or ideology of language.  
Irvine, in her definition of the concept, emphasizes its structural context; "the 
cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their 
loading of moral and political interests" (1989, p. 255). Silverstein, on the other hand, 
emphasizes the agency dimension, and defines the language ideology as "any [set] of 
beliefs about language articulated by the users as a rationalization or justification of 
perceived language structure and use" (1979, p. 193). Although mostly used in social 
anthropological research, the notion is also useful in explaining the ideological aspects 
regarding language regimes. In this sense, Coulmas‘s stress on ideology is significant, 
since language regimes exhibit complex relationship with linguistic ideologies. This 
relationship will be elaborated below. 
Habits of language use and ideological formations related to language regimes 
mostly correlate with a set of legal terms. Every language regime not only generates 
habitual uses or is backed by ideologies of language, but is also secured by the force of 
authority. The designations of use of official languages, the laws that may allow or 
forbid specified uses of various languages, and encouragement or punishment of the use 
of a particular variety of language are all within the domain of legal arrangements. 
Within the contemporary politics system, legality is constructed and maintained by 
states. 
43 
 
2.5.1 States and Language Regimes 
Pool has noted, as cited above, that every polity has to establish some sort of 
language regime. For Coulmas, the leading role in establishing language regimes is 
played by states. He highlights the instrumental factor for a state to found language 
regimes and notes, ―the state has an interest in establishing a language regime and is 
widely believed to have the right to do so, if only by virtue of the fact that the state 
communicates with its citizens by means of languages of its choice. State interest in 
language is basically instrumental‖ (1998, p. 67). With various degrees of importance, a 
language regime would work for a state in terms of providing it with a medium of 
communication for its efficient operation, setting up a working connection between the 
subjects and the governing bodies, and ascertaining horizontal or vertical relations for a 
particular economical system, etc. It is not only that states claimed the right to build 
language regimes, but also typically, it is believed that they should do so. Especially 
under the command of nationalism, state is assumed to be the main guardian of all that 
is deemed to national, and therefore, of the language as well. Popular demand for the 
protection and the management of language by the state or by authorized institutions is 
not a rarity in today‘s linguistic politics.  
Coulmas enhances his argument that language is under social and political control 
in modern societies, emphasizing that 
―… the idea that language is and, ought to be, subject to regulation by the 
powers to be is so deeply ingrained in all literate cultures that it will not be 
abandoned easily. Orthographic standards, reference dictionaries, mother 
tongue, second and foreign language curricula, standardised tests, 
publication, rules of procedure, provisions for the recognition of speech 
forms as languages and legitimate forms of expression, official status 
ascriptions on international, national, regional, and local levels are all 
measures predicated on the fundamental idea that language is not to be left 
to speakers‘ choices or unchecked market forces, but controlled by a regime 
which, presumably, serves the common good‖ (2004, p. 5).  
Other than the instrumental functions of language regimes, Coulmas also 
identifies a symbolic function (2005a, p. 11) that corresponds to the representational 
relations of a language. Closely related with the ideological and political settings, a 
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language or one of its varieties might symbolize an ethnic or national identity, 
religiosity, or a status- or a class-bound social position.  
The symbolic nature of language within the politics of nationalism is widely 
debated (see Barbour & Carmichael, 2000), and will be frequently elaborated as the 
discussion of this thesis evolves.  
With respect to symbolization of religiosity, Arabic would be a good example. 
Arabic is regarded in the Islamic world as sacred as Allah communicated with his last 
prophet and the book of the last religion was revealed in Arabic (see Suleiman, 2003).  
Exemplifying how a language is symbolized as a marker of social status, Amara 
shows how Hebrew, in contrast to the sacredness of Arabic, ―symbolizes the desire and 
aspiration to associate oneself with the modern outside world‖ for Palestinians in Israel 
(2002, p. 62).  
Consequently, as states have instrumental motives for establishing language 
regimes, they also operate symbolic functions. A nation-state usually aims to benefit 
from the legitimacy produced by the claim of being the political representative of 
culturally and linguistically unified subjects. To that end, such a state would labor for 
the foundation of linguistic spaces and domains in which the symbolic power of the 
language would be generated. In this sense, language ideologies and symbolic functions 
of language are knitted together. 
At this point, it would be meaningful to turn back to Bourdieu again. His idea of 
symbolic power and symbolic domination is directly related to the language ideologies 
and regimes.  
Following Bourdieu‘s debate on official language, it is arguable that the most 
modernist language politics single out the official language as the only legitimate one, 
and turns a tongue into the formal communicative medium. This monistic perspective 
establishes the official language as the representative of the political unit.  
What takes place at this point is the constitution of a unified linguistic market, 
which is dominated by the official language. It is at this very moment, the language 
regime gains another momentum, beyond its instrumental function. Via language 
regimes, not only rules, but also norms regulating linguistic practices and the ideologies 
of language are constructed. Domination of the linguistic market by the official 
language, with all the support, encouragement and enforcement of the state power, 
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inevitably transfigures existing linguistic relationships. Bourdieu describes this process 
of structural change as integration into a single linguistic community, which is a product 
of the political domination that is endlessly reproduced by institutions capable of 
imposing universal recognition of the dominant language (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 46). 
Bourdieu‘s analysis embraces the historical dimension, as well. According to him, 
in the absence of ―objectification‖ in writing, ―languages‖ only exist in the practical 
state, in the form of linguistic habitus.
25
 Concerning the European modernization, until 
the French Revolution, linguistic unification went hand in hand with the empowerment 
of the monarchical state: ―the popular and purely oral uses of all the regional dialects 
[were] degenerated into patois‖ (original emphasis, Bourdieu, 1991, p. 46).26  
French Revolution stamped its mark, with respect to our subject, with its 
enthusiasm for creating a new man, and a new language. Bourdieu identifies the 
political conflicts as the consequences of ―struggle for symbolic power, in which what 
was at stake was the formation and re-formation of mental structures‖ (p. 48). War on 
language was an essential aspect of this struggle, and the state was the main site for 
reification of this symbolic power.  
It is worth to elaborate on how the modern state happens to be foremost agent in 
determining language regimes. Blommaert emphasizes the centrality of state in 
organizing ―a particular space in which it can establish a regime of language perceived 
as ‗national‘ and with particular forms of stratiﬁcation in value attribution to linguistic 
varieties and forms of usage (2005a, p. 219). He explains that ―the state is one of the 
main organisers of possible sociolinguistic contrasts within a particular space: it allows 
others to create differences between their norms and those that are valid nationally (e.g. 
those that are transmitted through the education system)‖ (ibid.).  
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 McLuhan, similarly, observes a strong relationship between the development of 
modern politics and the domination of the written language over orality or of text over 
performance (2001). 
26
 In this sense it is import to note that becoming a minority language, or a non-
standard variety, then, is a process of political disempowerment. Bourdieu defines the 
process as ―social devaluation‖ (1991, p. 47). Similarly, there is no minority, per se, but 
the dispossession of power. It is not only that minorities lack power, but, more 
importantly, their lack of power results in their statuses as minorities. 
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According to Blommaert, state‘s fundamental role in the formation of language 
regimes derives from the very qualities that define it as the political body of the modern 
governance. It is the state which has the capacity to assemble and administrate a 
infrastructure ―for the reproduction of a particular regime of language: an education 
system, media and culture industries - each time a selective mechanism which includes 
some forms of language and excludes others‖ (pp. 219-220).  
What he explains at this point has important implications for the strength of the 
notion of language regime as a meaningful theoretical framework for this dissertation. 
For Blommaert, the state‘s capacity corresponds to its power to apply substantial control 
over ―access to symbolic resources and access to spaces of interpretation and value 
attribution‖ (p. 220). The state has the coercive instruments that enable it to practice 
such a widespread effect on the social sphere it rules: the legal system and the law 
enforcement system. Blommaert concludes, ―[s]o the state is often a determining force 
in the sociolinguistic landscape, in contrast to other centering institutions whose effect 
can best be described as dominant‖ (ibid.). The case is more so in Turkey, since the 
state has assigned itself the very responsibility to build a modern nation with its culture 
and language, and therefore it has been the foremost actor in the establishment and the 
maintenance of the language regime. 
2.5.2 Language Regimes, Policies and Planning 
States perform their effective roles in the formation and preservation of linguistic 
regimes through employment of language policies and planning, therefore, a brief look 
at the ideas on their links would be useful. 
In his analysis of the relationship between language regimes and language 
policies, Coulmas focuses on how the function of a language policy affects a language 
regime: 
 "The goal of a language policy is to perpetuate, establish or undo a 
language regime. Some examples of language regimes are the European 
Charter for Regional and Minority Languages, China‘s recognition of 55 
minority languages, Switzerland's territorialization of its official languages, 
Ireland's designation of Irish as its national and first official language, and 
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Quebec's 1977 Charter of the French Language which stipulates that all laws 
must be printed, published, adopted and approved in both French and 
English‖ (2005b, p. 186).  
For Coulmas, language policies function on language regimes. Pool presents a 
contrasting version of the relationship between language regimes and policies. He 
argues that language regimes produce language policies by taking into account 
linguistic facts of a community (1991, p. 449). Hence, for Pool, language policies are 
sub-functions or sub-programs of language regimes and are dependent on them. On the 
other hand, Coulmas assigns a more autonomous position, or priority of effect, to 
language policies.  
Coulmas incorporates ―language planning‖ in his conceptualization of language 
regimes, as well. He marks language planning as the implementation plan of language 
policy that aims to change the language regime (2005b, p. 186). With the example of 
language planning of East Timor, he argues that:  
―Specific language-planning measures fall into two categories illustrated 
by the two articles of the East Timorese constitution ... status planning and 
corpus planning corresponding, respectively, to macro- and micro-
sociolinguistics. While Article I declares Tetum and Portuguese official 
languages thus determining their status, Article 2 which calls for Tetum and 
other languages to be developed is concerned with not the status but the 
state of languages, their corpus. For a language policy to be effective it 
needs status planning and corpus planning since both are interrelated. Tetum 
will not be able to serve the functions of an official language unless it is 
developed. A third category, acquisition planning, is sometimes considered 
separately in addition to the other two (e.g. Cooper, 1989, p. 33)‖ (Coulmas, 
2005b, p. 186). 
In summary, in Coulmas‘s theorization, (a) a language regime is a general 
framework within which linguistic activity in a society is organized, (b) a language 
policy is a program that shapes a language regime and (c) language planning is a sub-
agendum to install language policies.  
Although Coulmas has informed the theoretical interpretation of the notion of 
language regime for this dissertation in a fundamental way, it is considered that Pool‘s 
approach to the relationship between LPP and language regimes is more plausible than 
that of Coulmas‘.  
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Hence, language policies and planning is described, in this work, to be produced 
and performed within the boundaries of the ideological/practical framework that is 
defined by the language regime. Once a language regime has been set, it has to be 
implemented by means of employment of certain language policies – concerning the 
extent of the use official language(s) in educational institutions, in courts, in economical 
transactions, etc. Language planning also stems from the premises of the language 
regime, in that, a regime determines status planning, and a regime almost always 
implies the ways in which a language would be developed by corpus planning. 
Similarly, acquisition planning, that refers to the ways in which speaker would obtain 
certain linguistic skills, is usually inhabited by the practical implications of a regime of 
language. 
Language regimes act on the linguistic realm through policies and planning of 
language. They are operated within particular sites of communicative, where they 
become realized. The next section deals with varieties of these sites and their relevance 
to the establishment and working of a language regime. 
2.5.3 Sites of Language Regimes 
One important idea in the literature of language regimes is that language regimes 
are not always explicit. According to Coulmas, a language regime consists of 
―… both of explicit, even legally binding components and implicit, 
habitual elements. […] Many countries have, by custom or statute, a 
national language thus establishing the foundation of a national language 
regime that is typically subject to a variety of modifications and restrictions 
of international and intranational provenance. Only some aspects of a 
country‘s language regime find expression in decrees and statutes. To a 
large extent, a language regime consists of practices, often unchallenged, 
which have evolved over time without much deliberate planning‖ (Coulmas, 
2003, pp. 246-247; quoted by Katsuragi, 2005, p. 45).  
In his inspiring work on the language policies and linguistic cultures, Harold 
Schiffman attempts to typologize language policies. His conceptualization of the notion 
of language policy is close to Coulmas‘s use of the notion of language regime, and there 
Schiffman similarly emphasizes the dual forms of language policies. He distinguishes 
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―overt (explicit, formalized, de jure, codified, manifest) policies and covert (implicit, 
informal, unstated, de facto, grass-roots, latent) aspects of the policy‖ (1998, p. 13). 
Unearthing the distinction of de jure and de facto language regimes enables us to 
articulate the ways in which language regimes, as assigned from above by legal texts, 
are either constructed, maintained or subverted and how the social configurations of 
power relations reflect onto linguistic issues. This approach keeps us in a safe distance 
from focusing merely on the dimension of the state and from state-centeredness in 
language-in-society research. It, therefore, facilitates a more complete representation 
with the inclusion of agents and structures of language use into the analysis.  
However, such an emphasis should not obscure the inequality of power between 
language regimes and users of the language within that regime. Blommaert (2005b) 
highlights one final decisive effect of the states in the social formation of language:  
―The state can contribute a materiality to its role as a centering institution 
in a way hard to match by others. The state has the capacity to provide an 
infrastructure for the reproduction of a particular regime of language: an 
education system, media, culture production - each time a selective 
mechanism which includes some forms of language and excludes others. 
The state, in other words, has the capacity to exert substantial control over 
the two dynamics of access ... to forms and access to spaces [domains] of 
interpretation. The state has coercive instruments usually exclusive to the 
state: the legal system and the law enforcement system. So the state is often 
a determining force in the sociolinguistic landscape, in contrast to other 
centering institutions whose effect can best be described as dominant.‖ (p. 
397) 
The infrastructure that state acts upon for the reproduction and the consolidation 
of a language regime is comprised of various sites where language regimes are realized. 
Actually, the language regimes function in all the domains that the state authority is 
exercised.  
Public offices, where a state gets in touch with its citizens, are significant sites of 
the language regime practices. In state institutions, there are languages that could be 
legitimately used, while others are ignored or directly forbidden. Application to those 
offices has to be in the official language, and citizens are expected to master the 
language, at least, at a level of basic communication with the state administrative 
centers.  
50 
 
The core language of a regime is also critical for political mobilization. In most of 
the countries, either candidates for offices are required, directly, to have the skills to 
communicate in the official language, or indirectly, to have degrees of certain levels of 
education, which itself mostly ensures the mastery of the language.  
Educational system is one of the most important sites within which a language 
regime operates and governs. The schools, and especially those at the elementary level, 
work as the reproduction centers of a language regime. It is in the schools where the 
children are forged into the linguistic system as the citizens of the political community 
and members of the cultural unity. The officially recognized form of a language is 
transmitted to those whose linguistic activities are ordered, and who consequently 
become the subjects of the linguistic regimes.  
In most modern states, the language of education is exclusively the official 
language. As unitary ideologies of nationalism still sweep across the world, children 
with mother languages different from the official one are not allowed to speak it. Apart 
from formal valuation function, that is the valuation or the legitimization of one 
language over others, the schools also operate to facilitate standardization of the 
language. Different varieties, accents or dialects of the education language are leveled at 
the school. ―The identity of language‖ is constructed in the educational institutions 
(Coulmas, 2004). 
Jurisdiction is another sphere of action for language regimes. The working 
language of the judicial system, similarly, is almost always the official language, 
although those, who are not able to communicate in the prescribed tongue, are provided 
with interpreters, in general. Nevertheless, equality before justice, then, is mediated 
through interpretation for those who are not able to speak or write the language of the 
court.  
Organization of the public sphere, if not its direct control, is another business for 
which a state is held responsible. The management of public spaces involves the 
designation of the information flow, and this opens up a vast area of action, from public 
signs to media industry. Anthony Brown quotes Shohamy about the workings of 
language regime on the public level:  
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―Yet aside from mere dissemination of information, the choice of 
language(s) on public signs accords a degree of ethnolinguistic prestige 
and/or status that serves a powerful symbolic function. Shohamy (2006, pp. 
110-111) contends that individuals in authority, i.e. governments, 
municipalities, NGOs, global and smaller companies, intentionally convey 
symbolic messages through signage about ‗the importance, power, 
significance and relevance of certain languages or the irrelevance of others.‘ 
In doing so, Shohamy claims that public space becomes ‗a most relevant 
arena to serve as a mechanism for creating de facto language policy,‘ and in 
some instances, ‗for influencing and creating de facto language realities‘ 
(ibid.)‖ (Brown, Status Language Planning in Belarus: An Examination of 
Written Discourse In Public Spaces, 2007, p. 282). 
One last, but not the least, site that is worth to mention is the language of mass 
media. Benedict Anderson‘s arguments on print capitalism and its relation to the 
formation of nationalism (1991) facilitated detailed inquiries of the relationship between 
languages and ideologies in the modern age. In most polities, where modernity has been 
a project rather than a process, and where capitalism has not preceded the formation of 
the modern state institutions and ideologies, the political control on mass media has 
been firmer. That is why, a solid enforcement on mass media is generated by the 
language regimes that are established and governed by states, rather than civil society. 
Concerning the intentions of this dissertation, the dynamics of the relationship between 
language regimes and the commoditization of newspapers, radios, televisions and other 
forms of information technologies are crucial and they will be explored in detail in the 
following chapters.  
2.6 Language Regimes and the Theoretical Framework of the Dissertation 
This last and concluding section summarizes the theoretical debate on the notion 
of language regime, and defines it in order to describe the theoretical structure of this 
dissertation.  
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a ―regime‖, with respect to social 
relations, as the following: 
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―1. (a) the act of governing; government, rule. (b) A particular form or 
kind of government; a prevailing system 2. (a) A manner, method, or system 
of rule or government; a system or institution having widespread influence 
or prevalence. (b) The set of conditions under which a system occurs or is 
maintained‖ (2002). 
Accordingly, three basic dimensions of a social or political regime can be 
delineated: its form (of governance), its manner (method or system concerning its 
operation), and the extent of its effect or prevalence. A regime also involves a 
dimension of institutionality with which its dominance is sustained. Although the 
Oxford definition does not refer to matters of agency, it would be appropriate to 
consider that regimes are comprised of unequally positioned subjects, and this 
inequality derives from the unequal distribution of power within the framework of the 
regime itself. Inequality entails asymmetrical access to institutional or procedural 
resources, which in turn makes some of the members of the domain more powerful in 
decision-making processes or more effective in the reproduction of the regime.  
Two scholars who have produced major works on language regimes, Jonathan 
Pool and David D. Laitin have centered their arguments by defining a regime through 
the ways in which official languages are chosen and operated. In this dissertation, the 
notion will be expanded far beyond that. Inspired by the Foucauldian understanding of 
―power‖, a regime will be reconceptualized as a general framework in which language 
and its use is organized, and that generates and generated by particular power relations 
and ideologies of language. 
So therefore, a language regime could be defined through two steps.  
Firstly, a language regime is the regulation (purposeful or not, de jure or de facto) 
of linguistic activity, both in content and status, within a defined space of 
communicative action. This space could be either the universe of a speech group of a 
particular language, or an interactional linguistic multiplicity. This scope of a language 
regime could encompass political or social formation of the administration of a 
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language or a particular variety, along with the formation of an elite culture
27
, to be a 
symbolic demarcation of social stratification, ethnic or national inclusion or exclusion, 
etc. Borrowing Coulmas‘ reflection, a regime consists of habits, legal provisions and 
ideologies of language (2005a, p. 7). 
Secondly, to further refine the definition for the purposes of this study and 
elaborate on the political dimension of a language regime, the notion corresponds to the 
governance of the linguistic domain within a defined political territory, through the 
employment of particular policies or planning. Such demarcation of the space of 
linguistic activity inevitably brings the state forward as the primary actor of determining 
and maintaining language regimes. Reconfiguring the discussion of state‘s role in 
language regimes above, the state leads the scene of language regime and its interest in 
this establishment is both instrumental and symbolic. It is instrumental in the sense that 
an organization of the use of a language or a variety of a language is inevitable for a 
modern-state to be utilized in its operations of internal bureaucracy, or its 
communication with its citizens or subjects, be it defined clearly in constitutional texts 
or not. The state‘s interest is also associated with the symbolic functions of a language 
regime, within which the national language is assumed to represent the uniqueness, 
authenticity, unity and cultural wealth of a nation, as defined within the ideology of 
nationalism and the practices of nation-states. Symbolic implications of a language 
regime are not confined to the function of representation. A regime also acts actively on 
the very construction of the political body called nation.  
An essential point to be underlined is that the language regimes are founded and 
maintained within a social matrix of unequal distribution of power. Coulmas reflects on 
the issue:  
―As any other regime, a language regime is the result of rival interests 
and reflects inequalities in social strength and power… Language regimes 
are a means of social control and the ability to make language-related 
                                                 
27 
Perry re-introduces the concept of linguistic elite closure and describes it as ―a 
system where language policy perpetuates the privileged status of an elite class, 
commonly by way of enshrining a minority language as the de facto or de jure official 
language of the state‖ (2003, pp. 7-8). Perry‘s definition echoes Laitin‘s third type of 
rationalized language regimes (with a single official language), that is rationalization 
through the recognition of the language of a minority group (see above). 
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choices on the policy level and on that of language planning are distributed 
quite unevenly‖ (2005b, pp. 186-187). 
In other words, language regimes are derivative functions of power relations – 
that is, a particular configuration of power relation produces a relevant language regime 
within which established power inequalities are maintained in and through the socio-
linguistic realm. In addition, they may also reinforce new power relations and 
transfigure the existing sociolinguistic relations by integrating hitherto unconnected 
communities of different languages and imposing among them a linguistic hierarchy. 
This has been especially observed in the processes of nation-state building. 
The state‘s predominance appears at this moment, once again. State‘s efficiency is 
reflected by its power as, what Blommaert calls, a ―centering institution‖. Blommaert 
boldly emphasizes the determinant power of state over frames of reference. Although, 
he advances, there will be other centers to overrule the state‘s authority, the state 
nevertheless in many cases appears the very institution that establishes itself as the main 
force defining relations among alternative centers and between itself and others (2005a, 
p. 220).  
The power of the state is enabled through its institutional network, which could be 
assessed as the sites of language regimes. These sites are where the language regime is 
reified and the unequal distribution of power in controlling the linguistic activity is 
reproduced, as pointed out above. An interesting point on how institutions function with 
respect to language regimes is about the way they take part in the emergence and 
diffusion of particular language ideologies.  
Debra Spitulnik, who has studied the language ideologies in the public 
broadcasting organization of the Zambian state, maintains that language ideologies are 
not only visible in the metalinguistic discourse, i.e., language about language, but are 
also ―embodied in a very fundamental and implicit sense within the everyday practices 
of institutions‖ (Spitulnik, 1998, p. 163). She proposes that ―the structural grounding of 
language ideologies in institutional practice is best understood as a process of language 
valuation and evaluation which occurs through specific kinds of semiotic processes‖ 
(sic., ibid.). She introduces the concepts of language valuation and language evaluation, 
borrowing from Saussure‘s concept of relational value and Voloshinov‘s concept of 
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social evaluation. She defines language valuation and language evaluation as ―processes 
through which different social values and referents come to be associated with 
languages, forms of speaking and styles of speaking‖ (p. 164). 
Spitulnik‘s emphasis on how these semiotic processes masks the contingencies of 
values of languages, and the power relations and interests underlying them, is the key 
understand the very nature of dynamics of the association between language regimes 
and ideologies. 
The notion of language ideology has been explored both theoretically and in terms 
of various case studies in recent years. A general agreement seems to have been formed 
on that language ideologies operate as bridges linking the micro-cosmos of a language – 
the way it is perceived, formed and used – with its macro-cosmos – the social structures 
of the community that speaks it. (Kroskrity P. V., 2000b; Paffey, 2007). Such a 
connection enables us to associate language regimes and ideologies, between which a 
dialectical relationship emerges. On this relationship, Milani reminds that: 
 ―… ideologies are not merely abstract systems of ideas, values, and 
beliefs existing in people‘s minds, but materialize in texts and discourses 
produced by ―real historical actors‖ (Blommaert, 1999, p. 7), and ultimately 
feed into actual policies and practices, thereby having a real impact on 
people‘s lives.‖ (Milani, 2008, p. 31). 
Language regimes are formed by those agents who have particular ideologies of 
language in their minds. The establishment of a language regime is framed by the way 
the linguistic universe is conceived by those actors, as well their practical limits in 
political power struggles.  
In turn, language regimes, once they start consolidating, construct new ideologies 
of languages or empower those that are already dominant. Therefore, while presenting 
how language regimes are founded and how they are conducted, it is an analytical 
necessity to reconstruct the ideological background, as well. 
Remembering Spitulnik‘s stress on language valuations, once again, it could be 
assessed that a language regime‘s symbolic domination effects on the definitions of a 
language, the way linguistic varieties are (de)valued, classifications of and hierarchy 
among languages, norms and legitimacies pertaining them, sites of usage, and qualities 
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of usage.
28
 In that way, linguistic aspects of symbolic capital for social mobilization is 
constrained and ordered by the valid language regime, and some subjects of that regime 
are, thus, rendered more advantageous over others.  
Language regimes have the power to simultaneously objectify and subjectify. 
They, on the one hand, produce or incite the productions of language as an object of the 
political action and regulation. The incorporation of vernaculars into the political sphere 
is the initial phase of formations of both language ideology and language regimes. The 
emergence of modern institutions of the state and the widespread integration of the 
masses into the economic and political realm created language as an object of desire 
over and through which power is pursued. Language regimes, on the other hand, create 
linguistic subjects, or docile linguistic bodies, to borrow Foucault‘s term (Foucault M. , 
1979), especially through mandatory educational facilities. Disciplining or colonizing 
minds is not only confined to issues of language and its use, but the ideological 
background of a language regime is also introduced, through discursive domination and 
the practices ―educate‖ the speaker on language use.  
In general, the process of subjectification proceeds mainly by making these 
―subjects‖ dispossessed of their means of creating meanings and make them dependent 
on the bombardment of meaning produced and imposed by discourses of language 
ideologies.
29
 So they are both subjugated by the regime that informs language 
ideologies (i.e., they are made the subjects of authority that orders language), and also 
they are turned into the subjects or the agents of the regime that serves as the pragmatic 
resource for language ideologies. In that way, the ideologies of language are embodied, 
practiced and transmitted by speakers. Here, the productive aspect of power is 
materialized besides its repressive effect.  
                                                 
28
 The emergence of linguistics, the scientific study of language, has a very 
exciting history, especially when this history is reviewed through its associations with 
language ideologies and regimes. Nonetheless, those aspects of the issue are considered 
well beyond the scope of this dissertation and therefore framed out. For the rise of 
linguistics, see Crowley (1996). 
29
 For a study, which employed the notion of ―docile bodies‖ within the context of 
language politics, see Pennycook (2002). 
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Within the framework of modern nation-states, this subjectification evolves 
towards cultural homogenization. The nation-building processes almost always 
conceived nation ―a linguistic identity, on the assumption of one language determining 
one nation determining one state‖ (Ozolins, 1996, p. 191). Homogenization usually 
involves the construction of a standard, manageable and national linguistic culture 
among citizen subjects and assimilation or exclusion of divergences. 
The problem of subjectification is interesting from another aspect, as well. First, 
as Kroskrity identifies, the notion of regime ―invokes the display of political domination 
in all its many forms, including what Gramsci distinguished as the coercive force of the 
state and the hegemonic influence of the state-endorsed culture of civil-society‖ (2000a, 
p. 3). The distinction between political society (the state) and civil society by Gramsci; 
―…correlates with distinct mechanisms of control – coercive and 
hegemonic apparatuses respectively. According to some interpreters of 
Gramsci, the state – in both its narrow sense (as government) and its more 
general sense (as the source of state-endorsed culture) – employs these 
different mechanisms in an attempt to control citizens through both forceful 
domination of the state and consent-organizing ―leadership‖ of its 
hegemonic culture.‖ (Kroskrity P. V., 2000a, pp. 33, n. 1).  
The state appears acts for the consolidation of its power. The concern here is the 
production of consent. Various processes of subjectification, which the state organizes 
and sustains, generate subjugated subjects, not only consent to the authority of the state, 
but also actively labor to reproduce it. 
Apart from symbolic functions, language regimes materially classify and stratify 
linguistic varieties. Some are recognized as official, others ornamental (such as 
provincial vernaculars or accents) and mostly tolerable, while some are denied, banned, 
degraded, or even denied being a proper language. This last aspect of language regimes 
is particularly relevant to linguistic minorities. Coulmas underlines the historical 
background of minority formation and states that  
―[s]ince the establishment of society-wide language regimes and 
compulsory education in the nineteenth century, many such groups have 
been forced to accept restrictions on the use of their languages in state-
controlled domains, such as education, government, and law.‖ (1998, p. 68).  
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Actually, this is what constitutes language groups as linguistic minorities. Hence, 
linguistic minority is a category generated by political action, not a transcendental state 
of being. This is important to underline to uncover the historico-political foundations of 
macro sociolinguistic relations.  
 
To conclude; the concept of language regime allows us to reconsider the power 
relations within a particular context of language politics. Language regime demarcates 
both the macro linguistic situation and the ways in which that linguistic situation was 
formed, transformed and reformed. It enables shifting the focus of analysis of language 
politics from the notion of language as a mere instrument for the achievement of 
political goals, mostly those of nationalism, to the notion of ―language as power‖. 
Taking language as power means to start with the postulation that language is more a 
social fact than a grammatical structure. Kroskrity asserts that ‘regimes of language‘, 
―promised to integrate two often segregated domains: politics (without language) and 
language (without politics)‖ (2000a, p. 3). 
This analytical approach facilitates a wider inquiry to investigate the processes of 
producing truth regimes about languages, ordering hierarchies of language varieties and 
of those who are speaking them, reconfiguring power relations pertaining to language, 
and the institutions and practices that generate, maintain or subvert a linguistic regime.  
Besides, the changes of language policies or ideologies are, argued here, better 
explained through the changes within the framework defined by language regimes. In 
particular, the issue of change in established language regimes is associated with the 
various dimension of an overall process, called globalization. Coulmas summarizes the 
kinetics of language regime changes in globalizing environments:  
―Since the French Revolution, language regimes in many parts of the 
world have been predicated on the nation state which appropriated one of 
the languages spoken within its borders as its national language. In recent 
decades, the privileged position of national languages has been challenged 
by ideas of democracy and equality as well as a proliferating discourse of 
non-discrimination, on one hand, and the force of global English, on the 
other. Rudimentary contours of an international language regime are 
becoming apparent which places restrictions on national language regimes 
and is likely, as the effects of globalization reach ever more areas of society 
and culture, to grow in importance. International standards are evolving, and 
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as a consequence national language regimes will gradually cease to be 
understood as the inviolable sovereign right of the state alone. Proscribing 
the use of minority languages will gradually become more difficult.‖ (2004, 
p. 5) 
The crucial position of the state as a ―centering institution‖, as offered by 
Blommaert, in discursive frames of reference and at the practical level was reviewed 
above. The next step to his contribution, incorporating Coulmas, would be to discuss in 
what ways states‘ centering power over language regimes is undermined through the 
global attack of English, and the sub-national discontents‘ claims of ethnic language. In 
that way, it would be possible to build a referential framework to understand the modes 
of change of language regimes in globalizing environments. 
As presented in this introduction chapter, it is a primary concern for this 
dissertation to answer why there has been so much conflict about language in Turkey, 
and what the social and political backgrounds of such a controversy have been. One of 
the basic assumptions regarding this question is that Turkish politics has always been 
intrinsically linked with issues of language. However, it seems that the main track of the 
debates pertaining to this link has shifted frequently in a way to be explained in detail in 
the next chapter.  
Language regime is assessed as a notion with theoretical details reviewed above, 
as the most promising one to understand the dynamics of relationship between language 
and politics. Throughout the text, the term is used variably as ―language regime‖, 
―regime of language‖ and ―linguistic regime‖, as the recent literature on the problematic 
did. With its implications, the idea of language regime is assumed to enable us to 
articulate a better analysis of the politics of language in Turkey. That is, to 
conceptualize the history of Turkish language politics through the notion of regime 
allows us to ask questions about how the linguistic universe in Turkey has been 
established; how it was maintained; what aspects of linguistic activities were 
administered; to what extent it achieved its goals or failed, and how recent challenges to 
the Turkish language regime.   
What is intended here is more than finding out in which language regime category 
that the case of Turkey would fit in. Pool‘s and Laitin‘s categories are, for sure, useful 
but are principally devised for the authors‘ propositions of a fair and efficient official 
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language systems. Although Turkey‘s installation of the official language policies will 
be elaborated in detail in the next chapter, and a concluding assessment of Turkish 
language regime with respect to Pool‘s and Laitin‘s categories will be given in the last 
part, this thesis will focus more on the symbolic aspects of the regime.  
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CHAPTER 3  
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES 
IN TURKEY 
3.1 Introduction 
For an appropriate presentation of the language regime in Turkey, and to 
enlighten the politico-historical background of controversies pertaining to it, the next 
two chapters will present and assess the history and the current situation of the language 
regime in Turkey.  
In this chapter, as the Turkish political tradition and, therefore, the linguistic 
ideologies intrinsic to it had been informed by the political developments occurred 
during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, a summary of the Ottoman past of 
language politics will be presented as an introduction 
After that, the next chapter will present the history of language politics and 
ideologies, the debates over various aspects of language and legal regulations that, in 
one way or another, have affected the use and the status of Turkish and other languages 
of Turkey. The ideological background of linguistic nationalism, the linguistic map of 
Turkey, which has considerably changed, and the legal history the construction of the 
Turkish language regime will be displayed in detail. While reviewing the language 
political history, the theoretical possibilities offered by the concept of language regime 
will also be included in the analysis, as well.  
Although, it is just noted that there is a continuum regarding the political sphere 
between the Ottoman Empire and the Republican era, the periodization of the history of 
62 
 
language politics is based on the republican break in this dissertation.
30
 There are two 
basic reasons for that.  
First, the republican elites were much keener on their associated projects of 
modernization, secularization and nationalization, as it will be displayed below in detail. 
Therefore, they did not experience the hesitancies of the Tanzimat or İttihat ve Terakki 
Cemiyeti (the Committee of Union and Progress, ĠTC henceforth) leaders. Surely, the 
rapid transformation of the cultural realm was as much related to the mindsets of the 
politicians as it was bound to the international and internal political circumstances. The 
republicans had ruled after a successful war against occupation and had different 
climate of legitimacy, both inside and outside the country. The Independence War and 
the Lausanne Treaty created distinct political conditions that were quite dissimilar to 
that of the Ottoman Empire of the post-World War I international context. Both the new 
state and its urge for a total modernization was legitimate, therefore the way they 
employed linguistic policies was radically different.  
The analytical separation of the Ottoman and Republic periods is also justified by 
the theoretical implications of the notion of ―language regime‖. The following section 
will reveal that, regarding the political conditions of the post-Tanzimat era, the political 
elites were unable to build a consistent and powerful language regime within the 
empire. From a viewpoint of agency, neither their political and military power nor their 
ideological standpoints were adequate for the establishment of a persistent regime. On 
the other hand, the structural conditions of both the Ottoman state and the society were 
non-resistant to a successful and solid modernization of the political institutions 
whereas such a modernization is essential for the construction of modern language 
regimes.  
                                                 
30
 The idea of a political continuity is at odds with the official Republican 
paradigm of Turkish history. While the Republican nationalist history thesis holds that 
the declaration of the Republic in 1923 has been a breakthrough in Turkish history, 
many historians observe that the ideologies and practices of the revolutionary 
Republican decades were already in the process of formation since the Tanzimat era. 
For a historical periodization that is different from that of the official thesis, see Zürcher 
(2003, pp. 1-6). 
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3.2 Before the Republic 
3.2.1 Pre-Ottoman regimes of Turkish language 
This chapter is not intended to be a complete history of Turkish language. Rather, 
it is confined to the aspects of politics that incorporated the Turkish language. 
Nevertheless, different constructions of the pre-Ottoman past of the Turkish language 
have been frequently visited within the contemporary discourses on language. This 
period has been a center of attraction for the many republican interpreters of the history 
of Turkish. The main argument is that the Ottoman era was a ―dark age‖ for the 
language, and it was the messianic revolution of the Republic that has saved it for 
good.
31
 Turning back to the antique resources of Turkish had been considered as a true 
nationalist attitude for the salvation of the language. On the other hand, the opponents 
of such an interpretation, mostly conservatives, also have been attracted to the period, 
since it was in this period that Turkish language displayed its greatness as the language 
of a great nation. To understand the language ideologies that are at work in the last 
century, then, a synopsis of pre-Ottoman period is required. 
The first written forms of Turkic languages were unearthed in the 19
th
 century. 
They were stone inscriptions and were found in one of the valleys of the Orhon River, 
in Mongolia. Many historians of the Turkic languages maintain that they are an 
indication of a well-developed language (Özkırımlı A. , 2002, p. 50). Nomadic life style 
of Turkic tribes both enabled the dispersion of their language to a vast geography and 
also caused grammatical and vocabulary exchanges with neighboring cultures. There 
have been other relics, inscriptions and manuscripts, few in number, in what is now 
Mongolia and China. This period is known as the first one in the history of the written 
varieties of Turkic languages: pre-Islamic East Old Turkic period (Johanson, 2006, p. 
162).  
As the Turkish clans advanced more to the West, they came across militarily weak 
but culturally strong civilizations. Iran, as it was between the geography of birth of 
                                                 
31
 Behar (1992) explains how the denial of Ottoman and Islamic past was 
reflected in the Republican historiography.  
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Islam and the Turks coming from the Central Asia, was more influential in the 
reformation of the Seljuk and Ottoman linguistic cultures (Belge, 2005, pp. 369-370). 
According to Johanson, these times correspond to the second period comprises the early 
times of assimilation to Islam, and lasted until the early modern period of 16
th
 century 
(2006, p. 162). 
Kemal Karpat notes that it was in this second period that Turkish went under 
strong Arabic and Persian influences and, ironically, when two major works that many 
accept as the monumental works of the linguistic heritage of Turkish, were produced 
(Karpat K. H., 2004, p. 441). Both were written in Kashgar (in today‘s China). 
The first one was Divan-ü lûgat at-Turk (Compendium of Turkic Dialects), 
written by Mahmud al-Kashgari, around 1072 and 1074. The book was a dictionary, but 
also a catalogue of the main Turkish groups and dialects of the eleventh century. Karpat 
emphasizes that:  
―Kashgarlı argued that the name ―Turk‖ was given by God and that it 
was a religious duty to learn Turkish, which was in his view as good if not a 
better language than Arabic and Persian; he mentioned hadises (later proved 
not authentic) in which the Prophet and the Caliph Umar (634–644) were 
made to praise the Turks.‖ (2004, p. 441) 
Mahmud tried to reverse the pressure of Arabic on the Turkish language. Mahmud 
also commented favorably on the purity of language. Intrusion of Persian and other 
languages was considered a flaw in the clarity and the correctness of the language (cited 
in Karal, 1978, p. 24). 
Kutadgu Bilig (published in English as ―Wisdom of Royal Glory‖) was written by 
Yusuf of Balasagun (Yusuf Has Hacib) and was dedicated to Buğra Khan of the 
Karakhanid dynasty (999–1212), in 1170 (Paksoy, 2002, p. 479). Karpat reminds that 
the book was ―a didactic poem of over 6,000 couplets which seems to have enjoyed 
great popularity in its time‖ (Karpat K. H., 2004, p. 441). 
Karpat‘s comments on these works are interesting:  
These works, along with others of lesser impact, express a profound 
attachment to the Turkish language and were intended to make the Turks 
known to the Arabs but also to preserve and propagate their language as the 
vehicle for the Turks‘ ethnic-linguistic identity within the framework of 
Islam. Both works can be read today by someone possessing the old 
65 
 
vocabulary and a good knowledge of phonetic changes… One may argue 
that the Divan-ü Lügat-it Türk and Kutadgu-Bilik were created, as some 
Turkish secularist-nationalists claim, in order to defend the Turkish 
language against the Arab rulers who used Islam as a vehicle for the 
assimilation of other peoples. Actually the reverse was the case. These 
works reflect the fact that Turkish flourished under Islam‖ (2004, p. 441). 
Karpat associated this thrive of Turkish language and the ethnic attachment to it to 
the characteristics of the Islamic conception of umma. He argues that as long as 
communities with languages other than Arabic accepted the political supremacy of the 
Islamic communal bond over ethnic and national loyalties, they did not experience any 
pressure on using their languages. He underlines that:  
―For a Muslim, membership in the umma superseded, without 
undermining or destroying, membership in a linguistic ethnic group, as the 
loyalties required for the two memberships were not in conflict—at least not 
until the introduction of Western type nationalism which gave priority to 
ethnicity and language and made them the basis of political organization‖ 
(Karpat K. H., 2004, pp. 441-2). 
As Karpat himself registers, this perspective is quite contrary to the republican 
version of the history of Turkish language. It is widely accepted that the retreat of 
Turkish is best exemplified in the Empire of Seljuks, where Persian was accepted as the 
official language. In literature too, Persian was dominant in the cultural circles of the 
Empire. Besides, there existed the unrivalled hegemony of Arabic as the language of the 
religion and science. Belge and Karal finds the situation of Persian and Arabic in the 
Turco-Islamic domains similar to that of Latin for the educated European elites in the 
Middle Ages (Karal, 1978, p. 23; Belge, 2005, p. 370).  
After a while came another triumphant moment for the ―glorious history‖ of 
Turkish. Karamanoğlu Mehmed Bey, in 1277, declared Turkish to be the language of 
officialdom and public speech. Karal, in his review of the Turkish language problem in 
the Ottoman Empire, observes the linguistic with respect to ―national unity‖. In 
his/story, for Mehmed Bey and the coming Ottomans basic political concern was to 
establish the cultural and national unity in their principalities and across Anatolia 
(Karal, 1978, pp. 23-27). Murat Belge (2005, pp. 38-39) warns that the declaration of 
Turkish as the language of state in 1277 should be analyzed free of today‘s nationalist 
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aspirations. He comments that during that time Arabic and Persian was the lingua franca 
of the ―civilization‖ in Anatolia and the declaration means to facing backwards to the 
Central Asian origins of the Seljuks in the face of an overwhelming cultural hegemony 
of the Anatolian landscape, which threatened Seljuks‘ dominance. 
After the Seljuks, the Anatolian principalities of Turkic origins continued to speak 
Turkish heavily influenced by Arabic and Persian, as Ottomans did. However, the 
conquest of Constantinople marks the rite of passage into the imperial age for the 
Ottomans, and language had its share. Belge comments that this should not be a 
determined language policy, but that language developed in a new way under the 
general settings of the new situation. (2005, p. 370) 
3.2.2 Ottoman politics of language 
Unlike the Seljuks, the Ottomans did not designate a specific official language. 
There were many non-Turkic communities whose linguistic affinity to Turkish 
strengthened the process of consolidation and growth of the Ottoman state (Karpat K. 
H., 2004, p. 446). Karpat adds that, although Greeks and Armenians had the chance to 
develop their languages without any impediment,
32
 the affinity of most of the non-
Turkic peoples to Turkish with its being ―the preferred language for everyday 
communication, particularly in cities and towns and mixed villages, because it was the 
language of the ruler and of the administration‖ (2004, p. 449)‖. Bernard Lewis, 
similarly, comments on the issue that Islam and Turkish language were pass cards to 
higher social statuses and political power for Kurds, Arabs, Albanians, Greeks and 
Slavic people (1980, p. 163).
 33
  
                                                 
32
 Karpat associates the much-celebrated ―tolerance‖ of the Ottomans with the 
very logic of being an empire. ―However, as innumerable ethnic and religious groups 
came under its authority, the Ottoman state attempted to accommodate them ethnically, 
religiously, and culturally on an equal basis by stretching to the maximum the religious 
tolerance and permissiveness of Islam‖ (Karpat K. H., 2004, p. 450). 
33
 For another account of the linguistic and ethnic transformation of the Anatolian 
peoples during and after the Seljuks and Ottomans‘ rule, see Meeker (2001, pp. 89-98) 
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Karal, indicates that, despite that there was no official language policy and the 
increasing use of Arabic and Persian in the court business, Enderun, the special school 
for recruiting bureaucrats to the palace, taught exclusively in Turkish during the reign of 
the Mehmet II. He also notes that in Acemi Oğlanlar Okulu (preparatory school for 
Enderun), Mehterhane (the Janissary Band), Tophane (artillery school) and Tersane 
(shipyard) Turkish was the language of education. Mehmet also issued his own 
Kanunname (book of codes) in Turkish, simple in its style and short in sentences, for 
the possible purpose of understandability for a large audience (Karal, 1978, p. 33). 
Nevertheless, taking into account that Mehmet II enabled a freedom of Greek by taking 
the Patriarchate under his imperial protection and that he did not hesitate to 
communicate with his Rum subjects in Greek (Karal, 1978, p. 34), it could be 
concluded that he was pragmatic more than doctrinal in his dealings with language. In 
parallel, Karal cites Köprülü where he notes that Greek had long become the diplomatic 
language between the Anatolian principalities of Turks and the Byzantine Empire and 
the Ottoman bureaucracy palace used it until the end of the 16
th
 century (ibid.). 
Although Karal celebrates the reign of Mehmet II for its preference of Turkish in 
many domains, he adds that the introduction of words from other languages gained 
momentum too (Karal, 1978, p. 36). This note is in parallel to what Belge remarks, that 
becoming an empire out of a small and local principality entailed a totally different 
language regime (2005, p. 370). The change in the political vision and structures had 
their effect on language use in contexts like diplomacy, navy building, titles of social 
stratification, etc. 
The influence of Islam and Arabic increased in the first half of the 16
th
 century, as 
a result of the expansion of the Empire‘s dominion over Egypt, when the dynasty 
acquired the Caliphate, and to Hejaz was joined with the holy cities of Medina and 
Mecca (Karpat K. H., 2004, p. 447).  
Karpat summarizes the linguistic history of Turkish for the rest of the 16
th
 century 
Ottoman Empire:  
 ―A separation of the court and especially literary language from the 
vernacular began and was accelerated during the sixteenth century, in part 
due to the sophistication of the Ottoman cultural, social, and artistic life. 
The social division between the vast ruling order composed of bureaucrats, 
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poets, the religious establishment, merchants, and other community leaders 
on the one hand, and the masses on the other, deepened so that two worlds 
were created, each one having its own Turkish language, the one 
sophisticated and complex, the other homely and simple. The lack of an 
educational system prevented the dissemination of high class Turkish 
among the masses. The emerging court literature adopted not only Arabic 
and Persian words but also a large variety of ingenious though often 
artificial constructions‖ (2004, p. 448).  
After the 16
th
 century, the third period of history of written Turkish according to 
Johanson (2006, p. 162), what is known as the Ottoman language began to form. It was 
a result of a liberal policy that allowed the introduction of Arabic and Persian 
vocabulary, which was based on the base of Turkish grammar. Belge also argues that 
Ottoman language was the language of the written texts and daily speech should have 
been constructed with more Turkish vocabulary (2005, p. 370). As an example of pre-
modern empires, the Ottoman State did not feel obliged to build an intense 
communication with its subject, and a well-known discrepancy between the language of 
the educated elites and that of commoners was established the Ottoman domains that 
was rapidly forming into an empire from a local principality. 
However, Belge warns the reader again against the nationalist interpretation of 
history. He argues in opposition of the idea that the ―corrupt‖ elites of the Ottomans 
found it unproblematic to ―pollute‖ the Turkish language, while the Turkish lay people 
remained loyal to their national essence and refused the intrusion of foreign languages. 
Belge states that the linguistic gap was formed in the Ottomans mainly because of the 
educational opportunities of the elites and the subjects (2005, p. 371). The classical 
political culture of the Ottomans involved the refusal of any intermediary aristocratic 
strata between the state and the society, and was very sensitive in protecting the 
hegemonic dominance of the palace over its subjects of various ethnic and religious 
origins. Belge, too, notes that this was particularly an important aspect of the Ottoman 
politics (2005, p. 219). In that sense, Ottoman state elites were also sensitive to the 
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protection of the elite language or its degradation. The language of the palace and its 
annexes also exerted a symbolic power of the political sphere over the social.
34
  
By the 18th century, the social stratification in terms of cultural capital and 
political power was at its peak. Karpat associates the cleavage between the ―high‖ 
language, of the upper classes, and the ―low‖ language, the vernacular, with the increase 
in the numbers of the elites, such as bureaucrats, scribes (20,000 in Istanbul in the 18
th
 
century), religious men, merchants, artisans and others (2004, p. 449). Karpat reviews 
the general linguistic situation of the time: 
―The basic educational system – medreses – placed the emphasis on 
religious learning, which required a knowledge of Arabic, while it was de 
rigueur for any self-respecting poet and intellectual to know Persian as well. 
The social dichotomy between the ruling order and the masses and the lack 
of a political ideology based on linguistic unity prevented the emergence of 
an educational system designed to disseminate the rulers‘ language, thus 
delaying the emergence of a uniform Turkish national language‖ (2004, pp. 
449-50).  
For Karpat, the profound change in the structure of the Ottoman State brought 
about the need for a more complex vocabulary for the expression of the new context. 
The enlargement of the society‘s elite classes and the structural changes that are 
experienced by the Ottoman State inevitably changed the linguistic ideologies: 
 ―Thus the vernacular and the language of the upper classes diverged still 
more sharply, until the words ―Turk‖ and ―Turkish‖ came to refer 
exclusively to the coarse, primitive, rural folk of Anatolia and Rumelia, and 
the society was clearly divided into the elites (has) and the commoners (am 
or havas, the latter meaning one who lives with the five senses)‖ (2004, pp. 
450-1). 
                                                 
34
 Belge gives an interesting detail of the Ottoman linguistic history. He notes that 
even those children who knew Turkish were not included into devşirme system 
(recruitment of young boys, mostly non-Muslims, for the service of the Palace). It is 
known that levied boys were subjected to a total identity transformation and they got 
devoid of their linguistic and cultural backgrounds. Belge thinks that this linguistic 
practice was a part of the preference of mentally virgin young ones, children of non-
elite families and those who had no craftsmanship, who had not seen the Capital before. 
(2005, p. 180). 
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Karpat draws the attention to a paradox concerning the political power and 
concern for language: 
―The early states of Uighur and of Chagatay, each of which lasted about 
two centuries, perished as political entities at the hands of nomadic 
conquering groups. Yet these states displayed a keen linguistic 
consciousness and tried to retain their Turkish language. The Ottoman state, 
far richer and more sophisticated than its predecessors, achieved both 
stability and continuity, lasting from 1286 to 1918, but it gradually lost its 
ethnic-national character and its linguistic consciousness until the revival in 
the second half of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the Turkish language 
survived and developed, chiefly as the consequence of the historical 
accident of its being the language of the administration rather than as the 
result of a consciously devised state policy or the political consciousness of 
the population. There was no forum or association charged with the study 
and diffusion of Turkish‖ (Karpat K. H., 2004, p. 450). 
Karpat‘s remarks are important, as the main argument of the republican historians 
of Turkish language was that it was the affinity of the Turkish speakers with their 
language that prevented its demise, despite the irresponsible and ungrateful rulers. 
3.2.2.1 Printing in the Ottoman Empire 
One of the novelties that radically changed the way language has been treated in 
the Ottoman Empire has been the coming of the printing house. It was printing and the 
possibilities that it enabled which basically determined the way language has been 
debated one century after it was first used for printing Turkish books under the control 
of the Palace.  
A short history of printing would enlighten the ways in which its introduction into 
the linguistic universe of the Empire and the formation of modern paradigms of 
governance coincided. 
Although the printing house has been considered to be established first by Ġbrahim 
Müteferrika in the Empire, the non-Muslim minorities were in the business of printing 
much before him. The first printing house was opened by Jews in Istanbul in 1495, and 
later in Salonika and then another one in Istanbul (Berkes, 2007, pp. 58-59; The 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, p. 799). Berkes comments that the main motive behind this 
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quick adaptation of printing was religion for the Jewish community and that it generated 
religious debates in large sections of the religious community (ibid.). Another basis for 
this would be the close relationship of Jews in various European countries who were 
acquainted with printing. It had been only a few years since thousands of Jews were 
forced to migrate out of Europe, especially from Spain to the Ottoman Empire. 
Armenians opened their own printing house in Istanbul in 1567. The first book 
printed was on the Armenian Alphabet. The first book in Turkish language printed in 
this house was titled ―This is a book containing what is necessary for our Christian life‖ 
(The Encyclopedia of Islam, p. 799). Similarly, religion seems to be the primary 
incentive for Armenians, too. In 1710, the Ottoman government banned books causing 
religious conflicts within the Orthodox and Catholic communities and closed the house 
(Berkes, 2007, p. 62). Orthodox Greeks, too, opened a printing house in Istanbul in 
1627 (The Encyclopedia of Islam, p. 800). 
Although there were printings in the Arabic Alphabet in Europe and these were 
traded in the Empire, there were no houses exclusively devoted to printing in Turkish 
with Arabic alphabet until Müteferrika in the 18 century. 
Ġbrahim Müteferrika collaborated with Mehmet Said PaĢa for establishing the 
printing house. Berkes remarks that he had most possibly been acquainted with printing 
before his conversion in Hungary (Berkes, 2007, p. 57). He prepared a report, Wasilat 
al-tiba‟a, where he stated the need for printing and presented it to the şeyhülislam and 
the padişah, Ahmet III. The necessary fetva and ferman were issued and the house was 
established in 1727. They were allowed to print on all subjects but the religious issues. 
Lack of sufficient paper interrupted the printing business and due to the diplomatic 
mission he was assigned in 1742, the house halted. In the same century, another printing 
house was established by the French Embassy to print in Turkish in 1787 (The 
Encyclopedia of Islam, p. 801). 
There are some points to be discussed after this short summary of the start of 
printing.  
The first one is the crucial period of encountering the European superiority. In 
1699, the Ottoman Empire was forced to withdraw from a land by a treaty (Karlowitz) 
for the first time and the decline had become more apparent. In Europe, there was an 
accumulating transformation of the political, governmental and military structures. An 
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immense advance in natural sciences and geography was taking place. In this situation, 
the non-Muslim minorities and the converted multi-lingual individuals serving the 
Empire were the main agents of transference of the technological and scientific 
novelties of the West, as the Ottoman state seems to be reluctant to take action in the 
face of these changes. Printing is a good example for this situation.  
On the other hand, as the Ottoman state decided to send envoys and establish 
embassies in European states towards the end of the 17
th
 century, long after the 
Europeans did so in various cities of the Empire. The educated diplomats and 
bureaucrats who visited those countries and made observation became the sources of 
reforms back at home. Yirmisekiz Mehmet Çelebi was in Paris in 1720. He was sent 
there to see the European civilization, to observe and to bring back information. His son 
Mehmet Said PaĢa, worked with Ġbrahim Müteferrika contributing with his experience 
of Europe and sympathy for change.  
As the European modernity had been diffusing into the Ottoman government and 
upper classes, the heads of the state and the religion had to be convinced for adopting 
new advancements. Ġbrahim Müteferrika wrote a memorandum to be presented to the 
padişah, first asking the question, ―Why do Christian nations, which were so weak in 
the past compared to Muslim nations, begin to dominate so many lands in modern times 
and even defeat once the victorious Ottoman armies?‖. He was asking Muslims to 
awaken from the slumber of headlessness and he added, ―let them be informed about the 
conditions of their enemies. Let them act with foresight and become intimately 
acquainted with the new European methods, organization, strategy, tactics and warfare.‖ 
He was asking geography to be learnt. He also wrote that Ottomans have to learn from 
the Russians whose Tsar had brought experts skilled in these sciences and reformed 
their armies (Kinross, 1977). Ġbrahim Müteferrika, had printed the maps of the Marmara 
Sea in 1719 and the Black Sea in 1724, and presented them to grand vizier, Damat 
Ġbrahim PaĢa, before the establishment of the printing house. Damat Ġbrahim PaĢa was 
quick to perceive how press could be used for military purposes. He was influential on 
padişah and şeyhülislam who did not hesitate to grant the authorization (Shaw & Shaw, 
1976, pp. 236-237). Müteferrika, later, printed another book to advise to the Sultan 
titled ―Usul ul-Hikam fi Nizam al-Umam‖, which is described by Shaw and Shaw as a 
kind of ―Mirror for Princes‖ (Shaw & Shaw, 1976, p. 237). 
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Berkes rejects a common idea that postulates that ulema opposed strongly to the 
business of printing (2007, p. 58). He observes no apparent religious resistance against 
printing and that there is no historical evidence of a declaration of that ‖printing is 
against Sharia‖. Similarly, Berkes finds no opposition against printing during the 
revolts of Patrona Halil. Since religious matters were left out of the allowed subjects 
for printing, the alleged opposition from the scribes is also seen as ineffective by Berkes 
(p. 59). Shaw and Shaw connects the two themes and argue that agreeing the printing 
except religious subjects, Şeyhülislam preserved for the scribes the most lucrative 
source of income and soothed their opposition (1976, p. 235).  
However, the Palace did not release the business of printing completely free. 
Ġbrahim Müteferrika seems to be alert to the religious sensitivity and avoided any 
incidence to cause ulema‟s disturbance. He, for example, is said not to be able to print 
his own Risale-i İslamiye, his autobiography of his conversion (Ġslâm Ansiklopedisi, p. 
899). Şeyhülislam was assigned for proof reading everything printed (The Encyclopedia 
of Islam, p. 800). The new institution, moreover, was integrated into the traditional 
guild system. The owner of the printing house had to pay a kind of tax per book 
published. The prices were decided by the government. Running the business of 
printing needed to be obtained through the malikâne system from the State. Berkes 
recognizes this integration, hence the lack of autonomy as the main reason of 
underdevelopment of printing in the following years (Berkes, 2007, p. 59). Until the 
launch of mass media, printing business remained a monopoly of the state.  
All in all, Berkes thinks that the general resistance against printing among the 
Ottoman elites mainly had political, rather than religious concerns. He notes that 
observing the intensified religious turmoil among the non-Muslim minorities of the 
Empire cultivated by the expanding possibilities enabled by printing, the religious elites 
were reluctant in releasing  printing free to avoid similar conflicts within the Muslim 
community (2007, p. 63).  
There were 17 works printed in total, in 23 volumes and 13,200 editions during 
Müteferrika‘s period. These included linguistic books and dictionaries, history books 
and the ones on geography, military and natural sciences. Until Selim III, at the end of 
the 18
th
 century, only the following books were printed: the reprint of Kitab-i Lügat-i 
Vankulı, which was also the first book printed in the Müteferrika‘s printing house of and 
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all of its editions were sold out; the histories of Şakir-Subhi and İzzi; three books on 
military subjects, and a book on the Arabic language (The Encyclopedia of Islam, p. 
801).  
The printed books were expensive, although not as much as the hand-written ones. 
Berkes notes too that there was no pressure from the market for cheap and a large 
number of books (2007, p. 65). 
For the conclusion on the introduction of printing in the Ottoman Empire, there 
some points to be highlighted.  
Printing did not only brought a new technology, but also introduced and spread 
new themes that were unknown to the Empire, like geography and natural sciences. 
There were books by Katip Çelebi, Copernic and Tycho Brahe. The increasing interest 
in geography could be related to the growing concerns for the precision and territory. As 
the new way of diplomacy necessitated being cognizant of the borders of the lands of 
the states, and as the populations within the territories became factors more than simple 
tax-givers, the numbers, statistics and records became the tools of governing. However, 
in the case of Ottoman Empire, the products of printing seem to address only to a 
narrow circle of intelligentsia. The lack of interest in large number of cheap books could 
be related to the non-existence of a significant literate population, the religious content 
of education and the state control over the Islamic cultural domain of the Empire.  
Yet, another important point is the growing interest on language, and the printing 
of dictionaries. A good amount of Islamic thought had been based on the interpretation 
of Quran and hadiths of Mohammed. The absence of a standardized dictionary and set 
rules of linguistic interaction could be regarded as one the reasons for this. Similarly, 
with a standard Arabic-Turkish dictionary, the translation of Arabic history books gains 
more importance in reading the cultural hesitation of the Ottoman Empire against the 
European predominance on the horizon.  
The last point to be underlined is the gradual diffusion of modernity with its 
paradigm, practices and institutions into the Ottoman Empire. The recognition of 
decline, the idea of reform and adaptation of European techniques and strategies seems 
to be intertwined with the attempts to recover by searching for what had been done 
wrong and for the solution in the Islamic past. The times of the start of printing 
coincides with the start of the paradoxical modernization of the Ottoman Empire.  
75 
 
3.2.2.2 Ottoman Modernization and Language Policies in the 19th century  
Peter Burke, too, underlines that it was after the 18
th
 century that Turkish became 
a concern for many institutions of the Ottoman state (2004, p. 154). However, major 
transformation of the relationship between languages and political ideologies occurred 
in the 19
th
 century. Modernization‘s impact along with an attempt to transform the 
Ottoman state into a modern one and with the nationalization movements resulted in 
that the imperial language became problematic. As Belge approves this 
problematization is common in many nation-state building processes (2005, p. 371). 
Karpat evaluates the evolution of Turkish language in the 19
th
 century and notes 
that it had been conditioned by three major developments:  
(1) ―the introduction of at series of reforms, largely under the political 
and economic impact of the West‖, (2) ―the emergence of Ottomanism as 
the denominator for a common national identity‖, and (3) ―the introduction 
of a government-supported European type of educational system designed 
chiefly to train personnel for government services.‖ (2004, pp. 451-452).  
The 19
th
 century endeavors for the formation of a modern state bureaucracy, the 
reorganization of the military forces, introduction of Western institutions of education 
such as academies of engineering, military and medicine were insufficient to save the 
Empire but were decisive in the building of Turkish modern politics. New institutions 
brought with them new statuses and new ideologies.  
On the one hand, new bureaucrats of the state became involved more and more in 
the politics of language, either by state enterprises of publishing daily newspapers or by 
expanding the communication networks, such as postage or telegram services. Political 
modernization was substantiating itself while its practices compelled engagement in the 
rethinking of the problem of language. A more easily printable script and a simpler 
lexicon were becoming increasingly essential, as the ―high‖ Ottoman language appeared 
to be unfit for relations of social and political modernity. Besides, the Ottoman alphabet 
was hard to come to terms with by large sections of the population, for not only it was 
complicated or alien to the nation as Kemalist cadres cursed, but also more than that, for 
educational facilities were poor. Therefore, literacy was low, especially among the 
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Muslim populations and this was not promising in the context of modernizing Ottoman 
politics.  
On the other hand, there were new groups emerging who were engaged also in 
politics: recently growing intellectuals for whom the first concern was to ―reach the 
public‖. It was a passionate debate in literary circles, for example, to what extent the 
language should be simplified in order to get in touch with the people. The idea behind 
such a reflection was obviously to include masses in to the political mobilization.
35
  
One specific challenge for the existing understanding of Turkish was that there 
were particular sources of formation of a new vocabulary of political, military and 
scientific terminology, borrowed both from Arabic and Persian, and from European 
languages. Mostly all version of a term was used simultaneously, as Karpat exemplifies 
―doktor, tabib, hekim‖. The conscious choice of the word depended on the political 
position one took. Multiplication of the varieties of language transforms the language 
use into a choice. Such multiplication could be a result of many developments, among 
which are the transfiguration of the political (modernization) or class structures 
(development of capitalism), the introduction of a new media of communication 
(newspapers) to enforce a different assessment of the language, or the introduction of 
the new domains of knowledge (natural or social sciences). Consequently, preferring 
one variety of a language over another is related to many factors, such as class position, 
political ideology, cultural and education background.
36
 
There were some important developments following the first decades of the 19
th
 
century that would allow us trace the links between the Ottoman bureaucratic 
modernization, formation of a public sphere and language policies. 
                                                 
35
 See for detailed analyses of the debates and developments concerning language 
during the last century of Ottoman Empire, Levend (1972), Sadoğlu (2003), Karal 
(1978), G. Lewis (2004), Heyd (2001), Yücel (1982), Bosworth (1965a; 1965b), and 
Ġmer (1998). 
36
 Geoffrey Lewis quotes some interesting comments of how the preferences of 
words reflected the positions of class and status in the Republican Turkish. Most known 
examples would be how the vocabulary shifts from aşevi to lokanta, and then to 
restoran, or from ayakyolu, to abtesane, and then to hela and to tuvalet or lavabo, as the 
speakers situates herself or himself within higher positions on the ladder of social 
hierarchy (2004, p. 169). 
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On November 1, 1831, the first newspaper of the Ottoman Empire was launched: 
Takvim-i Vekayi. It was the official gazette, and its language policy represented the 
multilingual linguistic situation in the Empire. Although Turkish had its primacy, the 
gazette was also sold with copies in Greek, Armenian, Arabic and Persian (Sadoğlu, 
2003, p. 82). 
On July 31, 1840, an English man, William Churchill took necessary permissions 
to publish a daily which was titled Ceride-i Havadis. The Ottoman State supported its 
publication. In the petition for permission, he stated that the language of the newspaper 
would be a plain Turkish, free from Arabic and Persian borrowings, in order that 
everybody could easily read (ibid.).
37
 
Twenty years later came the first private newspaper independent (from both the 
Palace‘s support and influence). On October 21, 1860, Agâh Efendi and ġinasi started 
Tercüman-ı Ahval. It was, then, the first time that press as business appeared with 
commercial worries about sales. The newspaper was a keen supported of the 
simplification of the language, in order to reach the maximum of the reader audience. 
ġinasi left the publication and launched his own on June 27, 1862: Tasvir-i Efkar. ġinasi 
continued on his articles there with a simpler and cleared Turkish, and his advocating of 
such a language use. Tercüman-ı Ahval was closed down in 1866 (p. 83).  
On the other hand, the State was publishing local official gazettes too. After the 
enactment of 1864 Vilayet Nizamnamesi (Regulation on the administration of 
provinces), there appeared 15 local gazettes, primarily using Turkish, but also the most 
used local language as the second one.
38
 Their number increased to 22 in 1876, when 
the first Constitution was declared.  
                                                 
37
 After Churchill died, his son ended the publication of the newspaper and issued 
a new, this time titled Ruzname-i Ceride-i Havadis. 
38
 The newspapers were: Duna (in Tuna), Aydın (in Ġzmir), Bosna (in Turkish and 
Sewrbian), Diyarbakır (in Kurdish?), Envâr-ı Şarkiye (in Erzurum), Furat (in Halep), 
Basra (in Turkish and Arabic), Edirne (In Turkish and Greek), Girid (in Crete), 
Hüdavendigar (in Bursa, in Turkish and Armenian), Kastamonu, Konya, Selanik, 
Trabzon, and Zevra (in Bagdat) (Sadoğlu, 2003, pp. 85-86). 
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Another private daily Muhbir started to publish by Ali Suavi in 1867. Ali Suavi 
explained on the first day of its publication about the language to be used in the 
newspaper: ―The newspaper will deliver everything that is considered to be provided to 
the readers in the daily spoken language of Istanbul‖. Later, he emphasized that this did 
not meant that the newspaper would use kaba Türkçe (crude Turkish) (Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 
85).  
In 1869, an important reform regarding the educational system was initiated: 
Maarif-i Umumiye Nizamnamesi (Regulation for public education). The elementary 
level of education was planned to mandatory for all subjects and it was declared to be in 
Turkish. After the secondary school level, Rüştiye, the communities were allowed to 
teach in their own languages (Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 75). The idea was on target for the 
cultural and educational integration of all the citizens of the Empire, nevertheless, this 
one, like other attempts of modernization, was proved ineffective.
39
  
The Tanzimat period witnessed several attempts to simplify the written form of 
the Ottoman language, as well. Increasing use of the print both necessitated and 
facilitated the use of a more easily printed script, called matbu (literally means printed), 
in which the characters were placed with spaces between them compared to the 
continuous flow of the brush in handwriting (Ortaylı, 2001, pp. 127-129).   
Before Tanzimat, a great calligrapher, Mustafa Râkım Efendi (also known as 
Hattat Râkım Efendi) offered a more uncomplicated script simpler in the first years of 
the 19
th
 century, but faced strong opposition. However, the Sultan of the times, Mahmut 
II, himself a calligrapher as well, supported him and the script widely used for some 
time (Mardin, 1998, p. 294; Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 67). 
ġerif Mardin notes that simpler alphabet prepared by the two main Tanzimat 
statesmen, Fuad PaĢa and Cevdet PaĢa was used to increase the rates of reading among 
the students of elementary schools (1998, p. 294).  
In many regulations up to 1876, Turkish was taken for granted as the language of 
official business, without any formal assertion. The first declaration of Turkish as the 
official language of the state came in 1876, in the first Constitution, Kanun-u Esâsî. The 
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 For a detailed explanation on the reasons of the failure of the Regulation, see 
Ortaylı (2001, pp. 188-190) 
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declaration of the constitutional monarchy came with an overarching legal text that 
would bind all the laws. Besides other regulations of the state functions, the text also 
enforces, in its Article 18, that ―in order to work in state services, the Ottoman subjects 
have to know Turkish, which is the official language of the state.‖40 Such order is 
interesting in that it words the rule as based on the given assumption that Turkish is the 
official language. However, there is no article before the 18
th
, which enlists the 
language of the state. Moreover, the Article 18 does not distinguish the knowledge of 
writing, reading or speaking Turkish.  
The 1876 Constitution also decreed that speeches in the parliament would be 
made in Turkish, in Article 57. Article 68, on the other hand, decided that, in the 
elections to be made after four years, members of the parliament would have be able to 
read Turkish, and also to write it as far as possible.
41
, 
The Law of Municipalities of 1877 similarly required those who would be elected 
to the municipal councils to be able to speak Turkish.  
Although short lived, the parliament seems to host some hot debates on the issue 
of language. For example, Kushner quotes from Times, dated April 9, 1877, that there 
erupted strong arguments in the parliament on language. A Greek deputy, who spoke on 
the rights of other languages, was silenced by Ahmet Vefik PaĢa, who argued against 
that Turkish has a priority before others (Kushner, 1977, pp. 117, n. 15).  
Tanzimat period is also known as the time when the bureaucratic network 
overcame the long established center of power, the Palace. The advisory councils, 
ministries, and the formation of a bureaucratic structure shifted the focus of authority 
from the Palace to Bab-ı Âli. The peak of this shift was the declaration of the 
Constitution and the opening of the Meclis-i Mebusan, the Parliament. However, 
Abdülhamit II ruled out both the Constitution and the Parliament in one and a half year, 
in 1878, shifted balance of power back to the Palace, once again. For the next 30 years,    
                                                 
40
 ―Tebaa-i Osmaniyenin, hidemat-ı devlette istihdam olunmak için devletin lisan-ı 
resmisi olan Türkçeyi bilmeleri şarttır.‖ (Kili & Gözübüyük, 2000, p. 44). 
41
 ―Dört seneden sonra icra olunacak intihaplarda mebus olmak için Türkçe 
okumak ve mümkün mertebe yazmak dahi şart olacaktır.‖ (Kili & Gözübüyük, 2000, p. 
50). 
80 
 
Abdülhamit II tried to re-establish the authority of the Ottoman State and utilized the 
title of Caliphate, to unify the Muslim peoples of the Empire.
42
 
The ineffective policies of language continued under Abdülhamit II‘s reign. A 
special council was established to be exclusively deal with the problem of language 
reform (Islah-ı Lisani). In 1894, as Levend states, Necip Asım proposed and the Bab-ı 
Âli accepted to ask the teachers and the officers in the provinces to collect pure Turkish 
words, which are lesser known. However, after two moths it turned out to be that there 
was no response from anyone (Levend, 1972, p. 147). Levend cites Abdülhamit‘s and 
his bureaucrats‘ letters where they mentioned about the proceedings of the council; 
however, he also notes that there were no concrete results. 
In the same year, Abdülhamit attempted to re-enforce the 1869 Regulation, which 
was noted above, and ordered that all local and foreign schools would teach Turkish as a 
compulsory course.
43
 The order also required that the ministry officials would be 
present in the language examinations and stipulated closing down the schools of which 
students were unable to pass. This order turned out to be yet another failure.  
On the other hand, the educational institutions of the ethno-religious communities 
where the education was in the communities‘ mother languages mounted rapidly. In 
1897, Sadoğlu reports, non-Muslim communities had 6739 primary schools, 5982 
secondary schools and 687 high schools (2003, p. 74)  
1880s had been the decade of the emerging opposition of Turkish nationalism 
from Jön Türkler (Young Turks).  
Sadoğlu marks an interesting phase of political action during Abdülhamit II‘s 
reign. He notes that, around 1880s, the censorship on the press considerably increased 
and that any direct reference to daily political issues would mean trouble for the writers. 
In following, he argues that the growing number of articles on language, culture, history 
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 Zürcher convincingly argues that the reign of Abdülhamit II was not a time of 
retreat from modernization, on the contrary, the elements of continuity predominates the 
signs of withdrawal (2003, pp. 76-90). For an interesting study on the ideological 
formations of the Abdülhamit‘s period, see Deringil (2002). 
43
 Avram Galanti, too, narrates that Christian schools were required to teach 
Turkish to its students (1928, pp. 64-65). 
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and literature, in time, turned out to be the camouflage for political opposition (Sadoğlu, 
2003, p. 117). In fact, Sadoğlu bases his case on ġerif Mardin‘s argument.  
Mardin states that in a political environment where Turkism was not favored by 
the State, linguistics turned out to be a channel for conducting Turkist politics (2001, p. 
114). This is an interesting point in that a similar environment and a similar masking of 
political opposition were reproduced in many sections of the republican history. 
Relevant details will be given in the next section; however, it is worth to underlie here 
how the science of language appeared as a position of authority and how it has been 
intrinsically political.   
Sadoğlu comments that there was a success during the Tanzimat period, in a quite 
limited way, in closing the gap between the spoken and written varieties of Turkish. 
Nevertheless, he goes on, there was no advance in the formation of a common language 
among the subjects of the Empire, despite all the attempts to build an Ottoman identity 
of citizenship. There was an increasing linguistic homogenization only at the level of 
literate intellectuals (Sadoğlu, 2003, pp. 62-76). This linguistic unification among the 
intellectuals, notwithstanding different approaches regarding the norms of language use, 
can be attributed to an expanding use of the print, to the formation of circles of politics 
and literature autonomous from the Palace and an intensifying circulation of books, 
newspaper articles and pamphlets.  
The lack of linguistic integration of the wider population of the Ottoman subjects, 
on the other hand, had a multi-dimensional background.  
Firstly, there was no solid official politics of language. Although many political 
elites of the time were aware of the fact that the new institutions and the new politics of 
citizenship required a standardized common language, principally in order to enable the 
communication between the state and its citizens, there was hardly an infrastructural 
organization aimed at that. The educational system was still fractured in line with the 
ethno-religious boundaries, to which the missionary schools were added. All these 
various institutions grounded their courses on different languages, and the state schools, 
which prioritized Ottoman Turkish, were far from being a part of widespread national 
education.  
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The military duties were skipped by most of the non-Muslim male subjects by the 
payment of a special tax, so the military institutions were the places to learn the state 
language only for the Muslim men whose mother language was not Turkish.  
The general two-fold development of Tanzimat, modernization attempts on the 
one side, and the persistence of conservative institutions and discourses on the other, 
was reflected on the language regime, as well. Institutions of justice, where in modern 
states, have been one of the main contact sites of the states and the civil society. 
However, in the Ottoman Tanzimat, like the educational system, each millet had their 
own judiciary organization, and beside that, there was the modernized court system in 
parallel to them. 
It could be concluded that there was not any consistent and effective language 
regime within the Ottoman Empire in the 19
th
 century. There were attempts like 
prioritizing Turkish in particular domains such as in education, or the declaration of 
Turkish as the official language in 1876. Nevertheless, the inability of the State to 
centralize and efficiently operate in the 19
th
 century ruled out possibilities of the 
establishment of any particular language regime.  
This absence, by no means, should be interpreted as that the 19
th
 century was 
insignificant in the issue language. On the contrary, this absence is strongly related to 
the fact that the linguistic ideologies were in the process of formation. These are the 
very ideologies of Turkish, with its repercussions to other related languages and 
varieties, which would inform the language ideologies of the Republican era.  
The notion of official language is one basic cause, among others, that triggers the 
politicization of language. The preference of one language or another exceeds mere 
linguistic facts, but is more associated with the ideological frameworks. Before the 
above-mentioned institutions of modernization such as the newspapers or the secular 
primary schools were established properly, the ideologies pertaining to them were at 
work. The political elites and intellectuals of the 19
th
 century in the Ottoman Empire 
quickly understood how language was a source of power and legitimization. The 
problem with the organization of a full-frame language regime was resulted from 
undecided political struggles, those that were both internal and external to the Empire. 
Young Turks ended the term of an absolutist sultan, Abdülhamit II, after 30 years of 
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rule, in 1908 (Kansu, 2001), however, they were unable to produce a resolution for the 
internal and international political conflicts.  
There is yet no agreement on the limits of Turkish nationalism – in terms of 
ideology or practice – of the Young Turks and ĠTC (Kushner, 1977; and Arai, 2000). 
Among Akçura‗s three ways of political inclinations of the time, Turkism, Islamism and 
Ottomanism, as he himself proposed in 1904, nationalism of Turkishness was confirmed 
to be more effective (Akçura Y. , 1976). With the influence of the studies of Turkology 
by the European orientalists, the association between the Turkish nation and a genuine 
Turkish language became securer. Following the failure of Ottomanism during the 
Tanzimat and the first constitutional period first Meşrutiyet, Young Turks were much 
more suspicious of the non-Muslim and non-Turkish populations of the Empire. Turkish 
nationalist policies were put into effect, coupled with attempts to create a Turkish 
bourgeoisie and industrialization, resulted in escalating Turkification of education and 
economic affairs.  
Multilingualism was still a reality of the ĠTC period. According to a study, there 
were 730 newspapers being published in the Ottoman Empire in 1909.
44
 The 
classification of the main languages used by these newspapers is shown in the Table 1 
below.  
Although there were attempts to linguistically Turkify the cultural, educational, 
economic and political spheres, similar to those of the Tanzimat period, the ĠTC leaders 
had much to negotiate with the non-Turkish minorities and the imperial powers that 
assigned themselves the mission of protection of the minorities. Still it is not possible to 
observe the formation of structured language regime, nor the political power in order to 
create one.  
Yet, nationalism was becoming more influential among the civil actors. It was 
during the ĠTC power when the foundations of many Republican institutions of civil 
society, which would subjectify the citizens as the ideological satellites of the state, 
were laid.  
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 A number of other minor languages are excluded from the above list. Numbers 
are given by Koloğlu (1979, p. 100). 
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Table 1 - Numbers of newspapers according their language in 1909  
Türk Derneği (Turkish Association) was one of them. The Association‘s 
concentration was on the formation of a common language among the population of the 
Empire. Their manifesto started with an emphasis on the linguistic diversity.
45
 Sadoğlu 
rightly interprets the approach of the Association as a demand for status planning (2003, 
p. 131), and explains that they also asked for a reform of the language itself regarding 
the grammar, script, syntax, spelling and purification from foreign elements. 
Most of the influential nationalists also appeared in this period, such as Yusuf 
Akçura and Ziya Gökalp. They were both members of the ruling elite in the ĠTC, but 
also they carved the foundations of the nationalist discourse of the Republican era, of 
which analysis would not be complete without referring to the works of them both.
46
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 See Üstel (1997, pp. 37-40) for the complete text of the manifesto.  
46
 For extensive information and essential analyses of the sources of Turkish 
nationalism, see Kushner (1977) and Heyd (2001). 
Language of the newspapers Count 
Turkish  308 
Greek  109 
Arabic  67 
Armenian  43 
Turkish/Arabic  41 
French  36 
Turkish/French  24 
Jewish (Ladino)  20 
Turkish/Greek  16 
Turkish/Armenian  5 
Persian/Turkish  3 
Italian  2 
Persian/Arabic  1 
(Other mixed-language newspapers)  36 
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CHAPTER 4  
REPUBLICAN REGIME OF LANGUAGE 
This chapter presents the history of legal arrangements with respect to language 
policy during the republican period in Turkey. To that purpose, the legal history of 
Turkey is reviewed and major official linguistic regulations are introduced. The review 
is not limited to the laws that are decreed by the parliament. Other relevant regulations, 
rulings, directive or rules that have been agreed and/or practiced are also included. Such 
commandments include the decisions of municipalities and public or educational 
institutions that in one way or another regulate the use of language in areas such as 
speaking, publication, broadcasting, use in meetings or propaganda, etc. 
Surely, the establishment of an official language regime is not merely confined to 
the use of Turkish, which has been the official language of the state since the 
declaration of Republic on October 29, 1923. Such a survey inevitably includes what is 
excluded, besides what is ordered, as well. In this sense, the regulations are evaluated 
also in terms of how languages of Turkey other than Turkish were treated.  
The minority language policies of the Republic of Turkey have been based on the 
Lausanne Treaty. On the one side, there are the languages of the officially recognized 
non-Muslim minorities of Armenians, Greeks and Jews. As they are bestowed with 
special statuses in the Treaty, their rights of language use are guaranteed by an 
international treaty.  
On the other side, there are major demographic or sociological minorities of 
which languages include varieties of Kurdish, Arabic, Laz, and Circassian. As it will be 
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exhibited below, there are no direct references to any of these languages in any Turkish 
law.
47
 A general official attitude with respect to other languages has been to abstain 
even to name them, until very recently. It seems like the main motive for such a refrain 
to mention them in any official document or discourse has been to avoid any sort of 
legitimacy that might arise. Although some of the authorities were unable to maintain 
such a discreet position in a consistent way, a pattern might be observed on the side of 
the state, which registers to the attitude of discursive negation while in practice taking 
measures against these languages, or the minorities speaking them. Therefore, with 
respect to the linguistic regime in Turkey, the discourse of negation conflicts with the 
practice of elimination. 
As summarized above in the language policies of the Ottoman Empire, Turkish 
became the official language for the first time in 1876 constitution. However, the 
political interest in the Turkish language and in its purity and simplification were much 
more effective than the direct practices of its hegemonization. The rising political value 
of the Turkish language in the second half of the 19
th
 century in the Ottoman Empire is 
indeed a significant symbol of the emergence of practices and institutions of modernity, 
and the ideology of nationalism. The linguistic variety of the common people, which 
had been until lately downgraded by the admirers of the cultural and political high-
language of Ottoman as primitive, unintelligible and crude, was then becoming a focus 
of linguistic, political and cultural interest.
48
  
The debates on reforming Ottoman alphabet, on the simplification of the language 
to make it accessible for the layperson, and on the status of Turkish/Ottoman with 
respect to its official use had been almost a century old when the Republic came to grips 
with the language problem. What the republicans inherited were Turkish as the state 
                                                 
47
 One exception is the proscription of Kurdish publications, by the Council of 
Ministers on January 25, 1967. Details are presented below, in this section.  
48
 Mardin refuses the classical and sharp distinction between the Ottoman of the 
palace and the folkloric Turkish vernacular and argues for that ―a common substratum 
of ‗Turkishness‘ was maintained across the varieties of linguistic code‖ (2002, p. 116). 
For the depreciation of folk Turkish by the elites see Heyd (2001, p. 10), Ahmad (1993, 
p. 78) and Lewis (1961, pp. 1-2). 
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language, which had been highly vernacularized, and a legacy of heated discussions on 
the Romanization of the alphabet.
49
 
As stated above, the Republic was much keener on the total modernization of the 
state and the social relations. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey was established 
in Ankara on April 23, 1920, during the war against the occupation of Greek forces. In a 
very short time, Ankara proved to be a real rival against the Istanbul government, which 
had long lost its legitimacy and credibility. There were many signs of, not only 
resistance against occupation, but also of preparation for the foundation of a new 
political unit.  
Language was yet to be the issue with a high level of priority. The alliances were 
made in order to gather forces as wide as possible for a military defense, from the tribes 
of Ottoman Kurdistan to the guerilla forces of the Northern Anatolia (Zürcher, 2003, pp. 
147-160). Although many members of the Assembly considered themselves as Turkish 
nationalists, the urgency of resisting occupation seems to prevent to emphasize the 
―Turkishness‖ of the new polity. The transformation of the political discourse from 
Islamic-patriotism to secular-Turkism only gradually evolved (Göktürk, 2002). 
Therefore, the new constitution of 1921, Teşkilatı Esasiye Kanunu, has no single 
reference to notions like Turk, or Turkish, and neither in any way to a process of 
Turkification. (Kili & Gözübüyük, 2000, pp. 95-108). In parallel, there was no mention 
on the official language. The language used in the parliament was Turkish in practice, 
and, maybe because of that, it is understandable that a debate on assigning an official 
language and stating it clearly in the Constitution would not be one of the main 
concerns. The Constitution basically regulated the operation of the Ankara government 
and the territory it claimed its authority.  
                                                 
49
 Mardin, in his same work noted above, loads a relatively autonomous 
characteristic to the vernacularization process with respect to the formation of the 
institutions of modern state and education, and of modern ideologies. He discusses 
against the Andersonian conception of linguistic vernacularization and suggests a 
challenging perspective for the cases of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey (2002). Also, 
see Mardin (1995). 
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4.1 Lausanne Treaty and the Population Exchange of 1922-1923 
With a victory against the Greek army in the second half of 1922, the Ankara 
government was recognized as the legitimate representative of what was left of the 
Ottoman Empire and was called to take part in the peace negotiations in Lausanne. 
After hard times during the meetings, which were interrupted twice, the Treaty was 
signed with the delegates of related countries on July 24, 1923. The Treaty is mostly 
treated as the constitutive document of the new state of Turkey, which was 
acknowledged as a genuine member of the international community, with the Treaty. In 
addition, it was with this treaty that the new state had to face the challenge to articulate 
a politically admissible discourse on its minorities and their cultural expressions. 
Against all pressure to register Kurds as an officially recognized minority (Özkan, 
2001), alongside with the Armenians, Greeks and Jews, the Turkish side resisted, and 
succeeded. On the other hand, the treaty enforced to guarantee linguistic rights of every 
Turkish citizen.  
The relevant articles of the Treaty were extensive defining social and cultural 
freedoms. Below are the articles that were pointing out linguistic issue.  
Article 38 ensured the equality of citizens without any discrimination, including 
language. The first clause of the Article read:  
―The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete 
protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction 
of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.‖  
Article 39 was specifically on freedoms of language use, and again, they were to 
be granted to every citizen: 
―No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national 
of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, 
or in publications of any kind or at public meetings… Notwithstanding the 
existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be given to 
Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own 
language before the Courts‖.  
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Article 41 regulated the educational rights of non-Muslim minorities and their 
right to educate their children in their own mother language: 
―As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in 
those towns and districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem 
nationals are resident, adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary 
schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Turkish 
nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision will not 
prevent the Turkish Government from making the teaching of the Turkish 
language obligatory in the said schools.‖  
Lausanne Treaty still triggers much debate, especially when the linguistic rights of 
the Muslim minorities, who were not particularly entitled to distinct rights, are at stake. 
Many supporters of such rights argue, rightfully, that the Turkish State violates its 
citizens‘ rights that were granted by the Treaty‘s Article 38 and 39.50 As it will be 
presented below, the Republican period has been a time of misery for any minority in 
Turkey in terms of rights and freedoms. 
The Treaty did not only define the minorities and the rights of citizens. In the 
same conference, before the final text of Treaty was formed, in January 1923, the Greek 
and Turkish governments agreed on a population exchange, which would affect more 
than one and half million people in both countries.
51
 The exchange involved the ―Greek 
Orthodox‖ people in Turkey except those residing in Istanbul, Bozcaada and Gökçeada, 
and the ―Muslims‖ of Greece except those in West Thrace.  
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 For similar arguments, see Oran (2004). Also there are others who argue that 
there are no minorities in Turkey other than Armenians, Greeks and Jews, as defined by 
the Lausanne Treaty. For a case that is empower by legal, historical and sociological 
theses in which ethnic groups in Turkey are acknowledged but are considered as 
minorities in legal terms, see Özkan (2001). For a perspective of a similar vein that 
exclusively bases its argument on international law, see Terzioğlu (2007). The latter two 
are the social scientific reproductions of the official discourse, which has been 
painstakingly constructed within the Republican period, in order to illegitimize and 
criminalize any claim of minority rights. 
51
 The issue only recently attracted attention of the Turkish social sciences. For 
different accounts of the 1923 Population Exchange see Aktar (2000c), Arı (1995), 
Pekin and Turan (2002), Pekin (2005), Yıldırım (2006), Gökaçtı (2003), Zengin-
Aghatabay (2007), Erdal (2006), Hirschon (2005a) and (2005b), (Küçük Asya 
AraĢtırmaları Merkezi, 2002) and Belli (2004). 
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Mass migrations, in fact, started almost a century ago in the Ottoman Empire. The 
nationalist uprisings in Balkans, the Russian oppression on the Muslims, massacres 
against the Armenians and their deportation, Balkan Wars in 1913-1914 and the World 
War I caused hundreds of thousands to be relocated. As for the 1923 exchange, it could 
be considered a final blow decided by an agreement of the two states to clean the 
remaining subversions of religious heterogeneity. Aktar reminds that the percentage of 
minority population in Greece fell from 20% in 1920 down to 6% in 1930s (2000c, p. 
26). Similarly Keyder states ―Before the World War I, one was non-Muslim in every 
five (20%) who were living within the territories of today‘s Turkey, the ratio fell well 
down to one in twenty (5%) after the [Independence] War‖ (2001, p. 112). By 1923, the 
land was more than 95 % Muslim, only two large Muslim linguistic group were left, 
Turks and Kurds, and some other small groups, Greek-, Armenian- and Syriac-speaking 
Christians, Spanish speaking Jews, and Circassian-, Laz- and Arabic-speaking Muslims. 
The exchange not only leveled the religious diversity in both countries, but also 
brought up the reconfiguration of the linguistic landscape. However, the language 
composition of the migrants was much more complex.  
There were two linguistic groups of Muslims, who migrated from Greece. Those 
who were deported from Aegean Islands and the southern mainland of the country 
mostly spoke Greek as their mother language. On the other hand, those who came from 
Ionnina and its environs (the northwestern regions of Greece) were speaking Turkish. 
There were also two linguistic groups among the Greeks, who that had to leave their 
lands in Anatolia. The mother language of their majority was Greek, and most spoke 
Turkish, as well. There was also the Orthodox Christian community of Karaman who 
spoke Turkish as their mother language and who wrote it in Greek alphabet. The 
community expected to be excluded from the Exchange, nevertheless, they ended up 
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among the deported, being officially considered as Greeks speaking Turkish (Okutan, 
2004, pp. 228-229).
52
  
By 1923, the land was more than 95 % Muslim, only two large Muslim linguistic 
group were left, Turkish and Kurdish, and some other small groups, Greek, Armenian, 
Syrian-speaking Christians, Jews speaking a variety of Spanish, and Circassian, Laz and 
Arabic speaking Muslims (Zürcher, 1997: 172). 
4.2 Republican Thrust to Radical Nationalization - 1923 Amendments in the 
Constitution 
The period, especially until the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1938, is 
distinguished with its intensity of reforms and uncompromising state authority. It was in 
this period when the radical project of total modernization and secularization through 
nationalization was operated by the new political elites. Language at that time became 
an indispensable dimension of modernization, homogenization and nationalization. It is 
possible to read the political trails of the Republican period by following the politics of 
language. At the very starting moment of the Republic, the formation of a national 
language regime was set out.  
With the proclamation of the Republic on October 29, 1923, the Grand Assembly 
agreed on amendments in some of the article of the 1921 Constitution. Article 2 was 
renewed as ―The religion of the State of Turkey is Islam, and its official language is 
Turkish. The capital is Ankara.‖ Article 2 was changed twice until the 1961 
Constitution came into force. The first change was with the Law no. 1222 decreed on 
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 The religious emphasis in the population exchange is worth to note. The people 
to be migrated were categorized according to their religions, not their national identities: 
Muslims vs. Orthodox Greeks. After a century of nationalist consolidation in both 
countries, it might appear as if the ethnic identities have overcome religious 
identifications. However, it was not the case then, especially for most of the Greek 
speaking Muslims. A similar story to that of the Karaman Orthodox community belongs 
to the Gagauz Turks of Moldovia. They were too speaking a variety of Turkish, they 
defined themselves as Turks and asked to be admitted to Turkey within the scope of the 
exchange agreement. They were, too, refused by the Turkish government (Gözler, 
2001). 
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April 10, 1928, when the part stating the religion of state as Islam was deleted and the 
article was made into ―The official language of the State of Turkey is Turkish and its 
capital is Ankara.‖ The second change was with the Law no. 3115 decreed on February 
5, 1937 when the six principles of Kemalism were added, leaving sentence on the 
official language intact (Kili & Gözübüyük, 2000, p. 120). 
The language regime was not limited to status planning. An early Republican sign 
of language purification was a statement in the 1923 program of the fourth government. 
The program ruled that books for the education of the people were to be written, in the 
language of the people (Kantarcıoğlu, 1998). The Ministry of Education was keen on 
the Turkification of the linguistic landscape and one of the main targets was minority 
schools. The Ministry obliged all minority schools to give at least five hours of Turkish 
courses a week. The courses would be taught by the teachers assigned by the Ministry, 
but their fees would be paid by the school administrations (Hür, 2005).  
4.3 1924 Constitution 
In 1924, a new constitution was initiated. The official language of the state was, 
again, clearly stated as a part of the Article 2: ―The official language of the State of 
Turkey is Turkish.‖ (Kili & Gözübüyük, 2000, pp. 120-121). In addition, the 
Constitution regulates the criteria to be elected as a member of the parliament. Similar 
to that of 1876 Constitution, Article 12 instructs that the candidates were to be literate in 
Turkish (Kili & Gözübüyük, 2000, p. 122). 
 Mesut Yeğen argues that Article 12 practically leaves the Kurds outside the 
parliament. He states that although there has always been Kurds in the Grand National 
Assembly, they were admitted in so far as they leave their Kurdish identities behind 
(1999, p. 120). It is true that multiculturalism has not been favoured by the Republican 
politics; however, the article could be also assessed as an inevitable regulation with 
respect to the official language, which was set in the same text. Yeğen maintains that 
Kurds were excluded not because they were Kurds but they were not Turks. 
Nevertheless, Article 12 seems to be the byproduct of the formation of a nation-state, a 
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polity based on a society defined as a nation. Therefore, the terms of eligibility ruled by 
this Article are more about the consolidation of the Turkish nation-state than it is a 
special arrangement for the exclusion of Kurds. 
The 1924 Constitution is the first grand text to mark the ethnicization of the 
political membership to the state, as well. A Republican legacy emerged in 1924 and in 
Article 88, a Turk was defined as any citizen, without any exception of religion and race 
(Kili & Gözübüyük, 2000, p. 138). A particular ethnic category was generalized as the 
name of those who bore the title of a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. Although, the 
formulation seems like a political or civic version of nationalism that is defined via 
citizenship, in fact it has obscured the assimilationist affinity of the State. On the one 
hand, all the citizens are legally Turks; on the other hand, Turkish-speaking Muslims 
have always been considered ―more‖ Turkish than the others have. Since such a framing 
of national identity was inscribed into the Constitution, any demand of right or claim of 
difference of identity was opposed by the elites. The argument was legitimized by the 
most authoritative legal text: no diversity in terms of identity (apart from the three 
official minorities) was admitted, therefore, any claim of it would not only be politically 
irrelevant but also a violation of the Constitution. As for the latter, it was considered so, 
really.
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4.4 Takrir-i Sükun period and Authoritarianism 
The main target of ethnic and linguistic homogenization of the society would 
apparently be Kurds. Zürcher reminds that, although not officially declared, there were 
incidents of prohibiting Kurdish use in public spaces (2003, p. 170). Combined with the 
feeling of alienation with the abolishment of the caliphate in 1924, the promises given 
during the independence struggle but not realized, and the Republican path emerging 
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 For Soner Çağaptay‘s review of this tension between Turkish citizenship and 
Turkish nationality, see his Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who 
is a Turk? (2006), especially pp. 14-15. 
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ahead alarmed some of the Kurdish nationalists and religious leaders. In the first months 
of 1925, what is now known as the Sheikh Said‘s rebellion erupted.  
Besides military actions taken, the government of Ġsmet Ġnönü passed Takrir-i 
Sükûn Kanunu (the Law on the Maintenance of Order), on March 4, 1925. Zürcher 
emphasizes that ―[t]his empowered the government for two years to ban by 
administrative measure any organization or publication it considered might cause 
disturbance to law and order.‖ (2003, p. 171). The rebellion also registered Islamism 
and Kurdish nationalism as the two major threats to the republican regime. It also built 
up the distrust to Kurds on the republican elites. The Congress of Türk Ocakları (the 
Turkish Hearth Movement) in 1926 hosted heated debates on a widespread ban on the 
use of Kurdish (Hür, 2005).54  
Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu, which was expanded later for several times, enabled the 
new regime to work in a opposition free environment and the reforms to transform the 
society accelerated afterwards.  
One major reform was to re-adjust the educational system. Tevhid-i Tedrisat 
Kanunu (the Law on the Unification of Education) of 1924 unified the all the 
educational institutions under the authority of the Ministry of Education. This meant the 
closure of religious schools and the elimination of the last Islamic educational sites. 
Such a change was furthering the linguistic Turkification of the society by outlawing 
any establishment where the education could be made in languages other than Turkish. 
Within a couple of generations, the educational reform would create a smooth 
linguistically Turkish surface.  
The formation of the language regime did not only involve the restructuring the 
linguistic space, but also the very vocabulary to be used. In 1925, the Ministry of 
Education issued a proclamation on ―Currents Trying to Undermine Turkish Unity‖ that 
―banned the use of the terms describing minority communities and the areas they 
inhabited, such as Kurd, Laz, Çerkez, Kurdistan and Lazistan‖ (Zürcher, 2001, p. 210).  
The nationalization project aimed at the destruction of the ―enemies of the state‖ 
not only by sheer violence but also at the discursive level. This discursive attack could 
be assessed as typical of a language regime: constructing categorical irrelevancies and 
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 See below for further details on the Congress. 
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political disempowerment of alternative narratives on language. Such political 
determination of the language-society relationship from above creates a wounded 
discursive universe in the sense that those concepts or names, which were once 
corresponding to particular social facts, now corresponds to a linguistically empty 
space. The erasure of the languages other than Turkish at the discursive level, such as 
excluding them from the class of ―language‖, turns them into illegitimate members of 
the domain of language. 
The republican regime was impatient to rule out unwanted social realities, like 
Kurdishness or Islamic sects. And, where it was unable to erase them immediately, it 
simply erased them from the language. On the one hand, the state seems to have 
overpowered its hand against any claim for minorities, to the point that any reference to 
Kurds, for example, would be considered as an attempt to create minorities out of a 
united nation. However, the unintended consequence of that kind of domination would 
be that the claim of the very existence of the terminologically forbidden realities would 
be a solid resistance to the hegemony. The discursive ban, on the other hand, might fool 
one as if the reality has vanished, and social or linguistic homogenization might fail in 
reality, although it would seem as a success in rhetoric. These arguments will be re-
assessed below as later developments on the way to the formation of the Turkish 
language regime are introduced. 
4.5 Eastern Reform Plan 
The new State continued, after the population exchange with Greece, to re-design 
the demographic formation of the country in 1925, with the Şark Islahat Planı (Eastern 
Reform Plan). The program was prepared by a number of appointed ministers, including 
Cemil Bey, the Minister of Home Affairs, and Mahmut Esat Bey, the Minister of 
Justice. The committee was formed in order to review the current situation in those 
provinces where ―irtica hadisesi‖ (the incident of reactionism) took place and asses 
necessary safety measures to be taken. On September 24, the Assembly received the 
report, which contained a reformation of the administrative partition of the country, 
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proposals of relocating influential families of Kurdish tribes in other parts of the country 
and the settlement of ―Turkish‖ immigrants to the Kurdish lands. The report was the 
first of its kind. The Kurdish region was particularly important, and also dangerous, 
therefore it deserves special treatment. Similar reports would be produced in the next 
decades.
55
 The 1925 plan exhibits one of the boldest expressions of the intention of 
Kurdish assimilation.  
The main idea about the problematic population in the region is that those, who 
were indeed Turks, were in danger of assimilation to Kurdishness. The ideology of the 
report reverses the direction of absorption and the case is now a matter of protection of 
the Turkish population from degeneration. Hence are the phrases like ―those who are in 
fact Turk but are about to be defeated to Kurdishness‖ (Article 13) and ―those who were 
originally Turks but about to get assimilated into Kurdishness‖ (Article 14). There is no 
denial of Kurds or Arabs of the region. In fact, although there was yet no sign of 
hostility against Turkishness on the side of Kurds, the report itself reformulates the 
issue as a potential danger to Turks, as it was commanded that Turks who were to be 
settled should be protected against Kurdish rebels. 
The linguistic aspects of the Report are inherent to the assimilationist policies that 
were proposed. Article 13 defines the provinces where the Turks were about to captured 
by Kurdishness, and decrees that those who spoke in a language other than Turkish in 
those provinces would be punished. The forbidden zones were governmental offices, 
schools, markets and bazaars. Such a restriction goes well beyond the imposition of the 
official language in the official institutions, and leaves only the household where 
language would be free of control of the ―order of the state‖.  
Article 14 of the Report introduces another, special plan for the regions where the 
population mostly speaks Arabic. In places like Siirt, Mardin and Savur, new branches 
of Türk Ocakları and new schools would be opened. The emphasis was on the schools 
for girls, that should be ―perfectly built‖ and attendance should be ensured. 
                                                 
55
 For other reports and files prepared by official authorities, governments, 
political parties or civil associations, see Akçura (2008) 
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In the Article 16, Kurds located around the west bank of Fırat (Euphrates) rives 
would be prevented to speak Kurdish, no matter what. Here, too, schools for girls would 
be opened and it would be ensured that especially women would speak Turkish. 
4.6 Civil society at work 
Türk Ocakları and Halkevleri were the organizations, which were active at the 
civil level, but they were encouraged and controlled by the government. Theirs was a 
missionary work, to deliver the revolution down to the people. At times, they became 
more enthusiastic about the rate of Turkification of the non-Turkish elements of the 
society. There were demands from the civil society to legalize the speaking Turkish in 
public spaces as mandatory. The speakers of the 1926 congress of Türk Ocakları 
severely criticized those who were speaking languages other than Turkish and they 
demanded the government to punish those who insist on that. ġakir Turgut Bey, a 
representative from the province of Çal, called for the legal punishment of those who 
were not speaking Turkish (Okutan, 2004, p. 181).  
The father of the nation was actively encouraging the enthusiasm of Türk 
Ocakları. It was in a speech in Adana branch of Türk Ocağı, that Mustafa Kemal 
directly addressed the issue of nationhood and language: 
―Language is one the most evident characteristics of nationality. Those 
who say that they belong to the Turkish nation ought to speak, first and after 
all, in Turkish. If anyone who does not speak Turkish would claim his 
membership to the Turkish culture and community, it would be wrong to 
believe him.‖56 
In the same speech, he assigns the mission to the movements, and strengthens his 
argument with a narrative that haunted the minorities throughout the republican period: 
the possibility of cooperation of ―others within us‖ against the Turkish nation: 
                                                 
56
 ―Milliyetin çok açık vasıflarından biri dildir. Türk milletindenim diyen insanlar, 
her şeyden evvel ve mutlaka Türkçe konuşmalıdır. Türkçe konuşmayan bir insan Türk 
harsına, camiasına mensubiyetini iddia ederse buna inanmak doğru olmaz‖ (Kocatürk, 
1984, p. 182; quoted in Yıldız A. , 2001, p. 202). 
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―Nevertheless, in Adana there are more that 20 thousand citizens who do 
not speak Turkish. If Türk Ocağı would tolerate this fact, if youth and all the 
political, social Turkish institutions would remain senseless before this 
situation, this situation which has went on for one hundred years could last 
hundreds years more. What would be its consequence? In any time of 
catastrophe, these people would join others to act against us‖57 
This is just one of many examples of how Mustafa Kemal was determined to 
integrate social forces into the total transformation of the society, and his charisma and 
the legitimacy he held as a victorious savior was indeed effective on the audience. 
The 1927 congress of the organization was also overwhelmed with the debates on 
the perceived insufficiency of speaking Turkish. A delegate from Mardin, mainly an 
Arab and Kurdish city, stated that they had difficulties in ―persuading Kurds to speak 
Turkish‖. Therefore, the organization decided to have a closer interest in the Kurdish 
region and its mission was set as ―to help the physical and intellectual development of 
the Turkish youth, in the regions other than the east of Anatolia, and to realize the 
national ideal by imposing Turkish culture and language in the eastern regions‖ (Yeğen, 
1999, pp. 177-178). There was, according to the members of Türk Ocakları, a problem 
to be dealt with in one particular part of the country, the eastern region, and the solution 
offered was the imposition of the Turkish culture.  
The demands for legal regulations were responded in the National Assembly. In 
1938, Manisa deputy Sabri Toprak proposed in the Assembly to prepare a law in order 
to enforce speaking Turkish in legal terms and to punish disobedience (Okutan, 2004, p. 
194). The proposal contained harsh measures. According to the draft of the law, the 
Turkish citizens were forbidden to speak any language other than Turkish, apart from 
their households. Any violation of this rule would be penalized with from one to seven 
days in prison and a fine ranging from 10 to 100 kuruş. In addition to that, those 
punished would not be able to work as doctors, teachers or journalists and their 
diplomas would be confiscated. The informers would get their shares from the money 
                                                 
57
 ―Halbuki Adana‟da Türkçe konuşmayan 20 binden fazla vatandaş vardır. Eğer 
Türk Ocağı buna müsamaha gösterirse, gençler ve siyasi, içtimai bütün Türk 
kuruluşları bu durum karşısında duygusuz kalırlarsa, en aşağı yüzyıldan beri devam 
edegelen bu durum daha yüzlerce yıl devam edebilir. Bunun neticesi ne olur? Herhangi 
bir felaket günümüzde bu insanlar, başka dille konuşan insanlarla el ele vererek 
aleyhimizde hareket edebilirler‖ (Önder, 1998, p. 8). 
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collected. And, any Turkish citizen who did not know how to speak Turkish language 
would learn it in one year (Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 286).  
Although the proposal was refused, Okutan points out that in Konya, Ġzmir and 
Niğde, municipal fines were issued to those who were ―caught‖ speaking a language 
other than Turkish (2004, p. 194).  
One infamous practice in order to hegemonize Turkish in the public places, which 
was spread via the cooperation between the state and the civic institutions, was the 
campaign, Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş! (Citizen, Speak Turkish!). In January 1928, the 
Student Union of Istanbul University‘s Faculty of Law decided to start a campaign, and 
it was followed by the transportation companies that hanged various banners containing 
relevant messages. Ahmet Yıldız reminds that the campaign commenced rapidly but its 
pace was slowed down in April the same year (2001, pp. 286-290). Nevertheless, the 
campaign has become the symbol of the mobilization of civil forces in order to join the 
nationalization process. It was also could be considered as the reification of xenophobia, 
as a result of the internalization of the nationalist discourse. Although the campaign 
faded away within months, it paved the way for civic reactions against speakers of other 
languages, which frequently reached at the point of physical attacks. 
The campaigns and the pressure to speak Turkish affected all linguistic minorities, 
but it was among the Jews that passionate supporters of Turkification emerged. One of 
them was Moiz Kohen, and he finally changed his name for Munis Tekin Alp, a very 
interesting selection of names.
58
 He was an active member of the ĠTC. He frequently 
addressed the Jewish community and tried to convince them to act, speak and think as 
the way new Republic demanded from all its subjects. Inspired from the Old Testament, 
he published a book titled as ―Evamir-i Aşere‖ (Ten Commandments), in which he 
advised Jews to change their language of religion and schools to Turkish, and to speak 
Turkish all the time. Avram Galanti, was another champion of the Turkish revolution, 
and he wrote a book to support the campaign: Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş! (Hür, 2005).59  
                                                 
58
 Munis in Turkish means obedient, subdued or friendly, while Tekin and Alp are 
old Turkic names from the Central Asian times. The selection clearly declares Kohen‘s 
subjection to, indeed internalization of Turkishness. 
59
 On the other hand, before, Avram Galanti had been an opponent of the script 
reform and published a book titled Arab Harfleri Terakkimize Mani Değildir (1927). 
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However, the fever of some Jewish intellectuals was not always appreciated by 
nationalists. Orhan Seyfi Orhon accused the speakers of non-Turkish and asked them to 
be excluded: 
―You fake citizen, who speaks French in Maçka, German in AyaspaĢa, 
Italian in Degüstasyon, English in Beyker, Spanish in Maksim! Never speak 
Turkish! … So that we could recognize you from your word, if we can‘t 
from your look!‖60 
Cevat Rıfat Atilhan, known with his racist declarations similarly asked Jews to 
stay away from the Turkish language: ―Jews‘ speaking Turkish is a harassment of our 
beautiful Turkish and our sweet accent".
61
 The times were difficult for all the Jews 
around the world. Coupled with the heat of nationalist revolution in Turkey, the anti-
Semitic feelings were set free. Racism has been a frequent stop within the Turkish 
nationalism.  
4.7 Governmental bodies takes action about Language Usage  
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People‘s Party, CHP henceforth) was the 
party of Kemalist revolutionaries and the period until the multi-party regime was 
accepted in 1945 is known as the one-party regime. Not an exception in the 1930s when 
the European and Soviet politics were becoming increasingly totalitarian, CHP was the 
basic political force that was to realize the project of modernization. In time, the Party‘s 
principles became the official ideology of the Republic. In 1927, the Statute of the Party 
expressed that the unity of language was one of the strongest bonds among the citizens. 
It was more than an expression of dedication to the nationalist attitude. Since the 
                                                 
60
 ―Maçka‟da Fransızca, Ayaspaşa‟da Almanca, Degüstasyon‟da İtalyanca, 
Beyker‟de İngilizce, Maksim‟de İspanyolca konuşan sahte vatandaş; sakın Türkçe 
konuşma!... Bir gün gelip de seni özünden, yüzünden tanıyamasak bile, bari sözünden 
tanıyalım!‖ (Orhon, 1940; quoted in Okutan, 2004). 
61
 ―Yahudilerin Türkçe konuşması, dünya kadar güzel Türkçemize ve tatlı şivemize 
bir tecavüzdür‖ (Hür, 2005) 
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discourses of the Party conditioned most of the political language of the time, the 
insistence on the use of Turkish and the banning others became more legitimate.  
In 1931, the Party renewed its program, and limitations for party membership 
became tighter. Article 7 defines the criteria for membership: 
―Any Turkish citizen can join CHP, on the condition that he has been 
speaking Turkish and accepted the Turkish culture and all the ideals of the 
Party‖62 
The striking issue in the statement is that the candidates were expected to ―have 
been speaking Turkish‖ rather than only to know Turkish. With this condition, the party 
practically excludes those who had other languages as their mother tongues or those 
who were not assimilated into Turkish speaking, and hence, secures a full-Turkish body 
of dedicated activists. Combined with the condition to become a deputy, the political 
realm had been considerably closed for non-Turkish minorities.  
The non-Muslim minorities were now far fewer in number compared to the 
Ottoman period, but they were still the others of the Turkish nationalism. They were 
frequently referred as to be the potential traitor within the nation. The result was 
harassment of their rights and conditions both from the State and from the nationalists 
of the civil society.
63
 Although the Greek communities of Bozcaada (Tenedos) and 
Gökçeada (Ġmroz, or Ġmbroz) were excluded from the 1923 Population Exchange, and 
that they were granted rights to educate their children in Greek, in 1927 these rights 
were ruled out. With the article 14 of Law no. 1151, titled ―Bozcaada ve İmroz 
Kazalarının Mahalli İdareleri Hakkında Kanun‖ (Law on the Local Governments of the 
Provinces of Bozcaada and Ġmroz), they were no longer entitled to the public service of 
                                                 
62
 ―Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası‟na … her Türk vatandaş, Türkçe konuşmakta 
bulunmuş, Türk kültürünü ve fırkanın bütün umdelerini benimsemiş ise, girebilir.‖ 
(Tunçay, 1999, p. 452). 
63
 For historical accounts of the relations with non-Muslim minorities in the 
Republican period see Oran (2004), Okutan (2004), Aktar (2000f), Levi (1996), Bali 
(1999; and 2001), and Demir and Akar (1994). 
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Greek education. They had to pay for in order to hire a private teacher to teach their 
own language, and the content of the course had to be authorized by the Government.
64
  
The municipalities were far from autonomous local councils, but were more 
operating as local branches of the only party. They were, too, active, in the construction 
of an all-Turkish language regime, especially with the measures they imposed upon 
public spaces.  
In 1929, the Municipality of Istanbul banned street peddlers to call their 
customers in any language other than Turkish.
65
 In 1932, in Dörtyol, local 
administration announced with town criers that those who would speak a non-Turkish 
language in common places would be persecuted and severely punished.
66
 In 1933, the 
Municipality of Izmir decreed a similar regulation and in 1938, the Municipality of 
Istanbul decided to re-enact on the old rule, which proved vain, and re-forbid any 
languages other than Turkish in trade, including the sellers and the customers (Sadoğlu, 
2003, p. 286).   
The municipal acts were not confined to the western provinces. Kurds and Arabs 
were also targeted. In 1939, the Municipality of Mardin announced that speaking 
Turkish was mandatory, and that even the villagers who did know Turkish would be 
communicated in Turkish, and assigned a 5 kuruş fine for any violation.67  
                                                 
64
 These schools would be opened again in 1951, after the relations with Greece 
calmed down. However, on July 29, 1964, the Ministry of Education, once more, 
decided to close down the schools, with the Ordinance no. 2690 and two months later 
the assets and properties were transferred to the local municipalities (Oran, 2004, p. 
109).  
65
 May 19, 1929, İkdam, quoted in Sadoğlu (2003, p. 286) 
66
 September 23, 1932, Son Posta, quoted in Sadoğlu (ibid.) 
67
 For an account of the ban, see Öztürkatalay (1995, p. 312; quoted in Dündar C. 
, 2004). 
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4.8 Religion and Language 
Although secularization is usually declared as one of the pillars of the republican 
revolution, religion and religious institutions were deemed allies as far as they were 
under control of the government. It was the case for the language regime, as well. The 
language of religious worship was becoming a problem for the Kemalist elites, and they 
wanted to get rid of every sign of the ancién regime. However, the resistance was 
substantial, since there were many who considered the Arabic language as sacred and as 
essential as it was the language of the Quran.  
In five years, the language of the communal religious services shifted from Arabic 
to Turkish. The first step was to deliver hutbe in Turkish on February 3, 1928 in 
Istanbul. A few years later, in the Yerebatan Mosque, the first Turkish Quran was read 
on January 22, 1932. In the same year, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (the Presidency of 
Religious Affairs, DĠB henceforth) notified the Istanbul Mufti office that in a few 
months, ezan and kamet would be recited in Turkish. And, in the next month, on 
February 7, its practice first began in Istanbul, then spread to other cities.  
Not everyone was happy about the linguistic change in religious matters. In 1933, 
in Bursa, there were protests against the change; reactionaries attempted an insurgency, 
which was suppressed in a short time. Atatürk, after the protest, stated, ―It must be 
assured that the national language and national identity of the Turkish nation will be the 
essence and dominate in the entire life.‖ (Ertop, 1963, p. 86).  
Turkish language regime was proposed to have an over-arching domination in 
every sphere of life of the new men and women of the Republic. The religious domain 
was not spared. As the republican regime aimed at the construction of the Turkish 
national identity to replace all other ―minor‖ identifications with ethnicities, cultures 
and religions, it accordingly worked for the elimination of linguistic expressions of such 
identities. Arabic was such a significant symbol of the old life, that its mere existence 
was perceived to be potential threat to the revolution. ĠTC was already tested with the 
1909 rebellions in Istanbul, of which suppression was managed by intervention of the 
supporters of the new Constitutional regime in the army, including Mustafa Kemal. 
Insurgencies of 1909 were denounced as a sign of the danger of Islamicist politics. 
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Added to that was 1925 Sheikh Said‘s rebellion and the republican government had no 
tolerance for any indication of politic of religion, apart from its own. 
The Turkish ezan has been a much-appreciated marker of the revolutionary spirit 
of the republican elites by the supporters of Kemalism. The withdrawal of religious 
practices in Turkish was one of the first performances of Demokrat Parti (Democratic 
Party, DP henceforth) in 1950. 
4.9 The New Script, the New Language 
A major step in the formation of the Turkish language regime was the change of 
the script, from Arabic to Latin, in 1928. After months of discussions in the 
commissions, which were set for laying out the possibilities of an alphabet change, and 
heated debates in daily newspapers, in August 1928, Mustafa Kemal announced the new 
alphabet. At the dinner, organized in the honor of Gazi, he introduced the new script as: 
―Our harmonious, rich language would express itself with the new 
Turkish letters. You have to save yourself from those signs, which are 
unintelligible, that we cannot understand and that held our mind in iron 
cages for centuries; you have to understand that.‖ (my emphasis).68 
So what was at stake was not only the coming of new, authentic alphabet with 
which Turkish would have the opportunity to express itself in a better way, but also 
―those incomprehensible signs‖ were got rid of. The law was prepared in a few months 
and on November 1, Türk Harflerinin Kabul ve Tatbiki Hakkında Kanun (the Law for 
the Adoption and Application of the New Turkish Letters, no. 1353), was issued in the 
parliament.  
The law mandated that the new script would be used in all the paperwork of 
economic and social institutions and associations with the first day of 1929. In all the 
printed and painted writings, the new letters would be employed. The very display of 
                                                 
68
 ―Bizim ahenktar, zengin lisanımız yeni Türk harfleriyle kendini gösterecektir. 
Asırlardan beri kafalarımızı demir çerçeve içinde bulundurarak, anlaĢılamayan ve 
anlayamadığımız iĢaretlerden kendimizi kurtarmak, bunu anlamak mecburiyetindesiniz‖ 
(my emphasis, (my emphasis, Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri II, 1997, p. 272). 
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the language was being changed and it was a total change of the image of the language. 
The symbolic shift also exemplified that the new Turkey was facing towards modernity 
and turned it back on the old, non-modern, traditional East. Therefore, the change of the 
script was an important sign of a new dimension of nationalization, which was set by 
the Kemalist elites as the ―language revolution‖. This symbolic characteristic of the 
figurative change of the language was of primary significance in the construction of the 
categorical division of old vs. new. The ―new‖ regime already established a new system 
of politics with the declaration of the Republic, without a sultan and a Caliph for whom 
the War of Independence was in fact pursued.  
The new script stood for the evidence of this change from the old to the new. 
Nevertheless, the employment of the new alphabet created a rupture of the written 
culture. Within a few months, the literate people of the old times were made illiterate 
(which was around ten percent), and written cultural wealth of the Empire, with all its 
historical documents and literature, was rendered inaccessible for the new generations 
(Ahmad, 1993, p. 80).  
One strong argument for the change was that the old Arabic script was difficult to 
learn. Many proponents of the alphabet reform have pointed the low rates of literacy in 
the imperial times. The Arabic script was not as easy to learn as the new script, true, 
since it was properly representing all the voices of the Turkish language. A student has 
to learn the patterns of words to recognize the meaning (Lewis G. , 2004). However, the 
reason of the low rates of literacy could be the lack of an organized public education 
system, rather than the difficulties in learning the Arabic script.
69
  
The claim that the new alphabet makes easier to learn reading and writing was to 
put to test. Right after the announcement of the new alphabet an educational 
mobilization was organized. Millet Mektepleri (Nation‘s Schools) were established in 
order to teach the new script to the illiterate and those who knew the old script. It was 
the first republican national mobilization, when every citizen between the ages of 16 
and 40 were obliged either to attend the schools or to enter an examination to be 
                                                 
69
 For extensive analyses of the Alphabet Reform, see Yorulmaz (1995), Ertem 
(1991), and ġimĢir (1992). These works cover debates on the alphabet that took place in 
the 19
th
 century Ottoman Empire, as well.  
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exempted. Attendance was mandatory and it was to be observed by the special 
commissions. 
The duration for the courses was four months for the illiterate and two months for 
the literates of the old alphabet. In these schools, according to Sami N. Özerdim, 
2.546.051 people received their certificates for their success until 1936, when the 
Schools were closed (cited in Sadoğlu, 2003, p. 230).70 
The language was not only figuratively transformed but also in terms of its 
corpus. The second phase of the formation of the new language is known as the 
―Language Revolution‖, which started with the establishment of the Türk Dili Tetkik 
Cemiyeti (the Society for the Study of the Turkish Language) on July 12, 1932. Mustafa 
Kemal initiated the efforts for the Society and the first thing to do was to organize an 
international scientific congress of Turkish language in the same year. The congresses 
were organized again in 1934, 1936 and 15 more until 1982. The meetings in the one-
party period were more about constructing the scientific infrastructure for the claim of 
authenticity of the Turkish language. Such justification was deemed especially 
important as the language ideology of the Kemalists dictated the equation of the nation 
and the language. As it could be scientifically proved that Turkish has been a language 
of civilization and culture throughout the history, so could be the legitimization of the 
Turkish nation.   
Later on the name of the institution was changed to Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish 
Language Institution, TDK henceforth). Language purification became the foremost 
mission of TDK. The foreign words were to be eliminated from the language. The 
problem of substituting the foreign words would be resolved by either the collection of 
―pure Turkish‖ vocabulary from all over the country, or they would be derived from 
authentic Turkic languages. Compiled words were published in books and the 
agglutinative character of Turkish language was made use of for devising many of the 
new terms. Öztürkçe was the term coined with new version of Turkish language, which 
the new Republic would build. 
                                                 
70
 An alternative number is a little more than 1.3 million (see Ġnan, 1979; and 
Albayrak, 1994) 
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However, there were always criticisms, especially after the 1950s, that the 
attempts at purification was an unscientific intervention to the language, that most of the 
new word did not comply with the rules of Turkish, and that purification was a mistake 
in the first place.
71
  
A significant moment regarding TDK was the invention of Güneş-Dil Teorisi 
(Sun-Language Theory) in 1935. The theory mainly argued, in line with Türk Tarih Tezi 
(the Turkish History Thesis),
72
 Turkish was at the source of all human languages. 
Zürcher explains the theory as it claimed that: 
―… languages derived originally from one primeval language, spoken in 
Central Asia, that Turkish was closest of all languages to this origin and that 
all languages had developed from the primeval language through Turkish‖ 
(2003, p. 190).
73
 
With Atatürk‘s encouragement, the theory became the official theory of language. 
It was widely supported in the Third Language Congress in 1936. It was claimed that 
the European linguistics was not able to solve the problem of ―glottogony‖ (the 
emergence of the first human language) since they had ignored Turkish. It was 
announced to be a challenge to the existing linguistic theories. 
Led by Atatürk, most of those interested in the Language Revolution, be them 
linguists or not, were trying to explain how virtually every word of the known 
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 See below for details.  
72
 For an analysis of Türk Tarih Tezi, see Behar (1992). 
73
 Harold Schiffman reminds that such a theory was not unique to the Turkish 
case:  
―… the idea that one‘s own language is the ‗original‘ language of all the 
world‘s languages was also a feature of Soviet language policy, when N. K. 
Marr‘s theories were dominant. Marr was a Georgian championed by Stalin, 
and Marr had a theory about ‗Japhetic‘ languages (which Georgian was the 
archetype of) being the original family. This fit the Soviet policy idea that 
all languages would eventually be given up (as relics of bourgeois 
nationalism) and people would adopt a universal language, derived from 
Japhetic, and resembling Russian.‖ (personal communication, April 2008). 
For an analysis of Marrist language policy, see Schiffman (2008). 
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languages were ―nationalized‖, through games of etymology.74 After the First Language 
Congress, Turkish had been claimed to be the mother of the Indo-European language 
family, now it became to be the mother of the languages of high civilizations, such as 
Sumerian and Hittite (Ertop, 1963, pp. 72-78). The Theory became a compulsory course 
at the Language and History-Geography Faculty of the Ankara University by the orders 
of Atatürk. After Atatürk‘s death, Güneş-Dil Teorisi lost its master and faded away. 
There have been various comments on the emergence of the theory. Zürcher, for 
example, maintains that the theory was supported as a reaction to the attempts of new 
word inventions, which were getting out of hand (2003, p. 190).
75
 Zürcher‘s utilitarian 
proposal should be taken into account; however, there is more in the Theory. The 
members of TDK and Atatürk seem to be amazed by what the Theory offers. There 
could hardly be any other scientific hypothesis to confirm the antiquity of the Turkish 
nation. Being the mother of languages could become another source of national pride, a 
feeling that Atatürk believed to be missing in the hearths of the members of the nation. 
On the other hand, the Theory itself shows the conceptual horizons of the Turkish 
nationalism.  
A frequently missing point in the reviews of the Theory is its contribution in the 
formation of the discourse, in which it is claimed that Kurdish is in fact a distorted 
variety of Turkish. Since Turkish to various extents reside in the roots of every 
language, this would be more so when Kurdish is the issue. The narrative effects of the 
claim would quickly transform as to declare that Kurds are in fact Turks, one of the 
basic clichés of the republican period. In post-1980 decades, the story would become an 
absurdity to claim that Kurds are mountain Turks and they were named after the sounds 
they made while walking on snow. 
In conclusion, the alphabet and language reforms of the first republican decades 
were the products of ―a massive linguistic engineering‖, to borrow AyĢe Öncü‘s 
statement (2000, p. 299). Öncü also emphasizes that this enterprise attempted to 
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 For an amusing account of Güneş-Dil Teorisi, based on the proceedings of TDK 
commissions, see ―Türk Dehasının Ürünü MuhteĢem Bir Teori!‖, Birikim (2), June 
1989, (pp. 56-61). 
75
 Also see Zürcher (1989).  
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generate an empty and homogenous universe that is ―liberated‖ from its ―old‖ and 
―traditional‖ connections, a cultural tabula rasa, on which the biography of the new 
national identity could be written (ibid.).  
4.10 The Army and Language 
The first modernization attempts aimed at the Ottoman army, and since then, the 
military forces have always been an important element of the issues of modern political 
power. The mounting efficiency of the Janissaries had already signaled the failure of the 
state‘s power over the provinces and the outcome, inter alia, was the emergence of a 
new class of aristocracy, âyan. To reinforce the central authority of the Ottoman palace, 
Selim III and Mahmut II labored for the construction of a new military system (Karpat 
K. H., 2006). The new military schools, since the end of the 18
th
 century, were first to 
educate its students with European methods and in European languages.  
Within the scope of instrumental rationality employed in the new army, language 
played an important role. Needs for standard and rapid communication among the 
different units of the army produced some pragmatic solutions. There are a substantial 
number of documents in the army archives, which contained telegrams in Ottoman 
language, but with Latin letters. The transliteration was done according to the spelling 
of the French Language. It was easier and quicker to print these messages, and the letter 
system complied with the machines that were imported from European countries. Later, 
in 1910s, Enver PaĢa devised an easily printable script to be used in the military 
correspondences (ġimĢir, 1992; Lewis G. , 2004, p. 45).  
As a rite of passage for young male citizens, the Turkish Army, besides other 
things, has always been conceived as a school. The army played in important role in the 
spread of literacy, as well. Webster states that more than ten percent of the literate 
population – which makes a total number of 350.000 men – learnt to read Turkish 
during their military service (1939, p. 223). Those who were taught Turkish were 
advised to teach it to their fellows back in their villages.  
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The role of the army in teaching Turkish is still valid, especially for the Kurdish 
boys who have not been registered to elementary schools before. It also recently plays 
one of the leading roles in keeping the issue of Turkish on the public agenda, by various 
campaigns and declaration.
76
 
So apart from its role as a modernizing agent, the Turkish army was also an 
important part of the production process that generated new subjects of the new political 
regime. These new subjects would be the individual bearers of new qualities of the 
national identity, devoted to progress and contributing to the expansion of the Turkish 
language regime.  
4.11 Economy in Turkish 
The Turkification of the linguistic universe involved the sphere of economics, as 
well. The rising of Turkish nationalism already resulted in the attempts to create a 
national bourgeoisie in the ĠTC power. Çağlar Keyder notes that the new nationalism 
encouraged the employment and entrepreneurship of Muslims in various sectors of the 
economy. Keyder reminds that the language regulations of May 1915 forbid the 
displays of French, English (and later on, German) signboards on the street and required 
the use of Turkish in every commercial correspondence and official accounting 
transactions (2001, p. 90). Certainly, the regulation also aimed at controlling and 
manipulating the economic realm, which was becoming more bound to the international 
economical system through the increasing integration of the Ottoman Empire with the 
global network. 
A similar law was enacted in the first years of the Republic, too. On April 10, 
1926, the Parliament passed the law, which made the use of Turkish compulsory in all 
companies in their transactions, contracts, accounting and communication. The 
corporations with foreign investments would also use Turkish with their relations with 
Turks and in their official connections. (Aktar, 2000b, p. 117).  
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 The army‘s involvement in the language debate in 2000s will be presented in 
detail in the next chapter. 
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Recalling the municipal regulations mentioned above, the municipalities were also 
entitled to control the language of public signs. The Law no. 5237, Belediye Gelirleri 
Kanunu (the Law on the Municipal Assets) commanded that the signboards to be 
displayed to publicize the name and slogans of shops and companies would be in 
Turkish. The law was in effect until the 1980s, but there are no signs of its enforcement 
in that period. Lately, the municipalities are compelling the workplaces and companies 
to be named in Turkish. The recent attempts to re-enforce the linguistic regime in local 
economics will be dealt in the next sections.  
4.12 Modernization, Citizenship and Language 
Turkish language had not only been considered as one of the new pillars of the 
Turkish modernization. Education of the new Turkish was also deemed to be a strong 
instrument in establishment and consolidation of the republican regime. New 
generations of the Turkish nation would learn to be proud of and advance their 
Turkishness, and teaching Turkish could be a significant facilitator for this pedagogical 
process. 
The republican cadres exhibited considerable effort to reform the educational 
system for it to conform the needs and aims of the massive transformation. Tevhid-i 
Tedrisat Kanunu (the Law on the Unification of Education), decreed on March 3, 1924, 
aimed at the unification of all educational institutions under the authority of the 
Ministry of Education. The law closed down medreses, the Islamic educational 
organizations, and totally secularized the educational system (Zürcher, 2003, p. 197). 
The education, as it was the case in other nation-states, was seen as the primary 
medium for ideological indoctrination of the new generations. The construction of the 
standard national language and the transmission of the knowledge pertaining to it was a 
vital dimension of the generation of the "new Turk". In 1930, the Ordinance for the 
Teachers of Secondary and High Schools requested the educators to take every chance 
to engage in the "republican education" and registered that Turkish courses were 
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extremely important in this sense (Akyüz, 1985, p. 324; quoted in KarakuĢ, 2006, p. 
65).  
Similarly, in 1935 program of the Ministry of Culture on the curriculum of the 
elementary schools, the emphasis was, once more, on the courses of Turkish. The 
overall aim of the new program was stated to be ―educating Turkish children as Turkish 
citizens equipped with national ideals, as active and loyal individual members of the 
society‖. Turkish courses, in following, were marked to be the fields of the development 
and nourishment of the national sentiments (KarakuĢ, 2006, p. 69).  
As noted above, speaking Turkish was registered as a condition for an adequate 
state of citizenship. According to the Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatlarına Methal 
(Introduction to the Outlines of Turkish History), one of the masterpieces of the Turkish 
History Thesis; 
―over time the Turks had ‗crossed with other races‘; however the Turkish 
language had preserved their memories, cultural characteristics and 
everything else that made them a nation, including the Turks‘ most 
cherished possession, the Turkish intellect. Since the Turkish language had 
preserved the nation, one had to speak it to prove that one was of ethnic 
Turkish descent and was eligible for membership in the Turkish nation.‖ 
(Çağaptay, Reconfiguring the Turkish Nations in the 1930s, 2002, p. 70) 
With the campaigns like Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!, and regular addresses to the 
society in which the relationship between the Turkish language and the Turkish nation, 
the discourse on citizenship was becoming increasingly ethnicist, despite the formal 
definition of Turkishness was based on the political bond of the individuals with the 
state. ―This ethnicist definition of the nation through language put non-Turkish speakers 
in a precarious position.‖ (Çağaptay, Reconfiguring the Turkish Nations in the 1930s, 
2002, p. 70). The aim of the language regime was not only to establish standardization 
among the speakers of varieties of Turkish or to reconfigure the image and the content 
of the Turkish language. The purpose of the republican language was also the creation 
of a nation-wide linguistic homogeneity and eradication of linguistic differences. 
Languages were assumed as essential elements for the definition and legitimacy of 
nations, therefore to ensure the creation of the new nation, the linguistic enterprise, 
similarly, was assumed as a necessity. 
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4.13 Expansion of the Republican Regime of language 
In June 1934, the Law of Surnames, no. 2525, required every citizen to take a 
surname. A regulation regarding the Law was later published in December, the same 
year, and the regulation clearly stated how the law would be operated.
77
 The foremost 
relevant issue was that the surname would be chosen from the Turkish language (the 
Article 5).  
The governors of the cities and towns were appointed as the officials in 
responsible of the execution of the Law, and they were commanded to resolve any 
conflicts. This has resulted in some odd applications, especially in Kurdish regions. 
There are many Kurdish families, who were given the surnames, such as Türk and 
Öztürk. The problem of naming has been a trouble, until recently, for many who were 
refused because of that the names they chose for their newborns were not Turkish or 
that they contained non-Turkish letters. The ban was based on the Law of Public 
Registration, dated 1972, which required that only Turkish names could be given to the 
newborns, and it was recently changed in 2003 in line with reforms to conform the EU 
standards. However, the condition of using letters that are in the Turkish alphabet is still 
valid. Therefore, many Kurds now can name their children with words from the Kurdish 
vocabulary but they cannot write them properly.
78
 Names like Xezal, Bawer, Berwar, 
Berxo, Cigerxwin, Ciwan, and Welat are transliterated with the Turkish alphabet. 
The same year means a lot for many Kurds, for another reason. On June 14, İskan 
Kanunu (the Law on Settlement, no. 2510), was decreed. It was in fact legalizing the 
Şark Islahat Raporu of 1925.79 The law categorized the society in three groups: (1) 
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 The Law and the Regulation are interesting in their use of ―pure Turkish‖ and 
recently produced words, such as günlemeç instead of tarih. 
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 ―Ġsim Yasağı Ayıbına Son‖, Radikal, September 23 (2003). 
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 The Turkish text of the Law is in Okutan (2004, pp. 316-330). The Law was 
replaced by the new Law on Settlement in 2006. The last version of the Law n. 2510 is 
accessible at http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/554.html (retrieved on July 30, 
2008). In the new law of 2006, no. 5543 does not refer to speaking Turkish but, still, 
―being of Turkish descent and associated with the Turkish culture‖ is still the basic 
category to classify the migrants.  
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those who speak Turkish and belong to the ethnic groups of Turks, (2) those who are 
ethnically Turks but who do not speak Turkish, and (3) those who are neither Turks nor 
speak Turkish.
80
 The purpose was to de-intensify the Kurdish population and arranged 
their re-settlement in regions where Turks are in majority, and the settlement of Turkish 
immigrants into the Kurdish regions. The law was about the reorganization of the whole 
population according to their cultures and their tendencies to become proper citizens. 
Many Kurdish families, especially those who were influential in their neighborhoods 
were dispersed in non-Kurdish provinces; their re-groupings were prevented. Even the 
Kurdish tribes who clearly stated before that they would ally with the Republic were 
forced to migrate.  
A clear assumption of the Law was that speaking Turkish was a solid evidence of 
belonging to the Turkish culture. There were those who belonged to the Turkish ―race‖, 
but they, according to the subtext of the Law, eventually lost their identities. The 
famous republican thesis, which claimed that Kurds were indeed originally Turks but 
they were assimilated, had its formal and discursive roots in the legal documents of the 
time.  
The elimination of linguistic alternatives was spread out to the names of 
settlements. Although the names of more than 800 villages and towns with Greek, 
Armenian or Kurdish names were already changed to Turkish between 1934 and 1936 
(Hür, 2005), it was properly stated in a legal text in İl İdaresi Kanunu (the Law on the 
Administration of Provinces) which was enacted on June 10, 1949. The law read, 
―Village names which are not Turkish and which should be changed are 
to be brought before the provincial council and changed by the interior 
minister within the shortest possible time. (Article 2, Clause D/2). 
After 1959, a total number of 12 thousand villages and towns were made Turkish, 
among which is the illustrious change of Dersim to Tunceli. 
Entessar informs that after the suppression of the Dersim Rebellion in 1938, the 
last Kurdish insurgency until that of PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan in Kurdish, 
Kurdistan Workers‘ Party) in the late 1970s, the terms, Kurd and Kurdistan were 
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 The only directly referred ethnic group was the gypsies, whose settlements and 
immigrations were subjected to strict conditions.  
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forbidden and references to them were removed in the Turkish history books (1992, p. 
84 and 87). Indeed, the name of an ethnic groups was erased from the official discourse, 
although everyone knew that there were people called Kurds, the authorities never made 
the name public until Turgut Özal, in mid-1980s, who announced that he was half-
Kurdish and frequently talked about possible resolutions of the Kurdish problem (Yıldız 
K. , 2005, p. 17). Many writers and politicians were arrested and sentenced for, among 
others, claiming that there are Kurds in the country, on the basis that they served the 
tendencies to divide the country by attempting to show that as if there is a separate 
nation within the Republic of Turkey or that they sought ―to destroy or weaken 
nationalist feeling‖ (ibid., p. 50).  
4.14 After the One-Party Rule 
Turkey was inclined to stay close to the Nazis in the WWII, and signed a treaty of 
friendship with Germany almost simultaneously with the invasion of the Soviet Union 
by the Nazi forces (Zürcher, 2003, p. 204). However, when it was becoming clear that 
the Allied Countries were about to triumph with the coming defeat of the Germans, the 
Turkish government declared war on Germany in 1945 (ibid., p. 205), in order to 
remain on the winners‘ side.  
The establishment of the United Nations, the worldwide condemnation of one-
party rules and totalitarian regimes; and the internal pressure in Turkey for change were 
among the reasons for changing the political regime to a multi-party system (ibid., pp. 
206-215). The first election with an opposition party was made in 1946, and DP came to 
power in 1950 with a considerable support from the citizens. The founder party of the 
Republic apparently lost the support of the nation, which the party pursued to transform 
and to modernize.  
The DP period, until 1960 when they were taken out of office by the coup d‘état 
of May 27, was a significant time for the language regime in the country as well. On the 
one hand, the Turkification of non-Turkish elements never slowed down, especially 
against the non-Muslim minorities. The notorious riots took place in Istanbul on 
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September 6 and 7, 1955 aimed at the houses and shops of Greek and Armenian 
minorities, and a new wave of emigration of them took place (Güven, 2006).  
On the other hand, as Blau notes, the DP period and the time until the 1971 was a 
renaissance in terms of the creation of a Kurdish intelligentsia (Blau, 1992, p. 54). Now 
that there were many Kurds in greater cities while preserving their provincial bonds 
with those who remained, they had more opportunities for access to educational and 
cultural facilities. It might be assessed that this climate of relative freedom laid the 
bases of the creation of a Kurdish politics that would became evident in the 1960s and 
1970s.
81
  
With respect to language policies, the results of the approach to the international 
pole led by the USA became evident, and English turned out to be the language of the 
new era. In 1955, the first Anadolu Lisesi (Anatolian High School) was opened. These 
were the public schools in which the students learnt English in the preparatory classes 
for one year, and most of the courses were conducted in English (Kırkgöz, 2007, p. 
175). And, the first university to use English as the language of education, Ortadoğu 
Teknik Üniversitesi (Middle Eastern Technical University) was open in 1956, in 
cooperation with the US government.  
As noted above, the opposition of DP against radical reforms of the one-party 
governments was clear and they acted on the language policies in parallel with their 
ideologies. The Arabic ezan was restored; the name of the Constitution was made 
Teşkilatı Esasiye Kanunu again, as many of the state offices regained their pre-
republican titles.  
As the DP period set free the conservative, liberal and leftist challenges against 
the republican policies, it was also the time when a substantial opposition against the 
republican language revolution made itself visible. Some writers, among which were 
Halide Edip Adıvar, Ġsmail Habib Sevük, Burhan Apaydın, Zahir Güvemli, Nihat Sami 
Banarlı and Nurettin Ergin, strongly resisted the works of TDK, claiming that the 
unscientific practices of the Institution was undermining the integrity of the Turkish 
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 A reproduction of this politicization, now at a higher level, took place in 1970s, 
when many Kurds migrated to European countries as they accepted immigrant workers 
and in 1980s, when many Kurdish politicians were forced to leave the country due to 
persecutions and torture after the coup d‘état of September 12.  
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language, therefore of the Turkish culture. One of the favorite demeaning etiquettes they 
coined with the purification efforts was uydurmacılık (making-up).82 What they were 
propagating was yaşayan Türkçe (living Turkish), the Turkish language which was alive 
among its speakers and which connects the present with the culture and wisdom of the 
past.
83
 The linguistic clash was between Öztürkçe and yaşayan Türkçe. 
The critics were no less nationalist or less amazed with the qualities of Turkish 
language; however, the way they considered the Turkish language was not puristic and 
they viewed society and language within a more conservative paradigm. For them 
language and culture were not objects of direct political action, an approach which 
solidly stands against the republican positivism. They were convinced that the 
standardization of the language is necessary, especially in its rules of grammar and 
punctuation, rather than its vocabulary. Moreover, they frequently demanded that this 
was to be a business of linguists and other language specialists, not of some politically 
biased people, and they asked for the foundation of a language academy, like that of 
France, instead of TDK.
84
 
This confrontation about the ways to treat language, on the other hand, was a 
conflict of power among elites. The republican political regime transformed the existing 
hierarchies of social status.
 85
  The new order excluded some of the important figures of 
military, politics, literature and some local notables. The new script and the efforts to 
create a purely Turkified language, in a very short time disqualified a large number of 
men of letters as the representatives of the old regime. They and their works were no 
longer appreciated and respected. The invention of new politics, which prioritized 
centralization, nationalization, positivist intervention to social relations, and a cultural 
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 See Peyami Safa‘s Osmanlıca, Türkçe, Uydurmaca (1970) for a critique of 
purification efforts.  
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 Who those speakers were and which section, class or status of the society was 
meant was almost never clearly noted. The obscurity of the linguistic variations among 
the citizens of Turkey in the writings of these writers opposing the republican language 
policies was yet another evidence that they shared the republican notion of a nation, 
which is indifferently united without distinction in culture and language.  
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 For a representation of anti-reform faction, see Banarlı (1999). 
85
 For an extensive analysis of the new Turkish political elite, see (Frey, 1965). 
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policy that oriented to rapid Westernization modified the way prestige was defined. 
Many of those who were socially dislocated, even those who were within the Kemalist 
elite circles in the one-party period,
86
 found a relatively free space to express their 
discontent in the 1950s and later on. As the language regime of the Republic became 
one of the foremost representatives of the new order, once again, the field of language 
became a battlefield of political ideologies. The way political confrontations were 
relegated to debates on language was a long established tradition in Turkish politics, 
since the Abdülhamit II‘s reign.87 
4.15 Between Two Military Interventions 
The policies of DP were deemed dangerous by a considerable fraction of the 
Army and most of the politicians in the CHP. On May 27, 1960, the Army reclaimed the 
power and refreshed the tradition of military intervention to the political system, which 
was first practiced in the ĠTC period (Ahmad, 1993, pp. 121-147; Zürcher, Turkey: A 
Modern History, 2003, pp. 141-144).  
The constitution of 1961, on the one hand, ensured many liberal rights and paved 
the way for the rapid politicization of the 1960s and 1970s. On the other hand, it also 
guaranteed the authority of Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council, MGK 
henceforth) over the political realm. 
The 1961 Constitution was not consistent in its description of the State, as it was 
phrased as Türkiye Devleti (the State of Turkey) in some articles and as Türk Devleti 
(the Turkish State) in others. The Article 2, titles as ―The Unity of the State, the Official 
Language, and The Capital‖ clearly defined Turkish as the official language, as did the 
1924 Constitution (Kili & Gözübüyük, 2000, p. 175). Article 9 protects the regime and 
outlaws any change about that the State is a republic, however has not set any 
mentioned about that the official language is not subject to change. (p. 176). 
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 Fuad Köprülü was one of them. See Turan and Özel (2003, p. 126-131) for a 
critical account of his changing sided on the issue of language reform. 
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 See above for the period and ġerif Mardin‘s comments on the issue. 
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The Constitution secured the fundamental rights and the Article 12 stated, 
―Everyone is equal before the law, without any consideration of language, race, gender, 
political thought, philosophical belief, religion and sect.‖ (p. 177).  
It also reiterated the definition of Turkishness. The Article 54 read, ―Everyone, 
who is related to the Turkish State with the bond of citizenship, is a Turk.‖ (p. 188). 
The linguistic restriction about candidacy for the parliament is kept intact and the 
Article 68 stated, ―Those who are not literate in Turkish … cannot be elected.‖ (p. 193). 
The DP policies made it clear, according to those who prepared the Constitution, 
that the protection of the republican benefits should be clearly asserted in this master 
legal document. The Revolution Laws or the republican reforms were protected by the 
Article 153, in which the Law on the Approval and the Application of Turkish Letters 
(no. 1353) is included (p. 227). 
Further rationalizations concerning the Turkish language regime followed in 
1960s. The Law on Turkish Citizenship, no. 403 and passed on February 11, 1964 
regulated the conditions for admittance to citizenship or its removal. Speaking and 
understanding Turkish, at least to be able to know how to express him or herself in 
Turkish, was among the criteria for acceptation. The Directorates of National Education 
were assigned for the documentation of the applicants‘ skills in Turkish. 
The 1960 coup was led by the idea of restoration of the republican order and the 
language regime was an essential part of it. The dark times for TDK, of which funds 
were reduced and studies of purification, harshly criticized by those who were close to 
DP were about to end after 1960. They regained their prestige before the new 
government. However, the response from the opponents of the Language Reform came 
quickly. In 1961, Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü (Institute for Research on Turkish 
Culture) and published volumes titled Türk Dili İçin. The volumes compiled articles 
written by the advocates of yaşayan Türkçe. An important figure among them was 
Faruk K. TimurtaĢ, a linguist and a scholar of literature, especially emphasized the 
unscientific base that fed the production of new words.
88
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 For a compilation of TimurtaĢ‘s articles, see TimurtaĢ (1996). A masterpiece, 
which analyzes and criticizes the development of the Language Reform, is Geoffrey 
Lewis‘s Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success. For the Turkish edition, 
see Lewis (2004). 
120 
 
In 1966, a Regulation on Censorship was issued by the Council of Ministers. The 
Regulation orders the how the communication would be controlled under conditions of 
war and martial law. It commanded that Turkish would be used in any communication 
within the country. The urge to control the information flow, apparently aimed at 
Kurdish, since after 1950s, there are hardly non-Muslim communities in considerable 
numbers left. According to 1965 census the total proportion of Greek, Armenian and 
Hebrew speakers in the country was no more than 0.65 percent. On the other hand, the 
ratio of those who declared that they spoke Kurdish as their first or second language is 
more than 8.5 percent.
89
 The Regulation of Censorship also limited the languages to be 
used in international communication: only those languages that were approved by the 
Supreme Military Command or the Commandership of Martial Law.  
The limitations on the use of Kurdish language made a peak when the Council of 
Ministers completely banned importation of any publication, records, and the like, that 
were produced in Kurdish (Yılmaz & Doğaner, 2007, p. 63). The ban doubtless 
intended to disconnect the international relationships conducted in Kurdish, whereas the 
main rationale behind the decisions was that those publications provoked a part of the 
society, they aimed at increasing the ―feeling of Kurdishness‖ and at the unity and the 
integrity of the country (pp. 54-64). 
Posta Tüzüğü (the Regulation on Postal Services), dated 1973, criminalized the 
use of languages other than Turkish or letters other than that of the Turkish alphabet, in 
writing the addresses. The Regulation was based on the Law on Postal Services, where 
there was no rule concerning language use.  
The rising politicization, including the development of Kurdish and socialist 
politics and student movements resulted in an increasing interest in the Kurdish regions. 
In accord with socialist interpretation, the problem was mostly assessed as one of 
underdevelopment and the State was accused for ignoring a significant portion of the 
society. The most significant protests were Doğu Mitingleri (Eastern Marches), which 
were supported by Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Worker Party of Turkey), the first socialist party 
in the Turkish parliament. The marches started in 1967 and eleven of them were 
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 The real number of Kurdish speakers should be higher than the one obtained in 
the census. See Appendix 2 for a detailed analysis of the results of Republican censuses 
with respect to linguistic minorities. 
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organized until 1969.
90
 The narrative of the protests started with emphasis on doğululuk, 
(being from the Eastern regions), not on Kurdishness. The speakers were calling for 
more economic investments and more attention of the government to the region. The 
organizers were cautious not to present the events as a Kurdish insurgence, but a civic 
and democratic protest of citizens who demanded equality between the citizens and the 
regions of Turkey. The use of the Kurdish language was avoided in speeches or banner 
in the first marches but as the protests drew more populated masses Kurdish become 
frequently visible. The prosecutors investigated the events, and the organizers were sued 
for ―regionalism‖.91 The marches would become a major subject of numerous cases 
against the socialist and Kurdish politician in the trials after 1971. 
Another military intervention came on March 12, 1971. The Army sent a 
memorandum to the government, which consequentially ended in the resignation of the 
latter and the formation of another one under the control of the military forces. 
Extensive arrests and prosecutions took place in order to prevent the further advance of 
radical movements (Ahmad, 1993, pp. 148-180; Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, 
2003, pp. 258-263). The 1961 Constitution was deemed as far too liberal for the Turkish 
society, and a clause was added to the Article 11 on September 20, 1971: 
―None of the rights and freedoms stated in this Constitution can be used 
to abolish human rights and freedoms, or the indivisible unity of the Turkish 
State with its country and nation, or the Republic, of which qualities are 
stated in the Constitution, according to distinctions based on language, race, 
class, religion or sect.‖ (my translation, Kili & Gözübüyük, 2000, p. 176). 
As the politics of 1960s was marked with the mounting of the socialist ideology 
and Kurdish movements, the 1971 amendment aimed at the further protection of the 
regime by criminalization of political ideas, which pursued the establishment of a 
socialist state based on the power of the working class, or the propagation of an 
autonomous or independent Kurdistan. 
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 From the project I worked on in 1998 for Kumru ToktamıĢ, as a part of her 
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 ―Doğu Mitingi Düzenleyenler Adliye'de‖, Milliyet, September 10 (1967); 
―Doğu Mitingi‖, Ant, September 12 (1967); "Doğu Mitingi Komite BaĢkanı 
Tutuklandı", Akşam, September 27 (1967). 
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Nüfus Kanunu (the Law on Public Registration, no. 1587, enacted in 1972), as 
noted above, regulated the way children are named. The Article 16 stated that the 
newborns could not be given names, which were ―in contradiction of our national 
culture‖.92 Such a phrasing of the law provided the Public Registration Offices a 
flexible sphere of action in their refusing any ―inappropriate‖ names, such as Kurdish 
ones. 
4.16 1980 Coup and Afterwards 
The effects of the 1980 military intervention were more widespread. It totally 
reconfigured the political realm (Ahmad, 1993, pp. 181-213; Zürcher, Turkey: A 
Modern History, 2003, pp. 278-284). Similarly, the language regime was redefined in 
many aspects.  
The 1982 Constitution was less focused on rights but more on duties, limitations 
and prohibitions, compared to the 1960 Constitution.
93
 It is still in effect, with 
considerable amendments made especially after 2001, when the governments were keen 
on legal adjustments to comply with the EU norms in order to start negotiations for full 
membership to the Union. 
Below are the constitutional regulations with respect to the Turkish language 
regime. 
Similar to the previous Constitutions, the first articles define primary attributes of 
the State. The first three articles are as follows:  
Article 1 – The State of Turkey is a Republic. 
Article 2 - The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social 
state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public 
peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the 
nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the 
Preamble. 
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 Law 1587 was changed in July 2003; annulled and replaced with a new one in 
2006. 
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 For a comparative analysis of the 1960 Constitution, see Tanör (2000) 
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Article 3 - The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an 
indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish. Its flag, the form of which is 
prescribed by the relevant law, is composed of a white crescent and star on a 
red background. Its national anthem is the ―Independence March‖. Its 
capital is Ankara. 
Article 4 takes under protection the first three articles and rules out any changes or 
any proposals to change them.  
The interesting aspect concerning the official language is that in the 1982 
Constitution, it is rather fuzzily phrased.
94
 Although the Section 3, under which the 
Article 3 is placed, is titled as ―The Unity, the Official Language, the Flag, the National 
Anthem and the Capital of the State, the Article 3 reads as ―the language of the State is 
Turkish‖. It neither clearly states that Turkish is the official language or it is the 
language of the state. This vagueness is, in fact, an essential characteristic of Turkish 
legal texts, in particular in the constitutions and penal codes. The urge to take under 
control of the political and social spheres means that there is the need of defining every 
minute detail of such control and its conditions. Since the legislators have been unable 
to define the totality of the societal relations, of which they aim to take control, the 
results are the vague statements and phraseology. This, on the other hand, offers the 
executors of the laws a flexible field of interpretation, as it has done in the issue of 
naming children with names ―in conformity with our national culture‖, as noted above. 
Various other examples regarding this elasticity will be presented below. 
An infamous pattern, introduced to the Turkish justice system by the 1982 
Constitution, is the phrase of ―kanunla yasaklanmış diller‖ (languages forbidden by 
law). The languages that are forbidden by law were made clearer in 1983 with the Law 
no. 2932, of which details will be given below. The Constitution, however, before 
defining which ones are the forbidden languages, brought limitations to the freedoms of 
expression and publication. It outlawed the expression and spread of ideas (the Article 
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 There were always debates on the poor language use in the 1982 Constitution. 
The discussions heated particularly during the assembly elections of the President in 
2007. Many argued that in the Constitution, the sufficient number of Assmebly 
attendees for an election of the presiden was badly phrased. For a similar argument see 
―367 kararıyla Anayasanın omurgası kırıldı‖, Yeni Şafak (June 27, 2007). 
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26/3) and any publication (Article 28/2) in forbidden languages. Both clauses were 
annulled in October 2001 in line with the EU regulations. 
The Constitution also limited the education of languages of the Turkish citizens 
and with the Article 42, it is prohibited to teach and study any language, other than 
Turkish, as a mother tongue. The Article implies that the education in and of other 
languages are ordered by law, however, none of them could be taught as the mother 
language of the students, except that the rights granted by international treaties, such as 
the Lausanne Treaty are recognized.
95
  
The issue of mother language has been a very problematic one, for the legislators 
of the 1980 coup, who were actually the chief generals in charge. There remained only 
the Kurdish minority of which language could be problem. The socialist movements 
were subdued but the Kurdish movement was promising more trouble to the coup 
leaders. Since the Kurds were spread in four countries and their regions are particularly 
important for the Middle Eastern political order and the global energy supplies, any 
possibility of a revival of Kurdish resistance could easily become an international 
problem. Besides, after 60 years of assimilation policies, there were still a considerable 
number of Turkish citizens, who would identify themselves as a Kurds. Moreover, the 
Kurdish population was no more restricted to the southeastern regions of the country; 
there were many Kurdish communities in the outskirts of greater metropolitan areas. 
The most apparent element of distinction of Kurdishness was the Kurdish language. The 
Turkish language regime pursued the linguistic assimilation of minorities, however, the 
educational facilities in Kurdish regions were not widespread hence many Kurds were 
spared of assimilation. Now, via the widened opportunities of education and the 
possibilities of ethnic politicization would help Kurds to rediscover their linguistic 
origins.
96
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 The Article 42 is still in effect, despite the changes in other minor legislations, 
which permitted private courses to teach Kurdish. As it will be explained it detail 
below, the courses, however, were considered to be teaching one of the ―different 
languages and dialects that are used by the Turkish citizens in their daily lives‖, but not 
teaching a mother language other than Turkish. 
96
 For an analysis of Kurds in Turkey, see Martin van Bruinessen (1995a; and 
1995b). 
125 
 
Therefore, the language of Kurds was a critical, and there were some methods 
devised to erase the public expressions of Kurdishness. A historical moment regarding 
that end was the preparation of relevant laws. 
One of the legal regulations associated with the problem of mother languages was 
Yabancı Dil Eğitimi ve Öğretimi Kanunu (the Law on Foreign Language Education and 
Teaching), dated September 14, 1983 and numbered 2923). The law formulated in an 
interesting way the outlawing of teaching mother languages other than Turkish. Article 
2/a stated that ―the mother languages of the Turkish citizens cannot be taught in any 
language other than Turkish‖. Here there is no denial of that there are other mother 
languages, but the restriction comes from that they have to be taught, if it ever happens, 
in Turkish.
97
 It is hard to imagine how it could be to teach a Kurdish or an Armenian 
child to teach their mother language in Turkish. If the mother language is Kurdish or 
Armenian, then it is reasonable to assume that the child has hardly learnt any Turkish 
until her age of education. Therefore, it practically becomes impossible to teach her 
Kurdish or Armenian with a language that she has almost no knowledge of.  
In July 2003, the title of the Law was changed as Yabancı Dil Eğitimi ve Öğretimi 
ile Türk Vatandaşlarının Farklı Dil ve Lehçelerinin Öğrenilmesi Hakkında Kanun (the 
Law on Foreign Language Education and Teaching, and on Learning Different 
Languages and Dialects Used Traditionally by Turkish Citizens in their Daily Lives), 
which is still in effect. Its second article was amended as follows: 
―No language other than Turkish can be taught in educational institutions 
and in schools to the Turkish citizens as their mother language. However, 
private courses can be opened for learning different languages and dialects 
used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives‖98 
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 As in other regulations, in this Law too, it is stated that the rights granted by 
international treaties are preserved. 
98  ―Eğitim ve öğretim kurumlarında, Türk vatandaşlarına Türkçeden başka hiçbir 
dil, ana dilleri olarak okutulamaz ve öğretilemez. Ancak, Türk vatandaşlarının günlük 
yaşamlarında geleneksel olarak kullandıkları farklı dil ve lehçelerin öğrenilmesi için … 
özel kurslar açılabilir; bu kurslarda ve diğer dil kurslarında aynı maksatla dil dersleri 
oluşturulabilir.‖ 
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It is worth to note that the Law made to comply with the Constitution‘s Article 42, 
hence preserving the prevention of mother language education. Although reviewed in 
detail below, it should be underlined here that the native languages other than Turkish 
were conceptualized, still after 2001, as tongues that are used in daily lives, as if they 
were not mother languages but invented during adolescence.  
Only five day later, on October 19, 1983, after long debates on its formulation, 
Türkçeden Başka Dillerde Yapılacak Yayınlar Hakkında Kanun (the Law on 
Publications and Broadcasts in Languages Other than Turkish, no. 2932), was accepted 
and enacted as of October 22.
99
 Now the society faced another assessment concerning 
mother languages. 
The Law stated, in its Article 1, that it was a regulation of the languages that were 
prohibited in order to protect the indivisible unity of the State with its country and 
nation, the national sovereignty, the Republic, the national security, and the public 
order. The Law‘s rationale, then, considered that any expression and publication of 
ideas in the forbidden languages might pose a threat to these precious elements of the 
republican political order. 
The second article defined those languages that were forbidden, in a spectacular 
phrasing, though: 
―It is prohibited to express, publicize and broadcast ideas in languages 
other than the first official languages of the states that are recognized by the 
Turkish State‖100  
The Article directly targeted Kurdish. The idiom ―the first official languages of 
the states that were recognized by the Turkish State‖ was in particular reflects the 
doubts about the Iraqi situation at the time, when Kurdish was the minor official 
language. The phraseology was bended in a way to avoid the straight reference to 
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 The full text of the law has been presented in the Appendix 1. The story of the 
formulation of the Law is documented in MGK assemblages (see Milli Güvenlik 
Konseyi Tutanak Dergisi, vol. 11 (1983). 
100
 ―Türk Devleti tarafından tanınmış bulunan devletlerin birinci resmi dilleri 
dışında herhangi bir dille düşüncelerin açıklanması, yayılması ve yayınlanması 
yasaktır‖ 
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Kurdish.
 101
  This is reasonable considering the sensitivity of the 1980 generals against 
any expressions that would imply that there are a separate people called Kurds in 
Turkey.
102
  
However, the Law was not only about forbidding languages, but also about 
linguistic facts. In the Article 3, Turkish was declared as the mother language of 
Turkish citizens. The Law and this Article were used the basis of other legal regulations 
that prevented the teaching and using of language other than Turkish.  
It is worth to review and asses the regulations concerning the mother language 
together. We are faced with three different conceptions:   
 The Constitution – dated 1982 – asserts, ―No language other than 
Turkish may be studied and taught to the Turkish citizens as their 
mother languages.‖   
 The Law on Foreign Language Education and Teaching – no. 2923, 
dated October 14, 1983 – states, ―The mother languages of the 
Turkish citizens may not be taught in a language other than 
Turkish.‖  
 The Law on Publications and Broadcasts in Languages Other than 
Turkish – no. 2932, dated September 19, 1983 – states, ―The 
mother language of Turkish citizens is Turkish. It is forbidden to 
… engage in any activity to use or disseminate languages other 
than Turkish as the mother language.‖  
This body of legal texts on mother languages has been quite confusing. The 
confusion is, in the first place, caused by the contradictory ideas on whether there are 
mother languages in Turkey other than Turkish or not. It is hard to resolve it from the 
phrasing in the Constitution; the Law no. 2923 is affirmative but limits its teaching with 
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 A similar clause was in Evlendirme Yönetmeliği (Regulation on Civil 
Marriages), enacted on November 7, 1985. It was stated that registrars of marriage 
agreement could use interpreters if the brides and grooms had no knowledge of Turkish. 
The condition is that the language must be one of the first official languages of the 
states that were recognized by the Turkish State. The last amendment of the Regulation 
was in 2006, and the clause remained.  
102
 An interesting incidence related to this Law occurred in 1987. Mehdi Zana, 
who was the mayor of Diyarbakır until he was arrested after the coup, refused to testify 
in Turkish, in order to protest the Law, and spoke Kurdish. Baskın Oran reports that the 
event was recorded as Zana spoke in an unintelligible language (2004, p. 108). 
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the obligation of using Turkish; and the Law no. 2932 is negative since it states that 
Turkish is the mother language of all citizens in Turkey. 
The logic behind this law, as well as other prohibitions on the mother languages, 
is significant since it plainly represents the way the State positions itself against its 
subjects. The idea that the mother language of all Turkish citizens, who are Turks 
anyway, according to the Constitution, is Turkish goes beyond the top-down 
transformation of the society and its total control. It aims at the construction of a 
discursive domain through which the reality would be altered. Recalling the concept of 
symbolic power, introduced by Bourdieu and defined as a power of constructing reality, 
then the Law no. 2932 should be one of the foremost expressions of the urge of the 
Turkish state for symbolic power. Similarly, following Foucault, the Law runs a regime 
of truth and its implications are far more than it is simply not true. The legislators of the 
1980 coup certainly knew that there were people with mother languages other than 
Turkish. What they intended, apparently, is to shift the discursive realm of legitimacy. 
For eight years until its annulment, the Law formed the basis of rejecting any claims of 
language rights.
103
 
 
To continue with the military legislation; Siyasi Partiler Kanunu (the Law on 
Political Parties no. 2820, dated April 22, 1983) have further restriction on the use of 
languages in political activities.  
The Law prohibits the use any language other than Turkish by the political parties, 
with the Article 81, under the section heading ―Prevention of Creation of Minorities‖:  
―Article 81: Political parties; 
a) cannot put forward that minorities based on national, religious, 
confessional, racial, or language differences exist in the Republic of Turkey. 
b) cannot advocate the goal of destroying national unity or be engaged in 
activities to this end; by means of protecting, developing, or disseminating 
language or cultures other than the Turkish language and culture and thus 
create minorities in the Republic of Turkey. 
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 The Law no. 2932 was annulled in 1991, with the introduction of the Law on 
Struggle against Terrorism, no. 3713.  
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c) cannot use a language other than Turkish in writing and printing party 
statutes or programs, at congresses, indoors or outside; at demonstrations, 
and in propaganda; cannot use or distribute placards, pictures, phonograph 
records, voice and visual tapes, brochures and statements written in a 
language other than Turkish; cannot remain indifferent to these actions and 
acts committed by others. However, it is possible to translate party statutes 
and programs into foreign languages other than those forbidden by law.‖ 
(my emphasis)
104
 
The Law on Political Parties, likewise, became the basis of many cases against 
Kurdish parties and Kurdish politicians. Considering that there have been many Kurds 
in the southeast region that speak no other language, the Article also prevents any 
political contact with the potential electors there in their own language.  
The title of the section that the Article 81 is placed under is important, as well: 
Prevention of creation of minorities. The discursive move here is similar to that of the 
Law no. 2932, that it is assumed there are no minorities anyway, and that the usage of 
any other language might facilitate their emergence. The protection of cultures and 
languages and their spread has been exclusively granted to Turkish. The narratives of 
these laws bend onto themselves, creating a discursive loop within which the chances of 
the generation of alternative discourses are insignificant.  
The coup also reconfigured the way civil society was organized. The Law on 
Associations, no. 2908 was accepted on October 10, 1983. The linguistic regime also 
acted on the languages that are used in the activities of associations or societies, and the 
Article 6 forbid the use ―languages forbidden by the law‖ in their documents, 
transactions, correspondences, congresses, publications and public banners, and in their 
formal or private meetings. Similarly, the Law further aimed at the prevention of any 
political activity that would be operated under associations, which has not been a rarity 
in Turkish political history.  
With the efforts for harmonization with the EU in 2003, Law no. 2908 was 
altered, as well. After the amendment, the only linguistic regulation for the associations 
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 Although the notion of ―languages that are forbidden by law‖ is eliminated in 
the respective articles in the Constitution, the phrase is not altered in the Law on 
Political Parties. Baskın Oran argues that the Law is yet another violation of the rights 
that were granted to all citizens by the Lausanne Treaty (2004, p. 86). 
130 
 
has been the obligation of using Turkish in their correspondence with the State 
offices.
105
  
4.17 A different Turkish for Broadcasting 
TRT was strictly bound to the political orientation of the government after 1980. 
The ANAP (Anavatan Partisi, Motherland Party) government came to power in 1983 
and it was led by Turgut Özal. Liberal in economics and conservative in ideology, the 
ANAP government did not hesitate to consider TRT as its backyard, as were many 
public institutions (Cankaya, p. 235) . In March 1984, Tunca Toskay was assigned as 
the General Manager of TRT. His period has been remembered by its biased and 
partisan broadcasting policies, the massive employment of people known as 
ülkücü106and frauds to be unearthed later on (Kejanlıoğlu, 1989, p. 179; cited in 
Cankaya, 2003, p. 230). 
On January 10, 1985, the administration of TRT published a notice and banned 
the use 205 words in radio and television programs of the. The reason stated was that 
the words were conflicting with the structure and functions of Turkish, and that they 
could not achieve the level of the standard Turkish (Cankaya, 2003, p. 230). 
Among the forbidden words were anı, bellek, öykü, söylev, söyleşi, ulus and 
uluslararası. The words offered to substitute these ones were of Ottoman origins. The 
list was prepared by Ahmet Bican Ercilasun and Hamza Zülfikar (ibid., p. 235). 
Ercilasun later became the president of the TDK, which lost its institutional autonomy 
after the coup and the 1982 Constitution assigned its new status as a state institution 
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 Law on 2908 was totally annulled in 2004, and replaced by the new Law on 
Associations, no. 5253. The clause concerning the use of Turkish in official 
correspondence with the State remained the same.  
106
 ülkücü: supporter or member of MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, Nationalist 
Action Party). MHP has been known as the far right, nationalist party, since it was 
established in the 1960. Its members were active in the street violence acts before 1980. 
As all the political parties were banned after 1980 coup, conservatives, nationalists and 
supporters of liberal economics were allies in ANAP. For a historical analysis of MHP 
and Turkish far right, see Ağaoğulları (1990), Bora (1998) and Can (2002). 
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under the direct control of the prime minister‘s office. It was a turning point for the 
republican history of institutional linguistic and language policy studies. Ever since the 
change of TDK status, there have been severe criticisms against it.
107
 
The attempt to re-form the vocabulary was not confined to radio and television. 
Other official institutions followed TRT. One month later, in February 1985, the 
General Manager of the police forces, Saffet Arıkan Bedük announced a notice which 
asked to avoid using words that are ―incompatible‖ with the norm of Turkish (zorlama 
kelimeler) in all written and aired correspondences and on the Police Radio (Polis 
Radyosu). The target was apparently the ―pure Turkish‖ words that were introduced by 
TDK.  
The implications of such efforts to rule out some words and ordering the use of 
others are remarkable. The reaction against the purification of Turkish was not new, as 
noted above. In fact, the effort to prioritize the use of older words after 1980 was yet 
another phase of the political conflict between the republicans and conservatives
108
, 
which was operated over language. Between 1960 and 1980, too, the language was the 
political playground of the parties in power. In the times when Süleyman Demirel, the 
head of AP, was the prime minister, the institutions of the state were pushed towards the 
use of less Öztürkçe and more yaşayan Türkçe. The situation was reversed when CHP 
came in power.
109
 The choice of words in speech or in texts was a sign of the 
ideological tendencies of the speaker or writer. That political cleavage over language 
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 Dil Derneği was founded after the change, and gathered many devotees of the 
pre-1980 TDK. The Association, since then, relentlessly called for the foundation of an 
autonomous language institution. For criticisms against the new TDK, see Turan and 
Özel (2007), and Püsküllüoğlu, Özen, and Özel (1986). 
108
 Hasan Bülent Kahraman argues that the notion of conservative does not suit 
well in the Turkish case. For him, those who were denounced as reactionaries or 
conservatives were in fact who took the steps for the modernization and historical 
progress. He defines a historical swing of political power between the forces of status 
quo and centralization, and change and democratization, since the Tanzimat period. He 
maintains that DP, AP (Adalet Partisi, Justice Party), ANAP, and AKP (Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party) turned out to be the sides of this 
political clash which acted more effectively on democratization, economic development 
and social modernization (lecture notes).   
109
 See Brendemoen (1990) and Belge (1983) on the reflections of political 
ideologies on language use, after 1950s. 
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use would slowly diminish over time in the 1990s. For example, writers from the leftist 
politics seem to leave their hesitations about using ―old language‖ behind. 110 
Additionally, recent comparisons between daily newspapers, which previously reflected 
their political differences also through their choices of old or new vocabulary, show that 
in the post-1980 period the disparity in using words of Turkish origin is decreasing.
111
   
Now a conservative nationalists coalition was in power after 1983. The leaders of 
the military junta were quite disturbed with the way Turgut Özal performed state 
businesses and his economically liberal approach, however, their contempt for any sign 
of leftist or socialist discourse was common. The banning of some words in TRT 
broadcasts was an expression of this alliance, since, in the blacklist, there were also 
words such as özgürlük (freedom) and devrim (revolution), which became the slogans of 
leftist, socialist and Kurdish groups before 1980. The 1980s military politics was 
primarily oriented to the destruction of the left and Kurdish movements, of which only 
the latter would revive in a short time. 
4.18 1990s: Insurgence of Linguistic Diversity 
The 1990s were marked with many developments that radically changed the 
language political universe.  
Presumably, the most important aspect of the last decade of the 20
th
 century was 
the rise of the Kurdish resistance. The Kurdish problem became an object of 
international interest as, where, on the one hand, there were armed clashes and attacks – 
a low-density war to use a popular term – on the other hand, there were serious 
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 The content of the language that is used by the writers from the circle of 
Birikim, a socialist monthly, like Tanıl Bora and Ömer Laçiner, might be regarded as an 
example case. They employ many words and terms that would be assessed in the 1960s 
as the language of a nostalgia for the Ottoman culture. 
111
 Ġmer discovered only a minor difference of two percent in her comparison of 
Cumhuriyet, a republican newspaper and Tercüman, a conservative daily. This low rate 
also points to the decrease in the political significance of Ottoman or Öztürkçe 
vocabulary (1998, p. 121).  
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violations of and desperate demands for human rights.
112
 In 1991, HEP (Halkın Emek 
Partisi, People‘s Labour Party) allied with SHP (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, Social 
Democratic People‘s Party) for the elections and for the first time in the republican 
history, a Kurdish party sent deputies in the National Assembly. However, they were 
not welcomed, especially after they attempted in the assembly to take the oath in 
Kurdish (Zürcher, 2003, p. 319). It was such a radical act: voicing Kurdish, a language 
that has been long denied, and that has been banned even longer, in the highest court of 
Turkish politics. That was a severe challenge to the language regime, both in practice 
and in theory. The assumed linguistic unity of the nation was torn apart, shown that it 
was unreal. The deputies heavily paid for it, and they were arrested within the premises 
of the Assembly in 1994 and they were sentenced due to ―their support to the terrorist 
organization‖. 
Although the deputies of HEP were punished, Kurdish was already becoming 
increasingly visible. In spite of various ways of legal and illegal prosecutions and 
oppression, publications and music records in Kurdish were becoming a part of Kurds‘ 
daily lives.
113
 In 1991, when Süleyman Demirel‘s DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi, True Path 
Party) made a coalition with SHP to establish the government, declared that they 
―recognized the Kurdish reality‖ (Düzgören, 1994, p. 124). Until then, it was a problem 
of terrorism, anarchy, underdevelopment, unemployment, eşkiyalık (banditry) etc., but 
never a problem concerned with Kurdishness. Turgut Özal, the president then, was 
frequently referring to the Kurdish problem, as well. After a very long time, 
Kurdishness was voiced aloud, as a political issue. The difficulty was that there were no 
solid steps taken to solve it. 
Although the Armed Forces never compromised about granting cultural and 
linguistic rights to Kurds, in 1991, the government led by Özal succeeded in adding in 
the new Law on Struggle against Terrorism a clause that would annul the Law 2932. 
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 For a historical account and political analysis of the Kurdish issue, see KiriĢçi 
and Winrow (1997) 
113
 Because of the pressures, many cassettes in Kurdish were circulated as pirated 
copies. Gökhan MaraĢ, the Minister of Culture in 1991, declared that Kurdish is not an 
official language (of any state?), but a dialect, a tongue, therefore they will not issue 
banderoles for Kurdish music records (Düzgören, 1994, p. 101).  
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The latter had stated that the mother language of all Turkish citizens was Turkish, and 
in practice, it turned out to be a total forbiddance of Kurdish. There were no Kurds, and 
Kurdish was not a mother language of no one. Anyone who dared to sing or write in 
Kurdish was immediately persecuted and mostly sentenced for the reason that they were 
―aiding the terrorist organization‖ or ―attempting to divide the country by claiming that 
some part of the population is culturally and linguistically different.‖114 Despite MGK, 
the abolition of the law and granting freedom to speaking Kurdish was widely 
supported. Even the architect of the Law no. 2932, ex-general Kenan Evren, who was 
retired in 1991, stated that people should be able to speak, publish and produce records 
in Kurdish as other can do so in English, Arabic or in Italian.
115
 However, the 
authorities were worried about that this freedom could be misused. In the end, the Law 
on Struggle against Terrorism, numbered 3713 was accepted on April 12, 1991.
116
 Even 
though, the unusual official statement on the mother languages was no longer valid, 
Kurdish was still a sign of possible trouble in the eyes of the prosecutors and police 
forces. What was effective in the matters of justice was the interpretation of the laws 
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 See Düzgören (1994) for numerous cases against using Kurdish. Zürcher 
reminds that Ġbrahim Tatlıses was also ―prosecuted for ‗separatist propaganda‘ when he 
declared that he regretted not being able to sing a folk song in his native Kurdish‖ 
(2003, p. 316). 
115
 ―Hatayı düzelttik‖, Cumhuriyet, January 27 (1991). 
116
 The international context should also be taken into account. In 1990, the allied 
forces led by the USA attacked Iraq in order to counter the latter‘s attempt to invade 
Kuwait. Following the eviction of Iraqi army from Kuwait, in 1991, Iraq‘s Kurds 
rebelled again, briefly capturing Kirkuk. ―They were driven back into the mountains, 
but the ‗coalition‘ allies who had defeated Iraq sent a small force which stayed there for 
four months and deterred the Iraqi army from pursuing the Kurds into an enclave 
designated as a ‗safe haven‘. Iraq‘s air force was warned not to fly north of 36° North, 
and American, British and French aircraft, based at Incirlik in Turkey policed this ‗no-
fly zone‘.‖ (Boyd, 1998). Turkey, with Özal, established close relationships with the 
Kurdish leaders of Barzani and Talabani. It was a widely accepted idea at the time that 
Iraq would soon be divided and the Kurds would be the masters of the lands on which 
they were majority. What was questioned was the role of Turkey in this process. On the 
other hand, the European Union and the European Parliament was constantly asking 
Turkey to recognize the rights of Kurds, and to end violations of human rights (Yıldız 
K. , 2005). 
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according to the political context and agenda, as it has already become a tradition in 
Turkey.  
The expansion of the audio-visual universe with the emergence of private radio 
and television broadcasts kept alive the debates on the rights of Kurdish. The 
broadcastings that began illegally were put into order with Radyo ve Televizyonların 
Kuruluş ve Yayınlar Hakkında Kanun (the Law on the Establishment and Broadcasting 
of Radios and Televisions, no. 3984) was prepared and accepted on April 13, 1994. 
Despite all the confrontations at the political level on the possibility of withdraw the 
restrictions of the use of Kurdish on broadcasts, the law strictly limited the language of 
programs with Turkish. Turkish to be used had to have some specific qualities:  
  ―using a moderate Turkish, as a speech language without distorting its 
characteristics and rules; to support development and empowerment of the 
language, which is one of the primary elements of national unity and 
integrity, as a contemporary language of education and science‖ (Article 4/t, 
Law no. 3984)
117
 
The emphases on the use of Turkish in a linguistic style, which is ―not excessive‖ 
and close to the daily speech, were, similarly, were placed in the clause as a precaution 
of using Öztürkçe. Such an attitude is a delicate expression of the populist vein in the 
political discourse of right-wing politics in Turkey.  
In the Article 4/t, an exception was made for teaching and delivering news in 
foreign languages that ―contribute to the production of the universal and scientific 
values‖.118 Such wording is of yet another vague definition to keep the possible 
demands of linguistic rights in broadcasting out of the framework of legitimacy. The 
classification of languages within the linguistic ideology of the official discourse, as 
mentioned above, considered sub-national native languages as inappropriate for 
satisfying the demands of modern and universal needs.  
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 ―Türkçe‟yi aşırılığa kaçmadan, özellikleri ve kuralları bozulmadan konuşma 
dili olarak kullanmak; milli birlik ve bütünlüğün temel unsurlarından biri olarak çağdaş 
eğitim ve bilim dili halinde gelişmesini ve zenginleşmesini sağlamak…‖ 
118
 The detailed history and an analysis of the politics of language in the area of 
broadcasting, therefore, any development concerning the regulations of the language use 
in radios and televisions will be presented in next chapter. 
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4.19 The EU Relations: Love and Hate 
The last decade of the 20
th
 century, for Turkey, was an episode of legal and 
structural re-organization in order to become a full member of the European Union. In 
1987, Turkey officially applied for membership to the European Community of the 
time. After two and a half year, the Community refused the application, basing its 
refusal on economic and political conditions of the country and its international 
problems with Greece and on the issue of Cyprus. The Community, however, stated its 
anticipation of keeping on the cooperation with Turkey.
119
 In 1995, Turkey became a 
participant of the customs union. In 1993, The Copenhagen European Council had 
already decided on a number of political criteria, widely known as the Copenhagen 
criteria, for accession to full membership in order to form a guideline for candidates. In 
1999, the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 granted the status of candidate 
country to Turkey. Until 2005, when accession negotiations with Turkey were opened, 
the EU demanded Turkey to adopt some serious structural changes in economics, and 
political, cultural and human rights. The Union closely observed the progress, and 
published annual reports.  
1999 was also the year when the leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan was captured in 
Kenya, trialed and sentenced to death after his trial. ―Öcalan had already declared 
during his stay in Rome that PKK would seek a peaceful solution to the conflict. This 
line was now reaffirmed by PKK leadership, which declared that it continued to regard 
‗Apo‘ as its leader, but also that the cease-fire declared in August 1998 would remain in 
force.‖ (Zürcher, 2003, p. 321). The end of armed clashes no doubt released an 
important pressure of the government to focus on democratization with substantial legal 
amendments.  
After 1999, there have been many changes, regarding the language regime, 
although the pace of structural transformation has considerably varied. Despite the 
difficulties in practice, which were mostly originated the traditional attitudes of the state 
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official against minorities, in just a few years, the linguistic regime of the Republic and 
the post-1980 order was significantly transformed. 
Besides legal arrangements, the interpretations of the existing laws were in line 
with the democratic rights in some cases.  
An example is from DGM (Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi, State Security Courts) in 
2000. The Court, for the first time in its history asked for a Kurdish interpreter for a 
suspect who did not know Turkish. The Court demanded the interpreted from the 
Istanbul Kurdish Institute, of which members were tried for separatism.
120
 
Another example is that in March the same year, a judgment was passed by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal on confirming the freedom of individuals to give any name of 
their children. The case was about a father who demanded to change his daughter‘s 
name to Mızgin, by which the girl was known. Although the local court refused the 
demand twice, the final decision of the Supreme Court was different and final, and 
formed a peer for similar cases.
121
 
In 2001, on March 19, the National Program of Turkey for the Harmonisation of 
the European Union Acquis Communitaire was adopted by the Council of Ministers. In 
the Program, the issue of language was stated, as well, with some reservations: 
―The official language and the formal education language of the Republic 
of Turkey are Turkish. This, however, does not prohibit the free usage of 
different languages, dialects and tongues by Turkish citizens in their daily 
lives. This freedom may not be abused for the purposes of separatism and 
division.‖ 
It was the declaration of what was obvious, as the penal code already criminalized 
separatism. However, it was a clear statement, which accepted that there were languages 
other than Turkish in Turkey.  
On the other hand, the way the State conceptualized these languages was 
remarkably interesting. There was no reference to mother languages, but to languages, 
tongues and dialects that were spoken by Turkish citizens in their daily lives. This 
pattern would become a popular one to be repeated in a number of new legal texts. The 
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State was cautious about the language issue, as the European Union was becoming 
increasingly sensitive on language rights in its member countries, and for the 
candidates, as well. The acceptation of that there are different mother languages would 
bring forward a conflict with the EU standards and the traditional politics of language 
against the minority languages. Turkey, until now, has noted reservations in the 
application of the agreements of the United Nations and the EU on cultural and 
linguistic rights, or has not ever signed them. 
Baskın Oran marks that a common reservation of the Turkish State in her 
participation in international agreements usually brings forward the Lausanne Treaty. 
Oran reports that a typical reservation looked as the following: 
―The Republic of Turkey reserves her right to apply the Article xxx, 
according to the provisions and the verdicts of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, 
the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, and their appendixes.‖ (Oran, 
2004, p. 49). 
This kind of a reservation basically aims at the refusal of recognizing any 
minority other than those of the Lausanne Treaty.  
One critical moment towards the change of the language regime was the 
enactment of The Law Amending Several Articles of the Constitution (No. 4709) on 
October 3, 2001. It covered 35 articles, two of which aimed at removing restrictions on 
the use of different languages and dialects. According to Article 9 of the Law, the 
clause, which read, ―no language prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and 
dissemination of thought‖ is deleted from Article 26 of the Constitution. In the same 
vein, the Article 10 of the Law deleted the second paragraph of Article 28 of the 
Constitution, which read, “Publications shall not be made in any language prohibited by 
law”. However, Article 42 of the Constitution, which reads, ―No language other than 
Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of 
training and at education‖ remains intact today.  
After 2001, there have been numerous attempts to expand the use of Kurdish, 
beside other minority languages. The efforts to use other languages, such as Circassian 
or Laz, in publication and music records remained limited due to their speakers 
potentials of social impact. Mostly the Circassian or Laz minorities have been organized 
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in non-governmental organizations, as association or foundations, and their political 
influence are quite restricted.  
On the other hand, Kurdish population is highly politicized and they have been 
able to organize in political parties. Linguistic rights have long become an important 
aspect of the Kurdish politics and developed in addition to the official denial and 
exclusion of the Kurdish language (Yıldız K., 2005). 
On one side of the attempts to push for the legal limits on the use of Kurdish were 
the civic groups. Right after the elimination of the notion of ―languages forbidden by 
law‖, a widespread movement started and the participants demanded education 
opportunities in Kurdish. Between October 2001 and January 2002, some university 
students began a campaign for optional Kurdish courses in the university curriculums. 
The way the students formulated their demands echoed well-known themes on the 
right and legitimacy of using mother language in education. In Dokuz Eylül University, 
Ġzmir, the Student Initiative for Kurdish Education and Schooling organized a debate on 
the issue. The spokesperson of the Initiative declared, ―Our mother language is the 
condition of our very existence.‖ and told that they would resist against any oppression 
of the movement.
122
  
The attempt was reacted with a very strong opposition by the university 
administrators and the movement was widely considered as one of the plans of PKK to 
transform itself as a civil movement.
123
 The students were both prosecuted by the 
university administrations
124
 and more than 1,000 people who plead were detained 
throughout Turkey.
125
  
 
In 2004, Eğitim-Sen, the labor union of workers in the educational sectors with a 
member number of more than 150,000, was similarly sued for defending the right of 
education in mother languages (Hür, 2005). The request for prosecution was ordered by 
the Governorship of Ankara. Although the local court refused the request and decided 
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that there is no need further investigation, the Supreme Court ruled, with unanimity of 
all its 45 members, that the statements in the Union‘s statute that defend the right of 
education in mother language should be considered within the framework of 
separatism.
126
  
The Supreme Court, in its reasoned decision stated that the freedom of education 
and schooling does not rule out the Constitution‘s verdicts, which commands that the 
Republic of Turkey is an indivisible unity with country and nation: 
―As a natural consequence of this unity, the Constitution rules that [the 
State‘s] language is Turkish. As another consequence of this attribute, the 
Article 42 decreed that no language other than Turkish could be taught in 
education as a mother language… This is to dictate the unity of nation and 
the uniqueness of nation in public life and therefore the national culture is 
authoritative in public life… The final verdict, to follow the relevant clauses 
of the Constitution, is that the language of education is Turkish in Turkey… 
Individuals are free to use their mother languages as they wish except the 
domain where Turkish is mandatory. Likewise, learning and broadcasting in 
different languages are accepted as a democratic right and those rights been 
regulated and protected by law… However, education in mother languages 
is a different concept and necessitates the use of languages other than the 
official language in every levels of schooling. Education in different mother 
languages would eventually stand for the appearance of an unknown 
number of mother languages in the public sphere in a state [sic.]. This is by 
no means compatible in the Republic of Turkey with the unitary nature of 
the state and the Constitution. Because not conceiving different languages 
and dialects as only cultural elements, and to pursue their introduction into 
educational system under the title of ―different mother languages‖ are 
against the Constitution, as noted above. It would also reproduce social 
conflicts in the public sphere. (my translation)
 127
 
The rationale of the decision is significant in that it is a clear statement of the 
language ideology and language regime of the State, at least as it is interpreted by its 
highest body of justice.  
According to the Court, the unity of the State and, in parallel, the national culture 
and its unity are the foremost Constitutional values. The mother languages of citizens, 
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however, are not considered parts of the national culture; therefore, they cannot be 
asked to be parts of the public life in general and in education, in particular. 
The Turkish linguistic regime does not handle every language with equal 
treatment. As seen in the decision of the Court, the emphasis is exclusively on the 
problem of teaching a mother language, rather than teaching any language other than 
Turkish.There is no reference to the universities who deliver education in English, for 
example. The conclusion is that the language regime particularly aims at the native 
languages of its citizens, of which uses in public domains are considered to run against 
the unity of the Republic. The unity of State and its national culture, then, is maintained 
by exclusively its official language. It is the official language, not the language that is 
shared among the citizens, which ensures the unity. That is, it is the State that ensures 
the unity of the nation by imposing the regulations of the official language in particular 
domains. The Court already conceives of the diversity of mother languages in the 
country as a source of social conflict, which would not be transmitted into the public 
sphere via educational system. The linguistic diversity is itself a source of conflict, not 
the way they are articulated into the political discourses according to the Court.  
The State is sure about that there is a linguistic diversity, which is a potential 
threat against the unity of the nation, of which unity is being guaranteed only by the 
practices of the State itself. The decision, and the rationale behind it, is a solid evidence 
of how the state is self-conscious of its critical tutelary function in ensuring the very 
existence of society, and how it is ambitious to keep it that way.  
As the argumentation is logically set in this way, any demand for linguistic rights 
would be a violation of the very unchangeable qualities of the Republic. However, the 
laws allow teaching of other languages in private courses, including the ―dialects that 
are used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives‖. The justification behind that is retained 
by a selective definition of public sphere. In the Court‘s decision on Eğitim-Sen‘s case, 
the public sphere refers to the services that are granted to the citizens. And that public 
sphere is based on the condition of a firm unity of the national culture.  
 In July 20005, the congress of Eğitim-Sen decided to eliminate the clauses in its 
program that caused prosecution in order to avoid a possible verdict of closure. The 
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president of the Union stated that they would be going to apply to the European Court 
of Human Rights.
128
 
 
In March 2002, another regulation in line with efforts of harmonization with the 
EU was decreed. The Law no. 4748, titled Çeşitli Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına 
İlişkin Kanun (the Law Amending Various Laws) followed the Law no. 4709 and 
deleted the clause from the Artcile 16/5 of the Basın Kanunu (the Law on Press, no. 
5680), which banned to the use ―languages forbidden by law‖.129 
A package of major amendments in the existing laws was issued in the summer of 
2002. On August 3, the Law Amending Various Laws, no. 4771, was accepted:  
―This law contained two articles enabling broadcasting in non-official 
languages and allowing private courses to be opened for the teaching of 
non-official languages, which are referred in the law as “the different 
languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily 
lives”.” (Eraydın-Virtanen, 2003b, p. 35). 
The elements of broadcasting will be analyzed in the next chapters, but the issue 
of private courses for teaching ―traditional languages‖ needs further emphasis. As usual, 
there were reservations regarding the operation of these laws.  
―Such courses cannot be against the fundamental principles of the 
Turkish Republic enshrined in the Constitution and the indivisible integrity 
of the state with its territory and nation. The procedures and principles 
related to the opening and regulation of these courses shall be undertaken 
through a regulation to be issued by the Ministry of National Education.‖ 
(translation in Eraydın-Virtanen, 2003b, pp. 36-37).  
Moreover, the interpretation of the non-Turkish languages as ―languages 
traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives‖ was in accord with the 
Constitutions‘ established clause in the Article 42, which forbids the teaching of any 
language other than Turkish as the mother tongue. Therefore, the formulation non-
Turkish language teaching was as a private course, nothing to do with the public 
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services of the State. People had to pay for, if they wanted, to become literate in their 
mother languages.
130
  
The State was definitely not encouraging the spread of languages other than 
Turkish with this regulation. The Ministry of Education set the rules for the operation of 
these private courses with Türk Vatandaşlarının Günlük Yaşamlarında Geleneksel 
Olarak Kullandıkları Farklı Dil ve Lehçelerin Öğrenilmesi Hakkında Yönetmelik (The 
By-law on the Learning of Languages and Dialects Used Traditionally by Turkish 
Citizens in Their Daily Lives) in September 2002. Eraydın-Virtanen describes the 
regulation: 
―It was drafted on the legal basis of Law No. 625, which regulates the 
opening, and functioning of Private Education Courses. The regulation 
consisted of 5 sections and 16 articles. The by-law stipulated that courses 
teaching non-official languages could be established and start to teach once 
they had fulfilled the required conditions and received the permits issued by 
the Ministry.  
According to Article 7, the personnel appointed to these courses had to 
be Turkish citizens and fulfil the qualifications required by Law No. 625. 
The personnel should not have been convicted of crimes committed against 
the State in the past.  
Article 8 allowed Turkish citizens with at least a primary –level 
education to register on the courses. Persons under 18 years of age could be 
registered with the permission of parents or legal guardians.  
According to Article 10, the course syllabus had to be approved by the 
Ministry and the list of trainees was to be submitted to the Director of 
National Education. The article also stipulated that the course syllabus 
should only cover the learning of non-official languages. Those attending 
these courses would have to obey the dress code of the Ministry of 
Education.‖  (2003b, pp. 37-38) 
The State wanted to keep away those who were convicted for their links with 
PKK for the courses. The authorities were worried about that they would seem 
conforming the demands of PKK because any demands of cultural and linguistic rights 
were already assessed as ―the political tactics of the terrorist organization‖ by the very 
same authorities. Now they were obliged to open some space to able to start 
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negotiations with the EU, of which evaluation would take place in December 2002.
131
 
That was the reason why Turkey, in 2001 and 2002, witnessed the most comprehensive 
legal reforms for a very long time. 
However, the application of the law was not easy. First courses could be opened 
with after one year of the installment of the by-law. Many obstacles were forwarded 
against those who applied for opening course. Among the excuses for not granting 
approval were the sizes of the doors
132
, the missing fire exits
133
 and the name of the 
course
134
. The last case was especially interesting. A retired teacher in ġanlıurfa applied 
in December 2002 for opening a Kurdish course, which he named Urfa Kürt Dili ve 
Lehçeleri Öğretim Merkezi. In six months, he was unable to start the courses since his 
application was refused for its name, which contained the word Kürt. The inspectors of 
the Ministry of Education declared that the approval would mean that they accept 
Kurdish as a language. The local directorate of National Education offered the name 
Özel Urfa Mahalli Lehçe Dil Kursu, but it was refused the applicant.135 The persistence 
of the language ideology that resists against the recognition of Kurdish as a language 
proper is perfectly exemplified in this case. Especially with respect to the officials who 
are in the end of practice line, the refusal became a natural reflex. 
There was great interest in the courses and they were opened with great 
celebrations in ġanlıurfa, Diyarbakır, Batman and Van. However, the fire went out 
quickly. In less than two years, the Kurdish course in Batman was closed down. The 
manager of the course stated that the number of the students had remained below their 
capacities and they had had hard times in financing the institution. Until its closure, the 
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course awarded certificates to about 450 students.
136
 The reaction of the mainstream 
dailies was particularly remarkable; many of them announced the news in their 
headlines and comments expressed various sentiments ranging from relief – from the 
fear of troubles that these freedoms could be misused, to teasing – the ―useless‖ political 
demands of the Kurdish politicians which in turn was not even supported by Kurds.
137
 
The Kurdish movement also gained a significant power in local politics through 
municipalities. 
4.20 Municipalities as the Guardians of the Language 
In 2004, in many cities, towns and provinces of the regions with high Kurdish 
population, Kurdish candidates won the local elections to which they joined as 
independent runners. With the legal openings that were brought about with the 
harmonization efforts to join the EU, many of these municipalities attempted to 
incorporate Kurdish language in the municipal matters.  
However, their enthusiasm was quickly responded and the persecutions followed 
one after another. Two major cases were about the mayors of Diyarbakır Metropolitan 
Municipality, Osman Baydemir and Sur, Diyarbakır, Abdullah DemirbaĢ. 
Abdullah DemirbaĢ announced in January 2007 that the Assembly of Municipality 
of Sur accepted the implementation of multilingual services in languages of Kurdish, 
Armenian, Syriac and English.
138
 Within two hours, the Ministry of Home Affairs 
assigned two inspectors for investigation. In June, the major and the members of the 
Assembly were discharged by the decree of the Council of State.
 139
 On Febraury 29, 
2008, DemirbaĢ, the members the Municipal Assembly and Osman DemirbaĢ, who 
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approved the decision as the Metropolitan Mayor were accused of and sued for 
misconduct and violation of the revolution law – the law on the Turkish letters.140 
The two mayors were once more in March. Baydemir was accused of publishing a 
compilation of Turkish and Kurdish stories, and DemirbaĢ for publishing a brochure on 
organ donation in both languages.
141
  
In the same month, Baydemir was acquitted for allowing Kurdish banners about 
the services of the municipality and for sending to the Governor of ġanlıurfa an 
invitation in which there was Kurdish writings. The public prosecutor asked for 10 
years and 6 months of prison service for the violation of the law ―on the Approval and 
the Application of Turkish Letters‖ and misconduct of duties.142 
The Municipality of YeniĢehir, Diyarbakır, in order to protest the judicial pressure 
on using Kurdish, prepared posters on March 8, Women‘s Day, in Chinese. Deputy 
Mayor ġefik Türk stated that there were already five cases and three investigations 
against the mayor, Fırat Anlı.143 
In February 2007, the Municipal Assembly of Suruç, ġanlıurfa, agreed on 32 new 
street names, of which 11 were Kurdish names. However, the Governor of the town 
refused the Kurdish names for that they were in Kurdish and that they could result in 
separatism and discrimination.
144
  
Next to demands for changes in the freedoms and rights of using languages other 
than Turkish, there were worries about the way Turkish is losing its supremacy. A 
widespread reaction came, yet again, from the municipalities, which pursued the re-
establishment of the domination of Turkish, at least in the visual landscape.  
Indeed MHP, who was already quite disturbed to be a part of the government who 
abolished the death penalty – including that of Abdullah Öcalan – and passed some 
other regulations concerning language rights, proposed a bill ―to make changes in the 
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Belediye Gelirler Kanunu (the Municipality Revenue Law) in order to ban the use of 
foreign words in advertisements (sales, jobs, etc.) and signboards and to impose more 
taxes on those businesses that use foreign names‖ (Doğançay-Aktuna, 2004, p. 20). 
Doğançay-Aktuna reminds that a similar law was in effect until the 1980s liberal 
policies of economics of Turgut Özal (ibid.).  
MHP‘s bill was not accepted but many municipalities agreed on either making it 
obligatory to use Turkish on signboards and shop and business names, or to encourage 
such practices. Many of the municipal administrations also decreed that the non-Turkish 
names of the streets and public places would be changed with Turkish ones. Some of 
the decisions also included regulations on the style of Turkish, as the Municipality of 
Çanakkale, of which mayor is from CHP, required Öztürkçe words.145 A remarkable 
stress is, on the other hand, on the use of the letters of the Turkish alphabet.  
In 2007, Marmara ve Boğazları Belediyeler Birliği (The Union of Municipalities 
in Marmara and Straits) accepted a proposal, which recommended its members to use 
the correct forms of the language in official correspondences. The proposal also 
included an invitation to encourage and take necessary measures for the use of Turkish 
in licencing new workplaces and their names.
146
 The municipal action has been a part of 
the general rise of mobilization based on ―saving Turkish‖.147 
The widespread interest in the protection of Turkish and its further support was 
echoed in the major institutions of the State, as well. 
One of the first measures taken was about the installment of an article in the new 
Penal Code, no. 5237, which was decreed on September 26, 2004, which ordered the 
punishments in case of violations of the Law on the Aprroval and Application of 
Turkish Letters, no. 1353, of 1928. The Penal Codes‘ Article 222 stated that any 
violation of the Law no 1353 would result in prison sentences from two to six months. 
This clause in fact was a response to the increasing complaints about the increasing use 
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of non-Turkish elements in language, including the letters of Q, X, and W. The protests 
were usually targeted the widespread use of English in mass media and various sectors 
of economics, but it was also a precaution against the uses of Kurdish. The Kurdish 
alphabet also used non-Turkish letters.  
Actually after the Supreme Court declared that giving Kurdish names to children 
should not be considered as crime, there have been some applicants who wanted to 
change their own names to those which contained non-Turkish letters. A case, already 
before the new Penal Code passed, was of the former president of the Istanbul branch of 
İnsan Hakları Derneği (Human Rights Association), Eren Keskin. She, with a friend 
applied for changing their names as Xezal and Xece, but their applications were refused 
for the reason that the proposed names involved the letter X that is not in the Turkish 
alphabet.
148
  
In the first AKP government period (2002-2007), a new investigation commission 
for Turkish language was established in TBMM.
149
 After interviewing many authors 
and scholars working on the subject, the commission prepared its report. However, the 
2007 general elections were closing, so the report proved vain, without even being 
discussed in the Assembly. After the elections, the interest was not extinguished and the 
new Assembly formed another investigation commission, with a rather long name: 
Türkçe'deki Bozulma ve Yabancılaşmanın Araştırılması, Türkçe'nin Korunması ve 
Geliştirilmesi için Alınması Gereken Önlemlerin Belirlenmesi Amacıyla Kurulan Meclis 
Araştırması Komisyonu (the Parliamentary Investigation Commission for Researching 
Corruption and Alienation of Turkish Language and for Assessing the Measures to 
Protect and Develop Turkish). The final report was published in June 2008. The report 
reviewed many aspects of the popular complaints on the problems of with Turkish, such 
as the expanding usage of slang and foreign words, non-standard uses in speech and 
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writing, inefficiencies in teaching Turkish, and education in foreign languages. The 
report was concluded that the national consciousness of language was missing and what 
the government must accomplish was to figure out a national language program.
150
 
The Turkish Armed Forces was involved in the wave of complaint for the 
corruption of Turkish, as well. The Army published a booklet in 2007 on Turkish for the 
use of its personnel. The aim of the book was described as to help the members of the 
Armed Forces to develop their communicational skills by using ―doğru ve güzel 
Türkçe‖ (correct and beautiful Turkish) (Erenoğlu & Otçu, 2007).  
The book was a part of a larger interest of the Army to the issue of language. In 
September 2007, the Army published four posters. They were made public on the 
internet site of the Armed Forces, and were prepared for the Turkish Language Festival 
on September 26. The two of them are presented below: 
 
  
Figure 1 – The posters prepared by the Turkish Armed Forces in    
September 2007. 
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The emphases were on the antiquity of the language and its wealth. Messages 
were so seleceted as to rouse feeling of pride of Turkish. However, the posters suffer 
from a routine irony, which is quite frequent in the publications of those who complain 
about the poor usages of the language: poor usage of the language. The poster on the 
left has problems with its expression. Regarding the mistakes in many elements of the 
complaint tradition, the very instrumentalization of the language for political ends could 
be assessed as the reason. The title by Radikal for the news of the posters, which read, 
―Asker Türkçeyi de Koruyor‖ is quite right in the sense that it is evident that the Army 
assigned itself another mission of protecting the language.
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The Chief of the Staff, YaĢar Büyükanıt, too, frequently stresses the importance of 
Turkish. In many of his speeches, and especially when he addressed the students of the 
Military Academies, he reiterated the well-known discursive elements of the 
relationship between the nation‘s well-being and that of the language. In one of his 
addresses he stated  
―Language is one of the fundamentals that define a nation, and when the 
language is damaged, the structure of the nation will follow. And, in that 
case, the country would eventually lose its identity. You have to pay a 
special attention to your expressions, in your speeches or writings, in order 
to prevent the pollution of our language. This is your national mission. 
Never forget that.‖ (my translation; Büyükanıt, 2006) 
On the one hand, the head of the Military Forces carries on the mission of 
protecting the nation and and the state, therefore language, as it comes as a vital 
dimension of nationhood. The dominant linguistic ideology, which prioritizes the 
decisive function of language on the bonds and the medium of nationality, inevitably 
makes Turkish as a subject matter in the Army‘s agenda. On the other hand, the 
emphasis on Turkish reaches beyond the correct and beautiful usage of the language. It 
also is an emphasis on the rise of ethnic languages and the political claims based on 
these languages. It is at the same time an emphasis on the linguistic consequences of 
globalization and the increasing influences of foreign cultures on the Turkish nationals.  
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 ―Asker Türkçeyi de koruyor‖, Radikal, September 26 (2007). 
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The poster publications of the Army were repeated in June 2008. This time there 
was only one design, with the letters Q, X and W crossed over and a large red letters 
read ―Önce Türkçe” (Turkish first) with the subtext ―Tabelalarda, ilanlarda, 
reklamlarda‖ (On the signboards, banners and advertisements). The poster was hung in 
all the premises of the Military Forces. In addition, the General Staff took steps to 
Turkify some of the words used in the Army. The substitutions were kuşluk for brunch, 
ayakkabı bakım yeri for lostra, hızlı yiyecek satış noktası for fast food, yemek listesi for 
menü and lokanta for restaurant.152 Despite the fact that lokanta is not more Turkish 
than restaurant or that lostra has been used for such a long time that it is for sure, no one 
will ever call the workshop ayakkabı bakım yeri, the act has a symbolic meaning. The 
idea of cleansing the pollution of the language is such a strong drive that it usually 
creates more contamination that it cleans. The control of the language from above and 
assuming a social change following linguistic modifications is a tradition of the modern 
Turkish politics. The Army, in which the symbols are of extreme importance, 
accomplishes its own mission in the protection of the language against the relentless 
attacks to it. 
The judicial perceptiveness is still very strong on the official language. Below are 
two cases of penalizations for attempting to use Kurdish in official correspondence, in 
2008. 
 On February 6, Mehdi Tanrıkulu, a Kurdish publisher, was sentenced to five 
months of imprisonment. His offense as announced by the Court was violating the Law 
No. 1353 on the Adoption and Application of the New Turkish Letters, as he delivered a 
petition in Kurdish to the Diyarbakır Attorney Generalship of the Republic‖153.  
On March 4, 2008, Mahmut Alınak, a former member of the Parliament and the 
former chairman of DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, Democratic Society Party), was 
sentenced to serve six months for he sent a letter in Kurdish to report on the problems of 
Kars. He was convicted for violation of the Article 81 of the Law on Political Parties.
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 ―Genelkurmay‘dan ‗Önce Türkçe‘ afiĢi‖, Hürriyet, June 19 (2008). 
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 ―'Kürtçe' dilekçeye hapis cezası‖, NTVMSNBC, (2008) 
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 ―Alınak‘a Kürtçe dilekçeden 6 ay hapis‖, Hürriyet, March 4 (2008) 
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Such incidents, that concern language and become a public issue seem to increase 
in number in the next years, as there are no signs of resolution in any of the issues, 
neither in the increasing ubiquity of non-standard, or ―low‖ varieties of Turkish, nor in 
the rapid ―invasion‖ of Turkish by English, nor in the discontent caused by violation of 
linguistic rights. Before advancing towards the discussion of the most recent 
developments especially on the issue of public broadcasting in minority languages, 
there will be short break to this account of Turkish language regime.  
In this chapter, the history of the formation of the language regime in Turkey has 
been presented. The mounting debates on almost every aspect of language are already 
solid evidences that, at least at the ideological level, the unification of Turkish nation 
through a standard, ―high‖ language has not been that successful. The next chapter is an 
assessment of the success of the regime in terms of leveling linguistic differences in 
Turkey. 
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CHAPTER 5  
THE HISTORICAL LINGUISTIC MAP OF TURKEY 
In the previous chapter, a long legal history of the Turkish language has been 
presented. The laws and regulations certainly point out how the language ideology of 
the official institutions and the authorities in charge were reified in order to establish a 
corresponding language regime. However, the history of official arrangement alone 
does not define the ways in which language regimes are practiced. Although a macro 
field study was not considered as a research method for this dissertation, where the 
major subject matter is the construction and the maintenance of the linguistic regime, a 
presentation of the history of the linguistic map of Turkey is necessary.  
On the other hand, the sources of data for such information are rather poor for the 
country. The State was uncompromisingly headed for a linguistic homogenization, with 
all the laws decreed and campaigns organized, which in turn is an evidence of a multi-
linguistic situation in Turkey. The citizens who were born into a non-Turkish linguistic 
environment in the families and household have been considerable in number. It was 
therefore the State aimed at the leveling of the linguistic diversity in favor of Turkish. 
However, it was not an easy task to work on the statistical information on these 
numbers. How many people in fact were speaking Turkish as a mother language? How 
was the homogenization process working? And, how was the linguistic shift effective 
between generations of non-Turkish speakers? As far as known, the only way the State 
devised was the censuses, of which history has been given below. For a very long, in 
fact until the 1990s the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the population was a taboo 
subject to be studied in the academia. Auto censoring has been quite powerful in the 
Turkish universities in order to avoid dealing with ―sensitive issues‖ such as cultural 
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diversity of the society, which was outlawed by the Constitution.
155
 Rare exhibitions of 
bravery were immediately punished by the political regime, as it was the case for Ġsmail 
BeĢikçi, who served many years in prison for the reason that his studies on the Kurdish 
population encouraged separatism.  
After the 1990s, the existence of ethnic differences within the assumed solidness 
of Turkish nation was slowly appreciated. The decade was also one of armed struggle 
against the separatist Kurdish groups, which in turn made the development relatively a 
difficult one. However, it is possible to say that there are more studies on the 
ethnographic configuration of the country recently, bearing in mind that the self-
controlling mechanisms are still commanding in some of the universities. 
The following section, presents the information available on the quantifiable data 
of the linguistic ecology in Turkey. After the presentation, an overall analysis on the 
extent the established language regime was effective will be given.  
 
The first republican census was in 1927. Second census was conducted in 1935, 
and in every five years, a new one was organized. In 1990, the government decided to 
conduct the censuses in every ten year, in the years with the number ―0‖ in the end. 
After the 1990 census, in 1997 the population data was renewed in accordance with the 
updating of electors‘ lists. In 2000, the last census was conducted and the concluding 
results were announced in 2002.  
The most quoted study on the linguistic minorities of which data were obtained by 
the censuses belongs to Fuat Dündar (1999). Dündar compiled the relevant numbers of 
the censuses between 1927 and 1965, and explained them with respect to the way the 
questions were formulated. He included in the work his analyses of the repercussions of 
counting the minorities of Turkey and he presented the speeches and declarations by the 
authorities on the significance and political implications of the censuses.  
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 Scalbert-Yücel and Ray reminds that 1960s was a decade of exception when ―a 
progressive social scientists‘ stand emerge … strongly interested in searching for the 
causes of inequality and its solutions‖ (2006). Martin van Bruinessen notes that ―in the 
course of the decade, many of them came to adopt Marxism in one form or another as a 
framework for explanation‘ (van Bruinessen, Ağa, ġeyh, Devlet, 2003, p. 4; quoted in 
Scalbert-Yücel & Ray, 2006). 
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Until 1985, there were questions concerning the mother and second languages of 
the population, but the results with regard to language data acquired in the 1970, 1975, 
1980 and 1985 censuses were not made public (Dündar F. , 1999, p. 65). The figure are 
shown in Appendix 2.  
Dündar explains the ways in whcih the questions on language were formulated. In 
the censuses of 1927 and 1935, the mother language was defined as ―the language 
spoken among family members‖. In 1940, it was ―the language spoken in the 
household‖. In 1955, the mother language was described as ―the tongue conventionally 
[mutad olarak] spoken in the household, within the family‖. In the following censuses, 
it was defined as ―the language of the household and within the family‖ (Dündar F. , 
1999, p. 67).  
The second language, on the other, was another information that was researched. 
The question on the second language was first asked to the respondet in 1935. In 1935 
and 1945, the second language was formulated as ―the language the responden knows to 
speak other than her mother language‖. In the next three subsequent censuses, the 
question was asked as ―the language best spoken other than the mother language‖ 
(Dündar F. , 1999, p. 68). The point of asking the second language was to find out the 
possible influences of cultures to each other (Aybar & Aykut, 1937, p. 89; quoted in 
Dündar F. , 1999, p. 68).  
An interesting detail with the question of the second language asked in 1950 was 
that it was filled by the census officer as Turkish, if the mother language was reported to 
be Turkish (ibid). This certainly excludes the speakers of other languages who were 
linguistically assimilated as a result of schooling, forced or voluntary migration, etc. It 
is reasonable to think that there have been many Kurdish families who were speaking 
Turkish at a time in the household for various reasons, but retained Kurdish as their 
second language. 
The numbers obtained from the censuses are quite problematic for other reasons, 
as well. Mete Tunçay states that there are inconsistencies in numbers of ethnic 
communities with respect to respective languages and religions: 
―In the last census of 1965, in which questions related to language and 
religion were asked, there were around ten thousand people who answered 
that they spoke Jewish, but the number of the Jews was around 40.000. 
156 
 
48.000 Greek speakers but 80.000 Greek-Orthodox, and 33.000 speakers of 
Armenian but around 70.000 people associated with the Gregorian Church.‖ 
(my translation; Tunçay, 1983, p. 1563). 
One of the main reasons for the unreliability of the data is that the respondents 
might have refrained from exposing themselves before a state with an unpleasant 
history of minorities. Fuat Dündar reminds, for example, the declaration of the Jews in 
1927 that they would report their mother languages as Turkish (1999, p. 49). Authorities 
promised that there would not be any counter practices, and called everyone to testify 
correctly. However, it should be considered as more than a coincidence that the 
campaign Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş! was started right after the census results were 
announced. In the following censuses, the policies and incidents the minorities such as 
relocations of Kurds, Trakya Olayları in 1934156, Varlık Vergisi (Wealth Tax) of 
1942
157
, September 6-7 incidents in 1955, and the deportation of Greeeks in 1964
158
, 
must have affected the way respondents answered questions about their ethnicities. 
Eraydın-Virtanen agrees to the idea that the data concerning non-Turkish languages are 
rather unreliable (2003b, p. 24). Therefore, the numbers should be treated carefully.  
The inconsistencies are seen also in the lists and the categorizations of the 
minority languages. The lists of languages in the censuses are presented below, in Table 
2.  
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 1927 1935 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 
Abaza (Abazaca)  + + + + + + 
Albanian (Arnavutça) + + + + + + + 
Arabic (Arapça) + + + + + + + 
Armenian (Ermenice) + + + + + + + 
Bosnian (Boşnakça)  + + + + + + 
Bulgarian (Bulgarca) + + + + + + + 
Circassian (Çerkesçe) + + + + + + + 
Coptic (Kıptice)  + +     
Croation (Hırvatça)  + + + + + + 
Czech language (Çekçe)   +  +  + 
English (İngilizce) + + +  + + + 
Flemmish (Flamanca)  + + +   + 
French (Fransızca) + + + + + + + 
Georgian (Gürcüce)  + + + + + + 
German (Almanca)  + + + + + + 
Greek (Rumca) + + + + + + + 
Hungarian (Macarca)  + +     
Italian (İtalyanca) + + + + + + + 
Jewish (Yahudice) + + + + + + + 
Kırdaşça    +   + 
Kirmanji (Kırmanca)    +   + 
Kurdish (Kürtçe)  + + + + + + + 
Laz (Lazca)  + + + + + + 
Persian (Acemce) + + + + + + + 
Polish (Lehçe)  + + + + + + 
Pomak (Pomakça)  + + + + + + 
Portuguese (Portekizce)      +  
Romenian (Rumence)  + + + +  + 
Russian (Rusça)  + + + + + + 
Serbian (Sırpça)  + + + + + + 
Spanish (İspanyolca)  + +   + + 
Swedish (İsveççe)  + + +   + 
Tatar (Tatarca) + + +     
Zazaki (Zazaca)    +   + 
Table 2 – List of languages in the censuses.159 
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 The 1940 population census was conducted based on sampling method with 
the quotient of 2.5 percent; therefore, it is not included in the table. The data is from 
Dündar (1999, p. 71). 
158 
 
With respect to the numbers of languages that were available in question forms, 
there were 14 designated languages to be asked in the 1927 census, 31 in 1935 and 
1945, 28 in 1950, and 25 in 1955, 1960 and 1965 (Dündar F. , 1999, pp. 69-70). 
In 1927, 1935, 1945 and 1955, the languages were listed alphabetically without 
further classification.  
In 1950, these categories were made up: 1-Turkish, 2-Local Languages and 3-
Foreign Languages. The local languages involved all those spoken by all Muslim and 
non-Muslim minorities. 
In 1960 and 1965, the languages were categorized under seven groups: 1-Turkish, 
2-Islamic minority languages 3-Other minority languages, 4-Anglo-saxon languages, 5-
Latin Languages, 6-Slavic Languages and 7-Others (ibid.). Table 3, below, shows the 
detailed categorization. 
 
Language Group Languages 
1. Turkish  
2. Islamic minority languages Abaza, Acemce (Persian or Farsi), 
Arabic, Albanian, Bosnian, 
Circassian, Georgian, Kırdaşça, 
Kırmanca, Kurdish, Laz, Pomak, 
Zazakî 
3 Other minorities Armenian, Greek, Jewish 
4. Anglo-Saxon languages German, Flemmish, English 
5. Latin languages French, Spanish, Italian 
6. Slavic languages Bulgarian, Czech, Croatian, 
Swedish, Polish, Romanian, 
Russian, Serbian 
7. Others  
Table 3 – The categorization of languages in the 1965 census 
The language categorization, as seen in the list, is both inconsistent and 
problematic. Ali Ġhsan Aksamaz registers that there have been more languages than 
listed spoken within Islamic minorities and he gives a long list of them (2007). 
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The most controversial classification is that of Kurdish. Kurdish was evaluated in 
three groups in the 1950 census (Kırdaşça, Kürtçe-Kırmanca, Zazaca) and in four 
groups in 1960 (Kırdaşça, Kürtçe, Kırmanca, Zazaca). However, in the question 
regarding the second language, the grouping was given up and only Kurdish was 
offered as a choice. Dündar assesses the variable categorization as an invention and a 
result of the urge of the official discourse to break up Kurdishness in pieces and to 
present its population as a segregated diversity, which, therefore, should not be 
evaluated as a unique and uniform ethnicity (1999, p. 70 and 106). 
Zazakî is another important issue. Recently, there are members of the Zaza 
community, who claim that they are ethnically distinct and that the languages of Zazaki 
and Kurmanji Kurdish are separate languages.
160
 Zazaki was included in the language 
list only in 1950 and 1965.
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 In 1965, 150,644 respondents told that they spoke Zazakî. 
Kırmanca counts as only 45 in the same census, and Kırdaşça as 42. These strange 
numbers indicate the misguided formulation of the language list.  
There is a widespread disagreement on the linguistic varieties of Kurdish. The 
Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics describes Kurdish as being spoken in three 
main variants: 
―Northern Kurdish, comprising Kurmanji in the west and dialects spoken 
from Armenia to Kazakhstan; Central Kurdish, spoken in northeastern Iraq 
(called Sorani) and adjacent areas in Iran (called Kordi or Mokri), as well as 
in Iranian Kurdistan (called Senne‟i); and Southern Kurdish, spoken in 
Kermanshah province in western Iran (including Lakki and Lori of Posht-e 
Kuh).‖ Skjærvø (2006, p. 265).  
According to Eyyüp Demir, among others, Kurdish has four main dialects (2005).  
Kurmanji (Kurmanca, Kurmançi or Kurmanci), of which speakers forms the 
largest Kurdish groups in Turkey), has four significant regional accents that are spoken 
in Turkey: Hakkarî, around the province of Hakkari; Botanî, around Botan, Aşîtayî and 
Beyazîdî, around the provinces of Ağrı and Doğubeyazıt.  
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Soranî, also called southern Kurdish, is spoken around Soran region. Kerkuk, 
Erbil, Süleymaniya and Haneqîn in Irak, and Mahabad and Senandaj (Sine) in Iran are 
where Soranî speakers mostly reside. Soranî is also known as Baba Kurdî or Sitêmani. 
Goranî is a dialect of Kurdish mainly spoken in a limited area around southern 
Iranian and Iraqi Kurdistan. Demir notes that many tribes switched to Soranî from 
Goranî in the province of Kermanshah. Two widely used accents are Hewremanî 
(around Halepçe, Mervan and Pawe) and Lekî.  
Lastly, Zazakî, also known as Dumilî, Dimilî, Kırdki or Zazaca, is spoken around 
Tunceli, Bingöl and in some provinces of Elazığ and Diyarbakır. Goranî and Zazakî are 
closely related in linguistic terms. Kırmançki or Kırmanca, as it is asked in the 1965 
census, is known as Nothern Zazakî. 
It is worth to underline that the names of these dialects are subject to change from 
one region to another, and different linguistic communities define their and others‘ 
varieties in different terms. Religion is also an important classifier in naming others, 
since the Kurdish population is divided into two major Islamic sects: Alevis and Sunnis. 
Such a diversity of varieties of Kurdish and the disagreement on their 
classification, without any doubt, is a consequence of a lack of a central political power 
that would utilize Kurdish as the language of a polity. The political pressures on Kurds, 
and therefore their language, inevitably ended in the absence of reliable linguistic 
studies on Kurdish. The categorizations of the Kurdish varieties are rarely more than 
derivations from ethnographic guesses and personal experiences and observations about 
a population that is highly mobile, both socially and geographically.  
Concerning the official reaction to Kurdish and its variants in Turkey, there are 
chiefly two distinct attitudes. One of them, as noted above, is denial: Kurdish has never 
been an authentic language. It is either a distorted form of Turkish or Persian, or just a 
tribal tongue that does not deserve to be classified as a proper language. It is worth to 
note that the emphasis on the distortedness which can be considered as a result of the 
republican understanding that holds that Kurds are inferior to Turks. 
After the 1980 coup d‘etat, an old story revived about the Turkishness of Kurds. 
In the universities, studies that ―prove‖ the Turkish origins of Kurds and their 
publications came one after another. Book titles included ―Doğu Anadolu‟nun 
Türklüğü‖ (Eröz, 1982), ―Türkistanlı Bir Türk Boyu: Kürtler‖ (Taneri, 1983), ―İki Türk 
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Boyu: Zaza ve Kurmancılar‖ (BaĢbuğ, 1984), ―Kürt Türklerinin Gerçeği‖ (Giritli, 
1989), and ―Doğu Anadolu Osmanlıcası: Etimolojik Sözlük Denemesi‖ (Gülensoy, 
1986). 
A consequential approach is that Kurdish is not a modern or sufficient language to 
produce culture. Bedrettin Dalan, former mayor of Istanbul and the present head of the 
board of trustess of Yeditepe University, Istanbul, stated in an interview for Zaman, a 
daily newspaper, that Kurdish is no language: 
―Kurdish has no more than 600 words. They introduce the Persian they 
speak as Kurdish. There is no such language… [in response to YaĢar Kemal 
who declared that there are 100,000 words in Kurdish] … forget the one 
hundred thousand words, forget even fifty-thousand, write me a novel with 
thirty thousand words. I will undertake the publication and the distribution 
of the book. If any thirty people read and understand the book, I will 
apologize from you before everyone.‖162  
Not surprisingly, Dalan‘s claims sparked off widespread debates on the adequacy 
of Kurdish.  
The second attitute towards Kurdish has been the overemphasis on the dialectical 
diversity of the language. This approach is, certainly in close relationship with the first 
one above. This was best exemplified in the choice of languages for broadcasting in 
2004. 
When the State felt obliged to start broadcasting in minority languages in 2004, in 
line with the EU harmonization programs, five ―languages that are spoken by Turkish 
citizens in their daily lives‖ were designated: Arabic, Bosnian and Circassian, Kurmanji 
and Zazaki. At the time, TRT asked statistical information about the linguistic 
minorities from Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (State Institute of Statistics, DĠE henceforth), 
and the data that was sent to TRT as a response was the results of the census of 1965. 
TRT declared that the design of language allocation was based on scientific evidence.
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It seems like the ratio of population who spoke other than Turkish according to 
the data of censuses remains more or less the same, between 12 and 15 percent. Latest 
researches conclude similar numbers. 
Koç, Hancıoğlu, & Çavlin (2008) in their research compiled the various studies on 
minority populations based on ethnic identity or language and came up with the 
following numbers, in the Table 4.  
 
Language/Ethnic group 1935 1965 1990 1992 1993 1998 2003 
Turks 89.2 90.1 - 85.8 82.7 83.2 82.6 
Kurds 9.2 7.6 12.6 12.4 13.0 14.4 14.5 
Arabs 1.0 1.2 - 1.4 1.7 1.9 1.9 
Other 0.6 1.1 - 0.4 2.6 0.5 1.0 
Table 4 – Percent distribution of language/ethnic groups in Turkey 
Another frequently referred research is a worldwide project of linguistic data 
called Ethnologue. Detailed information on the project and their information on the 
current situation of the languages of Turkey are presented as Appendix 3. The figures of 
Ethnologue are also compiled from various resources, and they display another example 
of the linguistic diversity in Turkey. According to Ethnologue, the largest linguistic 
minorities in Turkey are the speakers of Kurdish, Dimli (Zazaki), Arabic, Bulgarian and 
Adgyhe (Circassian), in order. 
The relative increase in the ratios of minority languages with respect to the overall 
population is makes the success of the language regime in Turkey questionable. Why, 
despite all the legal regulations, has the target of a linguistically homogenous society 
not been accomplished?  
Before proposing answers to this question, some remarks are needed. 
To begin with, the language regime seems to achieve the eradication of the minor 
linguistic groups. Göksel notes that ―[f]or most of the languages with less than 30,000 
speakers, the population is over 50 years of age.‖ (2006, p. 160). The background story 
without doubt is based on the forced or voluntary migrations of the Greek, Armenian 
and Jewish communities out of the country. Therefore, the language regime seemed to 
work in accord with the general minority policies or the political regime that aimed at 
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the cultural homogenization of the nation. However, it seems like it only worked on the 
non-Muslim elements of the society. The two major linguistic groups that remained, 
Kurds and Arabs are Muslim, although there are denominational differences.  
There are two main reasons behind the failed leveling of linguistic differences. 
First, although the Turkish modernization project assumably prioritized the 
withdrawal of the religion into the private spheres and its exclusion from the public and 
political domains, there is enough evidence to accept that religion has been a major 
instrument of the nation building process. As presented above in the discussion of the 
Population Exchange of 1923, religion has always been seen as an absolute dimension 
of the Turkish national identity. Even though the republican constitutions maintained 
that the association to the State of Turkey through the bond of citizenship defines 
Turkishness, it was clear that the non-Muslim were not considered as Turks.  
Second, the regional differences in educational and economic opportunities have 
been considerably high. From the very first years of the Republic, the schooling rates 
were relatively low in the regions, where most of the Kurdish population resided. 
Enrolment for the primary schools in 1930s was at the lowest percentage in the eastern 
and southeastern regions with respect to national figures; between 7.3 and 18.5 
percentage, respectively. Similarly, those provinces produced with the lowest ratios in 
the country of the adults becoming literate in Millet Mektepleri between the years 1928 
and 1935 the percentage of 2.4 and 5.8, respectively (Webster, 1939, p. 222). McDowall 
reports that by 1925 ―only 215 of 4875 schools in Turkey were located in Kurdistan, 
providing education for 8400 pupils out of Turkey‘s 382.000 enrolled‖ (McDowall, 
1997, p. 192).  
The figures above prove that the relative lack of institutions of modernity, such as 
educational network, is an inheritance of the Ottoman Empire to the new Republic. The 
nomadic and patriarchal culture of most of the Kurdish population at the time was also a 
reason. While there were many Kurds who were not settled and pursuing a pastrol-
nomadism, a considerable number of them have been located in rather small residential 
areas such as minor villages, where the land is arable, a rarity in mountainous sections 
of the region. On the other, patriarchal ideologies, as in the other sections of the 
country, keeps girls away from schools and many of them are married in their early 
adolescence. It should be emphasized here that patriarchal exclusion of girls from 
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schooling is by no means a property of the Kurdish population but has been experienced 
by many girls in the society, by and large.  
However, the republican political of integration could not eliminate the regional 
and gender differences after several decades of assimilation efforts.  
In 1945, the census results were also reflecting the relationship between the 
mother language and literacy. At that year, the findings were that 11 percent of the 
Arabic speaking population was literate in Turkish (Dündar F. , 1999, p. 79), while the 
figures for Kurdish speakers are 9.8 percent for men and 0.9 for women (p. 106). 
In 1950, only 8.6 percent of the Kurdish speaking population (covering all three 
defined groups of Kurmancji, Kırdaşça and Zazaki speakers) is literate in Turkish, 
where the rates of schooling among girls is one fourth of the boys‘ (p. 108). 
One of the latest researches
164
 found out that most of those who are at the bottom 
of the income distribution are Kurds. In accord, the income distribution in these two 
regions is remarkably different from other regions. In the Eastern Anatolia, 32.9 percent 
of the population is in the poorest section of income, out of five sections. The second 
section included almost half of the eastern citizens: 44.3 percent. The figures show that 
the citizens who live in the Southeastern Anatolia are more unfortunate, where 44.73 
percent of the population is in the poorest section and 39,1 of them are in the second 
section, which in total makes up the almost 85 percent of all the southeastern region.  
The same research concluded that the residents of the eastern and southeastern 
regions still have the lowest levels of schooling. They have the highest rates of illiteracy 
with 14.53 and 22.81, respectively. Only 5.67 of the Eastern Anatolian population could 
access university education and 4.59 of the Southeastern population. All figures are 
lower than the average of the country.  
Therefore, the persistency of linguistic characteristics in the Kurdish and Arabic 
population is more related with the exclusion of their regions from the nation-wide 
education systems and the way schooling was conceieved among the population rather 
than their ethno-political resistance. It is true that recently, especially the Kurdish 
population experienced a high level of politicization and the ethnic claim has risen 
considerably. Many members of the younger generation among the Kurds are interested 
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 ―Biz Kimiz? – 2‖, Milliyet, March 20 (2007). 
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in learning Kurdish, even though they have not leart it from their parents in their 
childhoods.  
 
At this point, the presentation of the Turkish history of language regime is 
concluded. In this chapter, three major parts of this history was given. First, the 
Ottoman heritage of the language policies and the Turkish language was summarized. 
Secondly, a legal chronicle of the various milestones of the establishment of the Turkish 
language regime was displayed in detail. Lastly, a short outline of the linguistic map of 
the country was laid out with figures from censuses and researches.  
The next chapter is devoted to a case study, of which analysis, it is expected, will 
explicate the dynamics of the transformation of the language regime and the way it was 
subverted.  
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CHAPTER 6  
CHANGING LANGUAGE REGIMES 
The language regime in Turkey faced important challenges in the post-1980 era. 
In the previous chapters, it has been presented how language was articulated into the 
comprehensive modernization project of the Republic. One of the pillars of this project 
was to eliminate any possibilities of cultural diversity and to build a Turkish nation with 
a homogenous culture. Language has been conceived as a vital dimension of this 
cultural transformation. Through various legal regulations and practices, the attempte 
has been to ensure the status of Turkish language both as the officially recognized and 
legitimized medium of communication and as the expression of the projected cultural 
unity. However, as noted in the last section of the previous chapter where census results 
concerning the languages spoken in Turkey have been evaluated, there have been also 
significant failures in the linguistic assimilation process, especially among the citizens 
of Kurdish origins.  
After the 1980 coup d'état, Turkey has experienced three basic transformations 
concerning the political and cultural domains. First, Turkey has became more integrated 
into the global economic movements and the idea of a protected and territorial economy 
has considerably changed. Second, related to the inclusion of Turkey into the 
globalizing economy, the domains, over which the state claimed exclusive authority 
before, rapidly have became commercialized. The state‘s monopoly of the control and 
instrumentalization of the cultural spheres has ended; the due result has been the change 
in the ideological functions of these domains that shifted from guiding and assisting the 
overall cultural transformation of the nation towards the exploitation of those very 
domains with the primary motivation of profit maximization. And third, the official 
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discourse of the ―unity of the state with its nation‖ has been undermined by the 
politicization of the Kurdish identity and due armed insurgencies.  
These major changes in the political, economical and social conditions, all-
Turkish language regime has had to confront many challenges, both from above with 
the pressure of English, and from below with the increasing demands for rights of 
minority languages, especially of Kurdish. Legal re-arrangements in the areas such as 
broadcasting were among the adjustments of the language regime to settle down these 
chief challenges.  
To explain the dynamics of the changes in the regime of languages, the following 
chapter will concentrate on a representative case study: the controversies that have 
focused on the problem of radio and television broadcasting in Kurdish. 
In the sections below, the theoretical implications of broadcasting with respect to 
the construction, maintenance and the subversion of language regimes, and the Turkish 
story of broadcasting regarding its relationship with languages will be reviewed in an 
interwoven fashion. 
6.1 Broadcasting as a Major Domain of a Language Regime 
The choice of ―Kurdish broadcasting‖ as the case study is generated by the overall 
problematic of the dissertation. As it is intended to present and explain the ways in 
which Turkish language regime has been contradicted by local and global 
developments, it is assumed as reasonable to explore the challenges in an area such as 
broadcasting, in which these contradictions are most evident. As it will be laid out in 
detail below, various domains of broadcasting have always been critical spaces of action 
for the Turkish language regime.  
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National identities are mostly considered as the constructs of modernity, of which 
specific institutions, ideologies and processes have constituted their very existence.
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The cultural integration of masses, which had previously defined themselves through 
traditional local distinctions of language and religion, became a possibility only during 
the modern age. Self-imagination of individuals as the members of a transcendental 
national community means sharing common cultural and political values. Language has 
been one of the primary dimensions of this development of identification of the self 
with the larger group. Several developments of modernity proved to be decisive in 
facilitating the formation of shared standard languages, which substituted the religious 
lingua franca of the elites and other local varieties.  
The formation of the modern states, bureaucratic centralization of political power 
and the practices of citizenship created official languages, which linguistically linked up 
the subjects with the body politic. Printing and mounting literacy, the ubiquity of text 
based on the circulation of information, and the establishment of nation-wide 
educational systems spread the official version of the language among the population 
within the territory. The result was the valuation of the official languages, their 
extensive use and devaluation of the excluded linguistic varieties, which turned into 
patios, dialects and accents in comparison to the authorized version.  
As it is the case with any identity, national identity can only prove persistent in 
time with a persistent process of reproduction. Citizens‘ renegotiation of their identities 
is therefore important to be kept within the limits of the national ethos. This is enabled 
by the profound power networks of the nation-state of which legitimacy is based on the 
consent of those who consider themselves as part of a nation. In this sense, the nation-
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 The debates on whether nationalism is an exclusively modern phenomenon or 
not, and whether the nation is imagined or real, have been distinctively favorite subjects 
among historians and social scientists. For an illustrative discussion on the issue, by two 
proponents of different views on the subject, Ernest Gellner and Anthony D. Smith, see 
what is widely known as the Warwick Debates (Gellner & Smith, 1996). For an 
intensive introduction on the theories of nationalism see Steger (2000) and for 
comprehensive reviews of these theories see Anthony D. Smith (1998) and Özkırımlı 
(2000). The view subscribed to in this thesis, it is assumed to be clear by now, stands 
close to what is commonly labeled as ―the modernist perspective‖ which holds that 
nationalism, and therefore national identity have only become possible to emerge and 
operate within the conditions of modernity. 
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states paid particular attention to reproduce the cultural vitality and dynamics of the 
national language. The technological novelties of 20
th
 century, radio and television have 
been regarded as fresh forces to be utilized in this reproduction process.  
Edensor, while being persuaded by Benedict Anderson‘s idea of nation as an 
imagined community and acknowledging the historical importance of print, criticizes 
Anderson for his overemphasis on the textual reproduction of the nation as it ―effaces 
the spatial, material and embodied production of identities‖ (Edensor, 2002, p. 7). For 
Edensor, Anderson‘s concentration on text induces a reductive view of culture. He 
argues that other means of cultural reproduction, such as popular music, theatre, 
festivals, architectural spaces of congregation, and other embodied habits and 
performances are as effective. Referring to Barker, Edensor underlines that there is 
hardly any medium with widespread influence as television, which addresses one in 
his/her living room as part of a nation and situates him/her ―in the rhythms of a national 
calendar‖ (Barker, 1999, pp. 5-6; cited in Edensor, 2002, p. 7).  
Especially in Europe, public service broadcasters (PSBs, henceforth) took the lead 
in using the opportunities that are produced by the new channels of information flow. 
Van den Bulck and Van Poecke emphasize the role played by the PSBs: ―Virtually all 
public service broadcasters (PSBs) in modern industrialized countries have contributed 
substantially to the creation of the … ‗imagined community‘‖ (1996, p. 164). It should 
be noted that PSBs, rather than actually creating it, has contributed to the consolidation 
of the sense of the national communities, which appeared much before the coming of 
the relevant technology. However, it is important to highlight their roles in creating an 
audio-visual universe through which the national identity has been reproduced. 
Language, then, once more plays the vital role in the formation of these domains and it 
achieves a magnified strength in defining the boundaries of communities. The new 
function of language is now added to its previous utilizations in the formation of the 
national identity through education, official uses and the creation of textual/national 
domains.  
These audio-spaces also reinforce the power relations pertaining to the uses of 
varieties of the languages. Official languages‘ hegemonic positions with respect to other 
dialects or languages have been intensified. In connection, the prestige that has been 
attached to the official language about its production and support of social relations of 
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modernity similarly aggregated. The reification of the invention of the national 
language, hence, is furthered through the operations of the audio-visual space, which 
prioritizes that language. Moreover, the legitimacy of the national universe, with its 
political and social organization becomes more plausible. The sense of ―us‖, and its 
implications, of partaking within the same communicational context, therefore, is 
similarly, empowered. Scanell, for example, refers to the British PSBs in the same line. 
She underlines that the British state defined the radio broadcasting as a public and 
national service, of which ultimate target was to create a homogenous time and space 
that would bind masses into a nation (Scannell, 1990, p. 14; quoted in Ahıska, 2005, p. 
3173). 
Spitulnik associates the power of the mass media with their high visibility and 
their inherent publicizing functions. She states, ―mass media are a particularly volatile 
domain for … battles over representation‖ (1998, p. 165). Besides, she marks the 
indexical factor in mass media‘s using a particular variety of language with respect to 
the linguistic power relations:  
―As mass media build the communicative space of the nation-state, all of 
a nation‘s language, dialects and language varieties and the speech 
communities associated with them are automatically drawn into relations 
with one other… In semiotic terms, what this means is that there is an 
indexical component of the use of a language or a speech variety, which 
extends beyond the indexing of a social group associated with the code: the 
code chosen indexes the code not chosen.‖ (sic., Spitulnik, 1998, pp. 165-
166).  
The linguistic multiplicities within political territories have been re-ordered with 
the becoming of the nation-state. In general, one particular variety, mostly that of the 
elite classes, groups or the culture that had played a more decisive role in the nation-
building process, has been sorted as the prime medium of communication. Other 
varieties and languages have been relatedly excluded from the public sphere.
166
  
Spitulnik introduces the notion of ―language valuation‖ in this process of 
language choice and draws attention the language ideological dimensions that are 
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 See Chapter 2 for the discussion of the theoretical implications of (Bourdieu‘s) 
symbolic power generated by the political unification of one variety of a language and 
the comparative devaluations of the others. 
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inherent to it, as it has been already noted above. The ways the languages of the national 
community are treated and the linguistic hierarchy that has been reproduced by mass 
media is critical in understanding how the linguistic ideology of nation-state is running. 
For Spitulnik ―broadcasting must be seen as both a source and a result of language 
evaluations‖ (sic., 1998, p. 175) as broadcasting ―gives a fixity and legitimacy to certain 
language valuations‖ (p. 182). It is not only that the evaluation of languages is made 
through their use, and non-use of others thereof, in mass media. In addition, social 
valuation of the communities speaking those languages is also classified.  
The states‘ power in organizing the linguistic control and discipline, as a 
productive power to categorize and subjectify in Foucauldian terms, is evident in the 
ownership and through the functions of the broadcasting institutions. PSBs were 
designed to  
―serve the audiences and social institutions within the national territory, 
center-peripheral in form of organization, expected to protect national 
language and culture and (however implicitly) to represent the national 
interest. As an aspect of their national character, broadcasting institutions 
were usually monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic in their form of control‖ 
(McQuail, Rosario de, & Tapper, 1992, p. 9; cited in Van den Bulck & Van 
Poecke, 1996, p. 164).  
The instrumental political rationality of the nation-state takes every opportunity to 
enforce its justification as the sole center of political power, and so was the case with 
radio and television. Both were made nationwide educational devices ―contributing to 
the development of a national identity and culture, which carried a threefold 
responsibility; education (to support the national education system), information (to 
create political consciousness), and entertainment (to articulate a national culture)‖ 
(Desaulniers, 1985; cited in Van den Bulck & Van Poecke, 1996, p. 164). The 
pedagogical function assigned to radio and television, especially of public broadcasting 
agencies, undertook the business of transmission of the ―proper‖ language to the whole 
nation that would be ―educated, emancipated, and liberated from their backwardness, 
their vulgar pleasures, and, indeed, their linguistic poverty‖ (Van den Bulck & Van 
Poecke, 1996, p. 164)‖  
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6.1.1 Broadcasting and Language in the Republican Turkey 
Although an apparent political project of Turkish nationalism could not be located 
before the end of the 19
th
 century (Heper, 2007, p. 4), the ideological contestations 
during its development had been quite dense. Language debate, as it has been a virtually 
universal phenomenon for all nationalisms, has also been one of the primary subjects of 
the intellectuals of Turkish nationalism. The nationalist writers and activists, who were 
extremely influential during the birth of Turkism, were in favor of a simplified language 
that would help to connect the elites and the folk. Having in mind Benedict Anderson‘s 
theory of the formation of nations as modern national ―imagined communities‖ 
(Anderson, 1991); the primary source for the insistence on a simplified, easy-to-
understand language should be assigned to the development of a public sphere with an 
increasing number of newspapers, journals, books and their readers and writers. The 
republican founders further rejected the Ottoman legacy of multiculturalism, in favor of 
a hegemonic Turkification of the population. Consequently, the demands for 
simplification turned into the attempts to create a purely Turkish language. The 
grammatical and lexical purification was accompanied by the change of the alphabet to 
Latin, from the Ottoman Arabic script that was deemed as alien to the Turkish language 
with its phonology and as an obstacle with its Eastern and Islamic references against the 
development of the new, modern Turkish national culture.  
The republican Turkish state, on the one hand, aimed at establishing a state of 
mind that was found necessary for a new and secular re-start with the reforms, like the 
new calendar, besides others. On the other hand, it had a strong belief that general and 
national education in ―new Turkish‖ would enhance ―the possibility of shaping, 
molding and steering the society into the ranks of western European nations‖ (Öncü, 
2000, p. 299) and eliminating two major ―others‖, Islamicist politics and Kurdish 
nationalism. 
Apart from assumed purity, the ambitious intervention in language 
institutionalized ―new Turkish‖ as opposed to what had been called ―old Turkish‖. 
Various practices of the State offices, works of republican men of letters, and especially 
the state radio were effective in the generalization of this new variant. As Öncü remarks 
(ibid.), in a very short period, what has been labeled as Ottoman Turkish turned out to 
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be a property of ―old people‖. The ancién regime, an object of total rejection by the 
republican modernization, hence, gained another representative among others: the old 
language, which symbolized traditionalism and conservatism. In an era when using the 
―new language‖ was an appropriate marker of being modern, the use of the ―old‖ 
version was deemed as a resistance to the secular/nationalist symbolic system, which 
had been under construction.
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Radio, and later on, television has been considered instrumentally as efficient 
ways of consolidating the monolingual cultural universe. Radio broadcasts were indeed 
more effective since their reception did not require literacy, and they could reach far 
beyond where the textual and institutional materials of linguistic uniformity could 
access. Radio was especially an important novelty in an illiterate society that was ruled 
with an enthusiasm for political and cultural transformation. Establishment of a state-
driven and controlled public sphere is crucial in the massive project of teaching the 
―new‖ Turkish.168  
Until 1938, when the Ankara Radio was officially launched, the radio has been 
mostly broadcasting music. The folk songs that were collected from all over the country 
were processed in the radio and many Kurdish and Armenian songs were sung with 
Turkish lyrics. Ahıska identifies this process as the disembodiment of the songs off their 
time and space, which were actually their constituents (2005, p. 140). The 
disembodiment of local cultures was accompanied by their re-embodiment as Turkish 
cultural expressions. What was decisive in this transformation was, unsurprisingly, the 
language of Turkish. In that way, Turkish language was not only imposed upon those 
                                                 
167
 A memory from an iconic name from the first Republican generations, 
Muazzez Ġlmiye Çığ, supports Öncü‘s comment. Çığ recalls an incident when she was at 
the Faculty of Language, History and Geography (Dil Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi, of 
Ankara University) in mid-1930s. ―Hasan Âli Yücel was an inspector at the time, and 
he was by coincidence at the university. I was studying in a room, alone. Old Turkish 
was on the blackboard; we knew it and used it for it was easy to take notes. He came 
over and checked my work; he saw that I was writing in the old Turkish. He got furious, 
and asked, ―How old are you? How come you use this old writing?‖ I said, very 
frightened, ―Since it is quicker, sir…‖ (my translation, Rıza & Sakızlı, 2005, p. 129). 
168
 Meltem Ahıska‘s work ―Radyonun Sihirli Kapısı‖ (2005), with its emphasis on 
the ways of production of social power in the first decades of the Republic, is an 
important source in this field. 
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who do not speak it, it simultaneously produces new realities: new Turkish songs, as 
part of the Turkish folk culture. This aspect of language as power is already assessed by 
Bourdieu, where he emphasized the symbolic power of language, one that constructs 
realities (see Chapter 2 for the discussion). 
After 1938, verbal programs increased in number, due to the advancement of 
technology in the premises of the studios in Ankara. Ahıska explains the change as that 
the ―singing box‖ has turned into a ―speaking box‖ (p. 210). As speeches were more 
frequently aired, the functional value of the language similarly arose. The general 
manager of the Ankara Radio, Vedat Nedim Tör explained that the aim of the programs 
was to give the most beautiful examples of Turkish, in both pronunciation and in inşad 
(aesthetics of reading and speaking) (ibid.). 
Equally, in the same line, Ġsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, a professor of pedagogy and a 
deputy of Afyon in 1945, declared in a discussion in the National Assembly on radio 
broadcasts that: 
―The purpose of the radio is that the beauty of our sound, of Turkish, the 
beauty of our feelings are presented by the State, and to nationalize each of 
them.‖ (cited in Ahıska, 2005, p. 337).  
It is clear in these quotations the authorities‘ belief in the power of radio as a 
mediator between a society to be educated, and a state as the educator.  
In time, however, the projected cultural progress of the masses could not be 
realized. Class and regional inequalities in accessing to opportunities of education and 
cultural products, reconstructed the critical role of the language in various social 
stratifications, now for the ―new‖ Turkish. Once again, mass culture and the universe of 
the elites were distinguished by different accents and uses of the language, this time 
with respect to the indexical reference point of officialized, standard Turkish. Here is 
relevant another point that Öncü observes for this development. She comments that the 
strict distinction between the ―high‖ and ―low‖ versions of Turkish language represents 
itself in two ways in a country where the majority of the population is semi-literate: 
This distinction, on the one hand lays on the cultural fault lines between different social 
strata. On the other hand, it also functions as a critical mechanism that enables the 
construction and the maintenance of a culture of officialism, which dissociates the State 
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from the rest of the society (Öncü, 2000, p. 300). Öncü underlines the complicated ways 
in which different uses of the language, vocabulary choices and accentual variations 
have become intrinsic to power relations in Turkey.  
Right at this stage Öncü also warns the reader against a misunderstanding: the 
boundaries between ―old‖ and ―new‖ or ―high‖ and ―low‖ Turkishes are not fixed but 
are rather quite dynamic, that these categories are constantly remade with respect to 
time and context within which the conflicts in the political sphere are transformed. She 
continues; ―at the core of this process is the national state itself which simultaneously 
defines and monitors the canons of ―düzgün, güzel Türkçe‖ (correct and beautiful 
Turkish) through a complex maze of institutions and practices‖ (ibid.).  
Turkish Radio Television (TRT) has had a special position within these 
institutions that monitor the ―correct and beautiful‖ Turkish.169 The language used by 
TRT has mostly been both the ―new‖ and the ―high‖ Turkish, although governments 
attempted to alter the limits of language employed from time to time. TRT spoke 
through carefully written texts of Turkish, as it had the self-assigned mission of the 
construction of the voice of national unity, addressing to the nation, in the name of the 
nation.
170
 TRT has had another mission of transferring modernity to uneducated masses, 
hence its ―correct and beautiful Turkish‖ has always been at the core of this 
transmission as the carrier of modernity itself.
171 According to Öncü, the rare exceptions 
were the speech styles of peasant Turks, cleansed of strong accents, and utilized in a 
number of entertainment or instructive programs. Those excluded were the diversity of 
speech styles that were under development at the outskirts of metropolitan cities, and 
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 TRT was established as an autonomous public broadcasting company, with the 
Law no. 359, right after 1961 Constitution was prepared, and reconfigured the public 
audio-visual service. However, after the 1971 military memorandum, the institution's 
autonomy was overruled, once again, with a change in its law. 
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 ―Using a comprehensible, correct, clean and beautiful Turkish‖ in the TRT 
programs was a condition ruled by the TRT Law of the 1980 coup, in its Article 5 that 
regulated the ―General Principles of Broadcasting‖. 
171
 A former TRT employee, Aysel Aziz clearly underlines this aspect of 
education: ―Television was not considered as an apparatus of entertainment but as a 
mass-medium for delivering news, education and culture. This issue was a reflection of 
the dominant mentality of the manager and producers of the time‖ (Aziz, 1999, p. 28) 
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local languages other than Turkish (p. 302-303). The state was painstakingly selective 
in deciding what could be heard by the nation. 
As it was stated in the previous chapter on the formation and the maintenance of 
Turkish language regime, TRT has been a battleground for competing political 
ideologies. The governments considered the Institution as a base to be conquered and 
each imposed their understanding of Turkish. The battle between Öztürkçe and yaşayan 
Türkçe, was not fought over the basic premises of the language regime, which basically 
legitimized Turkish over other languages of Turkey. It was more a war of different 
cultural and political networks. What they could not agree on was the legitimate variety 
of Turkish in general and the vocabulary in particular. This conflict was reflected on the 
linguistic policies of TRT as to prioritize ―new‖ or ―old‖ language under the rule of 
different governments. A similar intervention to broadcasting language policy was the 
1985 regulation on banned words (see above).  
In the 1990s, language politics of the audio-visual domain would get 
incomparably complicated. 
6.2 Changing Nature of Broadcasting 
Second of the reasons for the choice of ―the language policies in broadcasting‖ as 
the primary case study of this thesis is that the issue emerges as a reflection of global 
patterns in the Turkish locality. In connection with the worldwide ubiquity of the strain 
on the national language regimes generated by English and the minority languages, 
themes of English and Kurdish in Turkey turn out to be local cases of a global 
problematic. There are global and local transformations at stake, such as the 
globalization of capitalist economics of consumption, decolonization, forced or 
voluntary labor migrations, and transnational mass media, etc., that makes the language 
issue more complicated to be resolved in traditional frameworks of the national 
linguistic regimes (Safran, 2004, p. 13).  
The nation-states‘ public broadcasting policies that favored the official languages 
and their dominant status has been fractured by two simultaneous processes: (a) 
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commodification and commercialization of culture with respect to post-fordist 
economics (Van den Bulck & Van Poecke, 1996, p. 176), and (b) by the empowerment 
of the minorities who were long denied, assimilated or excluded by the nationalist 
politics. This section reviews the first of these developments that effected the changes in 
language regimes in broadcasting: the commercialization of mass media institutions. 
The next section (Section 6.3) deals with the rising ideological climate within which 
broadcasting in minority languages has become legitimate. 
6.2.1 Post-Fordist Economics of Broadcasting 
Van den Bulck & Van Poecke (1996) elaborates on the formation of a post-fordist 
postmodern culture where languages lose their criticality in the representation/ 
demarcation of clearly defined identities. This modification is reflected in the changing 
language policies of the PSBs. They argue that PSBs have been affected by a process of 
informalization, which points out the shift from a rigid categorization and valuation of 
language varieties to a more flexible positioning with respect to linguistic variations. 
They maintain that the increasing flexibility of broadcasting language policies in 
accommodating minority languages or varieties of the official language is a result of the 
flexible nature of the post-fordist economics of culture. 
In relation to their assessment of the PSBs with respect to the transformation of 
modernity, Van den Bulck & Van Poecke state ―[t]he original setup of the PSBs fitted 
the modernist organization of the society… both the nation-building project and the 
paternalistic ethos can be seen as elements of the sharp boundary maintenance and 
framing of visible pedagogy, or socialization.‖ (1996, p. 175). While the previous 
mission of the public service broadcasts was to educate and ―to give the population 
what they need‖, as the first director-general of BBC, Lord Reith stated (ibid.), the new 
trend is to present what is likely to be shaped by the entertainment market. ―As a result, 
the national character of the public service broadcasting is threatened.‖ (Van den Bulck 
& Van Poecke, 1996, p. 176). Recently, the audience is assumed to be getting what they 
want. 
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With the possibilities brought about by the information technologies that enable 
global broadcasting, the framework, within which the radio and television channels 
have been operated, has exceeded national boundaries. Broadcasting increasingly 
became a subdivision of the global economy, which has facilitated the international 
trading of audio-visual commodities. 
The expansion of the commodification is not confined to geographical diffusion 
of the global capital into the economical territories of nation-states, which had been long 
protected. Within post-modern capitalism, which has been also conceptualized as the 
post-fordist economy (see Harvey, 1997), there appeared the commodification of new 
spheres, previously out of the production relations. With respect to the further 
commercialization, audio-visual entertainment and delivery of information became vast 
fields to be exploited for profit.  
6.2.2 The Privatization of the Audio-Visual Universe in Turkey 
The year 1980 may be assigned as a turning point in Turkey in many aspects, 
from politics to culture, as the coup d'état and due policies of the military government 
transformed the way the political and the social spheres were organized. Two important 
consequences of the post-1980 period were the expansion of the civil society and its 
transformation of its relationship with the political sphere
172
, and the capitalization of 
domains that were previously regarded as the domains of the State.  
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 For a concise history of the civil society movements in Turkey, see Yerasimos 
(2001). 
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The explosion of the number of audio-visual mass media corporations and of their 
due effect had been another critical consequence of the post-80s social reconstruction.
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In the first years of 1990s, broadcasting of private television and radio channels began. 
After a short period of their prohibition and a succeeding popular protest, the broadcasts 
were decriminalized and regulated by law. This was an official end to the monopoly of 
the State on one of the significant sites of cultural production.
174
 This process is 
associated with the integration of the Turkish economy to the global markets of 
consumerism. The integration has been accompanied by rapidly penetrating patterns of 
cultural commodities. Relatedly, the perception of broadcasting has radically changed. 
In the times of the monopoly of TRT broadcasting was conceived as a public service 
(and mission), but with the privatization of the domains of radio and television this was 
substituted by an understanding of broadcasting as a consumer-oriented commodity. 
Accordingly, the audience, once-conceived as the recipients, hence the objects of 
modernizing projects and as the mass of citizens to be educated, were substituted by an 
audience who are now became subjects through the culture of consumption. With the 
remote controls in their hands, now the consumers could be in charge of their 
preferences of what to watch and what to listen. 
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 As of February, 2007, the following figures have been found with respect to  
channels licensed by RTÜK: 22 national TV channels, 36 national radio channels, 16 
regional TV channels, 100 regional radio channels, 215 local TV channels, and 958 
local radio channels (data compiled from RTÜK‘s web site at  http://www.rtuk.org.tr on 
February 6, 2007).  
With respect to the reception of broadcasts, in Turkey, there are 54 channels 
accessed via Kablo TV by Turksat, which has 1.187.960 subscribers in 21 cities 
(information compiled on February 6, 2007 from http://www.turksat.com.tr). There are 
140 channels on broadcast via Digiturk, a major digital satellite network, with over one 
million subscribers (compiled on February 6, 2007 from http://www.digiturk.com.tr). 
Besides, there were more than 6 million households in Turkey, who could access to 
satellite broadcasts with hundreds of channels from all around the world in 2006 
(Hürriyet, May 30, 2006). As of September 2007, more than 50 percent of the accesses 
to TV broadcasts were through satellite receivers. (―Televizyon uydudan izleniyor‖, 
Birgün, September 12 (2007)). 
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 Surely, this expansion did not mean an end to the attempts of the State to 
control the cultural. As it will be explored below, through several institutions and 
regulations, the State still resists and it is still persistent on its authority over social 
discipline. 
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Besides their wide-ranged social and cultural outcomes, the multiplication of mass 
media has also changed the way the language issue is assessed. Parallel to the geometric 
increase in the effects of mass media in socialization, language became more central in 
battles of ideologies and conflicts of political-cultural identities. 
The regulation of private channels was legalized on April 13, 1994 by Radyo ve 
Televizyonların Kuruluş ve Yayınlar Hakkında Kanun (the Law on the Establishment 
and Broadcasting of Radio and Televisions). The law also decreed on the foundation of 
an overarching institution called RTÜK (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu, Supreme 
Board of Radio and Television). The broadcasting language was set exclusively as 
Turkish, with a solid emphasis on that broadcasts would facilitate its development.
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However, the rule was not to become the reality. 
Television became more and more effective on the use of language, after the State 
lost its control over the linguistic geography of the audio-visual sphere. Television 
broadcasting, by producing and presenting the seductive forms of visuality, became 
increasingly influential on cultural socialization in Turkey, where functional literacy is 
relatively rather low (Öncü, 2000, p. 300).176 The rate of possession of a TV set is more 
than 97 percent in the country, where newspaper and book sales are comparatively low 
(Devlet Ġstatistik Enstitüsü, 2005). 
As television intruded into a greater part of daily life, so grew the debates that 
focused on the relationship between language and the way broadcasting is practiced. 
This multi-dimensional debate has participants from both official departments and the 
civil society. On the one hand, there are public institutions of which policies are directly 
determined by the government, such as RTÜK, which has sanctioned for many times 
the ―wrong‖ uses of Turkish language on television and radio. Besides TDK is still 
considered as an authority, and the representatives of the institutions frequently 
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 See above for the Article and a review of the regulation. 
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 A definition of functional literacy explains the concept as ―the literacy that 
would enable the individual to acquire the necessary information and abilities for 
success in all activities of life, in other words habit of reading‖ (my translation, Yılmaz 
B. , 1993, p. 25). According to a research that Öncü refers on the subject, in 1991, the 
67.6 percent of the adult population in Turkey never reads a newspaper. The ratio rises 
up to 79.7 percent among women. The same research states that the corresponding data 
for Europe is around 14 percent, on the average (2000, p. 315). 
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publicize their evaluations on the issue. On the other hand, there are contestants from 
the civil society, like Dil Derneği (the Language Association), Türkçemizi Canlandırma 
Derneği (Türkcan, the Association for the Revival of Our Turkish), university student 
clubs, internet communities like Türkçe Sevdalıları177, writers and columnists178. This 
wide-ranging foundation of sensitivity on Turkish invariably maintains that the 
―irresponsible media‖ is guilty for the corruption of Turkish. Before delving into the 
details of the discourse of this sensitivity, two additional dimensions of the ―threat‖ to 
Turkish should be briefly noted. 
The only factor that challenged the presumed hegemonic status of Turkish was not 
the local developments. Besides, compared to the TRT period, English has been 
occupying increasingly and aggressively a larger space in the audio-visual universe, as 
it did in other realms of daily life. Within the integration process with the global 
economy, the cultural products of Anglo-Saxon origins have become more frequently 
encountered, and English appears to be the main medium of this diffusion 
(Büyükkantarcıoğlu, 2004, p. 40). English has become more visible by means of music, 
movies and TV series with Turkish subtitles, original commercials of global companies, 
or channels broadcasting in English via the satellite or cable networks. However, more 
to its increasing visibility, English is also getting more room in the areas, which have 
been conventionally expected to be Turkish. There is a considerable density of English 
use in names of channels and TV programs, and the language used in especially 
entertainment productions. Büyükkantarcıoğlu similarly underlines; 
A sudden increase in the number of private TV channels and radio 
stations meant an end to the monopoly of the state-run TRT (Turkish Radio 
Television), which had exerted a highly controlled broadcasting policy over 
the country…. Commercials both on TV and in popular magazines 
presented new lifestyles and products with a generous use of English words 
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 The internet address of the groups is http://www.turkcesevdalilari.com. On the 
World Wide Web, there are tens of similar sites dedicated to the defense of Turkish 
language. Most of them have their own forums where registered members can 
communicate on daily issues.   
178
 See Kongar (2003) and Hepçilingirler (1998) for the compilations of their daily 
articles on the issue.  
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and brand names in order to convince people that using the advertised item 
meant sophistication and modern life.‖ (2004, p. 44). 
The knowledge of English has become a more significant and displayable 
parameter of contemporary cultural/symbolic capital and its exhibition an ordinary 
business. With respect to that, the mounting weight of English over the geography of 
Turkish language is considered as an indicator of cultural occupation, and that it has 
been targeted as a major issue of nationalist/reactionist politics. A feeling of cultural 
nightmare strikes back; in the first Republican decades Islamic or eastern effects on 
language were officially renounced as they were believed to be contaminating the ―pure 
Turkish‖ culture. A similar feeling recently peaks, this time because of English. The 
intensifying global hegemony of English now influences Turkey. In this process, 
national language is conceived as vital for the resistance against globalization or 
imperialism. The developments which bring English to the forefront in daily life, 
education, information technologies, and international relations are coupled with the 
alarming idea that ―the foreign forces that are at work for destroying Turkey‖, which is 
a politico-ideological inheritance of the demise of Ottoman Empire and a popular 
discourse of Turkish nationalism. The consequence is that the defense of the national 
language is constructed as a very critical means of political struggle against the 
linguistic and cultural imperialism of the West.
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 This type of linguistic response in 
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 Oktay Sinanoğlu is an iconic example of those who wage war for the ―defense‖ 
of Turkish. His countrywide university seminars, titled with the slogans of ―Sağ Sol 
yok! Önce bağımsızlık!‖ (Neither Left nor Right! Independence First!) and ―Türkçe 
giderse Türkiye gider!‖ (If Turkish is lost, Turkey will be lost!), has drawn many 
admirers among the students. His book, a collection of his articles on the subject, is 
titled ―Bye-Bye Türkçe‖ and has been frequently referred as the flag of this defense 
(Sinanoğlu, 2000). There are many internet sites for supporting his ―cause‖, that are 
often organizing campaigns related to Turkish and hosting discussion forums 
(http://www.sinanoglu.net/, which was very active until the last couple of months and 
http://www.byebyeturkce.com/, to name two of them). Discussions are not only on 
Turkish. Unsurprisingly, there are also heated debates on Armenian issue, terror and 
―treason of Turkish intellectuals‖ like Orhan Pamuk, as they are usual stops of Turkish 
nationalism recently. In passing, it should be noted that there is an astonishingly high 
number of grammatical and other linguistic errors in both Sinanoğlu‘s books and the 
mentioned web sites. 
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opposition to globalization is also very common in other nationalisms
180
. English seems 
not to be threatening only the status of Turkish, but also its corpus. It is one of the main 
reasons held responsible for linguistic weakening, via the corruption of Turkish.  
Recently, there is a widespread and escalating critique of how Turkish language is 
being polluted, corrupted or corroded, and usually this criticism aims at private 
television broadcasts. The concealed nostalgia for the ―Turkish that was once 
beautifully and correctly used‖ does not refer to any specific moment or situation of an 
uncorrupted Turkish language, but only to the discursive and imaginary construct of 
―the‖ Turkish language. The assumed ―golden age‖ sometimes recalls the times when 
TRT was the only audio-visual provider in the country. Beyond being a source of news 
and entertainment, the State‘s television also bore a constructive and instructive 
mission, and the Turkish language was both the medium and the subject of this 
education. One of the favorite subjects of the authors of Turkish is the great contrast 
that appears when one compares the hygienic Turkish of the TRT and today‘s private 
channels‘ poor and ―unruly‖ Turkish filled slang and words with foreign origins.  
6.2.3 “Corruption of the Turkish Language” 
The following sub-section reviews the approaches to the issue of the effects of 
commercial broadcasting on the deterioration of Turkish language. The theme does not 
seem directly related to the subject of the subversion of language regimes in 
broadcasting via the increasing employment of minority languages. Nevertheless, what 
connects the two is that they are both part and parcel of the overall process of changing 
language regimes in the context of globalization (Coulmas, 2007). 
There are qualitative differences between current grievances related to the 
corrosion of Turkish and the pre-1980 debates of language that were based mainly on 
―new and old‖ Turkish. Use of ―new‖ or ―old‖ Turkish was considered as a significant 
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 For exemplary studies on the impact of English to the linguistic and political 
regimes in other countries, see Papapavlou (2001) for Cyprus and Lai and Byram 
(2003) for Hong Kong. For detailed works on English in Turkey see Demircan (1988) 
and (2006), Köksoy (2000), Büyükkantarcıoğlu (2004), and Doğançay-Aktuna and 
Kızıltepe (2005). 
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marker of ideological tendencies in the previous period. Lately, the focus of debates on 
Turkish shifted to the issue of erosion of the language. 
Those authors who emphasize negative developments concerning the Turkish 
language label this tendency with notions such as corruption, pollution, contamination, 
wrong usage, or bad Turkish, etc. These critiques sometimes end up in warnings against 
the total destruction of the language. ―Murdering Turkish‖ (Kongar, 2003, p. 13) and 
―slaughtering Turkish‖181 are common expressions in these kinds of texts. There two 
main objections associated with the degeneration of the language: disorderly use of 
Turkish, and the use of words of foreign, mostly of English, origins. Rarely, to the 
second objection is added the use ―old‖ words (Hepçilingirler, 1998, pp. 34-36), as a 
reemerging sensitivity.  
A special report was prepared by TDK for RTÜK in 2000. It was titled Radyo ve 
Televizyonda Türkçe Kullanımı (Usage of Turkish on Radio and Television). It was a 
well-worked compilation of criticisms of bad usage of the language on television.
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The report evaluated a complete two-month monitoring of particular radio and 
television channels in 1999 and identified misuses were classified in detailed. In the 
classification, there are subtitles like grammatical, lexicological, and pronunciation 
―errors‖. For every problem remarked, there are numerous examples from the observed 
programs and their correct forms are indicated, as well. 
Among the motives for preparing such a report, there is an apparent continuation 
of the perception that television broadcasting has an educational mission. At least the 
report exhibits that the idea is still preserved by TDK and RTÜK. In the introduction 
section, it iĢ commented that ―most of the broadcasting, with respect to their content, 
purpose and qualities, result in the corruption of Turkish, instead of maturing the 
linguistic skills of the public, increasing their cultural level and motivate their 
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 Fatih Karaca, the general manager of RTÜK of the time (―Türkçedeki 
yozlaĢma tartıĢıldı‖, NTVMSNBC, September 24 (2004)). 
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 (RTÜK, 2000). Again, in passing, the internet link on RTÜK‘s web site to the 
file was wrongly typed as ―Radyo ve TV'de Türkçe'nin Kullanımı‖, with the mistaken 
use of apostrophe after the name of the language. This is yet another example of a 
careless use of Turkish by those who are apparently the most worried ones about the 
corruption of Turkish. 
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affectation for the language‖ (RTÜK, 2000). There are also conflicting statements. For 
instance, on the one hand it is stated that ―there has been an intensifying wrong and 
arbitrary public use of language‖ and after a few paragraphs, it is noted that ―there is an 
increasing public awareness of language‖.183 Institutions of education are especially 
emphasized for their failure in forming a consciousness of language.  
An important observation of the report is that most of the language mistakes are 
made in live programs. Not very surprising indeed, especially when the growing 
demand and supply of live coverage are considered. Particularly in news reporting, real 
time and on-the-spot-coverage induce a sense of reality. Drawing the full attention of 
the audience to the television, live broadcasts also contribute to the public image of a 
news channel for its punctuality, reliability, quality reporting and its technological 
competency.
184
 In the world of television, parallel to the technological advances, the 
growing affinity for ―breaking news‖ and the dramatization of narrated realities 
facilitate high ratings. From that respect, increasing rates of daily or spontaneous talk on 
television is closely related to the changing dynamics of television culture and 
technologies. They also make it much possible for the reporter, who has to talk without 
a pre-written text and has to do that quickly, to divert from the assumedly standardized 
version of the language use.  
Another process that triggered the increasing audibility of colloquial Turkish, or 
to enlarge the category, of non-standard varieties of the language, is the commercial 
production of television entertainment. 
Colloquial language has been heard more and more as the consumer culture 
absorbed the customs and the language of the masses, or the ―lower classes‖. AyĢe 
Öncü notes in her article that cultural banalities, undisclosed in various ways by 
commercial broadcasting, have had a more subversive effect on language than the 
global flows or words of foreign origins (2000). 
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 In fact, the conflict resides not on the observation but on the reality itself. As 
shown before, it is not rare that even the keenest critiques of ―bad Turkish‖ make errors 
in their language use. 
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 CNN Turk‘s slogan, ―İlk bilen siz olun!‖, an equivalent of CNN‘s ―Be first to 
know!‖, is an example to such a tendency.  
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Öncü analyses Kemal Sunal movies, as the case study in this respect. She remarks 
that commercial television channels‘ hunger for ―light‖ entertainment has oriented the 
broadcasts to take the common denominator of general tastes into consideration (2000, 
p. 304). After being banned from the state television for its ―cheap art‖, Kemal Sunal 
movies has been one of the favorites of private channels in order to satisfy such hunger. 
In those movies, the hero is the ―man of the people‖ with his plainness, modesty, 
simplicity, frankness, naïve honesty. The movies forefront a well-known conflict: the 
communal values of an ordinary man as opposed to the materialist individualism of the 
―bad guy‖. This ordinariness is mostly signified by Kemal Sunal‘s simple language. 
―He understands everything literally, seemingly unaware of the double meanings of 
language and blurts out what comes into his mind, again seemingly oblivious of social 
conventions‖ (Öncü, 2000, pp. 305-306). His answers in street slang in most of the talks 
in ―beautiful and correct Turkish‖, is one of the basic elements of comedy in these 
movies.
185
  
Besides the themes and the humor in Sunal‘s movies, they have become mostly 
desired commodities that increase ratings of commercial televisions. The abundance of 
the employment of daily language and ―low‖ versions of speech does not demand 
intense mental activity and are easily understood by the uneducated or less educated. 
Similarly, Öncü attributes the political significance of the movies to their low-
languages, or with her own words, to the ―opening of the cultural world of 
immigrant/low-income metropolitan life, grounded in syncretic speech styles (neither 
―modern‖ new Turkish nor ―traditional‖ peasant) to nationwide audiences.‖ (2000, p. 
306). 
However, such nationwide interest in these movies has not been celebrated by 
linguistic authorities. RTÜK, in its report mentioned above, reacts against the ―rude‖ 
versions of colloquial language: ―It is observed in Turkish movies and TV series that 
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 Such a controversy has been frequently referred in the history of Turkish 
literature. The traditional shadow theater, Karagöz and Hacivat, is a good example in 
which this gap in language use is represented with irony (see Bosworth, 1965a, p. 62; 
Dilaçar, 1962, p. 18; and Lewis G. , 2004, p. 25). For how the play was used as an 
ideological apparatus, delivering revolutionary messages, after the Republic was 
established, see Erdoğan (1998), where he presents a comprehensible account of how 
popular elements were utilized for ideological purposes. 
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there has used a lot of rude words, which are inappropriate considering the social 
manners. The extreme use of such words disturbs and disgusts the audience.‖ (my 
emphasis, RTÜK, 2000). The wording of the feeling on the speeches with slang or 
cursing as ―disgusting‖ should be considered as a good example of how class or cultural 
conflicts are also psychologically translated. Indeed, the result of this disturbance is 
―beeping‖ of such talks by the broadcasting channels against any chance of being 
warned the by Council.  
Although political subversion of Kemal Sunal movies has subdued in time, such 
language power play between colloquial and ―correct‖ Turkish has continued to be a 
basic element used in other entertainment programs and TV series, especially produced 
for the semi-literate audiences. RTÜK‘s report reflects the discontent with ―wrong 
Turkish‖ by that most of the language errors exemplified in the report are taken from 
such TV productions.  
The audio-visual spread of ―low language‖ has also drawn attention from the 
critiques that lay emphasis on cultural change, though mostly in an elitist tone. Emre 
Kongar, for example, comments on a letter from one of his readers who criticizes 
calling all the automobiles as taxis: ―[this] is a reflection of the provincial culture… our 
televisions are becoming more provincialized‖ (2003, p. 27).186  
In another example of this reaction comes from Ersin Salman. Salman, in his 
speech titled Dil Kirlenmesi ve Medya (Language Pollution and Mass Media) explicitly 
blames the varoş (suburb) culture: 
―Another socio-political element of the language pollution could be the 
suffocation of, not only the urban daily life, but also the culture of the city, 
by the suburbs. We can conclude that masses, paralyzed with cultural 
poverty, as well as economically, speed up the language pollution. We have 
to leave worries of populism aside here. The effects of many of our people 
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 The original text is as follows: ―Köy kültürünün bir yansıması olarak … 
televizyonlarımız köylüleşiyor.‖ The emphasis on provincial, village culture and on the 
negative implications on provincialization is important to note. Typically urbanization 
and urban culture has usually been celebrated by the modernizationist elites against the 
provincial uneducatedness and non-modernity. This is true despite the early Republican 
discourse of the prioritization of the village folk as the natural and the cultural core of 
the nation. However, Parla notifies that the ―populism‖ of the one-party era should not 
be confused with German idealization of the ―volk‖ or Russian ―peasant‖ (1995). 
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who learnt Turkish later on are not confined to the deterioration of the 
language as a means of daily communication. An indirect reason of 
language pollution is the concentration of the mass media on these sections 
of the society as customers.‖ (Salman, 1999, p. 312). 
Salman seems to leave the worries of populism aside really for good. Without 
disclosing the target population, he certainly has Kurds in his mind, when his stresses 
because of the outskirts of urban areas and not having Turkish as a mother language, but 
as a second language are considered. Quite unhappy to get in touch with the ―masses‖, 
Salman evidently suffers from a long-established ―provincial‖ invasion of the ―urban‖. 
This anxiety of provincialization (köylüleşmek) is apparently induced by parallel 
processes of a new wave of urbanization in the 1990s and its overwhelming effect on 
the republican elite‘s urban culture on the one hand, and the commoditization of low-
classes‘ culture and language, on the other hand.187 The reaction to the increasing 
impact of the ―low Turkish‖ might also be interpreted as an attempt to contextualize the 
shattering of the elite culture‘s assumed priority and superiority. 
The increasing visibility of different linguistic variations within the cultural 
sphere is mostly codified as a ―cultural decline‖ or a ―diversion of the road to the 
civilization‖. The picture becomes more complex when the reaction against the 
globalizing cultural patterns, especially via the spread of English is considered. It would 
be a plausible argument to underline that Turkey‘s elite culture is currently experiencing 
an identity crisis in opposition to (or between) local plebianism and global cultural 
dynamics. It is observable that the way to soothe the anxiety initiated by this depression 
in general passes through a particular reactionism shielded by nationalism.  
The RTÜK‘s report contains a special sub-section titled Yabancı Kelimelere 
Özenme (Imitation of Using Foreign Words). Almost without exception, ―the foreign 
language‖ is English. In fact, arguments such as ―the fashion‖ to use English words or 
―imitation‖ of English are very common.  
Beside such complaints, there is one particular perspective, which might be 
evaluated as contradictory to them: to assess the infusion of English into Turkish 
through conspiracy theories which seek an intentional plan and its perpetrators. The 
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 For a research on recent waves of migrations to urban areas and due political 
implications, see Kurban (et.al.) (2006) 
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report states: ―Foreign words are injected into the language by mass media in a very 
short time like an invasion, and the result is the corruption of the language rather than 
enrichment.‖ (my emphasis, RTÜK, 2000). The very terminology, which includes 
concepts like invasion, is yet another verification of the idea that culture in general and 
language in particular is a battlefield.  
The charge of özenmek (imitation by affection) should be elaborated more. The 
idiom has, by and large, negative connotations in Turkish. It evokes imitation, 
flightiness or volatileness, and reminds the futile search of those who are always unable 
to fix their dispositions. Therefore, it is mostly coupled with being seized by the trends. 
When the context of our subject is taken into consideration, özenmek refers to the 
positions that are cursed by the republican ideology such as alienation, loss of identity 
or unconsciousness. On the one hand, the children of the Westernizationist and 
modernizationist Republic are expected not to imitate the West. On the other hand it is 
frequently questioned whether to head for the West has been a good idea in the first 
place. The schizophrenic association of the Turkish elite culture with the West is 
disclosed once again and exemplified by the debates on English and Turkish. This is 
remarkably so, if it is taken into account that the calls to protect Turkish language from 
―foreign invasion‖ do not evolve into a kind of societal reaction or overarching legal 
regulations. The fear for the identity cannot transcend the discursive level.
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As mentioned earlier, due to increased number of institutions of education 
teaching in English, English names used in enterprise names, trademarks, commercial 
slogans, and even in daily conversations, the pressure of foreign language felt in a wider 
social and cultural sphere. How this process is defined, is closely related to the Turkey‘s 
political culture.  
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 In relation, education in foreign language is another theme of heated debate. 
There is a plethora of refusals of using foreign languages as the medium of education. 
Yet, those educational institutions, which teach in foreign languages, are the most 
popular ones and desired most in the general entrance examinations. This is true, despite 
the fact that many private and demand expensive tuitions. There are some local 
municipal regulations, which mostly discourage using words and letters from other 
languages in shops‘ signboards and commercial names. An analysis about the municipal 
regulations has already been presented above. See Appendix xxx for a list of the 
municipalities who decided to act on the widespread use of foreign languages.  
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For example, Reklam Yaratıcıları Derneği (an association of creative writers from 
the advertisement industry) organized a campaign in 2005 with the slogan ―Dilinizden 
utanmayın!‖ (Do not be ashamed of your language!). This campaign was announced by 
advertisements in various newspapers, and it was introduced with the following 
commentary: ―Turkish is one of the world‘s most rooted, richest, and most beautiful 
languages. Do not pollute it with foreign words. Use Turkish!‖189 In the text, the 
―natural‖ relationship narrated, between ―the pollution of language‖ and ―the 
destruction of culture‖ is a proof of how the notion of ―our national language‖ has been 
internalized by at least urban middle and upper classes. The direct relationship between 
preserving the language‘s uniqueness and sovereignty or independence is evident in the 
arguments of the writers like Emre Kongar or Oktay Sinanoğlu.   
The approach defined as ―complaint tradition‖ by James and Lesley Milroy 
(1999), is frequently employed by those who are considered as authorities in language 
matters in their critiques of the daily language usages of the masses. The problem is 
never dealt with as merely a matter of language, but also as a reflection of macro social 
circumstances. Mostly shining with intense elitism, as Öncü mentioned and defined 
above, the critiques involve a bemoaning for the threats against ―the Turkish‖. The basic 
attitude in the arguments of these critics, the ―missionaries‖ of Turkish, is that mistaken 
usages of Turkish is held to be crimes against the language, and consequently as crimes 
against society.   
To summarize the attitude of the complaint tradition, to note the conclusive 
declaration of a congress, organized in 2005 in Ankara, would be useful. The congress 
was titled ―Türkçem, Dilim Dilim…‖ and the following was argued in its final 
statement: 
―Language pollution is like blood pollution: it harms the nation‘s culture 
as the blood pollution harms the body. Based on this truth, it can be 
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 Detailed info can be found at http://www.ryd.org.tr/template.asp?id=10 
(retrieved on July 28, 2008). The split of the discourse and the practice is present in this 
campaign, too. Although the campaign is a propaganda of Turkish, some of its 
supporters named their companies as Marketing Türkiye, Mediacat, Radyo Foreks, 
Trendsetter. English words in these names imply that, ―being not ashamed by the 
language‖ stays only in discourse level. 
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concluded that, the most effective way to eliminate a cultural community is 
to damage its language… 
Language pollution leads to the pollution of ideas, which in turn leads to 
the pollution of identity. What we experience in the national context 
recently is closely related to the weakening of our languages. 
In order to keep our national identity alive … Turkish should be used 
appropriately in all walks of life. Science should be in Turkish…  
For Turkish, and therefore our nation, to live forever … the principal 
condition is that … education should be in Turkish. (Aslan, 2005, pp. 287-
288). 
It is obvious that in a text like this, in which references to biology and body are 
plenty, an organic definition of nation is constructed. This construction clearly excludes 
and disregards linguistic differences in order to enforce an imagined cultural unity. This 
imagination, which is narrated as the truth, is a reflection of the State‘s construction of 
the discourse of national unity.  
In the text, in which the relationship between national culture and language is 
defined as vital rather than important, mass media is singled out as one of the main 
responsible fields of action for the dangerous course: 
―Main function of mass media instruments is to contribute to the cultural 
development by educating the public. In this respect, one of their important 
responsibilities is to support the education of mother language. 
Nevertheless, the opposite is what is happening today.  
In our country, especially in the last years we observe that a high amount 
of language pollution is taking place in the mass media. Pollution in 
language has been accelerated as private radio and television channels 
became available.  
It is clear that in the process of polluting and corrupting our Turkish, 
computers, and consequential mass usage of internet has a great impact…  
Regarding all these, mass media instruments should be sensitive and 
conscious about the correct and beautiful usage of our Turkish…‖ (Aslan, 
2005, p. 287) 
This conclusive declaration follows the course of a mentality that maintains that 
the mass media must have ideological missions. It is evident that the authors of the 
statement are quite worried about the disappearance of this mission; however, they seem 
to neglect questioning the economical and political background of the current situation. 
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Mass media is considered apart from consumption economies and its corporate 
institutions, and addressed as such. 
The invitation made by the declaration could be described as a call for 
―awakening‖, or ―returning back to the essence‖; for being conscious about ―the right 
and beautiful usage‖ of Turkish of ―all of us‖.  
In this understanding of the nation as an organic unity, as exemplified with the 
emphasis on the ―education of mother language‖, the truth that there are mother 
languages other than Turkish in Turkey is obscured. Thus, Turkish is considered as not 
only an important but also the vital ―condition‖ of national culture. Turkish is taken as 
granted as the universal constant in the linguistic universe of the country. Both the 
substance of the nation and the main source underneath is Turkified. The discourse of 
Turkification is correspondingly a warning to those who use foreign words:  
―There is a truth that must be recognized; what lies beneath the affection 
for using foreign words, observed in some intellectuals, scientists and 
politicians, is the corruption of the identity – based on the diversion from 
one‘s own culture and the underestimation of one‘s own values‖ (Aslan, 
2005, p. 288). 
The text, which argues that the corruption of language is a reflection of the 
corruption of identity (and therefore of the essence, as well), is yet another evidence of 
how language is taken as a domain of identity politics, as Öncü underlines (2000, p. 
288), rather than mere system of signs and meanings. 
The statement, furthermore, locates two frequently pronounced sources of the 
pollution of language, one an external one, and the other an internal one. Using the 
―incorrect usages of the language‖ as a base, it targets at the ―affection for foreign 
languages‖. In this way, the text reproduces the cliché of ―external and internal 
enemies‖, and yet with its cultural proof. In parallel, those who are using the language 
in a wrong way or with borrowed words and idioms from foreign languages are blamed 
for a wide spectrum of guilt, from ignorance (KayıĢ, 2000), to indulgence and alienation 
(Sezgin, 2004, p. 105). 
The notion of ―pollution‖ is significant in anthropological terms. It contains both 
the denial of cleanliness, purity, refinement, or being sterile, and it distinguishes the 
inside from the outside, the healthy from the sick, the local from the foreign, the 
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original or authentic from the hybrid. The translation of a linguistic process as 
―pollution‖ should be perceived as the ideological outcomes of the modernist paradigms 
and practices, within which language is constructed and processed as the definition of 
the boundaries of the national culture and the national identity. Accordingly, in the 
background of the discourse of language pollution, it is likely to discover the 
ideological processes of the republican and nationalist discourses, which enables the 
production of the terminology of pollution.  
To summarize, the objections about the corruption of Turkish are concentrated on 
the anxiety of that the national identity is becoming indistinct due to the weakening of 
the mother language. Worth to note once more, those who are involved in language 
debates mostly refer to Turkish as the sole mother language in Turkey. This is more 
than a slip of the tongue but the result of the selective nationalist way of seeing.  
As if, not all the problems of the ―high‖, standard Turkish concerning its corpus 
and status were enough, the minority languages have joined English and the colloquial, 
slang and rude varieties of the language in ―troubling‖ the Turkish language. 
6.3 Broadcasting and Minority Languages  
It is reviewed above how public broadcasting activates more efficient channels of 
ideological indoctrination that further empower the state and how it is established as 
another apparatus of ideological hegemony. However, an official broadcasting policy is 
applied over a territory, which almost always contains more than one linguistic 
community. The problem of establishment, or consolidation, of a broadcasting language 
regime in multilingual conditions is further complicated by possible histories of 
colonization.  
The advancements in the technology of airing and of reception broadcasts have 
seemingly worked against the nation-state, its discourses and practices. Hobsbawm sees 
broadcasting as both a threat and an opportunity for the minority languages: 
―The first development is basically the effect of film and television and, 
above all, the small portable radio. It means that spoken vernacular 
languages are no longer only face-to-face, domestic, or restricted idioms. 
194 
 
Illiterates are, therefore, directly within the reach of the wider world and 
wider culture. (1996, pp. 1073-4) 
He acknowledges the expansion of the audio-visual action beyond immediate 
relationships as a result of the spread of broadcasting, and how it fits well with the 
purposes of the modern forms of power. He underlines the improved possibility of 
linguistic assimilation of a tongue, minor in power, that could be triggered by its 
confrontation with some bigger language. On the other hand, Hobsbawm considers that 
broadcasting could also be an instrument of resistance. 
―This may also mean that small languages and dialects can survive more 
easily, insofar as even a modest population is enough to justify a local radio 
program. Minority languages, thus, can be cheaply provided for.‖ (p. 1074) 
Similarly, Eisenlohr sees the dual face of the effects of broadcasting on minority 
languages. He is, too, attentive to that language shift away from less powerful languages 
is conditioned by the radio and television broadcasting in dominant languages: 
―Pessimistic perspectives on the relationship between the reproduction of 
linguistic diversity and electronic mass mediation have even culminated in 
assessments such as those describing the impact of electronic media on the 
maintenance of lesser-used languages as "cultural nerve gas". Activists have 
expressed similar views: A production coordinator of the Canadian Inuit 
Broadcasting Corporation likens the effects of mainstream television to 
those of a neutron bomb.‖ (Eisenlohr, 2004, p. 23) 
However, he reminds, that in recent works on minority language broadcasting it is 
stressed that electronic mediation is helpful in the maintenance and renewal of such 
languages:  
―A central concern of the use of lesser-used languages in electronic 
mediation is not only encouraging language maintenance and revitalization 
by providing speakers with opportunities to hear and maintain skills in the 
language, but also is achieving a transformation of ideological valuations of 
the language so that the lesser-used language is viewed as part of the 
contemporary world and as relevant for the future of a particular group‖ 
(Eisenlohr, 2004, p. 24). 
Before presenting the details on the subversion of the republican only-Turkish 
regime of language by the political claims of the minorities over their linguistic cultural 
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expressions, a brief review of the various cases in other countries would enable us to 
contextualize the local developments in Turkey. 
6.3.1 International cases of the relationship between language and broadcasting 
Every broadcasting policy prioritizes some languages or one of them over others. 
The time allocation of different languages in the radio or television programs is almost 
never free of the language ideologies that are in effect in a particular linguistic regime. 
In this short review section, examples from major areas of linguistic conflicts of the 
world are presented. 
In post-colonial settings, in Africa for example, the language policy of 
broadcasting is an intricate issue as the states have to deal with both the colonial 
languages such as English, French and Flemish and also with the languages of native 
populations. There is a push for the recognition of local languages in mass media 
whether they are official minorities or not. The demand from below coincides with the 
global demand of international communications thru English and the traditional usages 
of colonial languages as a ―neutral‖ unifying element to keep away the debates on the 
inequalities concerning the treatment of local languages, thus local communities.
190
  
In Algeria for example, where the linguistic regime excluded minority languages 
for a long time, recently there is an increasing articulation of ―other tongues‖ into the 
public space, thanks to the possibilities enabled by technology: 
―As for the audiovisual media in Berber, the ENTV began to diffuse two 
daily news bulletins in Tamazight by the end of 1991. At present, there is a 
daily 15 minute news bulletin. A TV channel completely devoted to Berber 
language and culture has been on the drawing board for quite some time. 
Since 2001, a Berber satellite TV station called Berbère Télévision, based in 
Paris, has been broadcasting programmes entirely in Tamazight. Such a 
crucial space has been enhanced in recent years by a proliferation of Internet 
sites and e-mail networks‖ (Benrabah, 2005, p. 459). 
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 See Kamwangamalu (2001), Louw (2004) and Giliomee (2004) for studies on 
the situation of Afrikaans with respect to English in South Africa and Namibia. For an 
analysis on the relationship between English and local languages, see Kamwendo and 
Mooko (2006). 
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In Spain, where the ethnic politics of Basque and Catalan identities have a long 
history as opposed to the centralized hegemony of Castilian, the autonomous regions 
already implemented their own language-protection policies. The Catalan regional 
government, for example, enacted Llei de Política Lingüística in 1998 (Atkinson & 
Kelly-Holmes, 2006, p. 242). With respect to broadcasting, the situation is also 
explicitly favoring Catalan: 
―However, in the case of the media such legislation tends to focus on 
outlets owned or licensed by the Catalan government. The private media, 
i.e. the bulk of the sector, have been left largely to their own devices. 
Catalan does have a strong presence in the broadcast media in Catalonia but 
in the case of television this is mainly due to the presence of two public 
channels which broadcast entirely in Catalan (TV3 and Canal 33), and as far 
as radio is concerned the station with the highest audience figures is the 
Catalan-medium Catalunya Ràdio‖ (ibid.) 
The republican tradition of France has been resisting for a long time against the 
demands for cultural rights for minorities. An iconic law, which aimed at the protection 
of French against foreign linguistic invasion, of English in particular, was issued in 
1994. The second article of the regulation, known as the Toubon Law, ruled that: 
―The use of French shall be mandatory for the designation, offer, 
presentation, instructions for use, and description of the scope and 
conditions of a warranty of goods, products and services, as well as bills and 
receipts. The same provisions apply to any written, spoken, radio and 
television advertisement. The provisions of the present article shall not 
apply to the names of typical products and specialities of foreign origin 
known to the general public‖ (Wise, 2006, pp. 206-207). 
Television and radio broadcasting are, with the enactment of the Toubon Law, are 
linguistically protected in favor of French. 
In the post-Soviet Republics, which became a major area of research in language 
politics recently, new linguistic regimes are being built after the declarations of 
independence. Here, the situation is similar to that of post-colonial contexts. Each new 
independent republic officialized their own national language. As reviewed in the 
Chapter 2, Russian, which has long been established as the language of politics, culture 
and education in the Soviet era, was demoted in most of the new states, despite the fact 
that there are considerable numbers of Russian and other minorities.  
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In Latvia, for example, the complicated picture of linguistic situation is also 
reflected in the political domain and is evident in the broadcasting policies. The Latvian 
Radio and Television Law, issued in 1995, restricted the use of languages other than 
Latvian in commercial broadcasts to a maximum of 25 percent of broadcasting time: 
However, in 2003, the process of EU membership resulted in a renewed conception of 
freedom and rights in the field of broadcasting: 
―The Latvian Constitutional Court ruled that the law violated freedom of 
speech and struck down these clauses in the law aimed at restricting 
broadcasts in Russian by a 5–2 vote. The chief judge remarked ‗It is clearly 
a violation of freedom of speech and freedom of information and would not 
hold up under international law‘‖ (Schmid, Zepa, & Snipe, 2004, p. 244) 
What Latvia experiences is quite similar to the adventure of minority language 
broadcasting in Turkey, as it will be presented below. In Turkey, too, the objective of 
EU membership necessitated considerable legal re-arrangements, which would not be 
realized otherwise.  
There are also cases, which are similar to the traditional devaluation of Kurdish in 
Turkey. Ironically, an exemplary case is from China‘s problem with the Uyghur 
minority. It is ironic in the sense that, Uyghurs and the political controversies on their 
situations are a significant subject matter of the Turkist groups in Turkey. The attitude 
against Uyghur language in Chine is comparable to the attitude against Kurdish in 
Turkey. Dwyer explains: 
―The official promotion of Chinese stems from the assumption that 
Uyghur is not as useful as Chinese (the latter being a ―quality‖ language). 
Uyghur is seen as backward. The central government‘s push to ―Develop 
the West‖ should begin, in the view of one official in the Xinjiang Chinese 
standardizedtesting HSK office, ―with a change in the language of 
instruction‖. Furthermore, during an interview on the western channel of the 
Chinese Central Television (CCTV), ―the CPC [Party] secretary of the 
Xinjiang UAR, Wang Lequan, state[d] that minority languages in Xinjiang 
contain only limited amounts of information, and cannot express some more 
advanced knowledge‖ (Dwyer, 2005, p. 37) 
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The Communist Party of China attempts to legitimize the exclusion of Uyghur as 
a part of the Chinese language regime by framing the issue within modernity.
191
 The 
discursive byproduct of the framework of modernity with respect to the issue of 
language is the creation of a hierarchy of languages, within which the Chinese is located 
on top, and unsurprisingly, the Uyghur language is way down below. Surely, the 
similarity between Turkey and China in cases of Kurdish and Uyghur is more related to 
the modernist and positivist ideologies that have been very much in the constitution of 
the political cultures of these two countries. In both countries, the state is far from only 
operating with a regulative function, but more importantly, it has assigned itself a 
mission of modernization of the ―non-modern‖ society. The ideology of 
modernizationism conditions the ways in which the communal identity, its language and 
their relationship with other ―subversive‖ sub-national identities and languages are 
conceptualized. The vaulational function of broadcasting institutions, as introduced 
with referring to Spitulnik above, necessitates discursive processes of legitimization of 
the ways in which official and other languages are dealt with, which are in turn 
conditioned by the modernist categorizations of languages. 
The prioritization of the official form of a language through broadcasting is a 
common development in other countries as well. The Japan Broadcasting Corporation 
(NHK) has a specific role in the domination of the ―proper‖ forms of Japanese: 
―…the most influential organization in spreading the spoken form was 
NHK through radio and, later, television. NHK is a public broadcasting 
organization but not a state organ; it places considerable importance on its 
role as a modeler of correct language, issuing pronunciation dictionaries and 
other language-related publications and from time to time conducting 
surveys on aspects of language. The advent of national broadcasting in the 
1920s presented a fortuitous opportunity to model the recently adopted 
standard in spoken form for listeners throughout Japan‖ (Gottlieb, 2005, p. 
9). 
However, the relationship of broadcasting and languages are not always that of 
assimilation or ethnicization. The European Union stands for an ambitious project of the 
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 Such a perspective was exemplified, as noted above in the fifth chapter, by 
Bedrettin Dalan when he declared that Kurdish could hardly be named as a language as 
it lacks certain linguistics standards. 
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expanding rights of non-official languages. The Union is sensitive in favor of the civic 
participation and to the circulation of information in languages of the members.  
―[T]he 1985 ADONNINO Report drew up specific proposals for creating 
a European identity of citizens of the Member States. The majority of these 
proposals have been realized. One proposal related to the creation of a 
‗European audiovisual area‘, and specifically a multilingual European 
television channel, with the aim of informing the citizens abobut European 
issues‖ (Magyar, 2006, p. 20). 
Surely, there are many complaints about the huge bureaucratic structure of the 
European Union, and about how its policy of language equality constitutes a heavy 
burden on the efficient working of the offices, as noted in the second chapter. However, 
at least formally, the Union has legalized many regulations in order to prevent the 
extinction of minority languages in the face of their dominance by the official 
languages, and also in order to refrain from facilitating a hierarchy among the languages 
of its member states. 
6.3.2 Broadcasting in Minority Languages in Turkey 
For the last two decades, Turkey has experienced further challenges to the 
language regimes. The influx of English in various domains and ―suffocating‖ pressure 
generated by the ―incorrect‖ form of speaking and writing of Turkish already triggered a 
reaction of anxiety in losing the integrity and the prestige of the language. By the 1990s, 
the rising Kurdish movements, which have had repercussions beyond the armed war 
that PKK waged against Turkey, emerged as another ―trouble‖ for the assumed 
hegemony of Turkish. Although the commercialization and privatization of the mass 
media created a potential for enhancements in broadcasting in minority language, the 
laws were not in favor of such an opening. However, the context has had an 
international dimension: the process of membership to the European Union, which 
compelled Turkey to reconsider its policies concerning her minorities and their cultural 
rights. The state, in spite of its reluctance, opened a limited space for the minority 
languages within the broadcasting system. Since 2002, when Turkey had to make 
compulsory changes in its laws in accord with aimed progress in the EU negotiations 
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for membership, the use of languages other than Turkish in broadcasts has become 
another major point of conflict. This section presents a detailed analysis of the 
emergence of broadcasting in minority languages in Turkey by a presentation of the 
history of relevant legal regulations, accompanied with the debates it generated in the 
public arena. 
 
Legalism has habitually saved the authorities of the Turkish state from dealing 
with emerging social and political problems. The logic of the laws and interpretations of 
legal texts have always served against the demands from below. This is the case with 
the issue of minorities in Turkey, as well. Although there are more cultural and 
linguistic varieties in Turkey, only three of them have been recognized as minorities. 
According to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, which has always been considered as the 
founding contract of the Republic of Turkey, Jews, Orthodox Greeks and Armenians are 
considered as minorities bestowed with various rights. The history of minorities, official 
or not, in the republican era has been one of misery, and in turn, the post-1980s have 
witnessed a hard time for the governments of Turkey for their treatment to the non-
Turks. Kurds have been a special constituent of these minorities both for their 
considerable confrontation to the policies of nationalization and for what their 
discontent has resulted within the last 30 years. After PKK has launched its attacks 
against Turkey in 1984, the issues related to Kurdishness were assembled under the 
title, ―Kurdish problem‖. The growing global concern for the rights of minorities also 
brought Kurds under focus as an international issue. The way that Turkish official 
ideology has devised to deal with the demands of Kurds and the international concern, 
has been to present these demands as legally irrelevant. Kurds were not among the 
officially recognized minorities. Although it has regularly failed to fulfill the rights of 
non-Muslim official minorities as was laid in the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey has stuck to 
the Treaty firmly in order not to expand the rights for other minorities. Turkey, with 
very same motives, has consented only partially with some of the basic treaties of the 
European Union (with which Turkey is within the negotiation period for full 
membership), Council of Europe (of which Turkey is a member) and the United Nations 
(of which Turkey is a founding member), and has disagreed to participate at all with 
some others.  
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However, there have been disagreements with Turkey‘s official position with 
respect to her denial of non-official minorities based on the 1923 Treaty. The opponents 
argue that Turkey in fact violates the Treaty as it had already assigned many of the civic 
rights to every citizen that are asked for by other minorities. Article 39 of the Lausanne 
Treaty entitles all the citizens of the Republic of Turkey with rights to use their 
languages in every sphere, except official transactions (while the law courts had to 
provide translators if needed). Accordingly, Baskın Oran, for example, maintains that 
the impediments on the use of, Kurdish for example, in press, meetings, and 
broadcasting are violations of the Treaty (Oran, 2004). 
Questions concerning minorities took precedence among other issues especially as 
the ―low-density war‖ in the southeast of the country has evolved after 1984. The 
mindset of the Kemalist ideology, which presupposed an indivisible unity and the 
integrity of the Turkish nation with its state and its country, has been experiencing a 
distressing confrontation since then, with the reality that there are indeed linguistic and 
cultural differences within the population. The Kurdish movement has been accused of 
being divisive, if not as terrorism, and as a betrayal by the State and Turkish nationalist 
groups. It was on the other hand celebrated by its supporters as a struggle of cultural and 
national rights. The movement with all its different components, as most ethnic/national 
movements did, established the Kurdish language as one of the most significant political 
battlefields.  
Until the 1990s, Kurdish language had been reacted by paradoxical positions of 
the Turkish State and the nationalist intellectuals. On the one hand, its existence was 
denied all together in parallel the denial of the Kurds ―as a nation‖. On the other hand, 
there had been various attempts to absorb Kurdish into Turkish with respect to its 
linguistic origins. In the end, with the unexpected developments – unexpected in terms 
of its pace and decision-makers, of the legal reforms aimed at European Union (EU) 
membership, Kurdish has been officially considered as one of the ―different languages 
and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives‖. The 
repercussions of the invention of a new linguistic category such as this one have been 
discussed above, in Chapter 4. The avoidance of using the words such as Kurds and 
Kurdish in legal texts is a byproduct of a tradition of court discourse. For decades, many 
people have been sentenced for ―claiming that there is a separate Kurdish minority‖ or 
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for ―their intentions to create minorities within the unity of the Turkish nation‖. Any 
reference to Kurdishness has been, therefore, punished immediately.
192
  
The linguistic diversity within Kurdish, on the other hand was an aspect that 
empowered the official discourse on Kurdishness. Within the nationalist discourse, 
which equaled a language with a nation, Kurdish language defines the Kurdish nation. 
Hence, as noted above, the dialectical diversity in Kurdish has been exploited to the 
point of claiming that there is no language as Kurdish at all. In 1999, a small crisis 
emerged in the National Assembly, when it was discovered that some deputies declared 
that they knew Kurdish as a foreign language in the forms they filled in for the 
Assembly documentation. The crisis was resolved by the statement of the President of 
the Assembly that they would not allow deputies to register Kurdish as a foreign 
language, because Kurdish was a dialect, not a language.
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After the delivery of the leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan to Turkey by the US 
forces in 1999, he was trialed and sentenced to death. For a few years during and after 
the trial, his demands from Turkey for the resolution of the Kurdish issue became 
considerably moderate. Previously seeking national Kurdish independence with a 
socialist revolution and then a federative political structure with an autonomous Kurdish 
region, Öcalan now put forward demands concerning cultural rights, such as freedoms 
in using Kurdish language, in education in Kurdish. Broadcasting in Kurdish in radios 
and televisions were among those cultural rights. However, the Turkish political 
reaction was to reject any ideas of the expansion of freedoms with respect to 
Kurdishness, on the base that these were the outcomes of the new strategies of PKK. 
The organization was claimed to shift the battleground from the armed struggle of the 
guerrillas in the mountains to the legal spheres of political and cultural rights. The calls 
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 See, three exemplary decisions of the Supreme Court that ruled for the banning 
of three political parties: Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi (ÖZDEP, Freedom and 
Democracy Party) in 1993 with Decree No: 1993/2; Sosyalist Türkiye Partisi (STP, 
Socialist Turkey Party) in 1993 with Decree No: 1993/3 and Demokrasi Partisi (DEP, 
Democracy Party) in 1993 with Decree No: 1994/2. All three parties were found guilty, 
among others, for violating the relevant clauses of the Political Parties Law (see above) 
that prohibits propagandizing the existence of other peoples and nations in Turkey, 
other than Turks. (Retrieved on November 10, 2007 from http://www.anayasa.gov.tr). 
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for cultural rights were deliberately squeezed into the category of ―terrorist 
organization‘s demands‖. They were thus illegitimized and pushed out of discussion. 
The changes in the strategies of PKK coincided with the new developments in the 
relationship between the EU and Turkey. After 1999, when the European Council 
accepted Turkey as a candidate to membership, the Turkish governments issued various 
sets of legal adjustments in order to match up with the EU regulations. The EU has been 
severely criticizing Turkey for its violations of human rights and the suppression of 
cultural rights of its minorities. Therefore, the EU has usually been assessed in Turkey 
with respect to the former‘s involvement into the Kurdish issue.  
The major theme of the discourse, which was developed against the demands of 
education and broadcasting in Kurdish, is that granting these rights would endanger the 
unity and the integrity of the nation, or the country.  
In 1999, Enis Öksüz, a minister from MHP opposed the idea that Kurds should be 
granted their linguistic rights: 
―A nation has only one official language. There is no nation with two 
official languages. In the definition of unitary states, there is space for only 
one language. The people, who we call as Kurds, are our own people. Our 
own people, in every sense; our brothers… We shall resolve our issues with 
our brothers, in the family. If we have any problem, we shall settle down to 
discuss it. Therefore, it is our family matter. It is wrong to search a solution 
with other people abroad. You shall put aside history, sociological 
phenomena, cultural facts, and pump tribalizaton instead of nationalization 
Then you shall declare that there are problems among the people. These are 
wrong dealings.‖ (my translation, ―MHP‘de Kürtçe Sıkıntısı‖, Evrensel, 
December 15 (1999)). 
As a typical statement of the nationalist conceptualization of identity and 
language, Öksüz‘s declaration indicates some of the basic elements of the official 
anxiety. The apparent paternalism in the speech is evident in the patronizing discourse 
of Turkish nationalists against Kurds. The notion of brotherhood mostly requires to the 
obedience of the younger brother. The organic definition of the nation relatedly 
compares the community of citizens to a family, of which father – the state – has the 
word to say. A pattern of reference to the Kurdish social organization as tribalism is 
clear in the statement, as well. The state already signaled that it would attempt to 
204 
 
respond the demands of cultural rights without ever altering the main tenets of its 
discourse against Kurds.  
Another MHP deputy, of Bitlis in the Kurdish region, made the case clearer: 
―There is no language as Kurdish, among the languages of the world. 
What counts as important for us is the integrity. Anyone can use whatever 
mother language he has, but asking for a Kurdish television shows Kurds as 
if they are a minority. I do not think it is right to broadcast in Kurdish. In 
anyway, the people of the region do not need anything like that.‖ (my 
translation, ―Kürtçe televizyon hakkında siyasilerin yorumları‖, Zaman, 
November 16 (2000)) 
Towards the end of 2000, the debates on possible regulations to be enacted with 
respect to the harmonization program with the EU fused intense debates. The EU 
demanded TV broadcasts in local languages to be allowed, in the Document for 
Partnership (Katılım Ortaklığı Belgesi).The adjustment program that the EU offered has 
been accordingly reacted by many as an intrusion to home affairs or as ―the well-known 
games played by the external enemies‖. 
The General Staff also declared their own unapproving ideas on the issue. The 
conceptualization of the demands of cultural rights by this most powerful institution of 
the state clearly has conditioned other discourses on such themes: 
―They are trying to create a political separatist movement based on ethnic 
nationalism. Slogans of ethnic identity, education and broadcasting in 
mother language, and the empowerment of local governments are the 
themes utilized by PKK for persuasion in the activities of political 
separatism. A new technique of struggles has to be developed against the 
new strategies of PKK‘s attempt to legitimize its politics.‖ (my translation, 
―Kürtçe TV PKK oyunu‖, Hürriyet, December 8 (2000). 
The Army, as always, evaluated the issue within its framework of struggle against 
terrorism, rather than with respect to rights and freedoms. The profound refusal of the 
Army of any demands concerning the minority rights is in fact discursively based on the 
notion of ―national security‖ and ―the mission of the military forces to protect the 
political regime and the national unity‖. 
There were representatives from the other end, who were positive on issue, as 
well, especially among the deputies from the Kurdish regions. They were mostly the 
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members of the political parties such as ANAP and, FP (Fazilet Partisi of the time, 
which would split into two as SP, Saadet Partisi and AKP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi 
in 2002). Many of them favored a controlled freedom of broadcasting in Kurdish, and 
stated that use of the mother language is one of the basic human rights. Salih Yıldırım, 
for example, the deputy from ġırnak of southeast Turkey with a highly Kurdish 
population, underlined that, 
―In the region, more than 75 percent of the people can access to Kurdish 
television channels with satellite antennas. The state should broadcast in 
Kurdish in order to reverse the influences of the terrorist organization‘s 
[PKK‘s] propaganda through broadcasting. In addition, the refusal of 
Kurdish as a language is not right. There is a Kurdish that every Kurd can 
understand. Moreover, there are many people in the region who do not 
know Turkish.‖ (my translation, ―Kürtçe televizyon hakkında siyasilerin 
yorumları‖, Zaman, November 16 (2000)) 
It was true that there were many Kurdish channels, which could be accessed by 
satellite technologies. They were aired from Northern Iraq,  from Yerevan, Armenia and 
from Europe.
194
  
The Kurdish diaspora in Europe has been particularly engaged in the Kurdish 
movement in Turkey. MED TV, for example, was launched in 1995. Turkey fought a 
relentless struggle against MED TV and asked many times to close it down from the 
countries, where the channel was operated.
195
 Recently, a similar crisis has emerged 
because of Roj TV, a television channel that is run by PKK and broadcasts from Europe 
via satellite (Romano, 2006, pp. 153-159). 
While the debates concentrated on the issue of whether the state could broadcast 
in Kurdish, Eser KarakaĢ, a scholar, reminded that the EU was not asking for positive 
actions on minority language rights: 
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 In connection, Hassanpour reports that Iran and Iraq have allowed state 
broadcasting, both radio (since the 1950s) and television (since the 1970s), in Kurdish: 
―This policy aimed at neutralising foreign and clandestine broadcasting targeted at the 
Kurds‖ (1995). 
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 See Hassanpour for an in-depth analysis of the contribution of MED TV as a 
language academy for the Kurdish language and for the history of protests against it by 
Turkey (1995). 
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―What is being debated is the broadcasting in Kurdish by the state. Why 
should a state get involved in such a business? The state has to refrain from 
intervening to those who want to make Kurdish broadcasting. The states 
have a distinction between positive and negative action. The European 
Union is not asking for a positive action. It does not say to do something. It 
just says not to do some things. The EU never tells the Turkish state to 
broadcast in Kurdish.‖ (my translation, ―Eser KarakaĢ ile röportaj‖, Zaman, 
November 19 (2000)). 
KarakaĢ‘s remarks are important in that it discloses the way the relationship 
between the state and society has been formulated. The state‘s impulse to govern the 
society ended up controlling and disciplining every field of action. Consequently, if it 
was such a need then it was the state that would do it.  
Among these debates, RTÜK became more sensitive to the use of Kurdish in 
radio broadcasting. In 2001, many radio stations were either warned or closed for 
periods up to one year for broadcasting Kurdish songs.
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 For example, charging with 
the violation of the Article 4/t of the Law 3984 by playing Kurdish songs, RTÜK 
stopped the broadcasting of Batman FM for 90 days and Radyo Ses of Mersin for one 
week.
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 Before 2002, the Law No. 3984 aroused further legal controversies. There are 
reports that although the legal consultants of the RTÜK declared that there is no legal 
impediment against playing Kurdish music, the Institution held it tight and gave 
warnings to the local radio and TV channels who broadcasted music in Kurdish. A 
similar legal assessment was made by Council of State, which decreed, in a case of a 
local TV program in which there were some Kurdish interviews that the short 
interviews in Kurdish do not violate the principle of broadcasting in Turkish, as the 
studio language was Turkish.
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 The following information of RTÜK decisions have been compiled from the 
web site of the Council, located at http://www.rtuk.gov.tr and from the annual reports of 
BĠA (Bağımsız İletişim Ağı, a news network for monitoring and covering media 
freedom and independent journalism), published at http://www.bianet.org.  
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 Article 4/t regulated the broadcasting languages and allowed the use of Turkish 
and those languages that ―contribute to the formation of scientific and cultural works of 
universal value‖. See above for a detailed discussion on the Law. 
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 ―Kürtçe Esnekliği‖, Zaman, December 4 (2000). RTÜK has also intervened in 
the usages of Turkish. For an analysis of RTÜK decisions and penalties concerning the 
―improper‖ uses of Turkey, see Balçık (2006, pp. 114-115). 
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The first major ―democracy package‖ within the framework of harmonization 
program was decreed in 2001 (the Law no. 4709, of which details were given above). 
The law eliminated the clauses in the Constitution, which banned the usages of 
―languages that were forbidden by law‖. This modification was conceived by many 
opponents as a freedom to Kurdish, or as a misleading step of the state for soothing the 
EU‘s and Kurds‘ demands for cultural rights by others. 
The legal arrangements concerning the use of languages in broadcasting came in 
2002. The Law Amending Various Laws, no. 4771, was issued on August 3, 2002, Its 
Article 8, allowed broadcasting in non-official languages by adding the following clause 
to the Law 3984: 
―Furthermore, there may be broadcasts in the different languages and 
dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives. Such 
broadcasts should not contradict the fundamental principles of the Turkish 
Republic enshrined in the Constitution and the indivisible integrity of the 
state with its territory and nation. The principles and procedures for these 
broadcasts and the supervision of these broadcasts shall be determined 
through a regulation to be issued by the Supreme Board.‖ (translation in 
Eraydın-Virtanen, 2003b, p. 36):  
By this change, for the first time and although accompanied with cliché warnings, 
the fact that there are different languages used by the citizens of the Republic of Turkey 
was formally acknowledged. From then on, the definition ―different languages and 
dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives‖ was going to be used 
in many regulations. The law enacted in September 2002, which regulated the private 
courses for teaching minority languages, was also titled using the same expression: 
―Türk Vatandaşlarının Günlük Yaşamlarında Geleneksel Olarak Kullandıkları Farklı 
Dil ve Lehçelerin Öğrenilmesi Hakkında Yönetmelik‖ (The By-law on the Learning of 
Languages and Dialects Used Traditionally by Turkish Citizens in Their Daily Lives). 
The laws concerning the minority languages were evident derivatives of the confusion – 
one that has been productively exploited by the state – of simultaneously refusing 
Kurdish as a language, and trying to forbid or regulate its usage. 
The Supreme Board completed its works in an atmosphere of dense contestations, 
and launched the regulation mentioned in the Law no. 4771, and it published in the 
official gazette on December 18, 2002. According to ―Radyo ve Televizyon Yayınlarının 
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Dili Hakkında Yönetmelik‖ (the Regulation on the Language of Radio and Television 
Broadcasts), TRT was entitled as the only authorized institution to broadcast in non-
Turkish languages. The programs could include news, culture and music. However, they 
would be made exclusively for adults and no broadcasts in order to teach these 
languages and dialects were allowed.  
The time allocations of the broadcasting and other regulations were also stated: 
―The duration of radio broadcasts in these languages and dialects shall 
not exceed 45 minutes per day and a total 4 hours per week. TV broadcasts 
shall not exceed 30 minutes per day and a total of 2 hours per week. TV 
broadcasts shall be accompanied by Turkish subtitles, which will fully 
correspond, to the broadcast in terms of timing and the content. As regards 
radio broadcasts, a Turkish translation will be broadcasted after the 
program.‖ (translation in Eraydın-Virtanen, 2003b, p. 38) 
Within several months, as a part of the sixth harmonization program, which was 
issued on July 15, 2003 as the Law no. 4928, the exclusive permission given to TRT for 
the broadcasts in other languages was expanded and the private channels were allowed, 
as well. 
In January 2004, the regulation on broadcasts in different languages was finalized 
with the by-law no. 25357, titled ―Türk Vatandaşlarının Günlük Yaşamlarında 
Geleneksel Olarak Kullandıkları Farklı Dil ve Lehçelerde Yapılacak Radyo ve 
Televizyon Yayınları Hakkında Yönetmelik‖ (the Regulation on the Radio and 
Television Broadcasts in the Languages and Dialects Used Traditionally by Turkish 
Citizens in their Daily Lives).
199
 Regulation, which was allowing very limited rights, 
specified the following principles in the fifth article:  
―The radio and television broadcasts in the languages and dialects used 
traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives are subject to permission 
of the Supreme Board.  
With these language and dialects, broadcasts can only be towards adults, 
and on music, news and for introduction of the traditional culture. 
No broadcasts are allowed for teaching of these language and dialects. 
Institutions that are licensed as public and private are allowed to 
broadcast in these languages and dialects; in radios for five hours a week, 
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not to exceed 60 minutes a day, and for television, for four hours a week, 
not to exceed 45 minutes a day. 
The television stations are responsible for the one-to-one subtitling or 
broadcasting of the same programs with Turkish translation immediately 
afterwards; and radio stations are responsible for broadcasting of the same 
programs with Turkish translation immediately afterwards.‖ (my 
translation)  
Considering the corresponding rights of minority language broadcasting in other 
countries, the limitations are quite unsatisfactory. However, the Turkish case should be 
evaluated within its specific history of total banning of minority languages. 
One of the most striking concerns of the regulation was its preventing the teaching 
of languages and dialects, and programming for children. The idea behind that is to 
preclude the transmission of a language other than Turkish to the younger generations. 
In this sense, the state has been determined to keep those languages as folkloric themes 
and as ―traditional‖ tongues, which would never achieve the status of a well-established 
language. The state has apparently avoided from such an image of officially supporting 
the non-Turkish languages, or their unification and standardizaiton. This would be a 
critical rupture in the integrity of the discourse on the unity of the Turkish nation and 
the priority of Turkish language pertaining to it. While there are already four channels 
that are broadcasting in Kurdish (Kurdish Human Rights Project, 2005) that are 
available in Turkey via satellite recievers, this regulation should be assessed as the 
persistence of the state in controlling the cultural domain. 
Predictably, the bureaucratic process of application and permission for obtaining a 
license for broadcasting in languages other than Turkish was so complicated that as of 
2005, none of the 11 private stations that applied was apporved.
200
 In March 2006, 
RTÜK granted permission to Medya FM, a radio station in ġanlıurfa, and Gün TV and 
Söz TV, television channels in Diyarbakır.201 In March 2007, Çağrı FM, an Islamic 
radio station in Diyarbakır, too, was licensed for broadcasting in Kurmanji, and 
Zazaki.
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 ―RTÜK‘ten farklı dilde yayına izin‖, NTVMSNBC, March 26 (2006). 
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 ―Yerelde Kürtçe yayın çeĢitleniyor‖, Evrensel, June 12 (2007). 
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In June 2006, RTÜK expanded the time limits for music and movies, with the 
restriction of subtitles. The decision took the broadcasting of these programs as 
―cultural demands‖ and ruled that their broadcasting would not count for the 45 minute-
a-day limit.
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However, TRT started broadcasting in non-Turkish languages before, in June 
2004. Although TRT was authorized by RTÜK as the public station to broadcast, there 
were serious hesitations within the institution for starting the broadcasts. Their major 
excuse was the article in the Law of the TRT, which required the use of ―easily 
understandable, clear and beautiful Turkish‖. With the encouragement of the AKP 
government, on June 2004 towards the resolution of the problems, the first non-Turkish 
language was heard on public television. 
Before detailing these broadcasts, it is important to mention that there have been 
already broadcasts in languages other than Turkish in public and private channels. The 
titles of the laws and regulations concerning our subject matter might sound as if there 
has been no broadcasting other than Turkish; however, this is not true.  
It has been a long time that all sorts of programs are broadcasted in foreign 
languages in radios and TV channels. Especially English has virtually become the 
language of the international cultural products like hit songs, video clips, movies and 
TV series. TV programs are sometimes broadcasted with Turkish subtitles. CNBC-e, 
the commercial channel of the workday, in other times broadcasts movies and TV series 
in their original languages, and has its own audience with the knowledge of English 
enough to follow the programs, who does not want to compromise the originality of the 
shooting in favor of a possibly impoverishing Turkish dubbing.  
Apart from Turkish channels, the cable and satellite networks allow to watch 
virtually every TV channel in any language. The cable network, operated by the 
recently privatized Türk Telekom includes most known English-language news 
networks like BBC and CNN, and also other French, German, and Azeri channels. 
Satellite receivers enable access to hundreds of channels from all over the world. 
The controversy is not about broadcasting in non-Turkish languages in general, 
but it was specifically about broadcasting in the minority languages of Turkey. A legal 
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 ―Kürtçe yayında kültürel devrim‖, Radikal, June 11 (2006). 
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excuse of the ―difficulty‖ of broadcasting in local/native/Muslim minority languages 
was declared by the general manager of RTÜK: 
―The law considers English, French, Italian, German, and the like, as the 
languages that contribute to the universal science and culture. Kurdish is 
considered out of this framework [in the law]‖ (my emphasis, my 
translation, ―Dilde kapsama alanı!‖, Zaman, October 6 (2001)). 
Languages of the west, in this narrative, are representing the advanced and 
―universal‖ culture and science, whereas the languages of Turkey, except Turkish of 
course, are deemed as divisive, backward, and not contributing to the universal science 
and culture. Surely, there is a cleavage between the political reasons of banning Kurdish 
and the discursive excuses presented in case of need. 
The delicacy of the issue is a product of the ways in which the issue of minorities, 
other than the recognized non-Muslim communities, was dealt with. The peculiar ways 
of wording and practicing of minority language broadcasting should be assessed as the 
results of the stress of re-formulating the language regime. This stress guided the state 
for the formulation of an interesting classification of languages. As it was mentioned 
above, a similarly interesting invention was devised in 1983 when the Law no. 2932 
banned the languages other than the first official languages of the states that were 
recognized by Turkey. 
TRT broadcasting in minority languages included half-an-hour programs, titled as 
―Kültürel Zenginliğimiz‖ (Our Cultural Wealth) in the weekdays. The time allocation 
was arranged to broadcast in Bosnian on Mondays, Arabic on Tuesdays, Kurmanji on 
Wednesdays, Circassian on Thursdays and Zazaki on Fridays. The programs were 
broadcasted on TRT Radio 1 at 6.10 AM, and on TRT3 television at 10.30 AM with 
subtitles. 
The administrators at TRT did not bother to contact with the authorities of these 
languages, as no authority of these languages were considered to exist. To avoid any 
relationship with a possible representation of the speakers of these communities, as 
representable cultural units, TRT attempted to manage broadcasts by its own resources 
and in its own peculiar style. The state apparently had no intention to give away its urge 
to govern the cultural domain. It was important for the authorities, with a tradition of 
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discursive emphasis on the power and capability of the state, not to be seen as it had to 
accept the demands of Kurds and the EU. The broadcasts were indeed presented as the 
courtesy of a great state. 
On the opposite side, most of the speakers of these languages considered the 
broadcasts as linguistically poor and as a maneuver to escape the enforcements of the 
EU. The official broadcasting in minority languages, despite all its limitations has a 
symbolic meaning and power to re-constitute the discursive field of language politics. A 
closer look at results of the wave-effect that this symbolic change has triggered would 
be enlightening.  
The very names of the programs, Kültürel Zenginliğimiz, resonates what Spitulnik 
defines as ―the culturalization of ethnicity‖ (1998, p. 167). Starting with the definition 
of minority languages as ―traditional languages and dialects that are used in the daily 
life‖, the culturalization or folklorization of ethnicities excludes any political 
representation, which is in line with the republican tradition. Spitulnik describes the 
process as the diffusion of the political dimension (ibid.). A similar reaction came from 
the Kurdish Institute, of Istanbul, of which deputy executive criticized the broadcasts as 
the state aimed at to present Kurdish, therefore Kurds, as an ordinary cultural element. 
Easily recognized is the insistence of the state in not assigning a status of 
language to Kurdish. While the dialectical varieties in Arabic, Bosnian or Circassian 
have been overlooked, those of Kurdish were underlined. Kurdish was split into two of 
its main dialects. Linguistic realities aside, the state‘s position here is important. The 
state aims to maintain its symbolic power in registering its own linguistic 
categorization. Categorization of Circassian and Arabic as ―language‖s contrasts with 
classifying Kurdish out and presenting, instead, two ―distinct dialects‖. Being engaged 
in the business of broadcasting in ―traditional languages and dialects‖ the state has to 
make a categorization. In this one, the established discourse on the way of existence of 
Kurdish was reproduced. The state decides, and it is willing to determine, which tongue 
is a language, or dialect and which one is not. This is a solid evidence of the centrality 
of the state as an institution of power in creating categorical realities, as discussed with 
reference to Blommaert (2005a), in chapter of theoretical framework. 
Ece Temelkuran defines the situation as ―the normalization of Kurdish‖ (2004). 
The culturalization of Kurdish ethnicity is accompanied by the division of the language 
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division into two categories. In this way, Kurdishness is de-politicized via 
fragmentation and presented as a traditional/ethnographic color. The state hence 
continues to use its political power to exclude Kurds and Kurdishness out of the 
political domain.  
This ―cultural expression of the nation‘s wealth‖ was responded by widespread 
curiosity. Although they were very early in the morning, the first broadcasts were 
watched in crowded coffee houses and the clubs of the associations of various ethnic 
communities. 
Kurdish communities mostly considered the broadcasts as an important step, 
however found it quite unsatisfactory in time and in quality. Especially the language 
quality was found to be quite poor. The criticisms aimed at the non-usage of appropriate 
letters of Q, X and W in the subtitles, frequent uses of Turkish and Arabic words, and 
not mentioning about Kurds or Kurdishness in neither of the broadcasts in Kurmanji and 
Zazaki.
204
 
Other language groups, on the other hand, reacted in various ways. The most 
striking comment came from Bosnian speakers. Many members of Bosna Sancak Kültür 
ve Yardımlaşma Derneği (the Bosna Sancak Association of Culture and Solidarity) 
stated that they evaluate the broadcasts as unnecessary. Bosna-Hersek Dostları Vakfı 
(the Foundation of the Friends of Bosnia-Herzogevina) declared, ―We did not demand 
such a broadcast. We sadly observe that there are those who are after tearing Turkey 
apart and colonize each of its part, and that they are using us for their own games‖. The 
president of the Foundation made a written statement and rejected the minority status: 
―We are part of the Turkish nation, in belief and culture. We support with all our hearths 
the spirit and the understanding of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk‘s ‗Ne Mutlu Türküm 
diyene‟‖. Other organizations of the Bosnian and Balkan communities signed the 
statement, as well.
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Circassian communities welcomed the broadcasts. However, they were too 
uncomfortable to be evaluated in the same framework with the Kurdish movement. 
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Muhittin Ünal, the president of Kafkas Dernekleri Federasyonu (the Federation of 
Caucasian Associations) stated 
―Our demand is merely cultural. It is questioned whether our demands 
for education and broadcasting in Circassian would pose a threat to the 
unitarian regime of Turkey. Our demands are associated by others with the 
Kurdish movement. Circassians have no purposes. Our citizens with 
Caucasian origins did everything for the unity of our country. Our intention 
is to prevent the Circassians to forget their languages; they have already lost 
many of their cultural values.‖ (my translastion, ―Bugün Arapça yarın 
Kürtçe‖, Akşam, June 8 (2004)). 
Speakers of Arabic are also reported that they did not enjoy the broadcasts.  
―Citizens of Arab origins reacted against the broadcasts in mother 
languages, like some of the Bosnian associations. Arabs, living in Adana, 
stated that they could not understand the broadcast as its dialect was 
different. Citizens told that those with Arab origins had no demand of 
broadcasting in mother languages and considered them as ―separatism‖. 
Arabs said that only the older generations spoke Arabic among each other 
and that many of the younger ones do not know Arabic.‖ (my translation, 
―Araplar da lehçeyi beğenmedi‖, Akşam, June 9 (2004). 
In the same piece of news, only Arabs of Mardin were reported to welcome the 
broadcasts and that they were already watching Arabic stations of Syria, Iraq and 
Iran.
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On the side of the government, there was an apparent relaxation of getting rid of a 
heavy burden. However, MHP was quite angry about the developments. Devlet Bahçeli, 
the leader of the party, stated that the decision of broadcasting in Kurdish was in line 
with the determination of PKK to become legalized. He added that a Kurdish language 
is being created with the support of the state.
207
 The main opposition party, CHP reacted 
in a different point of view. Its leader, Deniz Baykal told, ―What has to be done is to 
leave this business to its owners. It is important to overcome the dogmas. However, it is 
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(―Ġlk yayın BoĢnaklar için‖, Birgün, June 9 (2004)). The objection of Laz speakers 
brought the way the languages of the broadcasts are chosen.  
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not right to maintain this school show. The state cannot spend its money for the needs of 
any ethnic group‖208  
It is easy to understand the reactions concerning the time of the broadcasts or their 
linguistic quality. However, it is worth to comment on the sensitivity of the associations 
and foundations, of which organization was based on an ethnic identity, on being a 
minority. 
One of the most remarkable points has been the strict refusal of a status of 
minority. Although in none of the official narratives induced by the law ―minorities‖ are 
referred to, especially the representatives of the Bosnian associations seemingly felt it 
necessary to underline that they are first-class citizens in Turkey. Their statements, 
ironically, discloses the discursive implications of the notion of minority in Turkey.  
The minorities of Turkey have a two basically different history. On the one hand, 
there have been officially recognized non-Muslim minorities. Being a minority, in the 
official discourse and in general public opinion meant to be a non-Muslim. This was 
also an ideological inheritance of the Ottoman Empire, of which political traditions 
recognized the non-Muslims as different and employed specific policies in their 
governance while considering Sunni Muslims as the ―first class‖ subjects (Mahçupyan, 
1998-1999). The republican popular culture, too, labeled them as others, or foreigners. 
However, in the republican decades, non-Muslims have been further excluded and many 
considered them as ungrateful traitors within us. This difference from the Ottoman 
period was derived from the widespread belief that the Empire was destroyed by the 
western imperialists with the help of non-Muslims and their ―poisonous nationalisms‖.  
The construction of the Turkish national identity, typically, comprised the 
construction of the ―other‖, both of the outside and of the inside. What the Bosnian 
associations testified was indeed true; minorities are considered as second-class citizens 
in Turkey. And this consideration is so powerful that it conditions the narratives of the 
linguistic minorities in Turkey in a way that they, in the end, refrain from demanding 
the protection and support of their mother languages.  
The non-Muslim minorities were on the agenda between 1960s and 1980s with 
respect to the mounting Greek nationalism in Cyprus, and the terror attacks of ASALA 
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(the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia). The Kurdish movement, 
which was on the rise in the 1970s, accompanied the resentment against non-Muslim in 
the revival of the notion of ―minorities as traitors‖. Kurdish problem was different in 
that religion, this time, was not the borderline between ―us‖ and ―them‖. Being a 
minority or an ethnic group, or expressing cultural difference, throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, was held equal to separatism and treason.  
Both ways of minority existence, either as officially recognized non-Muslims or 
as denied Muslims, and the official discourse and practice against them enhanced the 
idea of that being a minority is not, and could not, be particularly a good situation in 
Turkey. This idea has been consequentially internalized even by the citizens with 
distinctively different cultural origins. At this point, it is worth to remind that it is a 
frequently declared notion by both Kurdish and Turkish politicians that Kurds could not 
be considered as a minority in this country, since they are the among the constitutive 
building blocks of the Republic (Aydın, 2005).  
Political and cultural existence in Turkey is conceived to be possible and 
legitimate in so far as one stands close to the discursive center. As different cultural 
communities speaks the tone of the state on the issue of Kültürel Zenginliklerimiz, the 
weight of the state in the formation of the civil society becomes more evident. 
 
To conclude; this chapter presented a historical overview of the changes in 
broadcasting language policies in Turkey in the 1990s and later. The presentation has 
been supplemented with an analysis of language ideological fluctuations across the 
society. The dynamics that brought about the radical transformation in the domain of 
radio and TV broadcasting have been effective on the debates on language at different 
levels. Changes in the social structures of Turkey (i.e. urbanization and 
commercialization, etc.) and in the availability of technological novelties that enables 
the transcendence of audio-visual national boundaries (via satellite and digital networks) 
led the emergence of major challenges to the established language regime. Moreover, 
politicization of ethnic and cultural differences within the context of compelling 
international relations such as the negotiations for membership to the EU introduced 
serious threats to the assumed unity and homogeneity of the linguistic topography of the 
society. Three appeared major fields of language debates with respect to broadcasting 
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issues: the ―corruption‖ of Turkish by misusages, the intrusion of English and the 
status-related problems of the language with respect to the minority languages.  
Practical consequences of these complicated processes have been less intricate, at 
least for the time being. With respect to the mounting criticisms of distortion of the 
linguistic essence of Turkish and the ―invasion‖ of English structure, there are only 
some minor attempts from RTÜK – that are minor in comparison to the intensity of 
critiques. As reviewed above RTÜK has inconsistently warned or punished, from time 
to time, stations that were assessed to be using language in a pejorative way. Although 
there have been several attempts in the parliament to regulate the protection of Turkish, 
there is no   
With regard to broadcastings in minority languages, there have been regulations 
that granted very limited freedoms for the use of languages of the non-official 
minorities. Besides, using those freedoms necessitates a very difficult and time-
consuming bureaucratic application and approval processes.  
However, ideological consequences of those changes have been much more 
complex. In the first place, the state has apparently lost its hegemonic position in the 
matters of language use in the audio-visual media. Despite some attempts for linguistic 
control through RTÜK, the central authority of the state seems no longer as effective in 
determining the variety of Turkish to be transmitted in broadcasts as it was before the 
commercialization of radio and television. On the other hand, an extensive circle of 
critiques that severely disapprove of what they consider as ―linguistic corruption‖ has 
emerged. As noted above, criticisms on this problem are not reflected on the actual 
―malpractice‖ of language. There are not any evident developments in television or 
radio broadcastings with respect to their language use, except the beep over slang thanks 
to the fear of punishment by RTÜK. Similar to the fact that changes in broadcasting 
regimes of minority languages have been more subversive for the established language 
policies, the ideological confrontations on the issue have also been more acute. It could 
be assessed from the explorations of this chapter that the ideological consequences have 
emerged in two ways.  
On the one hand, the developments concerning Turkey‘s implementation of legal 
regulations in compliance with the EU membership caused the discourses on the rights 
and freedoms of language use to be formulated and to be expressed. For a long time, 
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there have been ideas of human and cultural rights, but they were rendered illegitimate 
within the hegemonic language regime. The EU process succeeded what civil and 
political enterprises in Turkey could not, and as a result, there emerged a multiplicity of 
the discursive multiplicity on the issue. On the other hand, this multiplicity and calls for 
a more liberal linguistic regime triggered nationalist sensitivities, as well. There has 
already been a mounting resentment against the Kurdish political demands and the 
international pressure concerning the denial of these demands. What could be evaluated 
as the republican lobby has also found the opportunity to consolidate their own 
discourses against any concession in favor of cultural difference. It is not that cultural 
difference is altogether denied, but the nationalist ideology denies any attempt to divert 
the Turkified representations of these differences. As exemplified with quotations from 
MHP deputies, this perspective usually acknowledges that there are Kurds, for example, 
and they speak a different language or dialect or tongue. However is refuses that the 
reality of linguistic difference is a sufficient condition for changing the regime of 
language, hence of citizenship. The patrimonial political tradition of the Republic 
strictly holds that the only legitimate way of political existence is Turkishness, or at 
least, not non-Turkishness. Such political demands are quickly drawn into a discursive 
context of independence and separation of the country, a context within which the 
nationalist ideology has better equipped for confrontations especially during the times 
when PKK intensifies its attacks. The emphasis on national independence also attracted 
support from so-called leftist politics that shifts the context of the problematic, this time, 
to the problematic of imperialism – a field that is much enhanced especially following 
the US invasion of Iraq.  
In short, although forces that push for changes in Turkish language regime 
provided a discursive space within which demands that are insubordinate to the 
hegemonic republican/nationalist could be expressed. However, against the ideological 
and institutional power of the latter, these demands proved ineffective, yet, to bring 
about substantial changes in the politics of language in Turkey.  
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CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSION 
 
The present chapter concludes the dissertation. As noted in the introductory 
chapter, this study has been designed in order to accomplish several objects. One major 
objective has been the explanation the current public debates on language. Such a 
discovery necessitates both a historical reading of ―language‖ in modern Turkey, and 
also an evaluation of the recent social, cultural and political transformation that set the 
―infrastructure‖ of these debates. It has been assessed that the notion of language regime 
would enable the best theoretical framework for this enterprise. The concept of 
language regime has been introduced in Chapter 2. Before, the notion was used by Pool 
and Laitin but their usages involved in their formulation particular limitations for a 
comprehensive political analysis. I sought to enhance the concept with particular 
approaches that have been developed by the literature on language ideology; Foucault‘s 
notion of power as a regime and Bourdieu‘s symbolic domination; with Blommaert‘s 
assertion of state‘s centrality in the formation and dissemination of linguistic orders, and 
Coulmas‘s focus on the changes in language policies in globalizing environments. It 
presumed that the furnished framework facilitated a wealthy analysis of both the history 
of Turkish language politics and their recent transformation.  
The analysis articulated in this dissertation, therefore, poses an important 
challenge to the mainstream ideology of language in Turkey. The conventional 
understanding of language presupposes that (Turkish) language is an objective reality 
that has its own existence and power, independent of its social and political context. 
Situated within the context of nationalist politics, language is often taken as a primary 
field over which national pride and loyalty are demonstrated. However, as the thesis 
concludes, it is not only that a particular language regime has been the resource of the 
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generalization of such an understanding, but also that the very concept of ―Turkish 
language‖ itself is a political and historical construction. This construction process 
involves the singularization and officialization of one particular linguistic variety (a 
choice that is conditioned socially and politically), a vigorous effort for the 
standardization of that variety, dissemination of the standard variety through domains 
such as education and mass communication. Conceptualized as a regime, language 
policies have been employed in order to secure the exclusiveness of the official 
language. These policies have deliberately excluded other varieties, tongues and 
languages as illegitimate ways of communication or expression of cultural identity.  
What this thesis challenges is not only the public opinion about language, but also 
some particular manifestations in the social scientific world. As noted in the 
introductory chapter, the republican language ideology haunts many social scientists 
who write on Turkey. They either recall Turkish when they are discussing the language-
planning situation in Turkey, without even referencing to Kurdish, which has been 
recently at the focal point of language planning. Even in critical studies, which try to 
uncover the political foundations of Republican language politics, an instrumental 
paradigm is dominant. Turkish is taken for granted, and analyses concentrate on the 
nationalist political impulses that instrumentalize language. However, as it was 
mentioned before and will be reviewed again in the present chapter, failing to spot the 
productive aspects of power inevitably brings about an uncompleted representation of 
the relationship between language and politics. In this sense, this thesis attempted to 
construe a more inclusive investigation that not only pays attention to how language has 
been constructed as a primary field of modernist and nationalist governmentality, but 
also to how exclusions and disseminations of  the linguistic ideology through the 
linguistic regime has generated linguistic subjectivities.  
In this conclusion chapter, I will first refer back to the theoretical chapter to 
explicate in what ways the employment of the framework of language regime has been 
effective in the analysis of politics of language in Turkey. Secondly, I will introduce 
some of the theoretical openings that are provoked by the implications of the theoretical 
framework that is based on the notion of language regime, and the questions developed 
in relation, with regard to the exploration of the Turkish language regimes.  
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To begin with, Pool‘s and Laitin‘s conceptions of a language regime provided 
formal classifications with which Turkish language regime could be reviewed.  
As the thesis has been formulated mainly as a history of ideologies, Pool‘s 
account of various norms that are involved in the construction of language regimes 
(1991, p. 497), discussed in Chapter 2, could be employed to further reveal the 
ideational basics of the Turkey's language regime. Actually, deriving from the research 
presented in the chapters above, linguistic regime in Turkey inhabits some of these 
norms, simultaneously.  
Turkey's regime of language, in the first place, could be identified with its 
emphasis on distinctiveness by favoring a language that is unique to the political 
community, the Turkish nation. The authentic language of the national culture was 
deemed representative of the uniqueness of the nation itself. The feature of linguistic 
authenticity was also further developed with the Language Revolution when the 
purification of Turkish and elimination of what was considered as non-Turkish elements 
from the language were the primary aims. 
The language regime in Turkey is also found to be uniformist, by favoring only 
one single language. Turkish had been designated as the only official language since the 
first Ottoman Constitution of 1876. In that sense, the regime favored stability with 
respect to the privileged status of Turkish language, but not with respect to the  
freedoms enjoyed by the speakers of non-Turkish languages before the declaration of 
the Republic. The Republican policies of language have also been deliberately 
organized against the linguistic freedoms of non-Turkish speakers. Therefore, the 
Turkish language regime, until very recently, has also been definitivist in the way that it 
always excluded different linguistic options. The operators of the regime never stepped 
back from their determinacy of exclusion any language other than Turkish from the 
spheres of formal communication. 
Radicality could be assessed as another characteristics of the language regime in 
Turkey, at least within the discourse of the Republican ideology. Radicality refers to 
―using language policies to liberate oppressed groups‖ (Pool, 1991, p. 497). The official 
Republican thesis, especially through the speeches by Atatürk, frequently pointed out to 
the desire of freedom within the Turkish ―essence‖. A fight had been fought for 
independence prior to the establishment of the Republic. Now, another fight, this time 
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to liberate the minds of Turks should be fought by liberating the language from the 
tutelage of other languages. (Turan & Özel, 2007, p. 81). The definitive designation of 
Turkish as the sole medium of communication within the Republic has usually been 
associated with the overall struggle of ensuring the legitimacy of both the nation and its 
language.
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Populism is another norm valid mostly within the discourses of Turkish language 
regime. The complicatedness of the issue of populism comes from the divergence of the 
discursive and pragmatic elements of the Turkish nationalism, on the whole. A very 
frequently encountered theme of the Turkish nationalist ideology has been the 
celebration of the popular culture and other relevant elements that ensure the uniqueness 
of the nation, such as language. The birth of Turkist movement could be associated with 
the development of a national language and literature, especially by the intellectuals of 
the turn of the 20
th
 century (see ġavkay, 2002). However, populist approaches have not 
completely concealed the elitism that is intrinsic to Turkish modernization. The 
governance of the society has been framed, around the turn of the 19
th
 century, by the 
top-down modernization. Language has been, as shown above, a primary instrument of 
this modernizationist mission. This link connects to another norm that has been in effect 
in the construction and the consolidation of the regime of language in Turkey.  
Another norm effective in the establishment of the Turkish language regime has 
been modernizationism.
210
 As a reflection of the project of total modernization, the 
Republican language regime, on the one hand, endeavored for the development of the 
Turkish language in its capabilities of expressing ―the modern culture‖, and satisfying 
the latter‘s communicational needs. The labor to produce Turkish equivalents of 
tehcnical and intellectual terminologies, which was provided by Arabic, Persian and 
French languages before, was immense. On the other hand, the modernizationist aspect 
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 Radicality has been also assigned to Kurds, especially, as Kurdish political 
elites have always considered Kurdish language as the groups‘ primary cultural element, 
however, except for the development in Iraqi Kurdistan, it is hard to speak of a language 
regime operated by Kurds in Turkey. 
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 See Ayhan Akman (2004). Ayhan Akman introduces the notion of 
modernizationist nationalism with respect to the Turkish case in his article where he 
assesses the conventional categories of nationalism. 
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of the Turkish language regime is also reproduced in the negation of minority 
languages, but mainly of Kurdish. Kurdish has been consistently charged with a lack of 
unity and incapability to satisfy the needs of the modern world. Kurdish has usually 
been categorized as the language of the mountain folk or as a tribal tongue, of which 
varieties would be unable to form a standard medium for modern communication. The 
contrasted counter-fact has been, unsurprisingly, Turkish which is considered as a 
developed, legitimate and standard language of the Turkish nation. 
With respect to Pool‘s account of norms in language regimes, what the Turkish 
case has not inhabited are diversity (favoring multiple languages), liberty (non-
coercion), and tolerability (avoiding policies that would induce emigration or 
secession). 
And, with respect to Laitin's distinction between rationalized (single-official 
language regime) and multilingual regimes, that has been discussed in Chapter 2, 
Turkey would be classified as to have a rationalized regime of language. 
Rationalization, in the way Laitin appropriates the concept from Weber, refers to both 
centralization and standardization of the sphere of communicative action. Among 
various settings in which rationalized language regimes are organized, Turkey falls into 
the second category defined by Laitin, which appears when ―a dominant language group 
[has and practices] the power to impose its standard on a wider society‖ (Laitin, 2000, 
p. 151).  
Although norms and typologies have been introduced into the conception of 
language regime, the literature on the subject, as revealed in Chapter 2, lacks the 
ideological dimension. This lack has been complemented with contributions from 
anthropologists that work on the formation and transformation of language ideologies. 
A language ideology has been defined as a consistent set of ideas, assumptions and 
beliefs on the nature of language and on the relationship of language with culture, 
identity and representation. Language ideologies have been identified to be effective in 
the structuration of linguistic dispositions of a political system, as well as of daily 
sociolinguistic interaction and inter-communal relations. The articulation of the notion 
of language ideology into the theoretical framework founded on the concept of language 
regimes has evidently empowered the analyses of the case studies in this dissertation. 
Language ideology has enabled the assessment of the ideational forces that had been in 
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effect in the formation of the language regime in Turkey. It has enabled a 
comprehensive evaluation of the ideas pertaining to language that have been generated 
and disseminated by the regime, as well.  
Below are some specific implications of the theoretical framework that is based 
on the notion of language regime, and the questions developed in relation, with regard 
to the exploration of the Turkish language policies.  
Safran comments on the political nature of language and states that competition 
for language: 
―is not only an interethnic rivalry but also a conflict between elites and 
masses, religion and secularism, and ‗official‘ and de facto languages. 
Languages are not only tools of nation-building but also means of political 
control. That is why ethnic minorities use language – for example, the 
demand for bilingualism – as a political strategy – as ―a form of protest 
against political domination.‖ (2004, p. 4)  
Recent concentration on minorities and their cultural and linguistic rights might 
deceive an observer. The claim for language, in order to protect, defend or propagate it, 
might have been considered as a ―natural‖ reaction of linguistically subordinated 
communities.  
However, the social scientific explanation has to uncover the historical and 
ideological background of language politics. And, such a search takes one back to the 
formation of nation-states, as constitutive institutions. Almost all nation-states have 
produced their own language regimes based on a common nationalist language 
ideology. This particular language ideology holds that language is the primary source 
and expression of the genuine communal culture, of which representation has been 
accomplished by the nation-state. Therefore, it has been the nation-state that employed 
nationalist language policies based on the prioritization of one standard national 
language. It has been the nation-state than disseminated a particular understanding of 
language and a particular way of its politicization. The link between language and 
ethnic/national identity and culture has been formulated and practiced by the 
nationalism of the nation-state. Moreover, it has been the nation-state that produced the 
social and political category of ―minority‖ in the course of a series of discursive and 
practical ventures. The territorialization of the modern governance rendered some of the 
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population as the majority of which culture has been celebrated and refined by the 
nation-state, while leaving other segments as the minorities of which cultures and 
languages have been excluded, denied or terminated. 
Sue Wright has relevantly commented as follows: 
―For example, those engaged in the revitalization of minority languages 
believe that they can only do so by replicating nation building policy and 
planning processes. For example, languages become ‗endangered‘ because 
they are not used in political institutions, commercial circles or education, 
and speakers appear to assign little value to them if they are only used as the 
media of civil society and domestic life.‖ (Wright, 2007, p. 247) 
So, rather than a natural, instinctive urge to claim language in order to protect 
identity or distinctiveness, language politics of resisting subaltern communities emulate 
the language ideology developed and spread by nation-states. In Chapter 2, 
Blommaert‘s insistence of the centrality of nation-states in the construction of language 
regimes was introduced. The analysis of the Turkish case, it is presumed, has been a 
substantiation of that the state is the crucial leading agent in the creation of both the 
status of minority and the ideology within which the political claims of ethnic/linguistic 
minority identity are generated. 
The Turkish case, as it has been analyzed above within the conceptual framework 
of language regime, is a solid evidence of how the state has introduced the issue of 
language as a political domain. As the Turkish state instrumentalized language within 
every aspect of its modernization project, the notion of language became a politically 
loaded social phenomenon. Citizenship, national loyalty, national unity, cultural 
homogeneity and integrity have been defined also by the employment of, or the will to 
employ, the officialized variety of Turkish. Accordingly, any diversion from this 
enforced linguistic practice and ideology has been evaluated as treason, or disloyalty at 
best, the sacred notions of unity and integrity. Such a powerful construction of the 
legitimate domains of language politics rendered alternative discourses not only 
illegitimate but also irrelevant.  
Paradoxically, the Turkish state not only produced the regime of language as one 
of its techniques of governmentality, but also it produced a fertile discursive domain for 
the generation of the subversion of its own linguistic regime. The major linguistic 
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problematic in front of the Turkish state seems to be Kurdish language. Now, the 
politics of Kurdish identity demands linguistic and cultural rights on the very basis that 
Turkish language has been politicized: the authentic expression of an authentic cultural 
community.  
Eriksen narrates that a similar situation is experienced in France:  
―Why do the survival and revival of the Breton language seem so 
important to many Bretons? It would be simplistic to say, as an explanation, 
that their language forms an important part of their cultural identity. After 
all, language shift has been widespread in Brittany (and elsewhere) for 
centuries. The militancy concerning language can therefore be seen as an 
anti-French political strategy. Since the French state chose the French 
language as the foremost symbol of its nationalism, the most efficient and 
visible kind of resistance against that nationalism may be a rejection of that 
language. For many years, it was illegal to speak Breton in public. Many 
Bretons are still bilingual and switch situationally between the languages. 
By using Breton in public contexts, Bretons signal that they do not 
acquiescence in French domination. A notion of cultural roots alone would 
not have been enough.‖ (Eriksen, 1993, p. 110). 
In this sense, language has been formulated and presented as a political issue with 
the rise of Turkish nationalism, and it became the instrument of nation-state domination 
in Turkey. Now, in reverse, it becomes the instrument of ethnic resistance against this 
domination.  
However, resistance is not the only response that dominated linguistic groups 
produced against domination. As presented above in the case of the Bosnians‘ 
associations‘ rejection of a minority status, some could be so much dominated that they 
might even reject an opportunity to express their linguistic existence.  
This is the other facet of the productive aspect of power regimes in general and 
language regimes in particular. Language regimes are not only repressive – as they 
dominate and subordinate the uses of non-official and non-standard languages, but they 
are also productive, in the sense that they fabricate subjectivities of language politics 
either by internalization of the hegemonic discourse (as the Bosnians representatives 
did) or by resistance (as Kurdish movement did). Foucault‘s conceptualization of power 
as productive, rather than being merely repressive is evidently helpful in this case to 
elucidate the complexity of the issue. 
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These are the assessments of the ideological panorama on the issue of language 
politics that have been revealed by the transformation of the Turkish language regime. 
As it has been reviewed throughout the thesis, the construction of a language regime in 
Turkey prioritized Turkish, as the language of the ―only‖ legitimate state of being. The 
linguistic others were explicitly invited to the process self-assimilation into Turkishness 
(as Jews became the target of campaigns like Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!) or they were 
totally excluded or denied of existence (as Kurds were).  
The foundational indication of assimilation was speaking Turkish, an almost 
inevitable consequence of the very definition of language ideology of Turkish 
nationalism. As shown above, such a conception of language as the authentic 
representation of the authentic cultural identity is intrinsic to the modern nature of 
nationalism itself. One could shift one‘s language and, hence, one‘s identity.  
The symbolic power that the official language regime generated by prioritizing 
Turkish also created linguistic categories; it also indexed a hierarchy of languages. In 
the research above, several cases of these categorizations have been presented, such as 
the classifications of languages in pre-1965 censuses or of the ―traditional‖ languages to 
be broadcasted from TRT. This is clearly a verification of Bourdieu‘s argument with 
respect to symbolic domination that the latter constructs realities (1991). Symbolic 
domination over and through language has constructed linguistic realities.  
The historical overview of the language regime in Turkey in this study, which 
endeavored to present its story thoroughly up to the present day, is also considered as a 
contribution to the ongoing debate on the transformation of language regimes due to 
globalization. Coulmas has been the foremost scholar who worked on diverse responses 
that national language regimes generated as they encountered various challenges during 
the process of globalization (see 2005a; and 2007). A multiplicity of different case 
studies will undeniably add up to a wider understanding of globalization and its effects 
on national politics in general, and on language politics in particular. 
There are several dimensions of the post-1980 subversion of the language regime 
in Turkey. The challenges were fundamentally posed by the intrusion of English via 
globalization, the rapid commercialization of the domains that were once deemed as 
service sectors of the state – with the mission of modernization – and the growth of 
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ethnic politics. Similar cases in other language regimes have been exemplified as much 
as possible.  
However, the Turkish state is having hard times in responding the challenges 
posed by a much more vibrant cultural universe. The commoditization of culture, on the 
one hand, invaded the field of action of which the state was once the main agent. The 
global circulations of images, sounds and other resources of cultural capital as 
commodities have threatened the nation-states´ assumed cultural governance. In this 
sense, the nation-state of Turkey experiences a reflection of global tendencies in which 
national language regimes have encountered substantial challenges.  
Nevertheless, the crisis of the Turkish language regime is a sign that the power of 
the state could not secure full cultural homogeneity. An interesting outcome of the 
analysis of the language ideologies in Turkey reveals that almost everyone is quite 
interested in the protection of the language, many support its widespread use in new 
technologies and education, and however, it is hard to observe a material evidence of 
reification of this narrative. The most passionate militants of Turkish speak or write 
rather poorly, companies with English names see no problem to participate in the 
organization of a campaign to encourage the use of Turkish in every space. Or, the rates 
of applications to the schools with education in English are high enough to compel one 
to interrogate the problematic of how a widespread discourse on the protection of 
Turkish is rather poorly manifested in action. So, there is a clearly visible discrepancy 
between the discourse on language and the practice of language. With a preliminary 
consideration, it could be evaluated that this inconsistency is not far from the general 
mode of modernization in Turkey. The positivist paradigm of the Kemalist elites 
projected that the changes in the outfits, vocabulary, calendars or surnames would bring 
about the creation of a new man. But, even for the leaders of the Kemalist revolution, it 
was hard to get over the traditional ways of being. With respect to the issue of language, 
it is well known that many important figures of the one-party period were taking their 
personal notes in the old script, while propagandizing the use of the new, Latin 
alphabet.
211
 Therefore, the discrepancy mentioned above is not a problem of those who 
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 Ġsmet Ġnönü was a major example of such a political leader. His dairies have 
been written with the Ottoman script (Demirel, 2001). It would certainly be an 
interesting study to investigate how the elites of the Republic managed – or manipulated 
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are ―not modern enough‖. The very nature of Turkish modernization has similar 
problems. And, surely, this is not a unique problem for Turkey. In almost all late-
modernizing countries, the schizophrenic rupture between the modern as an object of 
desire and the modern as a threat to the self (of the nation), created wounded 
consciousnesses (Shayegan, 2002).  
  
                                                                                                                                               
– this divergence between their own daily, private lives and their political discourses or 
actions. 
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APPENDIX 1 
THE LAW ON PUBLICIZING IDEAS IN LANGUAGES OTHER 
THAN TURKISH 
 
Türkçeden Başka Dillerde Yapılacak Yayınlar Hakkında Kanun 
 
Kanun Numarası: 2932 
Kabul Tarihi: 19/10/1983 
Yayımlandığı Resmi Gazete: Tarih: 22/10/1983 Sayı: 18199 Sayfa: 27 
Yayımlandığı Düstur: Tertip: 5 Cilt: 22 Sayfa: 810 
Durumu: Külliyatın yayımlanmasından sonra 12/4/1991 tarih ve 3713 sayılı 
Kanunun 23 üncü maddesi ile yürürlükten kaldırılmıĢtır. 
 
Amaç ve Kapsam: 
Madde 1:  
Bu kanun; Devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bütünlüğünün, milli 
egemenliğinin, Cumhuriyetin, milli güvenliğin, kamu düzeninin korunması amacıyla 
düĢüncelerin açıklanması ve yayılmasında yasaklanan dillere iliĢkin esas ve usulleri 
düzenler. 
 
Düşüncelerin açıklanması ve yayılmasında kullanılamayacak diller  
Madde 2:  
Türk Devleti tarafından tanınmıĢ bulunan devletlerin birinci resmi dilleri dıĢında 
herhangi bir dille düĢüncelerin açıklanması, yayılması ve yayınlanması yasaktır.  
Türkiye Devletinin taraf olduğu milletlerarası andlaĢma hükümleriyle eğitim, 
öğretim, bilimsel araĢtırma ve kamu kurum ve kuruluĢlarının yayınlarına iliĢkin 
mevzuat hükümleri saklıdır. 
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Türk vatandaşlarının anadili 
Madde 3: 
Türk VatandaĢlarının anadili Türkçedir. 
a) Türkçeden baĢka dillerin anadili olarak kullanılmasına ve yayılmasına yönelik 
her türlü faaliyette bulunulması, 
b) Toplantı ve gösteri yürüyüĢlerinde, mahallin en büyük mülki amirinden izin 
alınmadıkça bu Kanunla yasaklanmamıĢ olsa bile Türkçeden baĢka bir dille yazılmıĢ 
afiĢ, pankart, döviz, levha ve benzerlerinin taĢınması, plak, ses ve görüntü bantları ve 
diğer anlatım araç ve gereçleriyle yayım yapılması, 
Yasaktır. 
 
Ceza hükümleri 
Madde 4: 
a) 2nci madde ile 3üncü maddenin (b) bendinde belirtilen yasaklara aykırı 
harekette bulunanlar hakkında, fiilleri baĢka bir suç oluĢtursa bile ayrıca altı aydan iki 
yıla kadar hapis ve yüzbin liradan aĢağı olmamak üzere ağır para cezası hükmolunur. 
b) 3üncü maddenin (a) bendi ile yasaklanan hususlarda her ne surette olursa olsun 
faaliyette bulunanlar hakkında, fiilleri baĢka bir suç oluĢtursa bile ayrıca bir yıldan üç 
yıla kadar hapis ve yüzbin liradan aĢağı olmamak üzere ağır para cezası hükmolunur. 
Mahkemece yapılacak kovuĢturma sonunda, mahkumiyet hükmüyle beraber her 
nevi elle yapılmıĢ veya yazılmıĢ veya basılmıĢ kağıt ve eserler, plaklar, ses ve görüntü 
bantları, afiĢ ve pankartlar ile diğer anlatım araç ve gereçlerinin müsaderesine de 
hükmolunur. 
Bu Kanun kapsamına giren yayın araç ve gereçlerinin kaçırılmasını, 
değiĢtirilmesini, ziyana uğramasını ve tahribini önlemek için tahkikatın her aĢamasında 
gerekli görülen tedbirler alınır. 
 
Toplatma kararı 
Madde 5: 
Bu kanundaki yasaklara aykırı olan her nevi elle yapılmıĢ veya yazılmıĢ veya 
basılmıĢ kağıt ve eserler, plaklar, ses ve görüntü bantları, afiĢ ve pankartlar ile diğer 
anlatım araç ve gereçleri sulh ceza hakiminin kararıyla, gecikmesinde sakınca bulunan 
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hallerde mahallin en büyük mülki amiri tarafından verilecek kararla toplattırılır. 
Toplatma kararını veren mülki amir bu kararı yirmidört saat içinde mahallin sulh ceza 
hakimine bildirir. Hakim, en geç üç gün içinde kararın onaylanıp onaylanmaması 
hakkında karar verir. Onaylanmama halinde, mülki amirin kararı hükümsüz kalır. 
Mahkemece verilen toplatmaya iliĢkin kararlar o yer Cumhuriyet savcılığı tarafından 
diğer yerlerdeki Cumhuriyet savcılıklarına en seri vasıtayla bildirilir. 
 
Muhakeme usulü 
Madde 6: 
Bu kanunda yazılı suçları iĢleyenler hakkında soruĢturma ve kovuĢturmalar yer ve 
zaman kayıtlarına bakılmaksızın 3005 sayılı MeĢhut Suçlara Muhakeme Usulü Kanunu 
hükümlerine göre yapılır.  
 
Yürürlük 
Madde 7:  
Bu kanun yayımı tarihinde yürürlüğe girer. 
 
Yürütme 
Madde 8: 
Bu kanun hükümlerini Bakanlar Kurulu yürütür.  
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APPENDIX 2 
MINORITY LANGUAGES IN CENSUSES OF TURKEY 
 
The figures in the following table are compiled from Eraydın-Virtanen (2003b), 
Tunçay (1983), and Dündar (1999). The table starts on the next page.  
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APPENDIX 3 
LINGUISTIC DATA ON TURKEY IN THE ETHNOLOGUE 
 
In the table below, the languages spoken in Turkey are exhibited, as they were 
presented by Ethnologue (Ethnologue Report for Turkey, 2005). Ethnologue is a US-
based institution and conducts a worldwide study of linguistics data, for every country 
and linguistic group, of which results are published the on its web site at 
www.ethnologue.com, and in printed format, as well (Gordon, 2005). Ethnologue states 
that the data is updated in every fours year. Although the report quotes studies of 
linguistics for some of the presented data, the information should be considered with 
attention. For Kurdish and Turkish below, comparative numbers are presented. 
 
Language Information Population * 
Alternate names Dialects 
Abaza Abazin, Tapanta, Abazintsy, 
Ahuwa 
Tapanta, Ashkaraua 
(Ashkar), Bezshagh 
10,000 (1995) 
Abkhaz Abxazo Bzyb, Abzhui, Samurzakan 4,000 (1980) 
Adyghe Adygey, Circassian, 
Cherkes 
 277,900 (2000) 
Albanian   15,000 (1980) 
Arabic Syro-Mesopotamian 
Vernacular Arabic 
 400,000 (1992) 
Armenian Haieren, Somkhuri, 
Ermenice, Armjanski 
Eastern Armenian 40,000 (1980) 
Azerbaijani, 
South 
Azeri Kars 530,000  
Bulgarian Pomak  Pomak 300,000 (2001) 
Crimean 
Turkish 
Crimean Tatar Northern Crimean (Crimean 
Nogai, Steppe Crimean), 
Central Crimean, Southern 
Crimean 
unknown 
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Dimli Southern Zaza, Dimli, 
Dimili, Zazaki, Zazaki 
Sivereki, Kori, Hazzu 
(Hazo), Motki (Moti), 
Dumbuli (Dumbeli) 
1,500,000 – 
2,500,000 (1998) 
Gagauz Balkan Gagauz Turkish, 
Balkan Turkic 
Gajol, Gerlovo Turks, 
Karamanli, Kyzylbash, 
Surguch, Tozluk Turks, 
Yuruk (Yoruk, Konyar) 
327,000 (1993) 
Georgian Kartuli, Gruzin Imerxev 40,000 (1980) 
Greek   4,000 (1993) 
Gypsy Middle Eastern Romani, 
Tsigene, Gypsy, Domari 
[Kıptıce in 1935 and 1945 
censuses] 
Karachi, Beludji, Marashi 28,461 (2000) 
Hértevin  Hértevin Proper (Arton), 
Umraya, Jinet 
1,000 (1999) 
Kabardian   550,000 
Kazakh   600 (1982) 
Kirmanjki Northern Zaza, Alevica, 
Dimilki, Dersimki, So-Bê, 
Zonê Ma 
Tunceli, Varto. Closest to 
Dimli (Zazaki) 
140,000 
Kumyk Kumuk, Kumuklar, Kumyki Khasav-Yurt, Buinak, 
Khaidak 
A few villages 
Kurdish, 
Northern 
Kurmanji, Kurmancî, 
Kirmancî, Kermancî, Kurdi, 
Kurdî 
Boti (Botani), Marashi, 
Ashiti, Bayezidi, Hekari, 
Shemdinani 
3,950,000 (1980) 
Ladino Dzhudezmo, Judeo Spanish, 
Sefardi, Judezmo, Hakitia, 
Haketia, Spanyol 
 8,000 (1976) 
Laz Lazuri, Laze, Chan, 
Chanzan, Zan, Chanuri 
 30,000 (1980) 
Osetin Ossete Digor, Tagaur, Kurtat, 
Allagir, Tual, Iron 
Unknown 
Pontic  Arlija (Erli) 4,535 (1965) 
Romani Arlija  25,000 
Serbian Bosnian  20,000 (1980) 
Syriac   extinct 
Tatar   Unknown 
Turkish Türkçe, Türkisch, Anatolian Danubian, Eskisehir, 
Razgrad, Dinler, Rumelian, 
Karamanli, Edirne, 
Gaziantep, Urfa 
46,278,000  
(1987)*** 
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Turkmen Trukhmen  925 (1982) 
Turoyo Süryani, Suryoyo, Syryoyo, 
Turani 
Midyat, Midin, Kfarze, 
`Iwardo, Anhil, Raite 
3,000 (1994) 
Ubykh  Ubyx, Pekhi, Oubykh extinct 
Uyghur Uighur, Uygur, Uigur  500(1981) 
Uzbek, 
Southern 
  1,981 (1982) 
 
* The numbers do not describe the ethnic group. 
**  The number is apparently very low. In other two studies, in which the 1965 census 
results were re-formulated according to the demographic data (such as birth-rates 
and migration), the number of the Kurdish speakers are estimated to be 7,224,402 
(Özsoy & Koç, 1992, p. 113; quoted in Dündar F. , 1999, p. 116) and 7,046,025 
(Mutlu, 1995, p. 49; quoted in KiriĢçi & Winrow, 1997, p. 123). A research, made 
in 2007 by a private research company KONDA for the daily newspaper Milliyet, 
found out that for 11.97% of the population, Kurdish (Kurmanji and Zazaki) is the 
mother language. This percentage corresponds to 8,735,000 according to the 
population of Turkey in 2007, which is 72,9750,000 (―Biz Kimiz?‖, Milliyet, 
March 22 (2007)). 
*** In the research by KONDA in 2007, the number of the population who has 
Turkish as the mother language is estimated to be 84.54%, which corresponds to a 
number of 61.693.065 (ibid.).   
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APPENDIX 4 
SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN THE CASE AGAINST EĞİTİM-SEN 
 
The following text is a part of reasoned decision of the Supreme Court in the case 
against Eğitim-Sen, which was persecuted in 2005 for defending the right of education 
in mother languages. The quoted parts are Section G on the controversy and Section H 
on rationale.
212
 
 
Yargıtay Hukuk Genel Kurulu'nun Eğitim-Sen'in kapatılma davasına iliĢkin, 
2005/9-320-355 sayılı gerekçeli kararının, UyuĢmazlık ve Gerekçe bölümlerinin tam 
metni: 
 
G-UYUŞMAZLIK:  
 
Davalı Eğitim ve Biiim Emekçileri Sendikası Tüzüğünün "Sendikanın 
Amaçları" baĢlıklı. 2. maddesinin (b) bendinde; "Toplumun bütün bireylerinin 
temel insan haklan ve özgürlükleri doğrultusunda demokratik, laik, bilimsel ve 
parasız eğitim görmesini, bireylerin anadillerinde öğrenim görmesini ve 
kültürlerini geliştirmesini savunur" denilmiĢtir ve davalı sendika yukarıda gerekçede 
yer verildiği üzere yapılan uyarılara karĢın, Tüzüğünde yer alan bu ifadenin Anayasa ve 
yasalara bir aykırılık teĢkil etmediğini, uluslararası sözleĢmelerin konuya iliĢkin 
değerlendirmelerine uygun olduğunu, bu nedenle tüzüklerinde değiĢiklik 
yapmayacaklarını bildirmiĢtir. 
Görüldüğü üzere yerel mahkeme ile Özel Daire arasındaki uyuĢmazlık, sendika 
tüzüğünün (sendikaların amaçları) bölümünde yer alan, "...bireylerin anadillerinde 
öğrenim görmesini savunur" ibaresinin kanuna, Cumhuriyetin temel niteliği ve 
demokratik esaslar unsuruna aykırılık oluĢturup oluĢturmadığı noktalarında 
toplanmaktadır. 
                                                 
212
 ―Yargıtay'ın Eğitim Sen Gerekçeli Kararı‖, Bianet (2005) 
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H-GEREKÇE:  
 
a)Anayasa Açısından İrdeleme: 
 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, tek yapılı yani üniter bir devlettir. Bu husus Anayasa'nın 
3.maddesinde açıkça "Türkiye Devleti, ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bir bütündür" 
denilmek suretiyle ifadesini bulmuĢ ve bu niteliğin doğal bir sonucu olarak da maddede 
dilinin Türkçe olduğuna yer verilmiĢtir. Yine bu niteliğin bir baĢka sonucu olarak 
42.maddenin son fıkrasında, Türk vatandaĢlarına eğitim ve öğretim kurumlarında 
Türkçe'den baĢka hiçbir dilin anadil olarak okutulamayacağı ve öğretilmeyeceği bir 
Anayasa kuralı olarak öngörülmüĢtür. 
Bir baĢka deyiĢle milletin bütünlüğü, kamusal yaĢamda milletin tekliği demektir 
ve bu nedenle kamusal yaĢamda ulusal kültür geçerlidir ve hukukun koruması 
altındadır. Özel yaĢamda ise herkes ait olduğunu hissettiği kültürü yaĢayabilir (Bülent 
Tanör-Necmi YüzbaĢıoğlu, 1982 Anayasasına göre Türk Anayasa Hukuku, Yapı Kredi 
Yayınları, îst,200i, sn: 106). 
Devletin tekliği, üniter oluĢu Anayasa'nın 4.maddesine göre değiĢtirilemez ve 
değiĢtirilmesi teklif; dahi edilemez. 
Anayasa'nın 66. maddesinde ise"Türk Devletine vatandaşlık bağı ile bağlı olan 
herkes Türktür" denilmiĢtir. 
Devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bütünlüğü kuralı sadece kanun koyucuyu 
değil, bütün kurumlan ve vatandaĢları da bağlayan, onlar açısından da sonuç doğuran 
bir ilkedir. 
42.maddenin 4.fıkrası ise, açıkça "Eğitim ve öğretim hürriyetinin Anayasaya 
sadakat borcunu ortadan kaldırmayacağını" öngörmektedir. 
Bütün bunlardan çıkan kesin sonuç, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde öğrenimin Türkçe 
ile yapılacağı hususudur. 
Ana dil en yalın tanımıyla, bireylerin yakın çevreleriyle ilk etkileĢimini sağladığı 
dili ifade eder. 
KiĢi ana dilini çevresinde öğrenir ve Türkçe'nin kullanımının zorunlu olduğu 
alanlar dıĢında bu dili istediği gibi kullanır. 
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Nitekim toplumda kullanılan farklı dil ve lehçelerin öğrenilmesi bu dil ve 
lehçelerde yayın yapılabilmesi demokratik bir hak olarak kabul edilmiĢ ve bu amaç 
yapılan yasal düzenlemeler hayata geçirilmiĢtir. 
Bu düĢüncenin sonucu ve somutlaĢtırılması olarak da, 2923 sayılı Yabancı Dil 
Eğitim ve Öğrenimi Ġle Türk VatandaĢlarının Farklı Dil ve Lehçelerinin Öğrenilmesi 
Hakkında Kanun ile Türk vatandaĢlarının günlük yaĢamlarında geleneksel olarak 
kullandıkları farklı dil ve lehçelerin öğrenilmesine olanak sağlanmıĢ, esasları 
düzenlenmiĢ, bu yöndeki hak ve özgürlüklerin uygulanmasına yer verilmiĢtir. 
Buna paralel bir düzenleme olarak 3984 sayılı Radyo ve Televizyonların KuruluĢu 
ve Yayınları Hakkında Kanun ile de Türk vatandaĢlarının günlük yaĢamlarında 
geleneksel olarak kullandıkları farklı dil ve lehçelerde yayın yapılabilmesi olanaklı hale 
getirilmiĢtir. 
Ancak, ana dilde öğrenim ise çok farklı bir kavramdır ve ilk öğretimden itibaren 
tüm eğitim ve öğretimin devletin resmi dili dıĢında, farklı dillerde de eğitim ve 
öğretimde kullanılmasını gerektirir. Bir baĢka deyiĢle ana dilde öğrenim haklarının 
hayata geçmesi, bir devlette sayısı belirsiz ana dilin kamusal alana taĢınması demektir. 
Bu da üniter bir devlet olan, ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bir bütün olan, dili 
Türkçe olan Türkiye Cumhuriyetimin Anayasası ile bağdaĢmaz. Anayasamız gereği 
Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde "Türkçe'den başka hiçbir dil, eğitim ve öğretim 
kurumlarında Türk vatandaşlarına ana dilleri olarak okutulamaz ve öğretilemez". 
Çünkü farklı dil ve lehçeleri sadece bir kültür öğesi görmek yerine, bu öğelerin 
"farklı ana diller" adı altında eğitim ve öğretim alanına sokmayı amaçlamak, yukarıda 
da belirtildiği gibi Anayasaya aykırılık oluĢturması yanında, toplumsal çeliĢkileri, 
eğitim, öğretim, bilimsel ve kamusal alanda da artırmaya neden olacaktır. 
Türkçe eğitim almak, ülkenin kamusal alanlarına, aldığı bu eğitim ve öğretim 
doğrultusunda katılacak yurttaĢlar için bir hak, Türk dilinde eğitim ye öğretim 
yaptırmakta, yurttaĢlarını hiçbir ayrım gözetmeksizin yurttaĢlık statüsüyle kendisine 
bağlamıĢ Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin, yurttaĢlarına sunduğu bir hizmet, bir görevdir. Ana 
dilde öğrenimin hayata geçmesi demek, bir devlette sayısı belirsiz ana dilin kamusal 
alanda boy göstererek bireyler aracılığıyla kamusal alana taĢınması demek olacaktır ki, 
bu da, yukarıda da belirtildiği üzere ulusal bütünlüğünü, ülkesi ve milletiyle 
bölünmezliğe ve diline bağlayan Cumhuriyetin üniter yapısı ile bağdaĢmaz. 
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Bu durumda davalı sendikanın, bireylerin ana dillerinde öğrenim görmesini 
savunması açıkça Anayasaya aykırıdır. 
 
b)Kamu Görevlileri Sendikaları Kanunu Açısından İrdeleme: 
 
Anayasanın yukarıya da aynen alınan 5l.maddesi, Sendika kurma hakkını 
düzenlemiĢ ve bu hakkın hangi nedenlerle sınırlanabildiğim de göstermiĢtir. 
4688 sayılı Kamu Görevlileri Sendikalar Kanunu'nun; 3/f maddesi Sendikayı, 
"kamu görevlilerinin ortak ekonomik, sosyal ve mesleki hak ve menfaatlerini 
korumak ve geliştirmek için oluşturdukları tüzel kişiliğe sahip kuruluşlardır" 
Ģeklinde tanımlanmıĢtır. 
Görüldüğü üzere bu Kanun ile kamu görevlilerinin ortak ekonomik, sosyal ve 
mesleki hak ve çıkarlarının korunması ve geliĢtirilmesi amaçlanmıĢtır ve uluslararası 
sözleĢmelerde de anlamını bulan örgütlenme özgürlüğünün somut bir göstergesidir, 
Ģeklidir. Ancak bu örgütlenme Özgürlüğü, hiçbir zaman fertlerin Anayasada ifadesini 
bulan Cumhuriyetin temel niteliklerine ve demokratik esaslara aykırı faaliyette 
bulunmalarına olanak vermez. 
Üzerinde durulması gereken husus bu amaca ulaĢmada kullanılan yöntem ve 
araçların amaçları gerçekleĢtirmekte gerekli ve yeterli bulunup bulunmadığı, 
demokratik esaslar karĢısında ölçülü bir yaklaĢımın benimsenip benimsenmediğidir. Bu 
yön sadece anılan tüzel kiĢilik için değil, tüm toplamsal kesitler için de siyasal, 
ekonomik ve en önemlisi toplumsal uzlaĢı ve ortak gelecek için benzeri anlamlan ifade 
etmelidir. 
4688 sayılı Kamu Görevlileri Sendikaları Kanunu'nun kuruluĢ iĢlemlerini 
düzenleyen 6. maddesi uyarınca sendika tüzüğünün içerdiği bilgilerin kanuna 
aykırılığının tespit edilmesi halinde, ilgili valilik eksikliklerin tamamlanmasını 
istemekte, tamamlanmadığı takdirde ise, mahkemece, kanuna aykırılığın veya eksikliğin 
giderilmesi için bir süre verilmekte, verilen süre sonunda tüzük ve belgeler kanuna 
uygun hale getirilmemiĢse, sendika veya konfederasyonun kapatılmasına karar 
verilmektedir. 
Madde hükmü ile, sendika tüzüğünün, kamu çalıĢanlarının sosyal, ekonomik ve 
kültürel menfaatlerini sağlamaya uygun nitelikteki unsurlardan oluĢması 
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amaçlanmaktadır. Bir ölçüde, sendika hakkının kapsamı belirlenmekte, sendika hakkı 
adı altında sınırsız bir örgütlenme hakkının ve yararlanmanın söz konusu olamayacağı 
ifade edilmeye çalıĢılmaktadır. 
Davalı Sendikanın Tüzüğünün 2/b maddesindeki "bireylerin ana dillerinde 
öğrenim görmesini...savunur" Ģeklinde belirtilen amacını; düĢüncenin ifade 
edilmesinden baĢka bir Ģey değildir, Ģeklinde savunulmasını, geçerli kabul etmek 
mümkün değildir. Çünkü dernek, vakıf, sendika, siyasi parti vb. kurumların 
örgütlenmelerine iliĢkin esasları, özel olarak bu konulan düzenleyen Anayasal ve yasal 
hükümlerin dıĢına çıkarıp, genel bir düĢünce ve örgütlenme özgürlüğü kapsamında ele 
almak, bu, kuruluĢların tabi tutulduğu özel yasaların varlık sebebini ve amacını ortadan 
kaldırmak veya görmezden gelmek olur ki, bu da genel hukuk mantığına aykırıdır. 
Hukuk mantığı ve ilgili yasalarla kurulması ve korunması amaçlanan hukuk düzeni, 
böyle bir yorumu kabule olanak vermez. 
4688 sayılı Kamu Görevlileri Sendikaları Kanunu'nun 7/b maddesinde, 
sendikaların tüzüklerinde amaçlarının yer alacağı, 20.maddesinde ise sendika ve 
konfederasyonların yönetim ve iĢleyiĢlerinin Anayasada belirtilen Cumhuriyetin 
niteliklerine ve demokratik esaslara aykırı olamayacağı, kurala bağlanmıĢtır. 
Davalı Sendika, tüzüğünün "Sendika amaçları" baĢlıklı 2.maddesinin (b) 
bendinde: 
"Toplumun bütün bireylerinin, temel insan hakları ve özgürlükleri 
doğrultusunda demokratik, laik, bilimsel ve parasız eğitim görmesini, 
bireylerin anadillerinde öğrenim görmesini ve kültürlerini geliĢtirmesini 
savunur." 
Amacına yer vermiĢtir. 
Bu amacı, yukarda belirtilen, Anayasanın 51, 4688 sayılı Kanunun 3/f, 7/b ve 
2G.maddeleri ile bağdaĢtırmak mümkün değildir. Çünkü bir sendika, Anayasanın kamu 
görevlileri sendikası için öngörüp çizdiği sınırlar çerçevesinde faaliyette bulunmak 
zorundadır ve faaliyette bulunurken de, Anayasanın öngördüğü ve buna dayalı olarak 
çıkartılan Kanunun da belirlediği ilkelere kesinlikle uyması gerekir. 
Davalı sendikanın bireylerin anadilde öğrenim görmesini amaçlaması, bu 
bakımdan da Kamu Görevlileri Sendikaları Kanunu'na ve Anayasaya aykırıdır. 
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c)Anayasamn 90/son Maddesi ile İnsan Haklan Avrupa Sözleşmesinin 10 ve 
11.Maddeleri Açısından İrdeleme: 
 
Kapatma davasının konusu olan tüzük kuralını ulusa! ve uluslararası hukuk 
çerçevesinde değerlendirmeden önce Anayasanın 9Û/son maddesi Ġle oluĢan durum 
üzerinde durmak, bu düzenlemenin anlamını ortaya koymak gerekir. 
Son fıkraya eklenen cümlede aynen; 
"Usulüne göre yürürlüğe konulmuĢ temel hak ve özgürlüklere iliĢkin 
milletlerarası andlaĢmalarla kanunların aynı konuda farklı hükümler 
içermesi nedeniyle çıkabilecek uyuĢmazlıklarda milletlerarası andlaĢma 
hükümleri esas alınır." 
Denmektedir. 
Bu düzenleme, ulusal hukuk ile uluslararası sözleĢmeler arasında oluĢabilecek 
çatıĢma sorununa çözüm getirmeyi amaçlamıĢtır. 
90. madde uyarınca uluslararası andlaĢmaların anayasaya aykırılığı iddia 
edilemeyeceği için bu andlaĢmaların Anayasa ile birlikte yorumlanması gerekecektir. 
Anayasanın 25. maddesi ile düĢünce ve kanaat hürriyeti, 26.maddesi ile düĢünceyi 
açıklama ve yayma hürriyeti, 51. maddesi ile sendika kurma hakkı düzenlenmiĢtir. 
Ġnsan Haklan Avrupa SözleĢmesinin ifade özgürlüğünü düzenleyen 10., Örgütlenme 
özgürlüğünü düzenleyen 11. maddeleri, Kamu Hizmetinde Örgütlenme Hakkının 
Korunması ve Ġstihdam KoĢullarının Belirlenmesi Yöntemlerine ĠliĢkin SözleĢme, 
Sendika Özgürlüğüne ve Örgütlenme Hakkının Korunmasına ĠliĢkin SözleĢme, 
Örgütlenme ve Toplu Pazarlık Hakkına ĠliĢkin SözleĢmeler de dikkate alındığında, bu 
sözleĢmeler ve diğer mevzuat iç hukukumuzda bütünleĢmiĢ belgeler niteliği ile yargı 
yerlerini de bağlayan onaylanmıĢ uluslararası sözleĢme niteliğindedir. 
Belirtilen metinlerde, ifade ve örgütlenme özgürlüklerinin önündeki yasal ya da 
yönetsel engeller açılmaya, kapsamı geniĢletilmeye çalıĢırken, bir kısım sınırlamalara 
da yer verildiği görülmektedir. 
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Davalı Sendika tüzüğünde yer alan ibarenin, ifade ve örgütlenme özgürlüğü 
kapsamında hukuksal koruma bulup bulamayacağı sorununa gelince; 
Anayasanın 26.maddesi ile, "Bu hürriyetlerin kullanılması, milli güvenlik, 
kamu düzeni, kamu güvenliği, Cumhuriyetin temel nitelikleri Devletin ülkesi ve 
milleti ile bölünmez bütünlüğünün korunması, suçların önlenmesi, suçluların 
cezalandırılması, Devlet sırrı olarak usulünce belirtilmiş bilgilerin açıklanmaması, 
başkalarının şöhret veya haklarının, özel ve aile hayatlarının yahut kanunun 
öngördüğü meslek sırlarının korunması veya yargılama görevinin gereğine uygun 
olarak yerine getirilmesi..." amaçlarıyla "düşünceyi açıklama ve yayma" 
özgürlüğünün sınırlanabileceği, Anayasanın 51.maddesi ile sendika kurma hakkının, 
"...ancak, milli güvenlik, kamu düzeni, suç işlenmesinin önlenmesi, genel sağlık ve 
genel ahlak ile başkalarının hak ve özgürlüklerinin korunması sebebiyle ve 
kanunla..." sınırlanabileceği, Ġnsan Hakları Avrupa SözleĢmesinin 10. maddesinde 
ifade özgürlüğünün "...ulusal güvenliğin, toprak bütünlüğünün veya kamu 
güvenliğinin korunması, asayişsizliğin veya suç işlenmesinin önlenmesi, sağlığın 
veya ahlakın, başkalarının ün ve haklarının korunması, gizli kalması gereken 
haberlerin yayılmasına engel olunması veya yargı gücünün otorite ve 
tarafsızlığının sağlanması için kanunla öngörülen bazı formalite/ere, şartlara, 
sınırlamalara ve yaptırımlara..." bağlanabileceği, benzeri nedenler ile SözleĢmenin 
11. maddesinde tanımını bulan örgütlenme ve toplantı özgürlüğüne engeller 
konulabileceği, Sendika Özgürlüğüne ve Örgütlenme Hakkının Korunmasına ĠliĢkin 
SözleĢmenin 8. maddesinde belirtildiği üzere, "Çalışanlar ve işverenlerle bunlara ait 
örgütler bu sözleşme ile kendilerine tanınmış olan hakları kullanmada, diğer 
kişiler veya örgütlenmiş topluluklar gibi, yasalara uymak zorunda..." olduklarına 
dikkat çekilmektedir. Ulusal hukuka bakıldığında sınırlamalara iliĢkin düzenlemenin 
SözleĢmenin 10 ve 11. maddelerinin göz önüne alınarak yapıldığı görülmektedir. 
Ġnsan Hakları Avrupa SözleĢmesinin 10 ve 11. maddeleri, görüldüğü üzere 
güvenceye alınan haklar yanında sınırlama nedenlerine de yer vermiĢtir. Belirtilen 
sınırlama nedenleri yanında diğer önemli bir yön, sınırlamanın "yasa ile" getirilmiĢ 
olması ve özellikle de "demokratik toplumlarda zorunlu önlemler" niteliği 
taĢımasıdır. Bu koĢul, sınırlamaların istisna oluĢuyla yakından ilgilidir. Sendika hakkına 
getirtilen yasak ve sınırlamaların iç hukuk düzenlemeleriyle temel hak ve özgürlüklere 
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iliĢkin uluslararası andlaĢmalara uygun bulunup bulunmadığı, iç hukuk 
düzenlemelerinin bu andlaĢmalarla uyumlu olup olmadığının belirlenmesi gerekir. 
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin, daha önce belirtilen tek yapılı (üniter) devlet anlayıĢına 
uygun olarak Anayasanın 3 ve 42. maddelerinde ifadesini bulan, ülke sınırlan içersinde 
eğitim ve öğretim alanında anadil birliğinin sürdürülmesi yönündeki ulusal istencini 
iĢlevsiz kılmaya yönelik bir sendika! amacın, üyelerinin çalıĢma hayatına yönelik 
olumlu bir katkıyı ifade edemeyeceği ve yürürlükte bulunan Anayasal ve yasal sisteme 
aykırı olduğu belirgindir. 
Bu nedenle tüzükte yer verilen Anayasa ve ilgili yasaya uyarlılık göstermeyen 
amaç bendinde belirtilen değiĢikliğin yapılmasının, ifade ve örgütlenme özgürlüğü 
alanında demokratik bir eksiklik yaratmayacağı açıktır. Bu açıdan sendika hakkı bu 
sınırlı nedenle kısıtlanabilir ve sınırlamanın demokratik toplum düzeni için zorunlu bir 
önlem niteliği taĢıdığının kabulü gerekir. Bu bakımdan davalı Sendikanın anadilde 
öğrenim savunmasının Anayasa'nın 90/son maddesi ile Ġnsan Hakları Avrupa 
SözleĢmesinin 10 ve 11. maddesine dayandırılması da olanaksızdır 
 
d) İrdelemelerden Ulaşılan Sonuç: 
 
Anayasamızın 51. maddesi ile 4688 sayılı Kanunun 20 ve 37.maddeleri davalı 
Sendikaya yapılan müdahalelerin yasal dayanaklarıdır. Bu yasaların koruduğu alan ise 
Cumhuriyetin temel niteliklerine iliĢkin Anayasanın 3 ve 42/son cümlesindeki 
kurallardır. 
EĢ söyleyiĢle; ana dilde öğrenim görmeyi savunmak Anayasanın 3 ve 42/6. 
madde!eri ile belirtilen hükümlere aykırı bulunduğu, taraf olduğumuz uluslararası temel 
hak ve özgürlüklere iliĢkin sözleĢmelerle uyumlu iç hukuk düzenlemeleri ve kurallarıyla 
çatıĢtığı, demokratik bir toplumda, (üniter devlet yapısını bozmayı amaçlamanın 
yaptırımının) zorunlu önlemler niteliğinde bulunduğu gözetildiğinde, yukarıda belirtilen 
nedenler ve Hukuk Genel Kurulu'nca da benimsenen Özel Daire bozma kararına 
uyulmak gerekirken önceki kararda direnilmesi usul ve yasaya aykırıdır. Bu nedenle 
direnme kararı bozulmalıdır. 
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SONUÇ: Davacının temyiz itirazlarının kabulü ile, direnme kararının yukarıda 
açıklanan ve Özel Daire bozma kararında gösterilen nedenlerden dolayı H.U.M.K'nun 
429.maddesi gereğince BOZULMASINA, 25.5.2005 gününde bozmada oybirliği, 
sebebinde oyçokluğuyla karar verildi. 
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APPENDIX 5 
MUNICIPAL ACTS TO PROTECT TURKISH LANGUAGE 
 
Below is table that lists the municipalities as of June 2008, which either 
recommended the use of Turkish language and letters of the Turkish alphabet in 
signboards, shop names or the names of public spaces such as streets, squares, etc., or 
decreed decisions which ruled that the use of Turkish and Turkish letters in the defined 
areas is mandatory. The types of the municipal decrees are noted with ―+‖ respectively. 
Where the regulation compells the use of Turkish, the municipalities refuse issuing new 
lincenses or cancel existing ones. 
 
Municipality Recommendation Obligation Year 
19 Mayıs / Samsun*   2008 
Afyon  +  1995 
Akçay / Edremit - Balıkesir  + 2007 
AlaĢehir / Manisa*   2006 
Amasya   + 2006 
Aydın   + 2006 
Bala / Ankara  + 2007 
Balıkesir  +  2006 
Beldibi / Antalya  +  2006 
Beldibi / Muğla   + 2006 
Beykoz / Istanbul  + 2006 
Beypazarı   + 2002 
Bitez / Bodrum   + ** 
Bodrum   + 2007 
Bolu   + 2004 
Boyabat / Sinop  +  1995 
Bozüyük / Bilecik   + 2007 
Bulancak / Giresun*   2006 
 
 continues on the next page… 
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Burdur  +  2003 
Cumapazarı / Aydın*   2006 
Çanakkale   + 2005 
Çankaya / Ankara +  2008 
Çıldır / Ardahan*   2007 
Çorlu  +  2007 
Demirci / Manisa  + 2006 
Denizli   + 2006 
Dereli / Giresun  + 2007 
Emiralem*   2007 
Erbaa / Tokat  +  1999 
Ermenek  +  2003 
Erzincan   + 2006 
EskiĢehir Metropolitan  + 2003 
Espiye / Giresun  +  2007 
Fethiye   + 2004 
Gazi / Samsun*   2008 
Giresun  +  2007 
Gönen / Balıkesir  +  1996 
GümüĢler / Denizli  + 2006 
Hisarcık / Kütahya   + 2003 
Ilgaz Ġlçesi / Çankırı  + 2005 
Ilgın*   2006 
Ġkizdere / Rize +  2007 
Ġnegöl*    2007 
KahramanmaraĢ*   2006 
Karabük   + 2006 
Karaman   + 1994 
Karayılan / Hatay  +  1996 
KarĢıyaka / Ġzmir  + 2007 
Kavak / Samsun*   2008 
Kayseri Metropolitan +  1996 
Keçiören / Ankara  +  1997 
KeĢap / Giresun*   2007 
 
 continues on the next page… 
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KırĢehir  +  1996 
Kocasinan / Kayseri  +  1999 
Konya Metropolitan  +  1995 
Malatya   + 2003 
Mamak / Ankara*   2008 
Manisa  +  2007 
Meram / Konya   + 2007 
Milas*   2003 
Niksar / Tokat  +  1997 
Nilüfer / Bursa   + 2002 
Odunpazarı / EskiĢehir  + 2007 
Ölüdeniz / Muğla  +  2006 
Piraziz / Giresun +  2006 
ReĢadiye / Tokat +  2006 
Seyhan / Adana  + 2008 
Sivas ***   2007 
Sungurlu / Çorum*   2008 
Tarsus / Mersin   + 2007 
TaĢova / Amasya*   2003 
Tokat  +  2006 
Turgutlu / Manisa   + 1995 
UĢak  +  2006 
Yalova  +  2001 
YeĢil Dumlupınar / Çankırı  + 2005 
Yozgat  + 2007 
Total: 78 municipalities 27 33  
 
*  No information on the content of the regulation was available. The names of these 
municipalities are taken from the list of the municipalities that were awarded by 
TDK. The list is retrieved on July 24, 2008 from www.tdk.gov.tr.  
**  There are news of the implementation of the Municipality of Bitez the rules 
concerning the use of Turkish,
213
 however, the date of the relevant regulation was 
unavailable. 
 
***  Extra tax is assigned for signboards in non-Turkish languages.  
                                                 
213
 ―Bitez‘de tabelalar değiĢiyor‖, Kent TV, May 02 (2007) 
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APPENDIX 6 
REGULATION ON BROADCASTING IN NON-TURKISH LANGUAGES 
 
Türk Vatandaşlarının Günlük Yaşamlarında Geleneksel Olarak 
Kullandıkları Farklı Dil ve Lehçelerde Yapılacak Radyo ve Televizyon 
Yayınları Hakkında Yönetmelik 
 
Yönetmelik Numarası: 25357 
Yayımlandığı Resmi Gazete: 25/01/2004 
 
BİRİNCİ BÖLÜM  
Amaç, Dayanak, Tanımlar 
Amaç  
Madde 1 - Bu Yönetmeliğin amacı, kamu ve özel radyo ve televizyon 
kuruluĢlarının radyo ve televizyon yayınlarının Türkçe yapılması esası yanında Türk 
vatandaĢlarının günlük yaĢamlarında geleneksel olarak kullandıkları farklı dil ve 
lehçelerde de yayın yapabilmelerine iliĢkin usul ve esasları düzenlemektir.  
 
Dayanak  
Madde 2 - Bu Yönetmelik, 3984 sayılı Radyo ve Televizyonların KuruluĢ ve 
Yayınları Hakkında Kanunun 4928 sayılı Kanunla değiĢik 4 üncü maddesine ve Avrupa 
Sınır Ötesi Televizyon SözleĢmesinde öngörülen hükümlere dayanılarak hazırlanmıĢtır.  
 
Tanımlar  
Madde 3 - Bu Yönetmelikte geçen;  
a) Üst Kurul: Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulunu,  
b) Kanun: 3984 sayılı Radyo ve Televizyonların KuruluĢ ve Yayınları Hakkında 
Kanunu,  
c) ĠletiĢim Ortamı: Radyo ve televizyon programlarının üretildiği merkez 
çıkıĢındaki sinyali herhangi bir teknik kullanarak tek veya birden fazla radyo ve 
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televizyon yayınını bir arada olarak radyo, televizyon alıcıları ve/veya veri dağıtım 
merkezlerine ileten her nevi ortamı,  
d) Tematik Kanal: Haber, belgesel, spor, müzik ve benzeri türlerde olmak üzere 
yalnızca belli bir konuda yayın yapan kanalı,  
e) Ulusal Yayın: Bütün ülkeye yapılan radyo, televizyon ve veri yayınını,  
f) Bölgesel Yayın: Birbirine komĢu en az üç il ve en çok bir coğrafi bölge alanının 
asgari yüzde yetmiĢine yapılan radyo, televizyon yayınını,  
g) Yerel Yayın: Mülki taksimat itibarıyla en az bir ilçe (merkez ilçe dahil) veya 
bir ilin alanının en az yüzde yetmiĢine yapılan radyo, televizyon ve veri yayını,  
h) Yeniden Ġletim: Yetkili yayın kuruluĢu tarafından kullanılan teknik araç ne 
olursa olsun, halkın izlemesi amacıyla yayınlanan radyo ve televizyon program 
hizmetlerinin değiĢiklik yapılmaksızın bütününün veya bir bölümünün alınması ve aynı 
anda veya teknik nedenlerle bağlı olarak daha sonra iletilmesini,  
i) Haber: Kamuoyunun bilgi edinme ihtiyacını karĢılamak amacıyla ve nesnel bir 
bakıĢ açısıyla izleyici ve dinleyicilere iletilen güncel, toplumsal, siyasal, kültürel, 
ekonomik olay, konu ve geliĢmeleri,  
j) Haber Programları: Kamuoyunun bilgi edinme ihtiyacını karĢılamak amacıyla 
olay, konu ve geliĢmeleri ayrıntılarıyla ele alan ve değerlendiren; olağandıĢı durumlar 
dıĢında belirli yayın gün ve saatinde ve genellikle belirli bir süreyle sınırlı olarak, 
düzenli biçimde izleyici ya da dinleyicilere sunulan program türünü,  
k) Haber Bülteni: Kamuoyunun bilgi edinme ihtiyacını karĢılamak amacıyla, 
güncel, toplumsal, siyasal, kültürel, ekonomik olay, konu ve geliĢmelerin, basın ve 
yayın meslek ilkeleri uyarınca, doğruluk ve çabukluk ilkesine uygun olarak izlenip, 
derlenerek, izleyici veya dinleyicilere, olağandıĢı durumlar hariç düzenli olarak, belirli 
saatlerde sunulduğu program türünü,  
l) Kültür Programları: Toplumun düĢünce ve hayat Ģekline konu teĢkil eden ve 
nesilden nesle aktarılan inanç, bilgi ve uygulamaların korunması, geliĢtirilmesi, 
yayılması ve zenginleĢtirilmesi amacıyla milli kültür politikasının ilkeleri doğrultusunda 
hazırlanan programları,  
m) Müzik Programları: Kültürel zenginliğin bir parçası olan her türlü sözlü 
ve/veya sözsüz müzik eserlerinin icra edildiği programları,  
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n) Yayın Planı: Kanun ve bu Yönetmelik uyarınca, yayıncının, yayınların gün, 
saat ve sürelerini belirtmek üzere hazırlayacağı yayın düzenini,  
o) Yıllık Yayın Dönemi: Her yılın 01 Ocak günü Türkiye saatiyle 00.00‘da 
baĢlayıp 31 Aralık günü saat 24.00‘de sona eren zaman dilimini,  
p) Aylık Yayın Dönemi: Her ayın birinci günü Türkiye saatiyle 00.00‘da baĢlayıp 
son günü saat 24.00‘de sona eren zaman dilimini,  
r) Yayın Günü: Türkiye saatiyle 00.00‘dan baĢlayan 24 saatlik zaman dilimini,  
s) Yayın Saati: Yayın yapılacak saatleri ve münferit programların yayınlanma 
saatlerini,  
t) Alt Yazı: Program kaydı veya yayın esnasında, çoğunlukla ekranın alt 
bölümüne yerleĢtirilen, sabit ve/veya hareketli olarak verilen yazılı bilgileri  
ifade eder.  
 
İKİNCİ BÖLÜM  
Yayınların Dili, Yayın Esasları, Başvuru 
 
Yayınların dili  
Madde 4 - Yayınların Türkçe yapılması esastır. Yayınlarda Türkçe‘nin özellikleri 
ve kuralları bozulmadan konuĢma dili olarak kullanılması, çağdaĢ kültür, eğitim ve 
bilim dili olarak geliĢmesi sağlanmalıdır. Münhasıran Türkçe‘den baĢka bir dil ve 
lehçede yayın yapılamaz. Ancak, bu yönetmelik çerçevesinde Türk vatandaĢlarının 
günlük yaĢamlarında geleneksel olarak kullandıkları farklı dil ve lehçelerde de yayın 
yapılabilir.  
Türk vatandaĢlarının günlük yaĢamlarında geleneksel olarak kullandıkları farklı 
dil ve lehçelerde yayın esasları  
Madde 5 - Kamu ve özel ulusal radyo ve televizyon kuruluĢlarınca Türk 
vatandaĢlarının günlük yaĢamlarında geleneksel olarak kullandıkları farklı dil ve 
lehçelerde de bu Yönetmelik hükümleri doğrultusunda Üst Kurul‘dan izin almak 
suretiyle yayın yapılabilir.  
Bu dil ve lehçelerde sadece yetiĢkinler için haber, müzik ve geleneksel kültürün 
tanıtımına yönelik yayınlar yapılabilir.  
Bu dil ve lehçelerin öğretilmesine yönelik yayın yapılamaz.  
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Kamu ve özel ulusal yayın lisansı sahibi radyo ve televizyon kuruluĢları, bu dil ve 
lehçelerdeki yeniden iletim konusu yayınları da dahil olmak üzere; radyo kuruluĢları 
günde 60 dakikayı aĢmamak üzere haftada toplam beĢ saat, televizyon kuruluĢları ise 
günde 45 dakikayı aĢmamak üzere haftada toplam dört saat yayın yapabilirler.  
Bu dil ve lehçelerde yeniden iletim konusu yayınlar dahil, televizyon yayını yapan 
kuruluĢlar bu yayınlarını içerik ve süre açısından bire bir olmak kaydıyla, Türkçe alt 
yazıyla vermekle veya hemen akabinde Türkçe tercümesini yayınlamakla, radyo yayını 
yapan kuruluĢlar ise programın yayınlanmasını takiben Türkçe tercümesini 
yayınlamakla yükümlüdürler.  
 
Başvuru  
Madde 6 - Kamu ve özel radyo ve televizyon kuruluĢları;  
a) Yayın yapmak istedikleri, dil ve/veya lehçeyi, bu dil ve lehçede yayınlanacak 
program türlerini, bu programların, günlük yayın akıĢı içindeki yerleĢimini, aylık ve 
yıllık yayın planlarını belirleyen, kuruluĢun yönetim kurulu kararı,  
b) Münhasıran bu yayınlarla ilgili denetleme kurulu, sorumlu müdür, haber 
biriminde çalıĢanlar ve spikerlerin 3984 sayılı Kanun ve Yönetmeliklerde aranılan 
vasıfları taĢıdıklarına dair belge,  
c) Taahhütnamenin kuruluĢun tüzel kiĢiliğini temsile yetkili kiĢi tarafından noter 
huzurunda imzalanmıĢ örneği ile,  
Üst Kurula baĢvururlar.  
BaĢvurudan sonra meydana gelen değiĢiklikler de Üst Kurul‘a bildirilir ve onayı 
alınır.  
 
ÜÇÜNCÜ BÖLÜM  
Değerlendirme, İzin, Yükümlülükler 
 
Değerlendirme, izin  
Madde 7 - Üst Kurul, Türk vatandaĢlarının günlük yaĢamlarında geleneksel 
olarak kullandıkları farklı dil ve lehçelerde yayın yapmak isteyen kamu ve özel yayın 
kuruluĢlarının baĢvurularındaki bilgi ve belgeleri inceler ve bu yönetmelik hükümlerini 
yerine getiren kuruluĢlara yayın izni verir.  
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Türkçe yayın yapan yayın kuruluĢlarının, günlük, aylık ve yıllık yayın planları 
göz önüne alındığında süreklilik arz etmeyen münferit müzik eserlerinin yayınları ve 
sinema filmlerine yer verilmesi bu izin kapsamı dıĢında değerlendirilir.  
Yayın kuruluĢlarının baĢvurusunun Üst Kurulca reddi kararlarına karĢı yargı yolu 
açıktır.  
 
Yükümlülükler  
Madde 8 - Türkçe‘den baĢka bir dilde de yayın yapmak üzere Üst Kuruldan izin 
alan yayın kuruluĢları yayınlarını; hukukun üstünlüğüne, Anayasanın genel ilkelerine, 
temel hak ve özgürlüklere, milli güvenliğe, genel ahlaka, Cumhuriyetin Anayasada 
belirtilen temel niteliklerine, Devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bütünlüğüne, 3984 
sayılı Kanun ve bu Kanuna dayanılarak çıkartılan yönetmeliklerle düzenlenen esas ve 
ilkelere, Üst Kurulun öngördüğü yükümlülüklere izin Ģartları ve taahhütlerine uygun 
olarak kamu hizmeti anlayıĢı çerçevesinde yapmakla yükümlüdürler.  
Yayın kuruluĢları farklı dil ve lehçelerde yaptıkları yayın süresince stüdyo düzeni, 
mevcut logo, ses efekti ve tanıtıcı ses iĢaretleri dıĢında simgelere yer vermemekle 
yükümlüdürler. Gerektiği takdirde, sadece Türkiye Cumhuriyeti‘nin simgesi 
niteliğindeki görüntü ve iĢaretler kullanılabilir.  
 
DÖRDÜNCÜ BÖLÜM  
Müeyyideler 
 
Müeyyideler  
Madde 9 - Kanundaki esaslara, yayın ilkelerine ve Üst Kurulca öngörülen 
yükümlülüklere aykırı yayın yapan yayın kuruluĢları 3984 sayılı Kanunun 33 üncü 
maddesi hükmü uyarınca cezalandırılır.  
Üst Kurulun izni olmadan Türkçe‘den baĢka bir dil ve lehçede yayın yapan yayın 
kuruluĢlarına 3984 sayılı Kanunun Ek-2 maddesi hükmü uyarınca izinsiz yayın 
müeyyidesi uygulanır.  
Üst Kurul‘ca yayın kuruluĢlarına uygulanacak müeyyidelere karĢı yargı yolu 
açıktır.  
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BEŞİNCİ BÖLÜM  
Çeşitli Hükümler 
Madde 10 — Bu Yönetmelikte hüküm bulunmayan hallerde 3984 sayılı Radyo ve 
Televizyonların KuruluĢ ve Yayınları Hakkındaki Kanuna dayanılarak çıkartılan 
yönetmeliklerin ilgili hükümleri uygulanır.  
Madde 11 — 18/12/2002 tarihli ve 24967 sayılı Resmî Gazetede yayımlanan 
Radyo ve Televizyon Yayınlarının Dili Hakkında Yönetmelik yürürlükten kaldırılmıĢtır.  
Geçici Madde 1 — Türk vatandaĢlarının günlük yaĢamlarında geleneksel olarak 
kullandıkları farklı dil ve lehçelerin izleyici-dinleyici profili belirleninceye kadar bu dil 
ve lehçelerdeki yayın sadece kamu ve özel ulusal yayın kuruluĢları tarafından yapılır.  
Üst Kurul ülke çapındaki talepler yanında, gerekli araĢtırmalar yaptırarak izleyici-
dinleyici profilini çıkarır.  
 
ALTINCI BÖLÜM  
Yürürlük ve Yürütme 
 
Yürürlük  
Madde 12 — Bu Yönetmelik, yayımı tarihinde yürürlüğe girer.  
 
Yürütme  
Madde 13 — Bu Yönetmelik hükümlerini Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu 
yürütür. 
  
258 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
176. BirleĢim, 19.10.1983. (1983). Milli Güvenlik Konseyi Tutanak Dergisi, 11. 
30 Bin Kelimelik Bir Kürtçe Roman Yaz Bastırması Benden. (2003, May 18). Zaman. 
367 Kararıyla Anayasanın Omurgası Kırıldı. (2007, June 27). Yeni Şafak. 
Abramowitz, H. (1991). The Press and the Red Scare, 1919-1921. In R. Edsforth & L. 
Bennett (eds.), Popular Culture and Political Change in Modern America (pp. 61-
80). Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York. 
Ağaoğulları, M. A. (1990). AĢırı Milliyetçi Sağ. In I. Schick & A. Tonak (eds), Geçiş 
Sürecinde Türkiye (pp. 189-212). Istanbul: Belge. 
Ahıska, M. (2005). Radyonu Sihirli Kapısı. Ġstanbul: Metis. 
Ahmad, F. (1993). The Making of Modern Turkey. London: Routledge. 
Akbulut: Kürtçe dil değil, Ģive. (1999, August 10). Hürriyet. 
Akçura, B. (2008). Devletin Kürt Filmi: 1925-2007 Kürt Raporları. Ġstanbul: Ayraç. 
Akçura, Y. (1976). Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu. 
Akman, A. (2004). Modernist Nationalism: Statism and National Identity in Turkey. 
Nationalities Papers, 32 (1), 23- 51. 
Aksamaz, A. Ġ. (2007, June 8). TRT'nin 'Anadil' Yayınları BaĢıyor (mu?). Birgün. 
Aktar, A. (2000a). 1934 Trakya Yahudi Olayları ve Türk Milliyetçiliği. In A. Aktar, 
Varlık Vergisi ve 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları (pp. 71-100). Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
Aktar, A. (2000b). Cumhuriyetin Ġlk Yıllarında Uygulanan 'TürkleĢtirme' Politikaları. In 
A. Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları (pp. 101-134). Ġstanbul: 
ĠletiĢim. 
Aktar, A. (2000c). Nüfusun HomojenleĢtirilmesi ve Ekonominin TürkleĢtirilmesi 
Sürecinde Bir AĢama: Türk-Yunan Nufüs Mübadelesi 1923-1924. In A. Aktar, 
Varlık Vergisi ve 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları (pp. 17-70). Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
Aktar, A. (2000d). Varlık Vergisi Nasıl Uygulandı? In A. Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve 
'Türkleştirme' Politikaları (pp. 135-214). Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
Aktar, A. (2000e). Varlık Vergisi Sırasında Gayrimenkul SatıĢları ile Servet Transferi. 
In A. Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları (pp. 215-244). Ġstanbul: 
ĠletiĢim. 
Aktar, A. (2000f). Varlık Vergisi ve 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları. Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
Akyüz, Y. (1985). Türk Eğitim Tarihi. Ankara: A.Ü. Eğitim Bilimleri Fakültesi 
Yayınları. 
Albayrak, M. (1994). Millet Mekteplerinin Yapısı ve ÇalıĢmaları. Atatürk Araştırma 
Merkezi Dergisi, 10 (92), 471-483. 
Alınak‘a Kürtçe dilekçeden 6 ay hapis. (2008, March 4). Hürriyet. 
259 
 
Amara, M. (2002). The Place of Arabic in Israel. International Journal of Sociology of 
Language (158), 53–68. 
Ammon, U. (ed.). (2006). Sociolinguistics. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities. New York: Verso. 
Arai, M. (2000). Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği. Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
Araplar da Lehçeyi Beğenmedi. (2004, June 9). Akşam. 
Arı, K. (1995). Büyük Mübadele: Türkiye'ye Zorunlu Göç (1923-1925). Ġstanbul: Tarih 
Vakfı Yurt Yayınları. 
Asker Türkçeyi de Koruyor. (2007, September 26). Radikal. 
Aslan, C. (2005). Türkçe Kurultayı: ‗Türkçem, Dilim Dilim…‘. Milli Eğitim (166), 
284–289. 
Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri II (1906-1938) (5th ed.). (1997). n.p.: Atatürk Kültür 
Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, Atatürk AraĢtırma Merkezi. 
Atkins, J. D. (1978). The English Language in Indian Schools. In F. P. Prucha, 
Americanizing the American Indians. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
Atkinson, D. & Kelly-Holmes, H. (2006). Linguistic Normalisation and the Market. 
Language Problems & Language Planning, 30 (3), 239–260. 
Aybar, C. & Aykut, S. (1937). Nazari ve Tatbiki İstatistik Dersleri. Ġstanbul: Devlet 
Basımevi. 
Aydın, S. (2005). "Amacımız Devletin Bekası": Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Devlet ve 
Yurttaşlar. Ġstanbul: TESEV. 
Aydıngün, A. & Aydıngün, Ġ. (2004). The Role of Language in the Formation of 
Turkish National Identity and Turkishness,. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics (10), 
415–432. 
Aytürk, Ġ. (2004). Turkish Linguists against the West: The Origins of Linguistic 
Nationalism in Atatürk‘s Turkey. Middle Eastern Studies, 40 (6), 1 – 25. 
Aziz, A. (1999). Türkiye'de Televizyon Yayıncılığının 30 Yılı. Ankara: Türkiye Radyo 
Televizyon Kurumu. 
Backhaus, P. (2007). Linguistic Landscapes: A Comparative Study of Urban 
Multilingualism in Tokyo. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. 
Balçık, M. B. (2002). Milliyetçilik ve Dil Politikaları. In T. Bora (ed.), Modern 
Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 4: Milliyetçilik (pp. 777-787). Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
Balçık, M. B. (2006). Televizyon Dünyası ve Dil TartıĢmaları. In A. Menz & C. 
Schroeder (Eds.), Türkiye'de Dil Tartışmaları (pp. 85-118). Ġstanbul: Ġstanbul 
Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları. 
Baldauf, R. & Kaplan, R. (eds.). (2005). Language Planning and Policy in Europe (Vol. 
1). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. 
260 
 
Baldauf, R. & Kaplan, R. (eds.). (2006). Language Planning and Policy in Europe (Vol. 
2). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. 
Bali, R. N. (1999). Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme 
Serüveni (1923-1945). Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
Bali, R. N. (2001). Musa'nın Evlatları Cumhuriyet‟in Yurttaşları. Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
Banarlı, N. S. (1999). Türkçenin Sırları. Ġstanbul: Kubbealtı NeĢriyatı. 
Barbour, S. & Carmichael, C. (. (2000). Language and Nationalism in Europe. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Barker, C. (1999). Television, Globalisation and Cultural Identities. Buckingham: Open 
University Press. 
BaĢbuğ, H. (1984). İki Türk Boyu: Zaza ve Kurmancılar. Ankara: Türk Kültürünü 
AraĢtırma Enstitüsü Yayınları. 
Bauman, R. & Briggs, C. (2003). Voices of Modernity: Language Ideologies and the 
Politics of Inequality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Baykal: Anadilde Yayın Devlet Eliyle Olmamalı. (2004, June 9). Radikal. 
Belediye'den Kürtçe hizmet! (2007, January 5). Milliyet. 
Belge, M. (1983). Türk Dilinde GeliĢmeler. In Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye 
Ansiklopedisi (Vol. 10, pp. 2588-2606). Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim Yayınları. 
Belge, M. (2005). Osmanlı'da Kurumlar ve Kültür. Ġstanbul: Ġstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi 
Yayınları. 
Belli, M. (2004). Türkiye Yunanistan Nüfus Mübadelesi. Ġstanbul: Belge. 
Benrabah, M. (2005). The Language Planning Situation in Algeria. Current Issues in 
Language Planning, 6 (4), 379-502. 
Ben-Rafael, E., Shohamy, E., Amara, M. H. & Trumper-Hecht, N. (2004). Linguistic 
Landscape and Multiculturalism: A Jewish-Arab Comparative Study. Tel Aviv 
University: The Tami Steinmetz Centre for Peace Research. 
Berkes, N. (2007). Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma (2nd ed.). Ġstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları. 
BİA 2007 Medya Gözlem Raporu (2007). Retrieved on July 7, 2008 from 
http://www.bianet.org/bianet/kategori/bianet/104186/bia-2007-medya-gozlem-
raporu-tam-metin. 
BİA 2008 Medya Gözlem Raporu - Ocak-Şubat-Mart (2008). Retrieved on July 7, 2008 
from http://www.bianet.org/bianet/kategori/bianet/106671/bia-medya-gozlem-
raporu-tam-metin-1. 
Bilaniuk, L. (2005). Contested Tongues: Language Politics and Cultural Correction in 
Ukraine. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Bir Efsanenin Sonu. (2005, July 19). Radikal. 
Bishop, E. (2006). Azerbaijan: Language Situation. In Encyclopedia of Language and 
Linguistics (2nd ed., Vol. 1, pp. 634-635). New York: Elsevier. 
261 
 
Bissenova, A. (2004, April 7). Language Debate in Kazakhstan Reflects Russian-
Kazakh Tensions. Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, 5-6. 
Bitez‟de tabelalar değişiyor. (2007, May 02). Retrieved July 25, 2008, from Kent TV: 
http://www.kenttv.net/haber.php?id=2835. 
Biz Kimiz? - 2. (2007, March 20). Milliyet pp. 16-17. 
Biz Kimiz? - 4. (2007, March 22). Milliyet, pp. 16-17. 
Blau, J. (1992). Kürt Dili ve Edebiyatı. In Uluslararası Paris Kürt Konferansı: Kürtler, 
İnsan Hakları ve Kütlürel Kimlik (October 14-15, 1989) (pp. 50-55). Istanbul: 
Doz Yayınları. 
Blommaert, J. (1996). Language Planning as a Discourse on Language and Society: The 
Linguistic Ideology of a Scholarly Tradition. Language Problems and Language 
Planning, 20 (3), 199-222. 
Blommaert, J. (ed.). (1999). Language Ideological Debates. Berlin and New York: 
Mouton de Gruyter. 
Blommaert, J. (2005a). Discourse: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Blommaert, J. (2005b). Situating language rights: English and Swahili in Tanzania 
revisited. Journal of Sociolinguistics, 9 (3), 390-417. 
Blommaert, J. (2006). Language Ideology. In Encyclopedia of Language and 
Linguistics (2nd ed., Vol. 7, pp. 510-522). New York: Elsevier. 
Bora, T. (1998). Türk Sağının Üç Hali. Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
BoĢnaklar Sitemkâr. (2004, June 8). Radikal. 
Bosworth, C. E. (1965a). Language Reform and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: A 
Brief Conspectus (First Installment). Muslim World, 55 (1), 58-65. 
Bosworth, C. E. (1965b). Language Reform and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: A 
Brief Conspectus (Second Installment). Muslim World, 55 (2), 117-124. 
Bourdieu, P. (1991). The Production and Reproduction of Legitimate Language. In 
Language and Symbolic Power (pp. 43-65). Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Boyd, A. (1998). An Atlas of World Affairs (10th ed.). London: Routledge. 
Brendemoen, B. (1990). The Turkish Language Reform and Language Policy in 
Turkey. In G. Hazai, Handbuch der Türkischen Sprachwissenschaft. Budapest: 
Akademiai Kaido. 
Brown, N. A. (2005). Language and Identity in Belarus. Language Policy (4), 311-332. 
Brown, N. A. (2007). Status Language Planning in Belarus: An Examination of Written 
Discourse in Public Spaces. Language Policy (6), 281–301. 
Brutt-Griffler, J. (2002). World English: A Study of its Development. Clevedon: 
Multilingual Matters. 
262 
 
Büyükanıt, Y. (2006, October 2). Harp Akademileri 2006-2007 Eğitim ve Öğretim Yılı 
Açılış Konuşması. Retrieved July 25, 2008, from Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri 
Genelkurmay BaĢkanlığı: 
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konus
malar/2006/harpakademilerikonusmasi_02102006.html 
Büyükkantarcıoğlu, N. (2004). A Sociolinguistic Analysis of the Present Dimensions of 
English as a Foreign Language in Turkey. International Journal of Sociology of 
Language (165), 33-58. 
Bugarski, R. (1992). Language Situation and General Policy. In R. Bugarski & C. 
Hawkesworth (eds), Language Planning in Yugoslavia (pp. 10-26). Columbus, 
OH: Slavica. 
Bugün Arapça Yarın Kürtçe. (2004, June 8). Akşam. 
Burke, P. (2004). Languages and Communities in Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Çağaptay, S. (2002). Reconfiguring the Turkish Nations in the 1930s. Nationalism and 
Ethnic Politics, 8 (2), 67-82. 
Çağaptay, S. (2006). Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a 
Turk? London and New York: Routledge. 
Cameron, D. (1995). Verbal Hygiene. London: Routledge. 
Cameron, D. (2006). Verbal Hygiene. In Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics 
(2nd ed., Vol. 12, pp. 407-408). New York: Elsevier. 
Can, K. (2002). Ülkücü Hareketin Ġdoelojisi. In T. Bora (ed.), Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi 
Düşünce: Milliyetçilik (Vol. 4, pp. 663-705). Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
Cankaya, Ö. (2003). TRT: Bir İletişim Kurumunun Tarihi (1927-2000). Ġstanbul: Yapı 
Kredi Yayınları. 
Çarkoğlu, A. & Rubin, B. (eds.). (2003). Turkey and the European Union: Domestic 
Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics. London: Frank Cass. 
Carroll, T. (1997). From Script to Speech: Language policy in Japan in the 1980s and 
1990s. Nissan Occasional Paper Series (27), retrieved February 14, 2008, from 
http://www.nissan.ox.ac.uk/nops/nops27.pdf,. 
Chambliss, D. F. (2005). Frame Analysis. In G. Ritzer (ed.), Encyclopedia of Social 
Theory (Vol. 1, pp. 289-290). London: Sage. 
Chimombo, M. (1999). Language and Politics. Annual Review of Applied Linguistics, 
19, 215-232. 
Christiansen, P. V. (2006). Language Policy in the European Union. Language 
Problems & Language Planning, 30 (1), 21-44. 
Çolak, Y. (2004). Language Policy and Official Ideology in Early Republican Turkey. 
Middle Eastern Studies, 40 (6), 67 – 91. 
Cooper, R. L. (1989). Language Planning and Social Change. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
263 
 
Coulmas, F. (ed.). (1991). A Language Policy for the European Union. Berlin: Mouton 
de Gruyter. 
Coulmas, F. (1998). Language Rights: Interests Of State, Language Groups and the 
Individual. Language Sciences, 20 (1), 63-72. 
Coulmas, F. (2003). Japanese Minorities, old and new. In T. Katsuragi (ed.), Kotoba to 
Kyosei [Language and the Idea of Mutual Tolerance]. Tokyo: Sangensha 
Publishing. 
Coulmas, F. (2004). Changing Language Regimes. Abstracts Handbook: International 
Conference on Changing Language Regimes in Globalizing Environments, 
Europe and Japan: Duisburg-Essen University 31 March - 2 April 2004, (p. 5). 
Retrieved on February 14, 2008 from http://www.uni-
duisburg.de/Institute/OAWISS/download/doc/Language.pdf. 
Coulmas, F. (2005a). Changing Language Regimes in Globalizing Environments. 
International Journal of Sociology of Language (175/176), 3-15. 
Coulmas, F. (2005b). Sociolinguistics: The Study of Speakers' Choices. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Coulmas, F. (ed.). (2007). Language Regimes in Transformation: Future Prospects for 
German and Japanese in Science, Economy and Politics. Berlin and New York: 
Walter de Gruyter. 
Crowley, T. (1996). Language in History: Theories and Text. London: Routledge. 
Crystal, D. (2003). English as a Global Language (2nd ed. ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Daoust, D. (1998). Language Planning and Language Reform. In F. Coulmas (ed.), The 
Handbook of Sociolinguistics. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Davis, H., Hammond, P. & Nizamova, L. (2000). Media, Language Policy and Cultural 
Change in Tatarstan: Historic vs. Pragmatic Claims to Nationhood. Nations and 
Nationalism, 6 (2), 203-226. 
Dean, M. (1994). Critical and Effective Histories: Foucault's Methods and Historical 
Sociology. London: Routledge. 
Demir, E. (2005). Kürt Dili, Yapısı, Dünü ve Bugünü. In Anadilde Eğitim ve Azınlık 
Hakları (pp. 83-116). Ġstanbul: Sorun Yayınları. 
Demir, H. & Akar, R. (1994). İstanbul‟un Son Sürgünleri: 1964‟te Rumların Sınırdışı 
Edilmesi. Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
Demircan, Ö. (1988). Dünden Bugüne Türkiye‟de Yabancı Dil. Ġstanbul: Remzi 
Kitapevi. 
Demircan, Ö. (2006, November 30). Öğrenici Açısından Yabancıdil Öğretimi ile 
Yabancı Dilde Öğretim İlişkisi. Retrieved May 11, 2008, from Yıldız Teknik 
Üniversitesi Yabancı Diller Eğitimi Bölümü: 
http://www.yde.yildiz.edu.tr/sunumdosyalar/s_061130.htm 
Demirel, A. (2001). İsmet İnönü: Defterler. Ġstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları. 
264 
 
Deringil, S. (2002). İktidarın Sembolleri ve İdeoloji: II. Abdülhamit Dönemi (1876-
1909). Ġstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları. 
Desaulniers, J. P. (1985). Télévision et nationalisme. Communication Information, 7 
(3). 
Devlet Ġstatistik Enstitüsü. (2005). Hanehalkı Bilişim Teknolojileri Kullanımı 
Araştırması Sonuçları.  
Devlet Kırmanci konuĢtu. (2004, June 10). Radikal. 
Devlet Planlama TeĢkilatı. (2000). Türk Dili Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu. Ankara. 
Retrieved on May 10, 2005 from http://ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/turkdili/oik542.pdf. 
DGM'de Ġlk Defa Kürtçe Tercüman. (2000, January 16). Sabah. 
Dilaçar, A. (1962). Devlet Dili Olarak Türkçe. Ankara: TDK. 
Doğançay-Aktuna, S. (1998). The Spread of English in Turkey and its Current 
Sociolinguistic Profile. Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, 
19 (1), 23-39. 
Doğançay-Aktuna, S. (2004). Language Planning in Turkey: Yesterday and Today. 
International Journal of Sociology of Language (165), 5-32. 
Doğançay-Aktuna, S. & Kızıltepe, Z. (2005). English in Turkey. World Englishes, 24 
(2), 253–265. 
Doğu Mitingi Düzenleyenler Adliye'de. (1967, September 10). Milliyet. 
Doğu Mitingi Komite BaĢkanı Tutuklandı. (1967, September 27). Akşam. 
Doğu Mitingi. (1967, September 12). Ant (32). 
Dündar, C. (2004, June 8). Alımlı Bir EbemkuĢağı. Milliyet. 
Dündar, F. (1999). Türkiye‟de Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar. Ġstanbul: Doz. 
Düzgören, K. (1994). Kürt Çıkmazı. Ankara: V Yayınları. 
Dunn, J. A. (1974). The Revision of the Constitution in Belgium: A Study in the 
Institutionalization of Ethnic Conflict. The Western Political Quarterly, 21 (1), 
143-163. 
Dwyer, A. M. (2005). The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and 
Political Discourse. Washington: East-West Center Washington. 
Edensor, T. (2002). National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life. Oxford and 
New York: Berg. 
Eğitim-Sen için gerekçeler. (2005, July 30). Radikal. 
Eğitim-Sen Tüzükten 'Anadil'i Çıkardı. (2005, July 4). Radikal. 
Eisenlohr, P. (2004). Language Revitalization and New Technologies: Cultures of 
Electronic Mediation and the Refiguring of Communities. Annual Review 
Anthropology (33), 21-45. 
Entessar, N. (1992). Kurdish Ethnonationalism. Boulder and London: Lynne Publishers. 
265 
 
Eraydın-Virtanen, Ö. (2003a). Dil Politikalarının Milliyetçilik Hareketlerindeki Tarihsel 
Kökenleri. In E. Uzpeder (ed.), Avrupa Birliği Sürecinde Dil Hakları (pp. 18-20). 
Ġstanbul: Helsinki YurttaĢlar Derneği. 
Eraydın-Virtanen, Ö. (2003b). Recent Changes in Turkey‟s Language Legislation. 
Mercator Working Papers. Barcelona: CIEMEN (Escarré International Centre for 
Ethnic Minorities and Nations). Retreived on July 20, 2008 at 
http://www.ciemen.org/mercator/Menu_nou/index.cfm?lg=gb. 
Erdal, Ġ. (2006). Mübadele Uluslaşma Sürecinde Türkiye ve Yunanistan 1923-1925. 
Ġstanbul: IQ Kültür-Sanat Yayıncılık. 
Erdoğan, N. (1998). Popüler Anlatılar ve Kemalist Pedagoji. Birikim (105-106), 117-
125. 
Erenoğlu, Ö. & Otçu, S. (2007). Türkçenin Doğru Kullanımı: İletişim, Etkili Konuşma, 
Yazma Ve Okuma Kılavuzu. Ankara: Genelkurmay Askerî Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt 
BaĢkanlığı Yayınları. 
Eriksen, T. H. (1993). Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives. 
London: Pluto Press. 
Erol, B. (2003). Yabancı Dil Eğitimi mi, Yabancı Dilde Eğitim mi? In B. Yediyıldız 
(ed.), Dil, Kültür ve Çağdaşlaşma (pp. 269-276). Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi 
Atatürk Ġlke ve Ġnkılapları Enstitüsü. 
Eröz, M. (1982). Doğu Anadolu'nun Türklüğü. Ġstanbul: Ġrfan Yayınevi. 
Ersanlı-Behar, B. (1992). İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye‟de “Resmi Tarih” Tezinin Oluşumu 
(1929-1937). Ġstanbul: Afa. 
Ertem, R. (1991). Elifbe'den Alfabe'ye. Ġstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları. 
Ertop, K. (1963). Atatürk Devriminde Türk Dili. In Atatürk ve Türk Dili. Ankara: TDK. 
Eser KarakaĢ ile Röportaj. (2000, November 19). Zaman. 
Esman, M. J. (1982). The Politics of Official Bilingualism in Canada. Political Science 
Quarterly, 97 (2), 233-253. 
Ethnologue Report for Turkey. (2005). Retrieved July 24, 2008, from Ethnologue: 
http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=TR 
Extra, G. & Gorter, D. (eds.). (2001). The Other Languages of Europe. Clevedon: 
Multilingual Matters. 
Foucault, M. (1979). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: 
Vintage Books. 
Foucault, M. (1981). Questions of Method: An Interview with Michel Foucault. I & C 
(Spring 1981, 8), pp. 3-14. 
Foucault, M. (2002). The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. 
London: Routledge. 
Frey, F. W. (1965). The Turkish Political Elite. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. 
266 
 
Friedman, P. K. (2005). Learning "Local" Languages: Passive Revolution, Language 
Markets, and Aborigine Education in Taiwan.. Unpublished Ph. D., The Temple 
University. 
Fumagalli, M. (2007). Framing Ethnic Minority Mobilisation in Central Asia: The 
Cases of Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Europe-Asia Studies, 59 (4), 567–
590. 
Galanti, A. (1927). Arab Harfleri Terakkimize Mani Değildir. Ġstanbul: n.p. 
Galanti, A. (1928). Vatandaş: Türkçe Konuş! Yahut Türkçe'nin Tamimi Meselesi. 
Ġstanbul: Hüsn-ü Tabiat Matbaası. 
Garipov, Y. Z. & Faller, H. M. (2003). The Politics of Language Reform and 
Bilingualism in Tatarstan. In F. Daftary & F. Grin, Nation-Building, Ethnicity and 
Language Politics in Transition Countries (pp. 163-184). Budapest: Open Society 
Institute. 
Geiger, R. L. (1980). The Changing Demand for Higher Education in the Seventies: 
Adaptations within Three National Systems. Higher Education, 9 (3), 255-276. 
Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Gellner, E. (1994). Nationalism and Modernization. In J. Hutchinson & A. D. Smith, 
Nationalism (pp. 55-63). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gellner, E. & Smith, A. D. (1996). The Nation: Real or Imagined? The Warwick 
Debates on Nationalism. Nations and Nationalism, 2 (3), 358–388. 
Genelkurmay‘dan ‗Önce Türkçe‘ AfiĢi. (2008, June 19). Hürriyet. 
Gessinger, J. (1980). Sprache und Bürgertum: Zur Socialgeschichte sprachliher 
Verkehrsformen in Deutschland des 18. Jahrhunderts. Stuttgart: Metzler. 
Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Giliomee, H. (2004). The Rise and Possible Demise of Afrikaans as Public Language. 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 10, 25–58. 
Ginsburgh, V. & Weber, S. (2005). Language disenfranchisement in the European 
Union. Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS), 43 (2), 273–286. 
Giritli, Ġ. (1989). Kürt Türklerinin Gerçeği. n.p.: Yeni Forum Yayıncılık. 
Gitlin, T. (1980). The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and 
Unmaking of the New Left. Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press. 
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame Analysis. New York: Harper and Row. 
Gökaçtı, M. A. (2003). Nüfus Mübadelesi: Kayıp Bir Kuşağın Hikayesi. Ġstanbul: 
ĠletiĢim. 
Göksel, A. (2006). Turkey: Language Situation. In K. Brown (ed.), Encyclopedia of 
Language and Linguistics (2nd ed., Vol. 13, pp. 160-161). New York: Elsevier. 
267 
 
Göktürk, E. D. (2002). 1919-1923 Dönemi Türk Milliyetçilikleri. In T. Bora (ed.), 
Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 4: Milliyetçilik (pp. 103-116). Ġstanbul: 
ĠletiĢim. 
Gordon, R. G. (ed.). (2005). Ethnologue: Languages of the World (15th ed.). Dallas, 
Texas: SIL International. Online version: http://www.ethnologue.com/. 
Gorter, D. (ed.). (2006). Linguistic Landscape: New Approach to Multilingualism. 
Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. 
Gottlieb, N. (2005). Language and Society in Japan. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Goujon, A. (1999). Language, Nationalism, and Populism in Belarus. Nationalities 
Papers, 27 (4), 661-677. 
Gözler, K. (2001). Devletin Bir Unsuru Olarak 'Millet' Kavramı. Türkiye Günlüğü (64), 
108-123. 
Greenberg, R. D. (2001). Language, Nationalism and the Yugoslav Successor States. In 
C. C. O‘Reilly (ed.), Language, Ethnicity and the State Volume 2: Minority 
Languages in Eastern Europe post-1989 (pp. 17-43). Hampshire and New York: 
Palgrave. 
Griffiths, G. (1997). Documentation and Communication in Postcolonial Societies: The 
Politics of Control. In A. Gurr (ed.), The Yearbook of English Studies: The 
Politics of Postcolonial Criticism (pp. 130-136). London: W.S. Maney and Son 
Ltd. for the Modern Humanities Research Association. 
Grin, F. (2003). Language Policy Evaluation and the European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Grumadiene, L. (2005). Language Policy and the Sociolinguistic Situation in Lithuania. 
Barcelona: CIEMEN (Escarré International Centre for Ethnic Minorities and 
Nations). 
Gülensoy, T. (1986). Doğu Anadolu Osmanlıcası: Etimolojik Sözlük Denemesi. Ankara: 
Türk Kültürünü AraĢtırma Enstitüsü. 
Güven, D. (2006). 6-7 Eylül Olayları: Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları 
Bağlamında. Ġstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları. 
Halls, W. D. (1983). Belgium: A Case Study in Educational Regionalism. Comparative 
Education, 19 (2), 169-177. 
Hamel, R. (1997). Introduction: Linguistic Human Rights in a Sociolinguistic 
Perspective. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 27, 1-24. 
Hanks, W. F. (2005). Pierre Bourdieu and the Practices of Language. Annual Review 
Anthropology (34), 67–83. 
Harvey, D. (1997). Postmodernliğin Durumu. Ġstanbul: Metis. 
Hassanpour, A. (1995). A Stateless Nation's Quest for Sovereignty in the Sky. Retrieved 
May 4, 2008, from http://www.kurdistanica.com/english/media/articles/media-
articles-01.html 
268 
 
Hatayı düzelttik. (1991, January 27). Cumhuriyet. 
Haugen, E. (1966). Linguistics and Language Planning. In W. Bright (ed.), 
Sociolinguistics (pp. 50-71). Mouton: The Hague. 
Haugen, E. (1983). The Implementation of Corpus Planning: Theory and Practice. In J. 
Cobarrubias & J. A. Fishman (eds), Progress in Language Planning (pp. 269-
289). Berlin: Mouton. 
Heinrich, P. (2005). Language Ideology in JFL Textbooks. International Journal of 
Sociology of Language (175/176), 213-232. 
Heinrich, P. (2007). The Debate on English as an Official Language in Japan. In F. 
Coulmas (ed.), Language Regimes in Transformation: Future Prospects for 
German and Japanese in Science, Economy and Politics (pp. 115-139). Berlin and 
New York: Walter de Gruyter. 
Hepçilingirler, F. (1998). Türkçe ”Off”. Ġstanbul: Remzi Kitapevi. 
Heper, M. (2007). The State and Kurds in Turkey: The Question of Assimilation. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Heyd, U. (2001). Türkiye'de Dil Devrimi. Ġstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık. 
Hicks, D. (2002). Scotland's Linguistic Landscape: The Lack of Policy and Planning 
with Scotland's Place-Names and Signage. World Congress on Language 
Policies: Barcelona, April 16-20, 2002. Retrieved February 16, 2008 from 
http://www.linguapax.org/congres/taller/taller2/Hicks.html. 
Hirschon, R. (2005a). Ege'yi Geçerken: 1923 Türk Yunan Zorunlu Nüfus Mübadelesi. 
Ġstanbul: Ġstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi. 
Hirschon, R. (2005b). Mübadele Çocukları. Ġstanbul: Tarih Vakfı. 
Hobsbawm, E. J. (1993). Milletler ve Milliyetçilik. Ġstanbul: Ayrıntı. 
Hobsbawm, E. J. (1996). Language, Culture and National Identity. Social Research, 63 
(4), 1065-1080. 
Hobsbawm, E. & Ranger, T. (eds.). (1983). The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hogan-Brun, G. (2005a). Language in Society across the Baltic Republics: A 
Comparative Overview. Journal of Baltic Studies, 36 (3), 273-282. 
Hogan-Brun, G. (2005b). The Baltic Republics and Language Ideological Debates 
Surrounding European Union Accession. Journal of Multilingual and 
Multicultural Development, 26 (5), 367-377. 
Hogan-Brun, G. & Wolff, S. (eds.). (2003). Minority Languages in Europe. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hornberger, N. H. (2006). Frameworks and Models in Language Policy and Planning. 
In T. Ricento, An Introduction to Language Policy: Theory and Method (pp. 24-
41). Blackwell. 
269 
 
Horspool, M. (2006). Over the rainbow: Languages and law in the future of the 
European Union. Futures (38), 158–168. 
House, J. (2003). English as a Lingua Franca: A Threat to Multilingualism? Journal of 
Sociolinguistics, 7 (4), 556-578. 
Hür, A. (2005, June 30). Ülkenin çektiği dil belası. Radikal. 
Irvine, J. T. (1989). When Talk isn‘t Cheap: Language and Political Economy. 
American Ethnologist, 16 (2), 248-267. 
Ġlk Yayın BoĢnaklar Ġçin. (2004, June 9). Birgün. 
Ġmer, K. (1998). Türkiye'de Dil Planlaması: Türk Dil Devrimi. Ankara: T.C. Kültür 
Bakanlığı. 
Ġnan, M. R. (1979). Atatürk Devrimleri ve Yazı DeğiĢimi: Yazı Devrimi. In Yazı 
Devrimi. Ankara: TDK. 
Ġremet, F. (1996). Dilimiz Zazaca (Zonê Ma Zazaki). Iremet Förlag: Stockholm. 
Ġsim Yasağı Ayıbına Son. (2003, September 23). Radikal. 
İslâm Ansiklopedisi (Vol. 28). (1988). Ġstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Ġslam 
Ansiklopedisi Genel Müdürlüğü. 
Ġsteyenin Bir Yüzü... (2002, January 11). Radikal. 
Janmaat, J. G. (1999). Language Politics in Education and the Response of the Russians 
in Ukraine. Nationalities Papers, 27 (3), 475-501. 
Janson, T. (2002). Speak: A Short History of Languages. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Johanson, L. (2006). Turkic Languages. In Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics 
(2nd ed., pp. 161-164). New York: Elsevier. 
Joseph, J. E. (2006). ‗The Grammatical Being Called a Nation‘: History and the 
Construction of Political and Linguistic Nationalism. In N. Love (ed.), Language 
and History: Integrationist Perspectives (p. 2006). Oxon: Routledge. 
Joseph, J. E. & Taylor, T. J. (eds.). (1990). Ideologies of Language. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Kamwangamalu, N. M. (2001). The Language Planning Situation in South Africa. 
Current Issues in Language Policy, 2 (4), 361-445. 
Kamwendo, G. & Mooko, T. (2006). Language planning in Botswana and Malawi: a 
comparative study. International Journal of Sociology of Language (182), 117–
133. 
Kansu, A. (2001). 1908 Devrimi. Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
Kantarcıoğlu, S. (1998). Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümet Programlarında Kültür. 
Ankara: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları. 
KarakuĢ, Ġ. (2006). Atatürk Dönemi Eğitim Sisteminde Türkçe Öğretimi. Ankara: Türk 
Dil Kurumu. 
270 
 
Karal, E. Z. (1978). Osmanlı Tarihinde Türk Dili Sorunu. In Bilim, Kültür ve Öğretim 
Dili Olarak Türkçe (pp. 7-96). Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu. 
Karpat, K. H. (2004). A Language in Search of a Nation: Turkish in the Nation-State. In 
K. H. Karpat, Studies on Turkish Politics and Society: Selected Articles and 
Essays (pp. 435-465). Leiden and Boston: Brill. 
Karpat, K. H. (2006). Osmnalı'da Değişim, Modernleşme ve Uluslaşma. Ġstanbul: Ġmge. 
Katsuragi, T. (2005). Japanese Language Policy from the Point of View of Public 
Philosophy. International Journal of Sociology of Language (175/176), 41-54. 
KayıĢ, N. (2000, September 18). Televizyonlarda Yeni Yayın Döneminin Başlaması 
Dolayısıyla Yapılan Basın Açıklaması. Retrieved December 16, 2005, from 
RTÜK: http://www.rtuk.org.tr/bas20.htm 
Kejanlıoğlu, D. B. (1989). Türkiye'de Yayıncılık Politikası: Ekonomik ve Siyasal 
Boyutlarıyla Türkiye'de Televizyon Yayıncılığı. Unpublised PhD Thesis, Ankara 
Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü. 
Keller, R. (1994). Sprachwandel — von der unsichtbaren Hand in der Sprache. 
Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag. 
Keyder, Ç. (2001). Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar (7th ed.). Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim Yayınları. 
Kili, S. & Gözübüyük, ġ. (2000). Türk Anayasa Metinleri (2nd ed.). Ġstanbul: Türkiye ĠĢ 
Bankası Kültür Yayınları. 
Kinross, P. (1977). The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire. 
New York: Morrow Quill Paperbacks. 
KiriĢçi, K. & Winrow, G. M. (1997). Kürt Sorunu: Kökeni ve Gelişimi. Ġstanbul: Tarih 
Vakfı Yurt Yayınları. 
Kırkgöz, Y. (2007). Language Planning and Implementation in Turkish Primary 
Schools. Current Issues in Language Planning, 8 (2), 174-191. 
Kloss, H. (1969). Research Possibilities on Group Bilingualism: A report. Québec: 
Université Laval. 
Koç, Ġ., Hancıoğlu, A. & Çavlin, A. (2008). Demographic Differentials and 
Demographic Integration of Turkish and Kurdish Populations in Turkey. 
Population Research and Policy Review, (Published online: 7 February 2008, DOI 
10.1007/s11113-008-9072). 
Kocatürk, U. (1984). Atatürk‟ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri. Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi. 
Koenig, T., Mihelj, S., Downey, J. & Bek, M. G. (2006). Media Framings of the issue 
of Turkish Accession to the EU: A European or National Process? Innovation, 19 
(2), 149-169. 
Köksoy, M. (2000). Yabancı Dille Eğitim: Türk Yükseköğretiminde Yabancı Dille 
Eğitim, Bilimlik Dergiler ve Türkçemiz. Ankara: Ahmet Yesevi Üniversitesi 
Yardım Vakfı Bilig Yayınları. 
Koloğlu, O. (1979). Turkish-Arab Relations as Reflected in the Arabic Press". In O. 
Koloğlu, Türk-Arap İlişkileri. Ankara: n.p. 
271 
 
Kongar, E. (2003). Yozlaşan Medya ve Yozlaşan Türkçe. Ġstanbul: Remzi Kitapevi. 
Kroskrity, P. V. (2000a). Regimenting Languages: Language Ideological Perspectives. 
In P. V. Kroskrity (ed.), Regimes of Language: Ideologies, Polities, Identities (pp. 
1-34). Santa Fe: School of American Research. 
Kroskrity, P. V. (ed.). (2000b). Regimes of Language: Ideologies, Polities, and 
Identities. Santa Fe: School of American Research. 
Kroskrity, P. V. (2004). Language Ideologies. In A. Duranti, A Companion to Linguistic 
Anthropology (pp. 496-517). Oxford: Blackwell. 
Kubilay, Ç. (2004). Türkiye‘de Anadillere Yönelik Düzenlemeler ve Kamusal Alan: 
Anadil ve Resmi Dil EĢitlemesinin Kırılması. İletişim Araştırmaları (2004 Güz). 
Küçük Asya AraĢtırmaları Merkezi. (2002). Göç: Rumların Anadolu'dan Mecburi 
Ayrılışı (1919-1923). Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
Kürtçe Dil Kursu ‗Kapı'ya Takıldı. (2003, October 13). Hürriyet. 
'Kürtçe' Dilekçeye Hapis Cezası. (2008, February 7). Retrieved February 7, 2008, from 
NTVMSNBC: http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/434879.asp 
'Kürtçe Eğitim' Dedi, Tutuklandı. (2002, January 11). Milliyet. 
Kürtçe Esnekliği. (2000, December 04). Zaman. 
Kürtçe Isim Davası. (2003, November 19). Sabah. 
Kürtçe Ġsme Ġzin. (2000, March 5). Hürriyet. 
Kürtçe Kursa Merdiven Engeli. (2003, November 11). Radikal. 
Kürtçe Kursun Ismine Itiraz. (2003, June 9). Radikal. 
Kürtçe Kursuna Ġzin Yok. (1997, April 28). Zaman. 
Kürtçe Kursuna Kürtçe Engeli. (2003, June 6). Hürriyet. 
Kürtçe Sokak Ġsimlerine Veto. (2007, February 26). Milliyet. 
Kürtçe Televizyon Hakkında Siyasilerin Yorumları. (2000, November 16). Zaman. 
Kürtçe TV PKK oyunu. (2000, December 8). Hürriyet. 
Kürtçe Yayına Eksik Evrak Engeli. (2005, November 24). Retrieved December 12, 
2005, from NTVMSNBC: http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/351018.asp 
Kürtçe Yayında Kültürel Devrim. (2006, June 11). Radikal. 
Kurban, D., Yükseker, D., Çelik, A. B., Ünalan, T. & Aker, A. T. (2006). "Zorunlu Göç 
ile Yüzleşmek": Türkiye‟de Yerinden Edilme Sonrası Vatandaşlığın İnşası. 
Ġstanbul: TESEV. 
Kurdish Human Rights Project. (2005). Recognition of linguistic rights? The impact of 
pro-EU reforms in Turkey: Fact Finding Mission. London: Kurdish Human 
Rights Project. 
Kushner, D. (1977). The Rise of Turkish Nationalism. London: Frank Cass. 
272 
 
LaGro, E. & Jørgensen, K. E. (eds.). (2007). Turkey and the European Union: 
Prospects for a Difﬁcult Encounter. Hampshire, UK and New York, NY, USA: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lai, P. S. & Byram, M. (2003). The Politics of Bilingualism: a Reproduction Analysis 
of the Policy of Mother Tongue Education in Hong Kong after 1997. Compare, 33 
(3), 315-334. 
Laitin, D. D. (2000). What is a language community? American Journal of Political 
Science, 44 (1), 142-155. 
Landry, R. & Bourhis, R. Y. (1997). Linguistic Landscape and Ethnolinguistic Vitality: 
An Empirical study. Journal of Language and Social Psychology 16 (1),. Journal 
of Language and Social Psychology, 16 (1), 23–49. 
Languages of Europe. (2008). Retrieved October 7, 2008, from The European Union: 
http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/lang/languages/index_en.html 
Lehçelerde Nüfus SavaĢı. (2004, October 25). Yeni Şafak. 
Lemert, C. & Branaman, A. (eds.). (1997). The Goffman Reader. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Lenaerts, G. (2001). A Failure to Comply with the EU Language Policy: A Study of the 
Council Archives. Multilingua, 20 (3), 221–244. 
Lepschy, A. L. & Lepschy, G. (2005). Italian. In Encyclopedia of Language and 
Linguistics (2 ed., Vol. 6, pp. 60-64). Elsevier. 
Levend, A. S. (1972). Türk Dilinde Gelişme ve Sadeleşme Evreleri. Ankara: Türk Dil 
Kurumu Yayınları. 
Levi, A. (1996). Türkiye Cumhuriyeti‟nde Yahudiler. Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
Lewis, B. (1961). The Emergence of Modern Turkey. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lewis, B. (1980). Türkiye: BatılılaĢma. Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, 
37 (1-4), 153-178. [originally: 1955, "Turkey: Westernization", in Gustave E. von 
Grunebaum (ed.) "Unity and Varlety in Müslim Civilization", University of 
Chicago Press. Proceedings of the Conference: Unity and Diversity in Islamic 
Civilization, 1953]. 
Lewis, G. (2004). Trajik Başarı: Türk Dil Reformu. Ġstanbul: Gelenek. 
Louw, P. E. (2004). Political Power, National Identity, and Language: the Case of 
Afrikaans. International Journal of Sociology og Language (170), 43-58. 
Loyal, S. (2003). The Sociology of Anthony Giddens. London: Pluto. 
Maffi, L. (2001). On Biocultural Diversity: Linking Language, Knowledge, and the 
Environment. Washington, D.C., Smithsonian Institution Press. 
Maffi, L. (ed.). (2000). Language, Knowledge and the Environment: The 
Interdependence of Biological and Cultural Diversity. Washington, D.C.: 
Smithsonian Institution Press. 
273 
 
Magyar, J. (. (2006). The Ideological Foundations of Europe: Unity in Diversity. 
Conference Proceedings. April 20-21, 2006. Budapest: Representation of the 
European Commission in Hungary. 
Mahçupyan, E. (1998-1999). Osmanlı‘dan Günümüze Parçalı Kamusal Alan ve Siyaset. 
Doğu-Batı (5), 22-48. 
Makoni, S. & Pennycook, A. (2005). Disinventing and (Re)Constituting Languages. 
Critical Inquiry in Language Studies: An International Journal, 2 (3), 137–156. 
Mamadouh, V. (1999). Beyond Nationalism: Three Visions of the European Union and 
their Implications for the Linguistic Regime of its Institutions. GeoJournal (48), 
133–144. 
Mardin, ġ. (1995). Culture in Geopolitics. The Caspian Crossroads Magazine, 1 (2). 
Mardin, ġ. (1998). Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu (2nd ed.). Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim 
Yayınları. 
Mardin, ġ. (2001). Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri: 1895-1908. Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim 
Yayınları. 
Mardin, ġ. (2002). Playing Games with Names. In D. Kandiyoti & A. Saktanber (eds), 
Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey, (pp. 115-127). New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 
Mar-Molinero, C. & Stevenson, P. (eds.). (2006a). Language Ideologies, Policies and 
Practices. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Mar-Molinero, C. & Stevenson, P. (2006b). Language Policy in a Changing Europe - 
Introduction. Language Policy (5), 239–245. 
Marshall, D. F. (1996). A Politics of Language: Language as a Symbol in the 
Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Aftermath. International Journal of 
Sociology of Language (118), 7-41. 
Masenko, L. (ed.). (2005). Ukraïnska Mova u XX Storichchi: Istoriia Lingvotsydu. 
[Ukrainian language in the 20th century: History of Linguicide]. Kyiv, Ukraine: 
Prosvita. 
Maurais, J. & Morris, M. A. (eds.). (2004). Languages in a Globalising World. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
McAuley, J. W. (2003). An Introduction to Politics, State and Society. London: Sage. 
McDowall, D. (1997). A Modern History of the Kurds. London: I. B. Taurus. 
McLuhan, M. (2001). Gutenberg Galaksisi. Ġstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları. 
McQuail, D., Rosario de, M. & Tapper, H. (1992). A Framework for Analysis of Media 
Change in Europe: The 1990s in Dynamics of Media Politics. London, Thousand 
Oaks, New Delhi: Sage. 
Medgyes, P. & Miklósy, K. (2000). The Language Situation in Hungary. Current Issues 
in Language Planning, 1 (2), 148-242. 
274 
 
Meeker, M. E. (2001). A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity. 
Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press. 
Meshtrie, R. (2006). Society and Language: Overview. In Encyclopedia of Language 
and Linguistics (2nd ed., Vol. 11, pp. 472-484). New York: Elsevier. 
MHP‘de Kürtçe Sıkıntısı. (1999, December 15). Evrensel. 
Milani, T. M. (2008). Language Testing and Citizenship: A Language Ideological 
Debate in Sweden. Language in Society (37), 27-59. 
Miller, J. R. (2004). Encyclopedia of Russian History. New York: Thomson Gale. 
Milroy, J. & Milroy, L. (1999). Authority in Language: Investigating Standard English. 
London: Routledge. 
Mitingle Açıldı, Sessiz Kapandı. (2005, July 19). Hürriyet. 
Mohamed, B. (2001). Language and Modernity in Algeria. In E. Ben-Rafael & Y. 
Sternberg (eds), Identity, Culture and Globalization (pp. 235-242). Leiden, 
Boston, Köln: Brill. 
Montgomery, D. W. (2006). Uzbekistan: Language Situation. New York: Elsevier. 
Moschonas, S. A. (2004). Relativism in Language Ideology: On Greece‘s Latest 
Language Issues. Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 22, 173-206. 
Mouffe, C. (1993, November 27 ). The Return of the Political. New Times. 
Mühlhäusler, P. (1996). Linguistic Ecology: Language Change and Linguistic 
Imperialism in the Pacific Region. London: Routledge. 
Mühlhäusler, P. (2000). Language Planning and Language Ecology. Current Issues in 
Language Planning, 1 (3), 306–367. 
Mutlu, S. (1995). The Population of Turkey by Ethnic Groups and Provinces. New 
Perspectives on Turkey (12). 
Neis, C. (2006). On the Origins of the Language. In The Encyclopedia of Language and 
Linguistics (2nd ed., Vol. 9, pp. 98-103). New York: Elsevier. 
Neustupny, J. V. (2006). Sociolinguistic Aspects of Social Modernization. In U. 
Ammon, N. Dittmar, K. J. Mattheier & P. Trudgill (eds.), Sociolinguistics (pp. 
2209-2223). Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter. 
O‘Reilly, C. (ed.). (2001). Language, Ethnicity and the State. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Okutan, M. Ç. (2004). Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları. Ġstanbul: Ġstanbul Bilgi 
Üniversitesi Yayınları. 
Oran, B. (2004). Türkiye'de Azınlıklar. Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
Orhon, O. S. (1940, August 1). VatandaĢ, Türkçe KonuĢma! Akbaba, p. 1940. 
Ortaylı, Ġ. (2001). İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı (10th ed.). Ġstabul: ĠletiĢim 
Yayınları. 
Oxford English Dictionary. (2002). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
275 
 
Ozolins, U. (1996). Language Policy and Language Reality. International Journal of 
Sociology of Language (118), 181-200. 
Ozolins, U. (2003). The Impact of European Accession upon Language Policy in the 
Baltic States. Language Policy (2), 217–238. 
Öğrenciler Anadilde Israrlı. (2002, November 28). Evrensel. 
Öncü, A. (2000). The Banal and the Subversive: Politics of Language on Turkish 
Television. European Journal of Cultural Studies, 3 (3), 296-317. 
Önder, M. (1998). Atatürk‟ün Yurt Gezileri. Ankara: Türkiye ĠĢ Bankası Kültür 
Yayınları. 
Özkan, G. (2001). Anayasa DeğiĢikliği ve Resmi Dil TartıĢmaları Üzerine Bir 
Değerlendirme. Kamu Hukuku Arşivi (2001 Eylül), 42-54. 
Özkırımlı, A. (2002). Türk Dili: Dil ve Anlatım (2nd ed.). Ġstanbul: Ġstanbul Bilgi 
Üniversitesi Yayınları. 
Özkırımlı, U. (2000). Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction. Basingstone: 
Macmillan. 
Özsoy, E. A. & Koç, Ġ. T. (1992). Türkiye'nin Etnik Yapısı. Nüfus Blim Dergisi, 101-
114. 
Öztürkatalay, L. (1995). Mardin ve Mardinliler. Ġstanbul: n.p. 
Paffey, D. (2007). Policing the Spanish Language Debate: Verbal Hygiene and the 
Spanish Language Academy. Language Policy (6), 313–332. 
Paksoy, H. B. (2002). Literature: Central Asia. In D. Levinson & K. Christensen (eds.), 
Encyclopedia of Modern Asia (Vol. 3, pp. 478-482). New York: Thomson and 
Gale. 
Papapavlou, A. N. (2001). Linguistic Imperialism? The Status of English in Cyprus. 
Language Problems & Language Planning, 25 (2), 167–176. 
Parla, T. (1995). Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek-Parti 
İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Ok'u (Vol. 3). Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
Patten, A. (2001). Political Theory and Language Policy. Political Theory, 29 (5), 691-
715. 
Patten, A. (2006). The Humanist Roots of Linguistic Nationalism. History of Political 
Thought. Vol. XXVII. No. 2. Summer 2006, 27 (2), 223-262. 
Pavlenko, A. (2006). Russian as a Lingua Franca. Annual Review of Applied Linguistics 
(26), 78–99. 
Pekin, M. (2005). Yeniden Kurulan Yaşamlar: 1923 Türk Yunan Zorunlu Nüfus 
Mübadelesi. Ġstanbul: Ġstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi. 
Pekin, M. & Turan, Ç. (2002). Mübadele Bibliyografyası: Lozan Nüfus Mübadelesi İle 
İlgili Yayınlar. Ġstanbul: Lozan Mübadilleri Vakfı. 
Pennycook, A. (1994). The Cultural Politics of English as an International Language. 
London: Longman. 
276 
 
Pennycook, A. (2002). Language Policy and Docile Bodies: Hong Kong and 
Governmentality. In J. W. Tollefson (ed.), Language Policies in Education: 
Critical Issues (pp. 91-110). Mahwah: Lawrance Erlbaum Associates. 
Pennycook, A. (2004). Language Policy and the Ecological Turn. Language Policy (3), 
213–239. 
Pennycook, A. (2006). Postmodernism in Language Policy. In T. Ricento (ed.), An 
Introduction to Language Policy: Theory and Method (pp. 60-76). Malden, MA: 
Blackwell. 
Perry, T. (2003). Language Rights, Ethnic Politics: A Critique of the Pan South Africa 
Language Board. Cape Town: PRAESA Press. Retrieved February 7, 2008 from 
http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/praesa/Occasional%20Paper%2012%20text%20layout.
pdf. 
Pharand, D. (1968). Review of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism 
and Biculturalism (Book I: The Official Languages). The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 16 (1/2), 267-270. 
Phillipson, R. (1992). Linguistic Imperialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Phillipson, R. (2003). English-Only Europe? Challenging Language Policy. London: 
Routledge. 
Phillipson, R. & Skutnabb-Kangas, T. (eds.). (1994). Linguistic Human Rights: 
Overcoming Linguistic Discrimination. Berlin and New York: Mouton de 
Gruyter. 
Pool, J. (1991). Official Language Problem. American Political Science Review, 85 (2), 
495-514. 
Pool, J. (1996). Optimal Language Regimes for the European Union. International 
Journal of Sociology of Language, 121, 159-179. 
Püsküllüoğlu, A., Özen, H. & Özel, S. (1986). Atatürk'ün Türk Dil Kurumu ve Sonrası. 
Ġstanbul: Bilgi. 
Rektörler 'Kürtçe'ye Kızgın. (2001, November 11). Radikal. 
Rıza, E. & Sakızlı, N. (2005, Eylül). Bir ‗KuruluĢ‘ Abidesi. …vs (1), pp. 128-131. 
Robertson, R. (1990). Mapping the Global Condition: Globalization as the Central 
Concept. In M. Featherstone (ed.), Global Culture: Nationalsim, Globalization 
and Modernity (pp. 15-30). London: Sage. 
Robinson, W. I. (2007). Theories of Globalization. In G. Ritzer (ed.), The Blackwell 
Companion to Globalization (pp. 125-143). Oxford: Blackwell. 
Rodriguez, C. M. (2006). Language and Participation. Califomia Law Review, 94 (687), 
687-767. 
Roller, E. (2002). When Does Language Become Exclusivist? Linguistic Politics in 
Catalonia. National Identities, 4 (3), 273-289. 
Romano, D. (2006). The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, 
and Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
277 
 
Rowat, D. C. (1968). The Problems of Governing Federal Capitals. Canadian Journal 
of Political Science / Revue Canadienne de Science Politique, 1 (3), 345-356. 
RTÜK. (2000). Radyo ve Televizyonda Türkçenin Kullanımı. Retrieved March 14, 2006, 
from RTÜK: 
http://www.rtuk.gov.tr/sayfalar/IcerikGoster.aspx?icerik_id=22eda3f2-8b0d-
4030-952b-6bbf89ac3a6f 
RTÜK‟ten Farklı Dilde Yayına İzin. (2006, March 26). Retrieved July 29, 2008, from 
NTVMSNBC: http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/364200.asp 
Ruzza, C. (2006). Frame Analysis. In Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics (2nd 
ed., Vol. 4, pp. 607-610). New York: Elsevier. 
Sadoğlu, H. (2003). Türkiye'de Ulusçuluk ve Dil Politikaları. Ġstanbul: Ġstanbul Bilgi 
Üniversitesi. 
Safa, P. (1970). Osmanlıca, Türkçe, Uydurmaca. (E. Göze, ed.) Ġstanbul: Ötüken 
Yayınevi. 
Safran, W. (2004). Introduction: The Political Aspects of Language. Nationalism and 
Ethnic Politics (10), 1–14. 
Salman, E. (1999). Dil Kirlenmesi ve Medya. Radyo ve Televizyon Yayınlarında Türk 
Dilinin Kullanımı (pp. 311-315). Ankara: TRT. 
Sami, ġ. (1898, August 8). Lisan ve Edebiyatımız. Sabah. 
Sanders, C. (2004). Introduction: Saussure today. In C. Sanders (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Saussure (pp. 1-8). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Scalbert-Yücel, C. & Ray, M. L. (2006). Knowledge, ideology and power: 
Deconstructing Kurdish Studies. European Journal of Turkish Studies. 
Scannell, P. (1990). Public Service Broadcasting: The History of a Concept. In A. 
Goodwin & G. Whannel (eds), Understanding Television. London: Routledge. 
Schieffelin, B., Woolard, K. A. & Kroskrity, P. V. (eds.). (1998). Language Ideologies: 
Theory and Practice. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Schiffman, H. (1998). Linguistic Culture and Language Policy. Florence, KY: 
Routledge. 
Schiffman, H. (2006). Language Policy and Linguistic Culture. In T. Ricento (ed.), An 
Introduction to Language Policy: Theory and Method (pp. 111-126). Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Schiffman, H. (2008). Language, Language Policy and Citizenship: Three Views. In J. 
V. Ciprut (ed.), The Future of Citizenship. MIT Press. 
Schmid, C., Zepa, B. & Snipe, A. (2004). Language Policy and Ethnic Tensions in 
Quebec and Latvia. International Journal of Comparative Sociology 2004, 45 (3-
4), 231–252. 
Selcan, Z. (1994). Zaza Ulusal Sorunu. Ankara: Zaza Kültürü Yayınları. 
278 
 
Sezgin, F. (2004). Türkçede Batı Kaynaklı Kelimelerin Yoğunluğu. Ankara: Türk Dil 
Kurumu. 
Shaw, E. (2007). Frame Analysis. In M. Bevir (ed.), Encyclopedia of Governance (Vol. 
1, pp. 321-322). London: Sage. 
Shaw, J. S. & Shaw, E. K. (1976). History of The Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Shohamy, E. (2006). Language Policy: Hidden Agendas and new Approaches. London: 
Routledge. 
Shohamy, E. & Gorter, D. (eds.). (2009). Linguistic Landscape: Expanding the Scenery. 
New York: Routledge. 
Siedlhofer, B. (2001). Closing a Conceptual Gap: The Case for a Description of English 
as a Lingua Franca. International Journal of Applied Linguistics, 11 (2), 133-158. 
Silverstein, M. (1979). Language Structure and Linguistic Ideology. In P. R. Cline, W. 
Hanks & C. Hofbauer (eds), The Elements: A Parasession on Linguistic Units and 
Levels (pp. 193-247). Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society. 
Simmons, J. (1995). Foucault and the Political. London: Routledge. 
Sinanoğlu, O. (2000). „Bye-Bye‟ Türkçe. Ġstanbul: Otopsi Yayınları. 
Skjærvø, P. O. (2006). Kurdish. In Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics (2nd ed., 
pp. 265-266). New York: Elsevier. 
Skutnabb-Kangas, T. (2000). Linguistic Genocide in Education or Worldwide Diversity 
and Human Rights? Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Smetoniene, I. (2003). Language Policy in Lithuania. Res Balticae (9), 147-162. 
Smiley, D. (1978). The Canadian Federation and the Challenge of Quebec 
Independence. Publius, 8 (1), 199-224. 
Smith, A. D. (1996). Warwick Debate. Retrieved February 3, 2008, from 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/gellner/Warwick.html 
Smith, A. D. (1997). Structure and Persistence of Ethnie. In M. Guibernau & J. Rex, 
The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multi-culturalism and Migration. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Smith, A. D. (1998). Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories 
of Nations and Nationalism. London: Routledge. 
Spitulnik, D. (1998). Mediating Unity: The Production of Language Ideologies in 
Zambian Broadcasting. In B. B. Schieffelin, K. A. Woolard & P. V. Kroskrity 
(eds), Language Ideologies: Practice and Theory (pp. 163-188). New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Spolsky, B. & Hult, F. M. (eds.). (2008). The Handbook of Educational Linguistics. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Steger, M. B. (2000). Editor‘s Introduction. Strategies, 13 (2), 133-139. 
279 
 
Stephenson, G. V. (1972). Cultural Regionalism and the Unitary State Idea in Belgium. 
Geographical Review, 62 (4), 501-523. 
Stevenson, P. & Mar-Molinero, C. (2006). Language, the National and the 
Transnational in Contemporary Europe. In C. Mar-Molinero & P. Stevenson 
(eds.), Language Ideologies, Policies and Practices Language and the Future of 
Europe (pp. 1-12). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Suleiman, Y. (2003). The Arabic Language and National Identity. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
ġavkay, T. (2002). Dil Devrimi. Ġstanbul: Gelenek Yayınları. 
ġimĢir, B. N. (1992). Türk yazı devrimi. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu. 
Taneri, A. (1983). Türkistanlı Bir Türk Boyu Kürtler: Kürtlerin Kökeni - Siyasi, Sosyal 
ve Kültürel Hayatları. Anakara: Türk Kültürünü AraĢtırma Ensititüsü Yayınları. 
Tanör, B. (2000). Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri. Ġstanbul: YKY. 
Taranenko, O. (2007). Ukrainian and Russian in Contact: Attraction and Estrangement. 
International Journal of Sociology of Language (183), 119–140. 
TBMM‟de „Milli Dil Politikası‟ Önerisi. (2008, June 25). Retrieved June 25, 2008, from 
NTVMSNBC: http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/451093.asp 
Televizyon Uydudan Izleniyor. (2007, September 12). Birgün. 
Temelkuran, E. (2004, June 13). 'Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Temsil Kolu' Tereddütle Sunar: 
Yurttan 'Etnik-Metnik' Sesler Korosu. Milliyet. 
Terzioğlu, S. S. (2007). Uluslararası Hukukta Azınlıklar ve Anadilde Eğitim Hakkı. 
Ankara: Alp Yayınevi. 
The Encyclopaedia of Islam (Vol. 6). (1986). Leiden: Brill. 
TimurtaĢ, F. K. (1996). Diller ve Türkçemiz. (M. Özkan, ed.) Ġstanbul: Alfa. 
Tollefson, J. W. (1991). Planning Language, Planning Inequality. London: Longman. 
Tollefson, J. W. (2006). Critical Theory in Language Policy. In T. Ricento (ed.), An 
Introduction to Language Policy: Theory and Method (pp. 42-59). Malden, MA: 
Blackwell. 
Trenz, H.-J. (2007). Reconciling diversity and unity: Language minorities and European 
Integration. Ethnicities, 7 (2), 157–185. 
TRT, Kürtçe 'Terörle Mücadele' Yayını Yapabilecek. (2008, May 29). Retrieved July 29, 
2008, from Bianet: http://www.bianet.org/bianet/kategori/bianet/107293/trt-
kurtce-terorle-mucadele-yayini-yapabilecek 
TSK'ya Kürtçe Yayınla Destek. (2008, January 18). Retrieved February 14, 2008, from 
Milliyet: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2008/01/18/guncel/gun07.html 
Türk Dehasının Ürünü MuhteĢem Bir Teori! (1989, June). Birikim (2), pp. 56-61. 
Türkçe‘ye ‗Yasal‘ Koruma. (1997, January 2). Sabah. 
280 
 
Türkçedeki Yozlaşma Tartışıldı. (2004, September 23). Retrieved December 16, 2005, 
from NTVMSNBC: http://www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr/news/288622.asp 
Tunçay, M. (1983). Azınlıklar Nüfusu. In Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi 
(Vol. 6, pp. 1563-1564). Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
Tunçay, M. (1999). Türkiye Cumhuriyet'inde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması. 
Ġstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları. 
Turan, ġ. & Özel, S. (2007). 75. Yılda Türkçenin ve Dil Devriminin Öyküsü. Ankara: 
Dil Derneği. 
Ünver, Ġ. (2000). Osmanlı Türkçesi. In Osmanlı Ansiklopedisi (Vol. 9). Ankara: Yeni 
Türkiye Yayınları. 
Üstel, F. (1997). İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları 
(1912-1931). Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim Yayınları. 
Urrutia, I. & Lasagabaster, I. (2007). Language Rights as a General Principle of 
Community Law. German Law Journal, 8 (5), 479-500. 
van Bruinessen, M. (1995a). Kürt Toplumu ve Modern Devlet: UluslaĢtırmaya KarĢı 
Etnik UluĢçuluk. In M. van Bruinessen, Kürdistan Üzerine Yazılar (pp. 173-204). 
Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
van Bruinessen, M. (1995b). Türkiye Kürtleri. In M. van Bruinessen, Kürdistan Üzerine 
Yazılar (pp. 337-356). Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
van Bruinessen, M. (2003). Ağa, Şeyh, Devlet. Istanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
Van den Bulck, H. & Van Poecke, L. (1996). National Language, Identity Formation, 
and Broadcasting: The Flemish and German-Swiss Communities. In S. Braman 
(ed.), Globalization, Communication and Transnational Civil Society (pp. 157-
177). Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press. 
Van Someren, E. (2004). The EU Language Regime: Lingual and Translational 
Problems. Doctoraalscriptie Engelse Taal en Cultuur, Utrecht University: 
Retrieved February 17, 2008 from 
http://www.ethesis.net/eu_language/eu_language_contence.htm,. 
Vincent, A. (2006). Modern Politik İdeolojiler. Ġstanbul: Paradigma. 
Watts, R. J. (2001). Discourse Theory and Language Planning: A Critical Reading of 
Language Planning Reports in Switzerland. In N. Coupland, C. N. Candlin & S. 
Sarangi (eds), Sociolinguistics and Social Theory (pp. 297-320). London: Addison 
Wesley Longman. 
Weber, M. (1968). Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Webster, D. E. (1939). The Turkey of Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish 
Reformation. Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science. 
Wertheim, S. (2003). Language Ideologies and the "Purification" of Post-Soviet Tatar. 
Ab Imperio (1), 347-369. 
Williams, G. (1992). Sociolinguistics: A Sociological Critique. London: Routledge. 
281 
 
Wise, M. (2006). Defending National Linguistic Territories in the European Single 
Market: Towards More Transnational Geolinguistic Analysis. Area, 38 (2), 204–
212. 
Wise, M. (2007). Putting Principles of Linguistic Rights into Practice: Geographical 
Perspectives on a Contemporary European Problem. Geoforum (38), 171–189. 
Woolard, K. A. (1992). Language Ideology: Issues and Approaches. Pragmatics, 2 (3), 
235-249. 
Woolard, K. A. (1998). Introduction: Language Ideology as a Field of Inquiry. In B. 
Schieffelin, K. A. Woolard & P. V. Kroskrity, Language Ideologies: Practice and 
Theory (pp. 3-47). New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Woolard, K. A. & Schieffelin, B. B. (1994). Language Ideology. Annual Review of 
Anthropology, 23, 55-82.  
Woolhiser, C. (2001). Language Ideology and Language Conflict in Post-Soviet 
Belarus. In C. C. O‘Reilly (ed.), Language, Ethnicity and the State Volume 2: 
Minority Languages in Eastern Europe post-1989 (pp. 91-122). Hampshire and 
New York: Palgrave. 
Wright, S. (2004). Language Policy and Language Planning. Hampshire and New 
York: Palgrave. 
Wright, S. (2007). Language Policy and Language Planning. In C. Llamas, L. Mullany 
& P. Stockwell (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Sociolinguistics (pp. 164-
172). London and New York: Routledge. 
Yargı 'Çok Dilli Belediye'yi Fesh Etti. (2007, June 15). Radikal. 
Yargıtay'a Göre 'Anadil'ler Böler! (2005, May 26). Radikal. 
Yargıtay'ın Eğitim Sen Gerekçeli Kararı. (2005, July 29). Retrieved July 25, 2008, from 
Bianet: http://eski.bianet.org/2005/07/29/64588.htm 
Yeğen, M. (1999). Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu. Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
Yerasimos, S. (ed.) (2001). Türkiye'de Sivil Toplum ve Milliyetçilik. Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim 
Yayınları. 
Yerelde Kürtçe Yayın ÇeĢitleniyor. (2007, June 12). Evrensel. 
Yıldırım, O. (2006). Diplomasi ve Göç: Türk Yunan Mübadelesinin Öteki Yüzü. 
Ġstanbul: Ġstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi. 
Yıldız, A. (2001). 'Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene': Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler 
Sınırları (1919-1938). Ġstanbul: ĠletiĢim. 
Yıldız, K. (2005). The Kurds in Turkey: EU Accession and Human Rights. London: 
Pluto. 
Yılmaz, B. (1993). Okuma Alışkanlığında Halk Kütüphanelerinin Rolü. Ankara: Kültür 
Bakanlığı Kütüphaneler Genel Müdürlüğü. 
Yılmaz, M. & Doğaner, Y. (2007). Cumhuriyet Dönemi'nde Sansür. Ankara: Siyasal 
Kitapevi. 
282 
 
Yorulmaz, H. (1995). Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Alfabe Tartışmaları. Ġstanbul: Kitabevi. 
Yücel, T. (1982). Dil devrimi ve sonuçları. Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları. 
Zaman. (2001, October 06). Dilde Kapsama Alanı! Retrieved April 12, 2008, from 
http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2001/10/06/televizyon/televizyon.htm 
Zengin-Aghatabay, C. (2007). Mübadelenin Mazlum Misafirleri: Mübadele ve 
Kamuoyu 1923-1930. Ġstanbul: Bengi. 
Zürcher, E. J. (1989, June). GüneĢ-Dil Teorisi ve Türk Dil Reformundaki Yeri. Birikim 
(2), pp. 52-55. 
Zürcher, E. J. (2001). Fundamentalism as an Exclusionary Device in Kemalist Turkish 
Nationalism. In W. van Schendel & E. J. Zürcher (eds), Identity politics in Central 
Asia and the Muslim world: Nationalism, Ethnicity and Labour in the 20th 
Century (pp. 209-222). London: I. B. Tauris. 
Zürcher, E. J. (2003). Turkey: A Modern History. London and New York: I. B. Tauris. 
 
 
